Ukraine War, 29 December 2023: Start of the Winter Missile Campaign

Hello everybody!

After probing and ‘mapping’ reorganised and bolstered Ukrainian air defences for weeks and months, the last night the Russians appear to have launched their ‘Winter Missile Campaign’ of 2023-24 - with a massive missile barrage. Before I go into more details, and because it seems we’ve got lots of new readers, who were not around the last winter, here some of ‘vocabulary’ that’s going to be used in this kind of reports. This is going to be followed with a short introduction to the military discipline called ‘mapping’, and then with a summary of known facts about last night’s Russian strikes.

***

COMINT = Communications Intelligence (in the sense of ‘means of gathering intelligence’)

ELINT = Electronic Intelligence

EMCON = Emission Control (essentially means: no communication- or any other kind of electronic signals are emitted)

EW = Electronic Warfare

FrankenSAM = nick-name given to specific Soviet/Russian-designed SAM-systems, meanwhile adapted to operate Western missiles (while this is not definitely confirmed, seems, it’s foremost the Buk SAM-system that was mated with US- or Italian-made RIM-7 Sparrow/Aspide/Spada missiles)

HAWK = US-made SAM (also stands for ‘Homing-All-the-Way-Killer’, because of its high success rate during different wars in the 1960-1980s)

IADS = Integrated Air Defence System

IRIS-T = EU-made SAM (also stands for ‘Infra-Red-Imaging-System, Tail/Thrust vector-controlled)

LPGM = Loitering Precision Guided Munition (what I’m using for what others simplify with Iranian-made ‘Shahed drones’, and their Russian-made version, Gerant)

PAC = Patriot Advanced Capability (advanced versions of the MIM-104 Patriot SAM-system; US origin)

PSU = Ukrainian Air Force & Air Defence (includes the mass of heavy SAMs operated by Ukraine, like PAC-2/3, S-300, IRIS-T, MIM-23, Buk, and similar).

SAM = surface to air missile

SIGINT = Signals Intelligence

UAV = unmanned aerial vehicle (‘drone’)

VKS = Russian Air-Space Force

ZSU = Ukrainian Armed Forces (here foremost meant for ‘army/ground forces’)

****

Mapping

I’ve described the mass of the following already back in May, in the series of features titled ‘Assault Mode’ (see: Assault Mode Part 1, Assault Mode Part 2, Assault Mode Part 3, Assault Mode Part 4, Assault Mode Part 5, and Assault Mode Part 6: please pay special attention at Parts 3 and 4, where I’ve explained the ‘basics’ of the function of an IADS and how to find it when it’s operated ‘Ukraine style’). Today, I’ll go a step further and add some more about something called ‘mapping’.

The last ‘major wave’ of the Russian missile offensive on Ukraine was back in Septembe, when the VKS was attacking almost every night. Over the last three months, the Russians have primarily operated Iranian-made Shahed LPGMs - or their own ‘licence’ variants of the same: Gerant - to ‘map’ the significantly re-organised and reinforced (in comparison to the Winter 2022-23) integrated air defence system (IADS) of the PSU.

The IADS in question is consisting of numerous, ground-based, early warning radars, (ground-based) COMINT, ELINT, and SIGINT-stations, and over 30 major SAM-units responsible for the defence of Ukraine in depth (apparently, not for protection of major ZSU units along the frontline: the ZSU has its own IADS; that said, the PSU’s and ZSU’s IADS’ are certainly integrated, so that one knows what is the other doing).

Now, what is ‘mapping’ and how does that work?

Ukraine is a huge country. While PSU’s radars are covering all of its airspace, there are not enough SAM-systems to do the same. That would take thousands of SAM-systems, which nobody has. Therefore, the PSU is deploying the SAM-systems it has got to protect most important civilian- and military facilities, and major urban centres. See: power plants, power grid, air bases, army bases, selected factories, Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhya and similar places.

Ukrainian IADS is mostly operating in the so-called EMCON mode. One could compare this with guerrilla tactics: the mass of Ukrainian early warning radars and SAM-sites are rarely powering up their radars, but frequently changing their position. In this fashion, they are ‘hiding’ from the Russians.

The Russians try to find them by the means of communications-, electronic- and signals-intelligence (COMINT, ELINT, and SIGINT), and by the means of human intelligence (HUMINT, also ‘espionage’). COMINT, ELINT and SIGINT are nowadays playing the crucial role. This is so because, and for example, any radar that emits can be detected over something like two times its maximum detection range. For example: a radar capable of detecting targets over a range of 100 kilometres, is detectable by the means of ELINT/SIGINT over up to 200 kilometres.

They work so that the Russians deploy their COMINT/ELINT/SIGINT systems around Ukraine, then send their LPGMs into the Ukrainian airspace and monitor and record all the activity of PSU’s air defence systems in reaction. Through triangulation and processing of recorded signals, they can precisely locate the position of all the radar systems and SAM-systems Ukrainians have powered up in reaction. For example, like on 25 September this year, resulting in the following map prepared by Texty.org.ua:

Why are the Russians going to such extensions to route their LPGMS this deep into Ukraine before ‘returning’ them?

This is so because medium- and long-range SAMs are depending on radars for guidance of their missiles. Means: if Ukrainians want to engage incoming LPGMs and missiles with their IADS, they have to power up their radars. When they do so, then lots (sometimes: all) of Russian LPMGs and missiles get shot down.

Obviously, the Russians are keen to get their LPGMs and missiles through. Because the mass of these is easy to detect by radar, they are thus routing them ‘around’ the areas protected by Ukrainian SAMs: they’re trying to take Ukrainians by surprise by striking them ‘from the flank’, even ‘in the back’.

Another reason is that through finding out what air defence systems of the PSU are deployed where, the Russians can better select not only routes, but also weapons they’re deploying to strike targets within the areas of their interest. For example: meanwhile, even the Keystone Cops in Moscow know, targeting most of Kyiv is pointless. It’s much too well-protected. But, other parts of Ukraine are nowhere as well-defended. Moreover, they want to know if it’s better to target specific target with LPGMs or (much faster) cruise missiles, or even by their ballistic missiles.

So, the last three months (if not longer), the Russians were sending their LPGMs over Ukraine and then recording PSU’s reactions, and to find out what types of SAM-systems are protecting what major area of their interest in Ukraine. To ‘map’ the IADS of the PSU. By now, they obviously think they’ve collected enough information to strike. And that’s what they did the last night.

Overwhelming/Overpowering Air Defences

After mapping the Ukrainian IADS through programming their LPGMs to fly in between and then in the rear of well-protected areas inside Ukraine, the Russians tend to strike selected targets by lots of missiles released ‘at once’, or within short period of time.

Why that?

For several reasons:

• depending on the type, a single SAM-system can only target a limited number of targets at once. For example, a typical MIM-23 HAWK battery (6 launchers) can simultaneously target only two incoming missiles. One Buk-M1 battery (4 launchers) can simultaneously target only four incoming missiles…

• SAM-systems have a limited number of missiles ready for action. A typical MIM-23 HAWK battery has a total of 18 missiles; a typical Buk-M1 a total of 16 missiles. Force them to fire all of these - and they’re entirely useless for at least 10-15 minutes, probably much longer: the area they protect is unprotected until they are re-loaded (of course, the same is valid for more powerful, and/or longe-ranged systems, whether S-300, or PAC-2/3, or IRIS-T).

That’s why then such screen-shots have reached the social media, like this one, taken on 23 September, and showing a ‘mass strike’ on the Odessa area:

We can be sure that something similar has happened the last night, and is going to happen more often in the future.

Known Air- and Missile Strikes of 29 December

Yesterday and then the last night, the Russians launched a big strike with ballistic- and cruise missiles on Ukraine. As far as is known by now, this began with a series of air- and rocket strikes on the Sumi Oblast and the town of Kupyansk, severe shelling of Nikopol, a vivid activity of Russian UAVs in the Odesa area.

As far as I can say, this round began with a stream of 8 Shahed LPGMs released during the night from 27 to 28 December, from the Primorsko-Akhtarsk district. Official Kyiv claimed 7 of these as shot down - by fighter jets and ground-based air defences. One of downed LPGMs hit a tall building in Odesa, causing a fire. During the day yesterday, there was vivid activity of Russian UAVs in the Odesa area: 3 were claimed as shot down by Ukrainians in the morning,

Then, as of 22.39hrs Ukrainian time this morning, 9 Russian Tu-95MS strategic bombers were reported as taking off from Olenya Air Base, on the Kola peninsula. NATO is constantly monitoring every movement of the Russian strategic forces - for example: by satellites - and Olenya is relatively close to northern Norway, Sweeden and Finland. Tu-95s are big and easy to track by radar even from very long ranges. Thus, we can be sure, there are lots of ‘eyes’ pointed at Olenya, and at least as many that were tracking the movement of Tu-95s.

Around 22.50, the PSU issued a warning that LPGMs have been launched at Ukraine from multiple directions. For example: some have entered the airspace over the Sumy oblast and were moving on Chernihiv; others from southern Kherson towards Mykolaiv. Finally, launchings of cruise missiles were reported from warships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Black Sea.

Around 23.20, air raid alert was sounded de-facto in all of Ukraine, all the way West to Lviv.

Around 23.50, explosions were reported from Lviv, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy. As far as is known:

Lviv: was attacked by 10 LPGMs and hit by 2.

Kharkiv: was hit by up to 20 missiles (a combination of S-300 SAMs fired in ballistic mode, and several Kh-22 hypersonic cruise missiles released by Tu-22M-3 bombers).

Around 06.48, the PSU reported cruise missiles underway over Sumy Oblast in direction of Poltava, and through Zaporizhzhya Oblast in direction of Dnipro and Pavlovhrad. Another wave of cruise missiles was reported from Sumy Oblast around 07.03hrs, while eight minutes later a single missile was reportedly approaching Kryvyi Rih. By 07.21-07.25, additional missiles were reported as underway to Dnipro, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Kropyvnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Lutsk, Lviv, and Kyiv, plus a launch of ballistic missiles from the south in direction of Zaporizhzhya.

By 07.40, explosions rang through Lviv, Kyiv and Konotop. A metro station in Kyiv is known to have been damaged, as were a shopping centre and a maternity hospital in Dnipro. But, the heaviest hit remained Kharkiv, where at least one person was killed as missiles hit objects in Kyivskyi and Kholodnohirskyi districts, causing problems with power supply.

That much for right now. Mind: related information is still coming in, so might update this one during the day.

***

UPDATE No.1: how massive was this strike is obvious from figures released by Kyiv by noon.

• 27 Shahed

• 87 Kh-101s and Kh-55/555s.

….then add S-300s and Kh-22s to this total… and that’s just the beginning of this campaign.

Indeed, Kyiv is meanwhile talking about some 157 missiles and LPGMs, while those that have experienced the last night are talking about ‘worst night since long’.

***

UPDATE No. 2: according to the PSU, the total breakdown of the Russian weapons released the last night was as follows:

• 90 Kh-101 & Kh-555: 87 shot down

• 8 Kh-22/32: 0 shot down

• 5 Kh-31 & Kh-59: 0 shot down

• 14 S-300s: 0 shot down

• 5 Kinzhal: 0 shot down

• 36 LPGMs: 27 shot down

Gauging by latest reports about numbers and types of missiles, and what places have been hit, the worst were Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhya. I.e. the Russians are exploiting the fact that these two big cities (Kharkiv used to be the second biggest in Ukraine) are poorly protected - especially in comparison to Kyiv and Odesa - and the West spent the whole year doing nothing to bolster the defences of such big urban areas closer to the frontline…

….probably because Biden and his National Security Advisor have more important things to do…