Ukraine War, 2 March 2024: 1+1=2... or 8?

Hello everybody!

Yes, me again. Few additional interesting things came to my mind this morning (always surprising what the morning portion of caffeine and nicotine can cause)…. and, well: ‘even’ I’m wondering how comes anybody is still reading the ‘flood’ of my posts of the last few days (thanks for your attention whoever does!). But, since you do: OK, lets sit down and put this on the paper, too…

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AIR WAR

I’ll start with the air war… ‘again’… because this is not only something like my ‘specialty’, but because lately (and contrary to most of the times over the last two years) the air war is strongly influencing events on the ground.

Yesterday, a Ukrainian analyst wrote that the VKS is meanwhile deploying more ‘KABs’ (i.e. MPK/UMPK glide bombs) than ever before. According to him, on 29 February, the VKS deployed 152 glide bombs (compared to 151 on 16-17 February). The mass of these in the Avdiivka area: on a single day, he says, the village of Tonenke alone was hit by 30, Orlivka by 10.

Now, the same analyst assesses that the Russians are pushing crews and aircraft to attack regardless of losses, because KABs are the only means they can breaching Ukrainian frontlines. In this regards, I’m partially in agreement. Provided they are precise enough, and there are enough of them around, KAB/MPK/UMPKs weighting 250-500kg are the means to deliver massive blows upon the Ukrainian ground forces.

However, me thinks that’s not the only factor important here. AFAIK, the reason for this rapid increase in deployment of MPK/UMPKs are ‘also’:  

a)       a massive increase in the number of available MPK/UMPK kits, enabling conversion of not only a growing number of FAB-250M-62 and FAB-500M-62 bombs, but also CBUs (cluster bomb units) like RBK-500 and OFAB-500, as photos below are showing. I.e. mass production of MPK/UMPK-kits.

ODAB-500 with UMPK-kit….

…and RBK-500 with UMPK-kit. Both are shown as installed on underwing hardpoints of Su-34s.

Moreover,

b)      meanwhile, MPK/UMPKs are deployed not only by Su-34s, but by older Su-24s, too. I.e. nowadays there are lots of additional ‘platforms’ (aircraft) that can deploy MPK/UMPK glide bombs than this was the case 2-3 months ago (AFAIK, the VKS should still have some 80 operational Su-34s, and at least a similar number of Su-24s).

BTW,

c) So far, there is no evidence for deployment of MPK/UMPKs from Su-25s or Su-35s (the Su-35s are deploying different other guided weapons, though), and,

d) the principal strike formation used by the VKS these days is a ‘trio’: a pair of Su-24s or Su-34s, escorted by a single Su-35. Each of Su-24s and Su-34s is armed by 4 MPK/UMPKs (i.e. ‘KABs’); the Su-35 is armed with 1-2 Kh-31 anti-radar missiles, 1-2 R-37M long-range air-to-air missiles, 2 RVV-AE/R-77-1 medium-range air-to-air missiles, and 2 R-73M short-range air-to-air missiles (like on the photo below). Means: a single formation of this kind is deploying some 8 MPK/UMPKs, and has also the option to target two Ukrainian radars, and protect itself against any Ukrainian interceptors - all of that at the same time. Quite some ‘punch’ in total….

Now few additional thoughts on the Ukrainian air defences, and ‘secrets of their (claimed) success’…

As mentioned earlier, over the last two weeks, the Russians have claimed the destruction of ‘two Patriot systems’. However, the video evidence for this they have provided is showing ‘only’ the destruction of two Ukrainian P-18 radars (one on 24 February, the other on 26 February, one NASAMS-launcher and - and that’s important - also two Ukrainian 30N6E radars (designated ‘Flap Lid’ in the West): one on 24 February, the other on 29 February.

(‘Disclaimer’: these are only kills recorded by cameras of Russian UAVs, and then released by the Russians. We do not know if any additional Ukrainian radars have been knocked out by Kh-31 anti-radar missiles, for example.)

Point is this: at this point in time, I think I’ll have to remind everybody about the delivery of such ‘stuff’ (i.e. software) like the Integrated Air and Missile Defence Battle Command System to Ukraine (AIAMD, alias IBCS BN Gateway), as reported back in March 2023. The essence of that system is provision of capability to integrate all types of SAM-systems in operation, regardless of their origin, into one, centralised, ‘integrated’ air defence system.

Be sure: there is other, similar integration software. Some of it is enabling integration of two different SAM-systems. Or missiles from one system to another. For example: software enabling S-300 SAM-systems to control the work of V-880 missiles of the S-200/SA-5 system. Specifically: 30N6E radar guide V-880 missiles.

Two days ago, I’ve mentioned the option of adding a second ECS to one of Ukrainian-operated MIM-104 PAC-2 or PAC-3 SAM-sites. Now, how about…. instead of waiting for the USA, or Germany, or whoever to come to its senses and deliver an extra ECS - how about integrating 30N6E/Flap Lid radar with MIM-104/PAC missiles?

Think that a ‘confirmation’ of sort was delivered by nobody less than the Russians: not only through their destruciton of two 30N6Es, but also on 14 January, when their first A-50 was shot down. Back then, there were reports about one of Su-30-crews underway near the A-50 around the same time, reporting that his RHAW-gear warned him about emissions from an S-300 SAM-system. Probably from the 30N6E radar.

Why would Ukrainians do this?

Several reasons.

• a) they were short on missiles for S-300s already as of March-April the last year (despite re-supply from NATO’s stocks);

• b) to create additional Patriot, NASAMS, IRIS-T and other firing units, without the need to receive additional of their ECS and other fire-control systems;

• c) and that without the need to re-qualify additional of their crews to Western systems, while

• d) such a deployment would also enable them to to cover larger sectors of the frontline.

See: it’s perfectly possible that units like the 138th Air Defence Brigade, have received ‘one’ Patriot SAM-system (one ‘divizion’) including one ECS and eight launchers, but then developed a way to ‘break down’ this one divizion/battalion into anything between two and eight different firing units. See: 1x ECS + LS, and then 7x 30N6E + 7 other LS’. That would also (and drastically) reduce the necessity to move single units over longer stretches of the frontline.

(…and then, there’s also some other Ukrainian Air Defence Brigade, operating 1, 2 or more of 36N6Es, coupled with 1,2, 4 or more of 5P72 launchers for V-880s missiles of the S-200/SA-5 system…)

Yes: that’s the ‘problem’ with modern-day SAMs. From the point of view of the Russian Su-24- and Su-34-crews, the digitalisation and integration of hard- and software operated by Ukrainian SAM-units is converting them into ‘lottery’ – and, as they say: ‘in lottery, everything is possible’.

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In that sense, seems, one of two Su-34s claimed by the PSU on 29 February, was confirmed by this video.

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BATTLE OF DONBASS

The issues like ‘are all the Ukrainian claims for destroyed Russian fighter-bombers right, or are the Russian claims for destroyed Ukrainian Patriots right’, or ‘how many UMPK has the VKS deployed yesterday, how many today’ - are as important because of the following.

Back on 26-27 February, the situation was ‘clear’: in the area west of Avdiivka and almost down to Vuhledar in the south, the Russians were on advance. Indeed, it appeared as if Ukrainians would rapidly fall back all the way to their new defence line (which, at least gauging by all the complaining and quarreling in the Ukrainian social media, was still incomplete).

In the north of this sector, the Russian assault groups were already entering Berdychi; further south, they were on the best way of entering Orlivka (have discussed the position of that village to some extent, back on 28th); then further south, they were inside Tonenke….and then, another 20km south, in Krasnohorivka, and in Pobieda, and in Novomykhailivka… and their latest tactics was nicely described here.

Then, the flow of reports about additional Russian assaults stopped, only to - since the night from 29 February to 1 March - be replaced by ever more reports about Ukrainian counterattacks, and news like that the Russians have been driven out of all these villages. For example:

• in Berdychi, the Russians used Stepove as a springboard for assaults on Berdychi, but several of their assault groups were hacked to pieces. One of these by this M2 Bradley of the 47th Mech that cuddled at least a dozen of orcs. In between of Stepove and Berdychi, the Russians left behind a trail of destroyed BTR-80/82s and similar stuff; inside Stepove, they’ve left dozens of cuddled orcs, but they also kept coming in the last two days and, between others, managed to kill the gunner of that Bradley mentioned above (indeed, think to have seen evidence for a destroyed M2, somewhere in the social media);

• Orlivka was heavily bombed by the Russian glide bombs, but, the 25th Airborne knocked out a lots of Russian IFVs, plus at least one T-80, and then, early yesterday, the 3rd Assault reported to have driven the Russians out of the village;

• Tonenke was heavily hit by glide bombs, too, but the 53rd Mech managed to repel assaults by 1st Motor Rifle Brigade (DPR, but including at least the Russian mobiks of the 1439th Motor Rifle Regiment), and the Russians fell back to Sieverne;

• Krasnohorivka: think to have already reported that a battalion of the 3rd Assault deployed there drove all the Russians out of the village, two or three days ago;

• Pobieda: most of war-mappers are still showing the entire village as under the Russian control, but they are holding only its eastern side (i.e. the 33rd Mech is in the western side);

• Novomykhalivka: the 79th Airborne drove the ‘Marines’ (read: sailors from different warships of the Russian Navy, re-purposed as infantry) of the luckless Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade out of the village, even if losing one T-64 in return.

Disabled Russian T-80BV and scores of kuddled orcs, outside Stepove, back on 29 February.

Coming on top of the failure of the 98th VDV Division and 11th VDV Brigade Bohdanivka and Ivanivske, west of Bakhmut, and the failure of the 42nd Motor-Rifle Division (and few other units) to push Ukrainians out of the ‘Robotyne Bulge’, the last week… well, it does look like the Russians have run out of steam.

At least for a while… Now, lets take a break, wait and see what happens as next.