Ukraine War, 29 February 2024: Roaming 138th

Hello everybody!

Have received lots of questions about the downing of the second Russian A-50, and then about all the claims for shoot-down Russian Su-34s and Su-35s, the last few days. Thus, for this evening, I’m going to address some of these.

Specifically, since mid-February, the headquarters of the Ukrainian Air Force & Air Defence force (PSU) have issued the following claims:

-          17 February: 2x Su-34, 1x Su-35 (1 Su-34 + 1 Su-35 confirmed)

-          18 February: 1x Su-34

-          19 February: 1x Su-34, 1x Su-35 (1 Su-34 + 1 Su-34 confirmed)

-          21 February: 1x Su-34

-          23 February: 1x Su-34

-          27 February: 2x Su-34

-          29 February: 2x Su-34

Of course, very few of these claims – four in total – have been firmly confirmed by visual evidence so far. Fact is: that’s unlikely to change for a while longer. If for no other reason then because in the case of losses resulting with fatalities, it’s taking Russians at least hours, but more often days, weeks, even months to find the wreckage, recover bodies, and have them buried. And if nobody was killed, there is, usually, no evidence to find at all – at least not in the social media. Thus, this is going to take some time. Meanwhile, please keep in mind the following.

One of 8 LS’ of the 138th Air Defence Brigade, PSU, as seen ‘somewhere in Ukraine’, in March 2023.

As next… AFAIK, currently, there are (at least) three Patriot SAM-systems in Ukraine. Gauging by different videos I’ve seen so far, they are equipped along the following lines:

-          1x ex-German PAC-2 system with AN/MPQ-53 multi-function radar (or ‘RS’) and AN/MSQ-132 engagement control station (ECS);

-          1x ex-US Army PAC-2 system with AN/MPQ-53 fire-control radar and AN/MPQ-132 ECS;

-          1x ex-US Army PAC-3 with AN/MPQ-65, but with older AN/MSQ-104 ECS.

Mind that essential components of one PAC-2 or PAC-3 battery (or ‘divizion’ in Ukraine) are these:

-          1x ECS (fire-control system)

-          1x RS (multi-function radar)

-          1x AMG (mast-antennas)

-          1x EPP (power generator)

-          8x LS (launcher)

Now, especially this with an AN/MSQ-104 ECS within a PAC-3 system is appearing ‘suspect’ to me, because the AN/MPQ-132 is one of ‘primary’ elements of the PAC-3: the older AN/MSQ-104 was used on the PAC-2. Which is why I think there are actually more than ‘just these three’ ECS’ in Ukraine. And that – this ‘extra ECS’ -  would not only ‘make things very interesting’. Indeed, I think this is explaining a lot about why are there so many claims about downed Russian Su-34s and Su-35s, lately.

Here I must remind about that with the ‘assault mode’, as described back in March of the last year. See: condition where a part of the PAC-2- or PAC-3-battalion is split and deployed separately from the unit.

Why that?

Mind: having eight launchers around (with a total of 32 to 128 missiles, depending on variant) - is ‘nice’. No doubt. But, it’s not always necessary. Indeed, taking enemy by surprise (by suddenly appearing in an unexpected place) requires mobility. Moreover, a lower number of components is easier to move and faster to re-deploy, than a higher number. Finally, the system is highly flexible, and all one needs for a single Patriot SAM-system to go into action is, actually, just this:

…or this:

Alternatively, and if there is a different radar providing targeting information, and one is in a big rush, only this is necessary:  

BUT: add a second ECS (for example: an AN/MPQ-132, in addition to the already available AN/MSQ-104) to an existing division, and you get two different firing units – each of which can operate over an entirely different sector of the frontline. And then you can send one ‘to the East’ and another ‘to the South’.

(The only ‘problem’ is the coordination of logistics: where should you send replacement rounds and spare parts, i.e. where should these wait for the firing unit, the next night, or the next morning…)

Now, back in March 2023, the Ukrainian media released a video showing troops of the 138^th Air Defence Brigade. In something like the first 10 weeks of that year, one divizion of this unit (see: battalion) – home-based in Dnipro and also operating Soviet/Russian-made S-300 (SA-10) – was re-equipped with German-supplied MIM-104/PAC-2 surface-to-air missile system. Alas, the video was in Ukrainian, so nobody was paying attention: even I have lost the link. Slightly later, an English translation was released, too: but, because this was done by an official instance (indeed: Ukrainian Air Force, PSU), it remained largely ignored, regardless how interesting:

The 138^th Air Defence Brigade is also the unit meanwhile known to have shot down the Russian A-50 felled over the northern Azov Sea, back on 14 January 2024 – plus a number of other Russian aircraft and helicopters over the last few months. Most of them by Patriots (AFAIK, it did shoot down a Russian helicopter using one its S-300s, back in early December, too).

Conclusion is on hand: it’s the ‘Patriot teams’ of the the 138th Air Defence that are ‘roaming’ the battlefields of Ukraine, and ambushing incoming Russian fighter-bombers at every opportunity, the last two weeks.

Then mind that sometimes the last year, there was a report about Ukrainians finding a near-intact Su-34 that crashed somewhere in the eastern Kharkiv Oblast, already sometimes back in 2022 (was a ‘typical Ukrainian claim’ for which ‘there was no confirmation’, and then for months).

That (‘famous’) itch in my small toe is telling me that before soon, there was a group of ‘men in black’ (MiB) inspecting that wreckage, carefully recovering every bit and piece of avionics, tidily packing and then taking that away… very, very, far away: all the way across the Atlantic Ocean.

….and over there, across the ‘Big Pond’, there is an agency named National Air and Space Intelligence Center (PDF): it came into being through re-organisation of the Foreign Technology Division of the US Air Force – the branch famous for sending its ‘MiBs’ all over the world. For example to collect MiG- and Yak-fighters, Mil-helicopters, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 and different Soviet air-to-air missiles, and other Soviet made weaponry, whenever these were captured – whether in Korea or Yugoslavia of the 1950s, then in Vietnam, in the Middle East, in Chad, or wherever else… and then study them closely, back during the (I) Cold War.

That would explain the rest of the story: essentially, Su-34’s avionics has been compromised – to the Americans, and thus to Ukrainians.

Unless the Russians find a way to upgrade it, significantly, the type is near-defenceless to such SAMs like PAC-2 and PAC-3.

Regarding the question about the amount of Russian losses and how long can they sustain this…

AFAIK, the VKS has received over 140 Su-34s so far. It has already lost something like 12-14 as of the summer of 2023. And the number of Su-34s claimed shot down since 1 January this year, is higher than the number of Su-34s officially announced as manufactured and pressed into service the last year.

Thus, unless the Russians increase production… and if the rate of losses remains the same, it’s easy to calculate that the rest of the fleet is going to be completely wasted by March the next year.

That said, the downing of the second A-50, late on 23 February, is not related to Ukrainian-operated MIM-104/PAC-2 or PAC-3s, but to Ukrainian-operated S-200 SAM-systems. The latter is longer-ranged than Patriot and originally made to counter precisely the kind of targets like airborne early warning aircraft and strategic bombers, and that out to a range of 250-300km.

How do I know this? Well, not only has the Ukrainian Pravda reported this, but there are other contacts confirming this. Perhaps their reports are not 10000% reliable: we’ll see. Point is: right now, there’s no better info and unless this changes I’ve got no reason to trust anybody else.

Sure, the Russians claim it was their ‘own goal’ and whatever else. Well, I doubt it was – even if I do know that their SAMs have opened fire in attempt to protect that A-50. Essentially, the jet was underway at its usual altitude (8,000m) when Ukrainians have targeted it by two V-880 missiles (V-880 is the designation of missiles deployed by the S-200/SA-5 SAM-system). The A-50 turned south and began descending. Obviously, the crew recognised the threat and tried to avoid it. This is even more obvious from the following video:

The video is not showing the A-50: it’s only showing it releasing ‘flares’. A flare is infrared countermeasure deployed by an aircraft to counter infra-red homing weapons (foremost SAMs but also air-to-air missiles). Depending on variant, V-880 missiles of the S-200 SAM-system are using either semi-active radar homing or active radar homing. Thus, deploying flares against them is pointless…

However, that’s not the point here: the point is that the jet was not only releasing flares: it was releasing so-called chaff, too. Chaff is a radar countermeasure. Essentially: a bundle of thin strips of aluminium dispersed to create a fake, but large radar echo, and thus confuse radar-homing missiles.

Point is that when the crew activates its countermeasures system, this is deploying both flares and chaff. Thus, what can be seen on this video is indicative of the A-50-crew deploying flares, but it also means they were deploying chaff, too.

Then, at around 1 minute and 2 seconds, there was a brilliant flash:

….and then the jet caught fire and began its terminal descent.:

What’s of particular interest on this still: besides the ‘fireball’, one can see a ‘trail of smoke’: that’s the trajectory of the missile that hit the A-50. And that trajectory is coming from above. Not from below – like a SAM would.

A second later, the A-50 is falling apart: it’s disintegrating and big pieces are separating from the fuselage and wing:

All of this is as interesting because two Russian contacts say: yes, the first of two incoming V-880s was hit by a Buk SAM (ASCC/NATO-designation ‘SA-17 Grizzly’): the other V-880 homed in on the A-50.

I.e. this was no ‘red-on-red’ or ‘own goal’, but a kill by an Ukrainian SAM. (And, as explained earlier: it’s no surprise the Buk can target V-880s, because V-880 missiles are big weapons, with a radar cross section of a fighter jet. Thus, the Buk had no problem detecting and tracking them: if at all, it had a problem with precisely calculating intercept vector for its own missiles).

Is that info 10000% reliable?

It’s the best I’ve got so far. Thus, hope, it’s of some help.