Ukraine War, 13 February 2024: Q & A

Hello everybody!

For today, a Q&A session with a mix of questions from you and from the media. I’ll start with issues related to politics, strategy and doctrine, and try to work myself down to operational- and tactical levels.

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1.)    How is it possible that a country with 30 times smaller economy, which cannot produce a working car, phone, or fridge – i.e. Russia – can outproduce all of the West when it comes to military material?

A)      That’s not exactly that simple. Or at least: it’s about the structure of the economies in question. Yes, the West does have ’30 times bigger economy’, but much of the ‘wealth’ making the worth of that economy is, literally, ‘moving electrons from the left to the right side of the PC/Mac-monitor’. See, ‘investment sector, banks, insurances’ etc. On the contrary, and for reasons explained a few days ago (see: it’s much more profitable to – literally – gamble on the market shares, than to actually manufacture something one can hold in his/her hands), the West has next to no own industrial production left: this has been outsourced somewhere else. Thus, the Russian military industrial capacity is at least ‘matching’ much of that in the West.

B)      Actually, and just like the West, after two years of this war, even Russia has shot-off its peace-time stocks of ammunition and major weapons systems. That’s why it began importing ammunition from North Korea, for example. Thus, it’s not really like the Russians are outproducing the West.

C)      While the Western oligarchy is never directly involved in the politics and thus ‘never making its hands dirty’, Western governments are, ‘at least’, responsible to the oligarchy bribing them. On the contrary, the Russian government is the peak of the Russian oligarchy. Thus, it’s not responsible to anybody and free to take ‘logical decisions’: to take steps it finds necessary to enable it to pursue its own politics. This results in effects like ‘consequence’ and ‘coherence’, but also a complete disregard for both. For example: as the top oligarch in Russia, Putin is free to pursue his own day-dreams about ‘re-establishing and expanding the Russian Empire’, even if his argumentation in favour of this enterprise is completely inconsistent. On the contrary, even politicians like Biden cannot pursue consistent politics, and this is even less valid for successive US- or other Western governments: essentially, and with one exception, their foreign policy is changing at least every four-five years.

D)      Moreover, in the light of what is the West doing in the Middle East of the last months, Western ‘humanism’ and ‘morality’ have proven to be a big scam. The result is that Western governments are having ever less influence abroad. That’s making it easy for the Russian government to find solutions where the West is struggling.

E)      …and then there are such factors making Western politics easily predictable, like ‘saving Israel at any cost’: as mentioned at another opportunity, few days ago, when one is easy to predict, one is easy to ‘kill’, too.

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2.)    What do you think about Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries?

Presently, that’s something like ‘the only way forward’ available for Ukraine - on one, major condition: all provided this offensive can be sustained over an extended period of time, and thus Ukraine proves capable of disabling the Russian network of refineries. In such case, this effort could have the cumulative effect of disabling the Russian ability to provide enough fuel for continuous offensive operations.

Just what kind of dramatic effects such an effort can have is obvious from the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Back in late 1987 and early 1988, and whether by accident or design, and after years of trying to force Tehran into negotiations by all other possible means, the Iraqi air force began targeting one Iranian oil refinery after the other. The cumulative effect was that Iran found itself unable to continue providing its armed forces with enough fuel to continue the war, and there was no solution in sight for something like 1-2 years, or even longer. (Since that story is likely to be ‘news’ even for many of versed historians of that conflict, here a source of reference, and mind that the conclusion in question is based on research by a colleague in the Iranian archives.)

However, mind that just ‘targeting refineries’ is not enough. Just ‘blowing up tanks filled with fuels’ is not enough. ‘Fuel tank afire against dark sky by night’ – appears ‘spectacular’ on a video in the social media, but means relatively little in grand total in a war the size and intensity of this one.

Actually, this kind of operation requires targeting control rooms of the refineries. It was already back in the 1980s that these were all computer-controlled. Such equipment is extremely hard to replace – and costs a lot, and takes time to manufacture (and Russia has no serious capability to manufacture such equipment), then install, and then work up.

And, it must be a sustained effort: such attacks must ‘roll’, night-after-night’ to become effective.

Thus, Ukraine needs many more UAVs with sufficient range and ‘punch’ (i.e. heavy enough warheads), and it needs much better precision (it must really become capable of targeting control rooms) - for this offensive to have really ‘war-decisive effects’. And even once such effects would come within reach: this effort would have to be accompanied by something like ‘oil embargo’ on exports of fuels to Russia.

Thus, while having a high potential, this type of operations must become much more intensive in its total scope, and it must accompanied by other measures.

As always: war is a system of systems…

Results of an UAV-strike on the Ilsky refinery, in the Krasnodar area, on 9 February. Seems, one of distillation towers was hit and set on fire. Is a sort of ‘nice’ damage to cause: might result in a slow-down of production for up to 2-3 months.

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3.)    What are the prospects in Ukraine for 2024?

Right now, there appear to be not much more than: organise serious and durable supply of superior amounts of ammunition (especially artillery ammunition), drones, communication systems, electronic warfare systems, night-vision systems, air defence systems, etc. – to what Russia is ‘feeding’ to its armed forces. Unless such critical issues are addressed in satisfactory fashion, no major turn-overs in this war can be expected because Ukrainians simply do not have the ammunition, drones, air defence systems, nor armoured vehicles enabling them to regain initiative.

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4.)    What can help Ukraine regain the initiative and move from defence to offensive?

Reliable and durable supply of superior amounts of ammunition (especially artillery ammunition), drones, communication systems, electronic warfare systems, night-vision systems, air defence systems etc…

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5.)    Is it sensible to create a new branch of armed forces in the middle of the war?

Yes, it is. Sometimes, there are technological break-throughs that are requiring such steps.

Mind that the first air forces came into being as independent branches of different armed forces mid through the First World War. Is anybody complaining about this fact, nowadays?

Gauging by the impact drones have upon this war, yes, it is nothing less than ‘pure logic’ for the ZSU to establish its own UAV Force as a separate branch of armed forces. Such steps are securing the necessary influence in decision-making, and thus the funding.

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6.)    What is currently going on in this war?

Essentially, the Russians are exploiting both the showdown between the Democrats and Republicans in the US Congress, and the general Western obsession with ‘saving Israel’ – and the resulting break-down in ammunition deliveries to Ukraine – for their purposes. As soon as it was sure USA would re-route their ammunition deliveries to Israel (back in mid-October) – and that despite agreements of the Atlantic Council (from September) – Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) have launched an ‘all-out’ offensive. In this fashion, Putin is, once again, highly successful in buying time until the US presidential elections in November this year – for which he is hoping might be won by the FSB’s asset (and that for some 30 years) best known as Donald Trump. Furthermore, he’s hoping that Trump, once back in the White House, might continue demolishing the US pluralism and ruin the alliance between USA and Europe in form of NATO. Ultimately, this would the led to a break-down of the Western support for Ukraine…

On the battlefield… whether it is so that Putin wants to secure Avidiivka and then declare a ‘victory in this war’, as many seem to say: I do not know. Sorry, it’s been some times since I’ve had a cup of tea with Vlad, and thus I can’t even guess… 🙄

Seriously now: what I can assess is that due to the lack of modern and suitable armoured vehicles, sufficient firepower, and effective targeting methods, and due to its own shortage of artillery ammunition, but also because of the firepower and fierce resistance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU), the Russians approached the task on hand in quite a ‘classic’ fashion. As first, back in October, they’ve acted as if attacking at multiple points along the frontlines (Svatove, Bakhmut, Toretsk, Avidiivka, Novomikhailivka, Robotyne, Dnipro/Kherson). Indeed, they’re still pretending preparations for another ‘major mechanised onslaught’ on yet another sector (Kupyansk). But, and actually, they have only one major aim. This is Avidiivka. Everything else is ‘demonstration/maskirovka’: efforts to divert Ukrainian attention, to pin down ZSU units where they are, so they would not be sent to reinforce the Avidiivka sector.

That’s also as much as the VSRF is actually capable of doing at once. Because, even if it managed to recover its troop-strength over the last 6-8 months, the VSRF has lost its overall capability of conducting large-scale mechanised offensive operations on multiple frontlines: it’s already since the Popasna-Severodonetsk-Lysychansk-times (May-July 2022), that it lacks the capability to neutralise ZSU in an entire sector, breach its frontline, and advance into the depth. Instead, the Keystone Cops in Moscow were forced to focus on gradually degrading Ukrainian defence positions and then grinding selected, minor sectors of the frontline by dozens of sustained infantry assaults, and to consider themselves happy if effecting an advance of something like 100-300 metres a week (and that at a price of hundreds of armoured vehicles and thousands of casualties).

Now, while the firepower and precision of single ZSU battalions and brigades is outmatching that of single battalions and brigades of the VSRF, it exists only as long as Ukrainians have ammunition, FPV-drones, necessary spares and other supplies. Once any of these are exhausted, or the FPV-drones are neutralised by electronic warfare, the VSRF can advance. Sure, it’s still suffering incredible losses to mines, mortars, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), snipers and anti-materiel rifles, and such Western armoured vehicles like M2/M3 Bradley, but it can replace these losses and continue pushing.

Nowhere is this as obvious from the force ratios in this battle. For months already, the core of Avidiivka’s defences are the 47^th and the 110^th Mech. Arguably, meanwhile they are supported by the 1^st Tank and the 23^rd Mech (North), 53^rd Mech (centre) and 115^th Mech (south). However, the last I’ve counted – and that was back in November 2023 – the Russians have concentrated some 7-8 brigades just for attacks on the sectors covered by the 47^th and the 110^th. Nearly all of these 7-8 brigades are meanwhile ‘destroyed’: they’ve suffered losses rendering them ineffective in offensive operations. The turn is on the ‘8^th,  9^th, 10^th, 11^th and 12^th’ Russian brigades to continue the assault. What a surprise then, after 3,5 months of this, Ukrainians have suffered losses, too, and many companies of the 110^th are down to 35-40 troops?

Even then, it took the 47^th and the 110^th running out of artillery ammo, almost two weeks of heavy bombardment by the Russian glide-bombs, and another series of costly infantry assaults, for the Russians to – ‘finally’ – effect a serious advance, and enter Avidiivka. Think, this is speaking volumes, entirely on its own.

Dana howitzer calibre 152mm of the 110th Mech in action.

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7.)    How do you assess the possible danger of a repeated Russian attack on Kharkiv and the north of Ukraine?

I consider this as ‘serious’ as all the threats about ‘renewed Russian assault on Kyiv from Belarus, circulated for much of the last year.

As obvious: nothing of that kind has ever taken place. A single combined arms army of the VSRF was sent to Belarus for training purposes, and then – once it completed its training purposes and it became obvious that the plot was not working (i.e. Ukrainians attacked in the south, nevertheless) - that army was withdrawn from there.

My assessment is that it’s similar in the case of Kupyansk now, with a remark: I haven’t seen any kind of evidence for something like ‘giant concentration’ of Russian mechanised forces opposite Kupyansk. Where are satellite photographs of ‘500+ tanks’?

Finally, and as explained above, not only that the VSRF has lost the capability of running such operations, but my assessment is that the actual scope of any other Russian operations – but those in the Avidiivka sector - and thus their importance, is measured by their ‘success’.

Read: the lack of the same.

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8.)    Is Ukraine preparing sufficiently? (…for, I guess, such an eventuality, i.e. for the case of a VSRF mechanised onslaught on Kupyansk…?)

As far as I can say: yes, it is. It has a handsome concentration of forces in the Kupyansk sector.

BTW, the Russians know this, too.

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9.)    How long can the Russians continue their onslaught on Avidiivka?

As long as they want to. Yes, the rate of Russian losses claimed by official Kyiv is very high (something like 700 troops plus 20 vehicles a day on average for the last three months), but: it is lower than the rate of new intakes into the VSRF.

The latter issue is crucial: as of around one year ago, the rate of new intakes into the VSRF was assessed at around 20,000-25,000 troops a month. Almost 12 months later, one must expect that this rate was significantly increased, resulting in a constant growth of the VSRF. The Russians are constantly recruiting, equipping, organising, training and sending to the frontline more troops than they are losing.

Why?

Because the VSRF was given enough time to expand its training facilities, improve its organisation and training. And Russia was given more than enough time to ramp up its production of war material – of armament, of ammunition, of supplies. Indeed, it was given enough time to organise imports from North Korea, just for example.

Meanwhile, the VSRF is likely to have an intake of around 30,000 troops a month, and – contrary to those from late 2022 and early 2023 – these are now receiving solid two months of training before being sent to the frontline. Lower-ranking officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) leading them, are receiving better training, too. The only field in which the VSRF is lacking is modern armoured vehicles. This is where it can’t do much more than try to repair whatever it can scrounge from the battlefield, and depend on the meagre intake from factories at home.

Finally, perhaps my impression is wrong, but for weeks already, I’m missing reports about another of ‘spectacular’ M142 HIMARS or M270 MLRS strikes at the Russian ammunition depots, supply depots, troop concentrations behind the frontlines. This can mean two things: either the Russians are right and they’ve managed to deploy electronic countermeasures that are significantly degrading the GPS-guidance of HIMARS’ and MLRS’ ammunition, or the USA are not delivering such ammunition to Ukraine for months already (just like they’re not delivering 155mm artillery shells). Or it’s both of that. The result is certain: VSRF’s commanders are free to marshal their units behind the battlefield as they like, to bring in all the necessary supplies and ammunition, and to continue their assaults.

Overall result is unavoidable. the ZSU is (still) not killing enough Russians to stop the Russian offensive, it’s not even seriously hampering VSRF’s manoeuvring of units behind the frontline. Definitely not disturbing its logistics. Considering the core essence of the VSRF’s doctrine is ‘attack is the best defence’, conclusion is unavoidable: we must expect this offensive to go on, and on, and on.

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10.)  Can ZSU run ‘active defence’, and what risks can this create for Ukraine?

‘Active defence’ would mean that the ZSU is running local counterattacks, something like ‘all the time’, at least ‘at every opportunity’.

The essence of the answer to this question is the ammunition supply: if there’s enough ammunition (plus enough trained troops, plus enough supplies, plus enough intelligence about enemy dispositions etc.), yes, it can. If not, then not.

Right now, the ZSU hasn’t even got enough artillery ammunition ‘just for serious defence’.

With this the issue of ‘active defence’ is answered, too.

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11.)  What opportunities are opening up for the ZSU?

This would require being more specific. Is it meant at strategic level? At tactical level? Specific sectors of the frontline? Something else…?

No idea, and thus this is hard to answer. Can only offer an example like this one: if (a big if) Ukraine would have enough artillery ammunition to stop the Russian onslaught on Avidiivka ‘plus some’, then it could aim to launch major counteroffensives into the flanks of the Russian advance. Such operations would require blocking the airspace for the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS), then targeting Russian drone-operators, then targeting the Russian artillery, then the Russian defence positions etc.

Right now, there is no ammunition ‘just for serious defence’, and thus this option is out of question, too.

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12.)  Is Ukraine building similar defence lines like Russia does?

Yes, it is. Don has discussed this, back in January.

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13.)  What is your opinion on the ZSU structure based on brigades and ad-hoc territorial commands? Many Western commentators say the ZSU lacks trained staff to man divisional- and army-level commands; however, Euromaidanpress stated exactly the opposite and complained about ‘bloated administration’: that the ZSU has too many headquarter and too little infantry.

Up front: the number of generals in service means not there are enough divisional- and army-level commanders around. It only means that there are many officers of specific age still around, still serving: not that they have the necessary qualifications, training, experience and merits. Considering the composition of the Ukraine’s population – where there are lots of men in the 40s and 50s, in comparison to relatively few men of the 20s or 30s, it’s no surprise the composition of the ZSU is similar. From that aspect, it’s actually ‘unsurprising’ to hear there are lots of generals, but too few divisional- and army-level commanders. Indeed, that there is ‘bloated administration’. However, this does not mean that the generals in question would do Ukraine any good service by serving in the infantry.

And even if, I’m not of the kind to hang on problems like bureaucracy, but of the kind searching for way around the problems. For example, I think that this war has made it crystal clear that the infantry branch in all the armed forces of the world needs a major upgrade. Typical example would be ‘ballistic helmets’, ‘kevlar wests’, ‘steel plates’ etc.: they were all ‘nice to have’ when they’ve appeared for the first time, back in the 1970s and 1980s, and remained rarities even in the 1990s and 2000s. To a certain degree, it was ‘comforting’ to seem them in widespread service with the ZSU as of early 2022. However, meanwhile they’re obviously insufficient. Indeed: the mass of what is around is obsolete.

Modern infantryman needs much better protection: even lighter body-armour, covering other sensitive parts of the body but the top of the head, front and rear of the torso. All troops should be equipped with (and trained to use) night vision sights; have their faces, sides of the body, knees, and feet protected. They should all get better targeting systems for their firearms, and their firepower (the firepower of their firearms) must be further increased, etc., etc., etc.

Finally, there is a host of modern technology that, if – first and foremost – applied at all, could greatly increase the survivability of the infantry on the battlefield. See deployment of combat robots; see deployment of unmanned ground vehicles; see advanced sensors; see portable electronic warfare systems; see networking in style of internet etc. And yet (and for reasons actually explained here, few days ago), such technologies are still ‘light years away’ from service-wide application even in the US Army, not to talk about the ZSU.

Thus, I would say: the solution is not in gang-pressing 40-50-years-old generals, or mobilised- and unwilling recruits to serve in the infantry, but in upgrading the survivability and combat effectiveness of the infantry.

Obviously, that costs a fortune, but: sorry, it’s the only way forward.

As for the ZSU structure… actually, I think that the brigade-structure works fine. What is a problem, time and again, is when territorial commands start detaching 5-10-15 battalions from as many brigades to serve as ‘fire-brigades’ at certain crisis points. This is destroying cohesion of units, leading to (often: massive) disagreements between commanders, regularly resulting in chaotic circumstances on the battlefields (where ‘present’ units regularly do not know about arrival or reinforcements and reinforcements lack detailed knowledge about dispositions of units they’re supposed to reinforce etc.), and similar.

Finally, I’m in disagreement with such operational-level practices like letting old, well-proven units ‘bleed themselves to death’ while ‘holding the line’ to ‘buy time’ for ‘new brigades to be established’; these new brigades then getting the ‘best’ equipment and being rushed into offensive operations – as it has happened regularly the last year.

This didn’t work for the Wehrmacht in the Second World War, and I do not understand why anybody thinks it might work for the ZSU now.

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14.)  Is it common (and sensible) to change most or all of high-level commanders like Zelensky just did (through replacing not only Zaluzhny but most of other senior positions)?

Sorry, ‘too little data to compute’: except in the case of General Zaluzhny (and while, yes sure: ultimately, all of orders have to be undersigned by Zelensky) I do not know what of changes within top ranks of the ZSU were undertaken on order from Zelensky, and how many on order from General Syrsky.

And, while I do recall few similar shuffles over the time, I do not think I recall any of similar extension.

However, and again: I do not know enough details to say. Can only guess that there must have been reasons. Indeed: good reasons.

Ideally, General Syrsky might be searching for a way into a complete reform of the ZSU, based on experiences of the last two years, plus less US influence in decision-making at strategic and operational levels. Gauging by the outcome of the last year’s summer offensive, this would appear as crucial issues to me. But then, that’s just my assessment, and I’m not in his boots.