Hello everybody! For today, a Q&A session with a mix of questions from you and from the media. I’ll start with issues related to politics, strategy and doctrine, and try to work myself down to operational- and tactical levels. *** 1.) How is it possible that a country with 30 times smaller economy, which cannot produce a working car, phone, or fridge – i.e. Russia – can outproduce all of the West when it comes to military material?
Industrial control rooms are too easy to hide underground with the modern computer techs. (It wasn't so during Iran-Iraqi war, for these belligerents especially), so I think it's impossible to repeat with modern Russia.
If control rooms have a connection to the Internet, you can hack them and generally disable the entire plant and even blow it up, disabling the security system.
Then, because my latest work with support for a major bank in EU: even low (outsourced) personnel need to go into separate premises, accessing only via biometric devices. After that, they need to log in only and only one computer (login four or five times to have full access).
Also, the info available was divided by branch (I.e.: accounts, mortgages and so on), and only people with very high security rate may access to 2/3 (at the most) info.
I had lived big hacks attacks (even ramson attacks), and never all the bank info (even in the worse cases) was at risk.
My point is: hacking a sensitive premise in hackerland (Russia) is, as minimum, very difficult.
Russians recently hacked deep into a large Ukrainian mobile communication provider - they reset the routing configuration of their network which disabled half of the country's mobile stations for a week.
There were posts on the Internet that surveillance cameras of the Russian railways are easy to access from the Internet (open standard ports in routers or something like that). And many private Ukrainian surveillance cameras are said to have been used by the Russian to check the results of their attacks.
I am afraid they are based on cheap personal computers these days. The special hardware will be inside the plant, controlled by Pentium desktops via ethernet cables.
AFAIk, nope. Most (in Russia) are using ages-old computers available on free markets. I know at least one still running on Windows 3.11 or something like that.
The Russians also proved unable to complete the construction of the oil refinery in Dayr az-Zawr, in NE Syria, back in 2008-2010, because they were already subjected to some sanctions and couldn't get modern computers for the control room. Eventually, somebody I used to know jumped in - by obtaining brand-new PCs via Dubai (obviously, the PCs in question were actually prohibited from being exported to Syria, but nobody in the UAE cares).
My point was not that the control rooms are NOW hiden, it was that control rooms are easy to be hiden (and also dublicated beforehand with less reliable, yet much cheaper and more compact equipment) if needs arise.
The one I worked on, yes. And the reason was because the control center had to be protected from the refinery itself. There were certain types of failures that would result in much of the plant becoming a giant bomb. The procedure was that if there was a threat of that happening, everyone rushes into the hardened control bunker, *buried underneath* which was the control system (DCS). I presume many in Russia would be like that.
Curious, since you worked at a refinery, what surface level facilities would the Ukrainians have to hit to either put the refineries out of commission or bring down their output to critical levels for long periods of time.
We were contractors working in said 'bunker' on ancillary systems (e.g. seal pressurization / water demineralisation), so limited experience. But my understanding talking to staff was that there isn't much in a refinery that isn't critical for production and if it shuts down, it can take a long time to start up again. E.g. if the demineralisation plant goes down, you get silicates in the water, which is a poison to the refining catalysts, and so on. This is just one system. Also see others' replies about the main towers.
Over the time, have chatted with people who used to work on Syrian refineries (whether those hit in 1973, or those hit since 2011), and in Iranian and Iraqi oil refineries of 1980-1988 period.
The impression they have created (independently from each other) was: OK, distillation towers are sensitive (can take 2-6 months to replace), but there is nothing as sensitive as control rooms.
Obviously, that's just one aspect: after all, a refinery is (also) a big system of systems.
Thank you Tom for this Q&A. Just a remark for point 1. The West could easily outproduce Russia. While commercial service is nowadays the dominant factor of Western economies and GDPs, there is still a relevant industrial share. Germany with a GDP of roughly 4.1 trillion has app 25% industrial share, while Russia with 2.2 trillion GDP has 32% industrial share. So even German industry alone is still outmatching Russias. But Western politicians and oligarchs decided IMHO that the Green Transformation and Climatechange scam should be "the next big thing" for syphoning trillions into oligarchs pockets. Now the Green transformation is damaging the industrial base of Western economies (recession in Germany) and there is not much money left to spend on fighting off Putins invasion in Ukraine. Additionally Russia was successful with influencing public opinion in Europe in recent years. There is a big share of population also putting blame on Ukraine or NATO for Putins invasion and supporting Ukraine is not really popular. Therefore Western politicians are also reluctant since there is no boost for elections by supporting Ukraine.
Fair point, but's a minority of crackpots who want to see Ukraine fall to Putin. In England Putin is widely hated ever since he started assassinating people on our land.
Few people want to see Ukraine fall. But they are not willing to take the consequence of that wish and support Ukraine. Most have some vague hope that one morning we will wake up and Putin will come to his sendes, or he will be satisfied or… the whole damn thing could just go away.
And therefore they think 0.5% GDP is too high a consequence. But I think they will get there. The sensible western governments are overly cautious and spineless but they are starting to understand.
For sure it's not the same in each country. I'm an Austrian like Tom and in Austrian/German newspaper comment sections you can read lots of comments from people blaming UKR/NATO for Putins invasion, calling to end all support for UKR, repeating Russian propaganda lies about the systematic killing of Russian speaking people in Donbass 2014-2022 via UKR shelling and so on. Also in Austria and Germany the parties calling for ending support of UKR and armistice with Russia are on the rise. In Austrian national poll the FPÖ is clearly on 1st place (election this year, probably in autumn) and in Germany the AfD in national polls on 2nd place but in some East German federal states (like Saxony, Thuringia and Brandenburg also having elections this year) already clearly leading. UKR is mostly just a side topic, main reason for the rise of FPÖ/AfD is revenge for Covid-missmanagement of governments, rising cost of living/inflation and migration out of control. Especially in Austria cost of living is strongly linked with Russian gas, since we are heavily dependent. Austrias partially state owned mineral oil company OMV signed in 2018 a long term treaty (until 2040) with Gazprom and a "take or pay" condition. Thus the share of Russian gas in January24 was still 98% in Austria gas supply Lots of people are more interested in cheap gas and don't care about the fate of Ukraine.
Just take the CO2-certificate trade scheme and the CO2 taxes. It's meanwhile a business were billions are shifted and they want more. You just need to read the message on X/twitter of EU-commission president von der Leyen when she was at the COP summit in Dubai: "In climate finance we need to move from billions to trillions (!). To get there we need new sources of revenues. New levies, green bonds and of course - carbon pricing."
Trillions of public funding are like drugs for oligarchs. They are heavily invested in Green Business and are pushing the ESG/climate agenda via media to get their profit.
Did you ever hear such a call for "trillions" to end the UKR war? Despite ending UKR war would be an achievable target, while stabilizing the climate is pure illusion. The UKR war is just a side business for the oligarchs, the outlook for profit for them is quite small compared to the CO2/climate scam and thus it's not in their focus.
It does not follow that because large corporations enrich themselves and loot public coffers under the guise of protecting the climate that therefore the entire concept of climate change is fake. Very silly analysis/conclusion. In case you haven't noticed everything is commodified in our culture. Capitalists will sell you the rope you intend to hang them with, as they say. Corporations, often in cahoots with government, will find methods of extracting public funds by setting up all kinds of schemes, NGO's, charities, etc, that feign concern for or pretend to solve real problems, but that doesn't mean the problems themselves are fabricated. In fact, it really only works if they're real. Quack medicine is a billion dollar industry, but that doesn't mean cancer is fake. It feels weird having to explain this... Like I'm interacting with someone who's been asleep for the past 200 years. Stick to the science. Empiricism, not inferences from economics.
I stick to the science and therefore know how flawed the science behind climate change is. Yes, there is a CO2-Greenhouse effect, but it's abysmal small and absolutely no relevant driver of climate change (which is changing all the time). CO2 has a vastly positive effect on todays earth, since it is a plant fertilizer and leads to increased harvest yields and plant growth. Even NASA had to admits this: https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/146296/global-green-up-slows-warming
Are you a climatologist? Biogeochemist? Meteorologist? The overwhelming consensus among actual scientists is anthropogenic climate change is real. I think I'll stick to what they say rather than some layman who says things like "actually, more atmospheric CO2 is good because plants use it" and thinks he's made a theory-destroying rebuttal, lol.
A forum like this one is for sure not the right place for a scientific debate in detail. Believe your flawed climate models if you want, I don't give a damn.
Germany manufactured about 4.1 million vehicles in 2023. I shouldn't need to explain that an artillery shell is vastly cheaper and less complex to make than a car, but it helps for rhetoric's sake. Now, recently it was reported that the Germans produced 200,000 shells a year. Sorry, did I say they produced 200k shells? What I meant to say was that they agreed to eventually produce 200k shells. 200k theoretical shells. Per year. This is a joke. It cannot be taken seriously. But what about the US? Well, they set a goal of pumping out 100K shells a month by 2025, which is better, but still inadequate as it is significantly less than what the Russians are already producing. And, again, we are talking about theoretical shells in the fairly distant future.
I don't think you can dismiss these pathetic efforts as the effects of climate change legislation or whatever. No, their lack of action or willingness to reorder or change their economies even slightly is due to something more fundamental and ingrained. Incapable of action, disinclined to change or prepare for tomorrow.... even their promises for the future are profoundly insufficient and disappointing. This is the world we live in. Money has no country or allegiance. It goes wherever it can accumulate more.
I'm afraid that Ukraine is going to have to do a lot more themselves, though I fear they may suffer from the same problem. For over a decade the chance of a war with Russia seemed very high. What, then, were they doing to prepare in terms of ammunition and weapons manufacturing? Yes, hindsight is 2020, but I suspect the thinking and planning people desired to focus more resources on fortifying the country but the "elite" behaved the same as ours and simply did what was most expedient and personally beneficial--nation, people and future be damned. We can only hope that the prospect of national annihilation and the focus on survival that war brings is enough to keep these "elites" in check and give the state the tools and resources to do what is required.
An artillery shell isn't produced out of the blue. You need explosives, fillers, electronics (if it's a smart-shell), raw materials. Most of this base material industry is energy intensive, mostly no longer existing in Western Europe (90% was shut-down and went to Asia due to energy prices) and such factories are harder to build as an assembly line for artillery shells. To build a chemical factory to produce explosives nowadays is next to impossible in a Western European country or it takes at least a couple of years from the start (getting all permits and allowances) until the first product rolls of the conveyor belt.
Why are you making out like everything needs to be made from scratch using only local raw materials? Of course that would make the process more difficult. Good thing the year is 2024 and countries can trade with one another for components and resources they can't acquire locally. Where there's a will there's a way. But there is no will. That's the whole point. And these dismal shell production figures are just the latest example of that among a host of others.
Some interesting numbers regarding military production numbers and such:
Covert cabal (aka guy who counds equipment via satelite images and comments on it on youtube) claims that at the beginning of the war, Russia had 14000 (14 thousand!) total artillery pieces in storage - including literally everything no matter how old. Per latest data 7000 of those are left. (for which we don't know the condition, thus we cannot assume anything - they could be all good, they could be all junk). As far as I understand, likely the 7k missing ones are not just destroyed but could potentially be used as replacement barrels for maintenance, as well as some of them could be increased number of guns on the battlefield and not expended yet at all.
From what I see in the news, France is currently increasing their yearly Ceasar gun production from around 50 to closer to 100. This probably does not include production of replacement barrels for maintenance. Russia, by contrast, is producing a flat 0 guns and barrels from what I've read.
The general argument I'm trying to make is - the impression that Russia is "outproducing" the west is one Russia is trying to create but it's unlikely to match reality. We can never know for sure but definitely Russia has every incentive to fake production numbers upwards and count stuff they take out of storage as new production. And USSR storages are so vast it will take years for this to become apparent. In reality, both Ukraine and the West are doing their job, even if not perfectly - the West is in fact outproducing Russia, and Ukraine is exchanging every western gun for many destroyed Russian guns. This is a slow and steady process but with a clear result - so Russia has correctly concluded that their only way out is to bs their way out of it via spreading narratives like "We're producing sooo much weapons, you have no chance so let's stop now!"
Refurbishment of old tanks, APCs and artillery exceeds production of new equipment. For tanks, about 500 are being refurbished in a year compared to 200 being built. And a lot of those artillery pieces are being salvaged for replacement barrels.
Is it true about barrels? Russia definitely had a very small production of new SPGs through 2010s - were they using old barrels or imported barrels for those?
I was assuming Russia still had barrel production for artillery, even if very-very downsized one.
I remember reading a few other sources implying Russia has trouble producing barrels, some citing the specialized steel as the main problem. I haven't researched the topic beyond that. At the very least, while the numbers are all over the place in different sources, there seems to be a consensus that the towed guns are being canibalized for barrels for the SPGs.
“Before the war, just two factories in Russia were equipped for producing artillery barrels: the Motovilikha Plant in Perm and Barrikady in Volgograd.”
This kinda confirms my original assumption - Russia does produce barrels, but at noticeably lower rates than they are burning through.
BTW: Attacking the destillation tower as shown on the picture is IMHO even a better choice to put a refinery out of operation for months, than attacking control room. Destillation towers are easier to hit then control rooms, which can be hidden everywhere. The destillation tower is also THE central processing element of a refinery, without destillation tower the refinery can't work (normally refineries have no 2nd destillation tower with same capacity) and it takes at least months to rebuild a destillation tower. On 3rd of June 2022 happened an accident (or sabotage?) during maintenance at destillation tower of OMV refinery in Schwechat. It took 4 months to repair (and this just for a damaged destillation tower, not a destroyed/burned down one) and costs of 240 Mio €. The workload of the refinery fell from 91% to 44%.
I did wonder a bit about your comments regarding the attack on control rooms. Having worked in a refinery, I doubt, that it would be possible to target control rooms for the Ukraine. Those buildings are usually already well protected and this protection can be comparable easily enhanced, at least to be quite well protected from what is currently available for the Ukraine.
However, far huger targets and hardly protectable are the destillation towers. When such an equipment had a problem, often half of the refinery was on hold. I would expect that attacking several major ones in one refinery could render the whole refinery useless for months – those parts are usually also not produced in Russia.
I am not talking of storage tanks here, destroying those might usually not affect the production a lot.
I do not want to doubt, that destroying control rooms the better option, but if not possible, I would expect that attacking some equipment would work as well.
Tom, you are certainly right. Some brigades are bleeding and have no rest, but some brigades have a minimum burden. As far as I know some brigades during 17 months were involved in active combat actions.
Excellent overview. I think it's worth keeping a close eye on southwest Kherson and the northwest coast of Crimea. If there is one place where Ukraine stands a chance of creating a logistical "island"of sorts and overwhelming ruscist forces, it'll be west of the Crimea canal.
This assumes, of course, large quantities of stockpiled HIMARS, ATACMS, and other long-range weapons, plus massive amounts of drones. And Patriots/F-16s in close coordination. But water is less of an effective barrier than most folks think. Especially if there are only a dozen or so crossings vulnerable to glide bomb attacks.
If you look at the sum total of Kyiv's wins over the past year, there's a case to be made that the entire 2023 counteroffensive was a kind of maskirovka waged against Moscow and D.C. to cover for a more effective push in 2024. Zaluzhnyi paid the price for Jake Sullivan (America's very own Goebbels) looking bad.
Poor Biden wanted to sell Ukraine and avoid a fight - now he's got another forever war. Coward. Too bad his designated opponents are as bad (that RFK loon included).
Oh, and hiding 500+ tanks from satellite imagery is not that difficult. Dispersal, engineering, decoys - remote sensing has limits. Moscow didn't bother hiding its buildup in 2021 and 2022. Needed to feed the CIA "declassified intel" that insisted Kyiv was doomed so shouldn't get real military aid.
Finally, thank you for pointing out the absolute need for better infantry protection. Big theme in my fiction saga's 2041 plotline - networked infantry backed by disaggregated fires. Armored vehicles remain vital for fire support and taxi service, remote weapons stations and logistics drones are key, but the fundamental core of the battlefield are teams of people in full-body armor relying on augmented reality to locate targets for shooters.
Thanks for the excellent Q&A, I have two more qns.
1.) Why didnt the ZSU strike through Zaporizhzhia in the fall 2022 offensive instead of trying to retake Kherson city directly?
Back in 2022 I thought the telegraphed ZSU build up on the Kherson city direction was a ruse to get the Russians to commit as much across the river and then the ZSU would attack through Zaporizhzhia and then cut off the bridges on the Dniper with HIMARS as well as get close to the Sea of Azov. Instead and to my delight the surprise Kharkiv offensive happened but I still thought after that, recapturing Zaporizhzhia was more important than trying to retake Kherson city at that point. The Russians in Kherson city were in a disadvantageous position with HIMARS hitting the bridges. From a layman's perspective I hope you could shed light on the merits and demerits of this.
2.) Could you elaborate a bit more about Zaluzhnyi's plans to attack through Zaporizhzhia instead of trying to hold Bakhmut after the successful summer offensive of 2022?
This seems like it would have been a smarter idea for me as a layman, although I'm sure those in the security services who wanted to hold Bakhmut had their good reasons as well.
But how could they flank the Ukrainian army a distance of over 300km when it took them 9+ months to do so in Bakhmut, a front of about 10km?. As well how would they resupply the Russian soldiers through Kherson city if HIMARS had made the lines of communication across the bridges completely inoperable? I remember at the time Russians had to fly in helicopters to resupply the Russians in Kherson city. How would the Russians advance past without resupply? And how would the left Russian flank get past the Dnipro city to reach the Ukrainian southern attack through Zaporizhzhia? As well how would the Russians flank from the right when they couldnt get past even Bakhmut at the time and even today cant get past Bakhmut?? I know you've mentioned this before but maybe you can elaborate. Because the whole point is Ukraine would put defensive lines on Kherson city then after Kharkiv offensive, strike through the middle in Zaporizhzhia.
"when it took them 9+ months to do so in Bakhmut" - Bakhmut was an urban warfare. The proposed offensive would have gone over fields. And it is very unlikely for Ukraine to be able to concentrate enough power to push along 300 km line - see how the push was attempted in summer of 2023, with all the added tanks.
"how would they resupply the Russian soldiers through Kherson" - the push south in Zaporizhzhia region means there are no soldiers to push for Kherson.
"How would the Russians advance past without resupply" - the supply route goes from Russia through Crimea. Kherson is way aside from the Zaporizhzhia combat zone.
"how would the left Russian flank get past the Dnipro city to reach the Ukrainian southern attack through Zaporizhzhia" - don't need that. First let the Ukrainians push towards the sea, then hit from Russia->Crimea->Melitopol->Vasylivka in the west and Vonlovakha->Vuhledar in the east. The front cannot be too wide, as there are not enough forces.
I'm not sure you got what I was asking. Let me clarify and see if you could explain to me better. According to Tom, after the recapture of Kherson city, Gen Zaluzhnyi wanted to attack through Zaporizhzhia and not try to hold Bakhmut at whatever cost(like Zelensky wanted). Zaluzhnyi's approach makes so much sense to me. My argument goes further i.e Ukraine didnt even need to immediately try recapturing Kherson city. They should have left some units ready to siege Kherson city as a ruse then put the bulk of the forces down towards Zaporizhzhia immediately after the Kharkiv offensive. Instead Zelensky let Russia dictate where the actual hot point of the war would be(Bakhmut) and then Surovkin used the time to fortify the south while Ukraine was dedicated to Bakhmut.
"And it is very unlikely for Ukraine to be able to concentrate enough power to push along 300 km line - see how the push was attempted in summer of 2023, with all the added tanks." Which is my point, in late fall Ukraine would need to strike down one point on the Zaporizhzhia front, not the whole front. And Russia didnt have anywhere near the amount of fortifications nor manpower to man those fortifications nor had the adapted to using off the shelf drones. But by summer 2023 Ukraine had to pinch different parts of the front to find which ones were least fortified which even made it worse. In fall 2022 there was a whole frontline for Ukraine to attack through using similar methods as they used in Kharkiv since the Russians were not yet prepared.
"the push south in Zaporizhzhia region means there are no soldiers to push for Kherson." My point exactly!, Russian soldiers were across the Dnieper in Kherson city trying to hold it yet it was already completely untenable. So Ukraine didnt need to launch a massive attack on Kherson city BUT an eventual siege, I dont mean leave 0 soldiers on that front but leave enough to hold a defensive line. Because the bulk of forces ended up in Bakhmut instead anyway. Similarly, if presently Ukraine can cut off the land bridge and destroy the Kerch bridge, they wouldnt need to immediately attack to recapture Crimea but could siege it since Russia holding onto the territory would be untenable as they wouldnt be able to resupply the area. So Ukraine didnt need to commit a huge number of troops FOR AN ATTACK!! on Kherson city in my amateur arm chair opinion. They simply needed to siege it by blowing up the bridges and carrying out attacks on resupplies and to prevent the Russians from moving forward past Kherson city, not try to retake the city. Then like the Kharkiv offensive, push the bulk of their forces downward through Zaporizhzhia which is what Zaluzhnyi wanted to do in late Fall 2022. I hope we're on the same page so you can share with me your insights.
Kharkiv offensive was stopped because of lack of ammunition supply.
Bukhmut hot point was organized exactly for winning a time for russians to dig in the south, to build protection line and mine the territory. Zelensky has successfully facilitated this russian objective. Everyone knew russians have started to fortify the south from summer 2022 when established grain deal stopped the offensive in the south. By the way, in addition to reckless tactics used of retaking a Kherson you described, the russians were allowed to go out of the city, around 40K troops, 5K units of military equipment were safely crossing the Dnipro river more than a week.
Thank you!! You get what I was asking. I know I'm not crazy for asking these questions. You bring up very good points and this is why I was asking, because even Russians were saying it openly on Pro Ru twitter to calm each other, that Bakhmut was giving them time to fortify other areas. I remember this chatter on Pro Ru twitter while Ukraine was increasing the number of troops towards Bakhmut.
I also remember before the summer offensive, Ukraine telegraphed clearly that it was going to try and retake Kherson city. So a lot of people including the Russians expected at least a second attack somewhere else. Even on the Kharkiv front the Russians had prepared for some sort of attack, it was just that they didnt have enough men and as well Syrski hit them on the flanks and overwhelmed them moving beyond where even the Ukrainians had expected to reach. It was this that prompted Putin to start the "partial" mobilization. But after Kharkiv offensive for me (and some others), the most logical thing to do was to attack down through Zaporizhzhia at one point to reach as close to the sea of azov. As well as possibly another attack to recapture the Zaporizhzhia NPP as well as land in that area and secure critical Nuclear power. The Kherson city front didnt require a continued push imho since it was going to fall as long as Ukraine cut the lines of communication across the Dnipro river which was the bridges. As well, if they pushed down to the Sea of Azov and then hit the Kerch Bridge, Russia wouldnt be in a position to resupply Kherson Oblast and Kherson city across the Dnipro river through Crimea.
The war would be in a much more dangerous position for Russia and Ukraine would have destabilized Russia by focusing on Zaporizhzhia. I dont think Russia would have committed as many men to Bakhmut if Ukraine had pushed downwards towards Zaporizhzhia seriously. That front would have been just another hot point in the long front. So this is why I was asking about this particular situation. I am a lay man and I have heard Zelensky's reasons for sticking to Bakhmut but I would like a counter for why Zaluzhnyi wanted to attack through Zaporizhzhia as that made more sense to me in 2022.
As you pointed out not only was Kherson city retaken with huge losses but a deal was likely struck for safe passage of the Russian soldiers across which Ukraine honored. And some of these Russian men were then put at the Zaporizhzhia front, battle hardened from the loss at Kherson city and the easy controlled withdrawal. All that fighting yet it was almost impossible for the Russians to resupply Kherson city especially going into the winter!!
Any push in a narrow sector would have created a salient that could be surrounded by counterattacking its flanks. And there were no forces to push over the entire 300 km of the southern front.
Right now Avdiivka is a salient and see how it is being attacked from flanks to surround its defenders.
I think you're confusing the 2022 Russian army which had manpower problems and no major fortifications with the mobilized 2023 Russian army that was sitting behind well laid fortifications ready to man them.
Because Russia didnt have the men to man the Zaporizhzhia front as well as keep 30K+ men in Kherson city, which is why they smartly immediately started mining the whole frontline in late 2022 because Ukrainian ground forces could maneuver past their main units on the Zaporizhzhia front. There was a lot and still is a lot of space for Ukraine to maneuver if they can solve the current mine situation. As well the Russians in 2022 consistently failed to counter attack against Ukrainian maneuvers since they didnt have well dug in fortifications to slow down Ukrainian units in both Kharkiv as well as Kherson city.
And they do not have such units today, which is why the Surovikin line is very effective and works to augment their mobilized men and the Ukrainians unfortunately gave them time to set it up. The only thing saving them is the fact they mined the whole front line after Ukraine gave them the time on the Zaporizhzhia frontline which makes counterattacking easier today not in 2022.
For Avdiivka, Ukraine chose to defend the city, we're talking about attacking, and wrt salients, you have to remember the Russians started out by trying to envelope the whole Ukrainian army in Donbas in early 2022 because their was a salient of similar size to the Zaporizhzhia front. This completely failed which is why they resorted to trying to take small towns/cities(Bakhmut). So I dont understand how they could counterattack Ukrainians in 2022 without enough men in an area much larger than they completely failed to do earlier on in 2022 in Donbas. I hope you get me. The Salient would have been too large for the Russians.
But thanks for sharing your insights. I think I will continue to ask until I get more clearer answers.
Thanks Tom. I think you are completely right about the scale and quality of strikes on oil assets needing to increase. Having said that, there are lots of unknowns and success could turn out greater than anticipated. These refineries often have very little redundancy, meaning that the chance of hitting something that "must" be fixed before resuming production is relatively high. Also, Russia has trouble fixing this equipment due to sanctions and manpower shortages. Even after finally fixing a damaged component, it can take days or even weeks to ramp up to production again.
Thank you for the Q&A Tom. It gives quite a good insight.
I just would disagree on the part of hitting the destillation tower. That is the part of the refiniery where you actually produce the final products for sale e.g. fuel, cerosine and so forth. This is not some piece of metal that is easily replaced. You need quite some special steel and manufacturing skills to produce those. Like other things in Russia and as you mentioned already regarding DIB, those times are gone for them, where you could easily replace those. Especially as they are not coming from an automised factory, but are rather manufactured and labour for that is currently also in high demand for the DIB.
So yes, those attacks need to be rolling on a daily bases, but hitting those destillation towers should quite disable the refinieries and that not only includes fuel for the troops, but also for the civilians and the agricultural production (that's why the put a ban on export during last harvest) and the exports.
Oh, don't think I've 'underestimated' the importance of the distillation towers: actually, have pointed out that a fire of that kind is likely to render the tower non-operational for a few months.
Indeed, I know that distillation towers are relatively sensible.
I do admit, though, I am a bit 'more focused' on control rooms, because over the years have talked with a number of participants about what happened when these were hit - whether in Syria of 1973, or in Iran and Iraq of 1980-1988.
In comparison: when the Iraqis were targeting - for example - the Rey refinery outside Tehran, in 1987-1988, hitting distillation towers had minimal results, because the refinery had four groups of four of these (for a total of 16 towers), and an excellent damage-control team.
I am aware that you mentioned that. I just think if distillation towers are burned down like on the video that is available, it is most likely not a few months, but goes rather into the direction of a year minimum if not replaceable at all during war time, because a lot of the technology of Russian oil infrastructure was imported from the West and companies like Schlumberger won't export to Russia as long as there is a war going on. Additionally, the staff for that equipment was also from the West and I hardly think you will get anyone of those going to Russia any time during a war.
Can only agree with this post of yours: indeed, every single word.
(If for no other reason, then because I know how many of Russian-projected refineries planned for Syria were cancelled due to the economic crisis of 2008, when Russian companies suddenly couldn't pay for all the Western equipment necessary.)
I don't know how much Peter Zeihan's analysis crossed your way. He basically forecasted a war of Russia against Ukraine between 2020 and 2024.
However someone sees his analysis. The key factor regarding education is definitly true. I am for example born in the 80s and am now in my beginning 40s - so the age were you are most productive. My education was in the 90s + 00s -> that was not a time in Russia were anybody was focussed on education and everybody who was, left. So my generation as professionals is missing and male Russians tend to live a lot shorter than their Western counterparts.
So if the Ukrainians manage to destroy those, they are gone and they will stay gone as long as there is war.
I am not sure Ukraine targets oil refineries to hope to limit VSFR army operations directly (i.e. there will be not enough fuel for the army). I think they hope to limit the oil export first. That would hit Russian income hard. Russian income is more dependent on oil export than before the war. (Remember oil shortages in Russian agriculture last summer? They were caused by over-export.) Ukraine have some small short time success with it already and yes - they should be able to do it for long time to have effects on war production etc.
I think, in cases like this one, one can never know for sure.
Strictly speaking: in 1987-1988, 'it wasn't even the Iraqi air force's strikes on Iranian oil refineries' that forced Tehran into negotiations.
'But'... these strikes knocked out some 4-5 out of 6-7 major refineries, and 'killed' the Iranian oil refining capacity - at the time the mass of the IRGC was concentrated on the northern frontlines. So, that mass of troops was 'paralysed' up there in the north, while urgently necessary in the south, and it was clear that Tehran has no means to get the fuels necessary to re-deploy them from the north to the south for at least 6-9 months.
So, a combination of factors. But, crucial one was the disabling control rooms on 4-5 oil refineries.
Yes, I mean for Russia with it's large oil export it would be hard to knock out so many oil refineries to so they would not have oil for domestic and war consumption. But their shattered economy would go down fast without oil export. So yes, then they may (and probably would have to) decide to keep some oil export but limit oil for the army. (Because limiting the oil for the domestic consumption - agriculture, industry, ... - would cause economy collapse too.)
Do you trust Syrsky that he really wants to reform ZSU in a best way, Tom? He is very unpopular in Ukraine, called butcher in ZSU. Do you know he is a russian, his close relatives (father is ex russian army officer) live in RF. There are many people in Zelensky's office with close relatives russian ties.
I know at least 10-15 Ukrainians that either have relatives in Russia, or in the Donbass (including mothers, brothers, sisters etc.). All are fighting. All are using Russian as their every-day-language, and nobody has any kind of doubts about their loyalty.
Thank you for the update. Rather depressing though. The fact that Ukraine kills 700 a day does not really matter because they can and will be replenished and who cares about the Russian infantery soldier… not Putin for sure. But lest be fair, during WW1 losses were much worse. So modern nations can sustain losses. And Russia will. Even without recruiting much from Moscow/St. Pburg. So the only worthwile effort is enough artillerygrenades. To increase the kill rate above 1000 per day, since Russia now can recruit and train 30000 troops per month according to this analysis. Attacking out of the bridgehead across Dnieper is of course an idea, but probably it require to much. Depressing. I hope for a stroke or something for Putin as well.
The goings on in Washington might seem like the USA being an erratic effed up country making terrible decisions. But closer to hand there's a chainlink of extremest criminal fringe under the Trump cult pulling other Republicans along because they vote as a party and try to win, over all. Except that winning comes at the expense of Trump's insanity and his appalling talentless closest supporters wielding the ignorant racist nihilist uncaring and stupid position on every matter, completely without realistic sense of the meaning ramifications or situations they tamper with, that he capriciously undermines. It's not majority America being so feckless and irresponsible, they're more like a criminal organization attempting to destroy the country and destroy its foreign policy and get out from under international law or any consideration of others, and it is they, this Mike Johnson, Don Trump, producing the turbulence and unresolve. All they want is power and control of all the money and laws of the United States government, with the senile and ever idiotic Trump using his practice of torment to foul up the world so he can foul up his political opponents. by schewering America itself with lies and fraud and low intimidation. Trump and his pathetic cohort should have been rounded up and charged with treason long before. And Trump is among all his greasy crimes, bought by Putin, like an ugly doll. It's first of all harmful to people here and harmful to the whole world and the stakes are raised by Trump's unelected meddling on behalf of Putin's disgusting regime.
Industrial control rooms are too easy to hide underground with the modern computer techs. (It wasn't so during Iran-Iraqi war, for these belligerents especially), so I think it's impossible to repeat with modern Russia.
If control rooms have a connection to the Internet, you can hack them and generally disable the entire plant and even blow it up, disabling the security system.
Internet is irrelevant to my point, it's not that modern computer techs are limited to internet suddenly.
(And nope, if something is connected to internet, it does not mean it's easy to hack. Every bank in connected - go and hack at least several in row.)
First, many thanks Tom for your Analisis.
Then, because my latest work with support for a major bank in EU: even low (outsourced) personnel need to go into separate premises, accessing only via biometric devices. After that, they need to log in only and only one computer (login four or five times to have full access).
Also, the info available was divided by branch (I.e.: accounts, mortgages and so on), and only people with very high security rate may access to 2/3 (at the most) info.
I had lived big hacks attacks (even ramson attacks), and never all the bank info (even in the worse cases) was at risk.
My point is: hacking a sensitive premise in hackerland (Russia) is, as minimum, very difficult.
Russians recently hacked deep into a large Ukrainian mobile communication provider - they reset the routing configuration of their network which disabled half of the country's mobile stations for a week.
There were posts on the Internet that surveillance cameras of the Russian railways are easy to access from the Internet (open standard ports in routers or something like that). And many private Ukrainian surveillance cameras are said to have been used by the Russian to check the results of their attacks.
Thus it actually depends on the organization.
Of course. RuZZians are very famous for his hacker abilities… but that isn’t a shield against Ukrainian ciber attacks.
So, the control rooms of all the Russian refineries are hidden, even hardened in sense of being constructed under the ground?
I am afraid they are based on cheap personal computers these days. The special hardware will be inside the plant, controlled by Pentium desktops via ethernet cables.
It's not so uncommon that old harwdware is running in industry - keep it until it's whole industrial unit is replaced. E.g. see https://www.theregister.com/2024/01/30/windows_311_trundles_on/
AFAIk, nope. Most (in Russia) are using ages-old computers available on free markets. I know at least one still running on Windows 3.11 or something like that.
The Russians also proved unable to complete the construction of the oil refinery in Dayr az-Zawr, in NE Syria, back in 2008-2010, because they were already subjected to some sanctions and couldn't get modern computers for the control room. Eventually, somebody I used to know jumped in - by obtaining brand-new PCs via Dubai (obviously, the PCs in question were actually prohibited from being exported to Syria, but nobody in the UAE cares).
Anything modern is much much cheaper than those mainframes of 80s. Windows 3.11 can run on virtually anything https://virtuallyfun.com/2021/07/27/freedos-running-windows-3-1/
My point was not that the control rooms are NOW hiden, it was that control rooms are easy to be hiden (and also dublicated beforehand with less reliable, yet much cheaper and more compact equipment) if needs arise.
Here a useful Twitter/X-thread on Russian oil refineries (with a map of refineries hit by Ukraine so far):
https://twitter.com/AlexvB___/status/1757340866362900952
The one I worked on, yes. And the reason was because the control center had to be protected from the refinery itself. There were certain types of failures that would result in much of the plant becoming a giant bomb. The procedure was that if there was a threat of that happening, everyone rushes into the hardened control bunker, *buried underneath* which was the control system (DCS). I presume many in Russia would be like that.
Curious, since you worked at a refinery, what surface level facilities would the Ukrainians have to hit to either put the refineries out of commission or bring down their output to critical levels for long periods of time.
We were contractors working in said 'bunker' on ancillary systems (e.g. seal pressurization / water demineralisation), so limited experience. But my understanding talking to staff was that there isn't much in a refinery that isn't critical for production and if it shuts down, it can take a long time to start up again. E.g. if the demineralisation plant goes down, you get silicates in the water, which is a poison to the refining catalysts, and so on. This is just one system. Also see others' replies about the main towers.
Thank you so much!! This is quite informative.
My involvement /knowledge was minimal. But overall- refineries are fragile.
Over the time, have chatted with people who used to work on Syrian refineries (whether those hit in 1973, or those hit since 2011), and in Iranian and Iraqi oil refineries of 1980-1988 period.
The impression they have created (independently from each other) was: OK, distillation towers are sensitive (can take 2-6 months to replace), but there is nothing as sensitive as control rooms.
Obviously, that's just one aspect: after all, a refinery is (also) a big system of systems.
Thank you, Tom. For taking the time to answer your questions, it’s a pleasure to read you as always and we look forward to new articles.
Yes, that is right: he answer HIS questions! :) :)
Thanks Tom . .
Thank you Tom for this Q&A. Just a remark for point 1. The West could easily outproduce Russia. While commercial service is nowadays the dominant factor of Western economies and GDPs, there is still a relevant industrial share. Germany with a GDP of roughly 4.1 trillion has app 25% industrial share, while Russia with 2.2 trillion GDP has 32% industrial share. So even German industry alone is still outmatching Russias. But Western politicians and oligarchs decided IMHO that the Green Transformation and Climatechange scam should be "the next big thing" for syphoning trillions into oligarchs pockets. Now the Green transformation is damaging the industrial base of Western economies (recession in Germany) and there is not much money left to spend on fighting off Putins invasion in Ukraine. Additionally Russia was successful with influencing public opinion in Europe in recent years. There is a big share of population also putting blame on Ukraine or NATO for Putins invasion and supporting Ukraine is not really popular. Therefore Western politicians are also reluctant since there is no boost for elections by supporting Ukraine.
'Fair enough'.
The money isn't the obstacle. Like you said, it's the political support and will.
Fair point, but's a minority of crackpots who want to see Ukraine fall to Putin. In England Putin is widely hated ever since he started assassinating people on our land.
Few people want to see Ukraine fall. But they are not willing to take the consequence of that wish and support Ukraine. Most have some vague hope that one morning we will wake up and Putin will come to his sendes, or he will be satisfied or… the whole damn thing could just go away.
And therefore they think 0.5% GDP is too high a consequence. But I think they will get there. The sensible western governments are overly cautious and spineless but they are starting to understand.
And Russia's goal is to sap our will to resist so we never reach the point of making such sacrifices...
For sure it's not the same in each country. I'm an Austrian like Tom and in Austrian/German newspaper comment sections you can read lots of comments from people blaming UKR/NATO for Putins invasion, calling to end all support for UKR, repeating Russian propaganda lies about the systematic killing of Russian speaking people in Donbass 2014-2022 via UKR shelling and so on. Also in Austria and Germany the parties calling for ending support of UKR and armistice with Russia are on the rise. In Austrian national poll the FPÖ is clearly on 1st place (election this year, probably in autumn) and in Germany the AfD in national polls on 2nd place but in some East German federal states (like Saxony, Thuringia and Brandenburg also having elections this year) already clearly leading. UKR is mostly just a side topic, main reason for the rise of FPÖ/AfD is revenge for Covid-missmanagement of governments, rising cost of living/inflation and migration out of control. Especially in Austria cost of living is strongly linked with Russian gas, since we are heavily dependent. Austrias partially state owned mineral oil company OMV signed in 2018 a long term treaty (until 2040) with Gazprom and a "take or pay" condition. Thus the share of Russian gas in January24 was still 98% in Austria gas supply Lots of people are more interested in cheap gas and don't care about the fate of Ukraine.
Interesting. Thanks
Signed in 2018 so already 4 years after Russia invaded Ukraine. Disgraceful.
I'm not going to justify it. In 2018 they even proudly announced the signature and that Russia is a reliable gas supplier for Austria already since 1968: https://www.omv.com/en/news/50-years-of-reliable-supplies-of-Russian-gas-to-Austria
Fortsatz, what sort of things indicate to you that the green revolution is entangled with money siphoning?
Just take the CO2-certificate trade scheme and the CO2 taxes. It's meanwhile a business were billions are shifted and they want more. You just need to read the message on X/twitter of EU-commission president von der Leyen when she was at the COP summit in Dubai: "In climate finance we need to move from billions to trillions (!). To get there we need new sources of revenues. New levies, green bonds and of course - carbon pricing."
Trillions of public funding are like drugs for oligarchs. They are heavily invested in Green Business and are pushing the ESG/climate agenda via media to get their profit.
Did you ever hear such a call for "trillions" to end the UKR war? Despite ending UKR war would be an achievable target, while stabilizing the climate is pure illusion. The UKR war is just a side business for the oligarchs, the outlook for profit for them is quite small compared to the CO2/climate scam and thus it's not in their focus.
Here are the words from von der Leyen on X, so that you can read it yourself: https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1730850092565901713
Then perhaps in 50 years time, this will be seen as a war between the greenie oligarchs and the oil oligarchs.
They are one and same, as far as I know. For example, BP are claiming that they are an energy provider, not just an oil company.
It does not follow that because large corporations enrich themselves and loot public coffers under the guise of protecting the climate that therefore the entire concept of climate change is fake. Very silly analysis/conclusion. In case you haven't noticed everything is commodified in our culture. Capitalists will sell you the rope you intend to hang them with, as they say. Corporations, often in cahoots with government, will find methods of extracting public funds by setting up all kinds of schemes, NGO's, charities, etc, that feign concern for or pretend to solve real problems, but that doesn't mean the problems themselves are fabricated. In fact, it really only works if they're real. Quack medicine is a billion dollar industry, but that doesn't mean cancer is fake. It feels weird having to explain this... Like I'm interacting with someone who's been asleep for the past 200 years. Stick to the science. Empiricism, not inferences from economics.
I stick to the science and therefore know how flawed the science behind climate change is. Yes, there is a CO2-Greenhouse effect, but it's abysmal small and absolutely no relevant driver of climate change (which is changing all the time). CO2 has a vastly positive effect on todays earth, since it is a plant fertilizer and leads to increased harvest yields and plant growth. Even NASA had to admits this: https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/146296/global-green-up-slows-warming
Are you a climatologist? Biogeochemist? Meteorologist? The overwhelming consensus among actual scientists is anthropogenic climate change is real. I think I'll stick to what they say rather than some layman who says things like "actually, more atmospheric CO2 is good because plants use it" and thinks he's made a theory-destroying rebuttal, lol.
A forum like this one is for sure not the right place for a scientific debate in detail. Believe your flawed climate models if you want, I don't give a damn.
Germany manufactured about 4.1 million vehicles in 2023. I shouldn't need to explain that an artillery shell is vastly cheaper and less complex to make than a car, but it helps for rhetoric's sake. Now, recently it was reported that the Germans produced 200,000 shells a year. Sorry, did I say they produced 200k shells? What I meant to say was that they agreed to eventually produce 200k shells. 200k theoretical shells. Per year. This is a joke. It cannot be taken seriously. But what about the US? Well, they set a goal of pumping out 100K shells a month by 2025, which is better, but still inadequate as it is significantly less than what the Russians are already producing. And, again, we are talking about theoretical shells in the fairly distant future.
I don't think you can dismiss these pathetic efforts as the effects of climate change legislation or whatever. No, their lack of action or willingness to reorder or change their economies even slightly is due to something more fundamental and ingrained. Incapable of action, disinclined to change or prepare for tomorrow.... even their promises for the future are profoundly insufficient and disappointing. This is the world we live in. Money has no country or allegiance. It goes wherever it can accumulate more.
I'm afraid that Ukraine is going to have to do a lot more themselves, though I fear they may suffer from the same problem. For over a decade the chance of a war with Russia seemed very high. What, then, were they doing to prepare in terms of ammunition and weapons manufacturing? Yes, hindsight is 2020, but I suspect the thinking and planning people desired to focus more resources on fortifying the country but the "elite" behaved the same as ours and simply did what was most expedient and personally beneficial--nation, people and future be damned. We can only hope that the prospect of national annihilation and the focus on survival that war brings is enough to keep these "elites" in check and give the state the tools and resources to do what is required.
An artillery shell isn't produced out of the blue. You need explosives, fillers, electronics (if it's a smart-shell), raw materials. Most of this base material industry is energy intensive, mostly no longer existing in Western Europe (90% was shut-down and went to Asia due to energy prices) and such factories are harder to build as an assembly line for artillery shells. To build a chemical factory to produce explosives nowadays is next to impossible in a Western European country or it takes at least a couple of years from the start (getting all permits and allowances) until the first product rolls of the conveyor belt.
Why are you making out like everything needs to be made from scratch using only local raw materials? Of course that would make the process more difficult. Good thing the year is 2024 and countries can trade with one another for components and resources they can't acquire locally. Where there's a will there's a way. But there is no will. That's the whole point. And these dismal shell production figures are just the latest example of that among a host of others.
Some interesting numbers regarding military production numbers and such:
Covert cabal (aka guy who counds equipment via satelite images and comments on it on youtube) claims that at the beginning of the war, Russia had 14000 (14 thousand!) total artillery pieces in storage - including literally everything no matter how old. Per latest data 7000 of those are left. (for which we don't know the condition, thus we cannot assume anything - they could be all good, they could be all junk). As far as I understand, likely the 7k missing ones are not just destroyed but could potentially be used as replacement barrels for maintenance, as well as some of them could be increased number of guns on the battlefield and not expended yet at all.
From what I see in the news, France is currently increasing their yearly Ceasar gun production from around 50 to closer to 100. This probably does not include production of replacement barrels for maintenance. Russia, by contrast, is producing a flat 0 guns and barrels from what I've read.
The general argument I'm trying to make is - the impression that Russia is "outproducing" the west is one Russia is trying to create but it's unlikely to match reality. We can never know for sure but definitely Russia has every incentive to fake production numbers upwards and count stuff they take out of storage as new production. And USSR storages are so vast it will take years for this to become apparent. In reality, both Ukraine and the West are doing their job, even if not perfectly - the West is in fact outproducing Russia, and Ukraine is exchanging every western gun for many destroyed Russian guns. This is a slow and steady process but with a clear result - so Russia has correctly concluded that their only way out is to bs their way out of it via spreading narratives like "We're producing sooo much weapons, you have no chance so let's stop now!"
Refurbishment of old tanks, APCs and artillery exceeds production of new equipment. For tanks, about 500 are being refurbished in a year compared to 200 being built. And a lot of those artillery pieces are being salvaged for replacement barrels.
Is it true about barrels? Russia definitely had a very small production of new SPGs through 2010s - were they using old barrels or imported barrels for those?
I was assuming Russia still had barrel production for artillery, even if very-very downsized one.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/01/12/russia-needs-fresh-artillery-barrels-bad-its-yanking-them-off-old-guns-by-the-thousand/
I remember reading a few other sources implying Russia has trouble producing barrels, some citing the specialized steel as the main problem. I haven't researched the topic beyond that. At the very least, while the numbers are all over the place in different sources, there seems to be a consensus that the towed guns are being canibalized for barrels for the SPGs.
Think to recall similar reports. But, tracking down every single one... sigh...
Thanks!
“Before the war, just two factories in Russia were equipped for producing artillery barrels: the Motovilikha Plant in Perm and Barrikady in Volgograd.”
This kinda confirms my original assumption - Russia does produce barrels, but at noticeably lower rates than they are burning through.
BTW: Attacking the destillation tower as shown on the picture is IMHO even a better choice to put a refinery out of operation for months, than attacking control room. Destillation towers are easier to hit then control rooms, which can be hidden everywhere. The destillation tower is also THE central processing element of a refinery, without destillation tower the refinery can't work (normally refineries have no 2nd destillation tower with same capacity) and it takes at least months to rebuild a destillation tower. On 3rd of June 2022 happened an accident (or sabotage?) during maintenance at destillation tower of OMV refinery in Schwechat. It took 4 months to repair (and this just for a damaged destillation tower, not a destroyed/burned down one) and costs of 240 Mio €. The workload of the refinery fell from 91% to 44%.
Thank you Tom. I really appreciated all of your in-depth answers.
Thank you very much for your continous reports!
I did wonder a bit about your comments regarding the attack on control rooms. Having worked in a refinery, I doubt, that it would be possible to target control rooms for the Ukraine. Those buildings are usually already well protected and this protection can be comparable easily enhanced, at least to be quite well protected from what is currently available for the Ukraine.
However, far huger targets and hardly protectable are the destillation towers. When such an equipment had a problem, often half of the refinery was on hold. I would expect that attacking several major ones in one refinery could render the whole refinery useless for months – those parts are usually also not produced in Russia.
I am not talking of storage tanks here, destroying those might usually not affect the production a lot.
I do not want to doubt, that destroying control rooms the better option, but if not possible, I would expect that attacking some equipment would work as well.
Tom, you are certainly right. Some brigades are bleeding and have no rest, but some brigades have a minimum burden. As far as I know some brigades during 17 months were involved in active combat actions.
Excellent overview. I think it's worth keeping a close eye on southwest Kherson and the northwest coast of Crimea. If there is one place where Ukraine stands a chance of creating a logistical "island"of sorts and overwhelming ruscist forces, it'll be west of the Crimea canal.
This assumes, of course, large quantities of stockpiled HIMARS, ATACMS, and other long-range weapons, plus massive amounts of drones. And Patriots/F-16s in close coordination. But water is less of an effective barrier than most folks think. Especially if there are only a dozen or so crossings vulnerable to glide bomb attacks.
If you look at the sum total of Kyiv's wins over the past year, there's a case to be made that the entire 2023 counteroffensive was a kind of maskirovka waged against Moscow and D.C. to cover for a more effective push in 2024. Zaluzhnyi paid the price for Jake Sullivan (America's very own Goebbels) looking bad.
Poor Biden wanted to sell Ukraine and avoid a fight - now he's got another forever war. Coward. Too bad his designated opponents are as bad (that RFK loon included).
Oh, and hiding 500+ tanks from satellite imagery is not that difficult. Dispersal, engineering, decoys - remote sensing has limits. Moscow didn't bother hiding its buildup in 2021 and 2022. Needed to feed the CIA "declassified intel" that insisted Kyiv was doomed so shouldn't get real military aid.
Finally, thank you for pointing out the absolute need for better infantry protection. Big theme in my fiction saga's 2041 plotline - networked infantry backed by disaggregated fires. Armored vehicles remain vital for fire support and taxi service, remote weapons stations and logistics drones are key, but the fundamental core of the battlefield are teams of people in full-body armor relying on augmented reality to locate targets for shooters.
Thanks for the excellent Q&A, I have two more qns.
1.) Why didnt the ZSU strike through Zaporizhzhia in the fall 2022 offensive instead of trying to retake Kherson city directly?
Back in 2022 I thought the telegraphed ZSU build up on the Kherson city direction was a ruse to get the Russians to commit as much across the river and then the ZSU would attack through Zaporizhzhia and then cut off the bridges on the Dniper with HIMARS as well as get close to the Sea of Azov. Instead and to my delight the surprise Kharkiv offensive happened but I still thought after that, recapturing Zaporizhzhia was more important than trying to retake Kherson city at that point. The Russians in Kherson city were in a disadvantageous position with HIMARS hitting the bridges. From a layman's perspective I hope you could shed light on the merits and demerits of this.
2.) Could you elaborate a bit more about Zaluzhnyi's plans to attack through Zaporizhzhia instead of trying to hold Bakhmut after the successful summer offensive of 2022?
This seems like it would have been a smarter idea for me as a layman, although I'm sure those in the security services who wanted to hold Bakhmut had their good reasons as well.
1) was unsure under the threat of flanking attacks that could lead to the Russians surrounding the entire Ukrainian assault group.
But how could they flank the Ukrainian army a distance of over 300km when it took them 9+ months to do so in Bakhmut, a front of about 10km?. As well how would they resupply the Russian soldiers through Kherson city if HIMARS had made the lines of communication across the bridges completely inoperable? I remember at the time Russians had to fly in helicopters to resupply the Russians in Kherson city. How would the Russians advance past without resupply? And how would the left Russian flank get past the Dnipro city to reach the Ukrainian southern attack through Zaporizhzhia? As well how would the Russians flank from the right when they couldnt get past even Bakhmut at the time and even today cant get past Bakhmut?? I know you've mentioned this before but maybe you can elaborate. Because the whole point is Ukraine would put defensive lines on Kherson city then after Kharkiv offensive, strike through the middle in Zaporizhzhia.
"when it took them 9+ months to do so in Bakhmut" - Bakhmut was an urban warfare. The proposed offensive would have gone over fields. And it is very unlikely for Ukraine to be able to concentrate enough power to push along 300 km line - see how the push was attempted in summer of 2023, with all the added tanks.
"how would they resupply the Russian soldiers through Kherson" - the push south in Zaporizhzhia region means there are no soldiers to push for Kherson.
"How would the Russians advance past without resupply" - the supply route goes from Russia through Crimea. Kherson is way aside from the Zaporizhzhia combat zone.
"how would the left Russian flank get past the Dnipro city to reach the Ukrainian southern attack through Zaporizhzhia" - don't need that. First let the Ukrainians push towards the sea, then hit from Russia->Crimea->Melitopol->Vasylivka in the west and Vonlovakha->Vuhledar in the east. The front cannot be too wide, as there are not enough forces.
I'm not sure you got what I was asking. Let me clarify and see if you could explain to me better. According to Tom, after the recapture of Kherson city, Gen Zaluzhnyi wanted to attack through Zaporizhzhia and not try to hold Bakhmut at whatever cost(like Zelensky wanted). Zaluzhnyi's approach makes so much sense to me. My argument goes further i.e Ukraine didnt even need to immediately try recapturing Kherson city. They should have left some units ready to siege Kherson city as a ruse then put the bulk of the forces down towards Zaporizhzhia immediately after the Kharkiv offensive. Instead Zelensky let Russia dictate where the actual hot point of the war would be(Bakhmut) and then Surovkin used the time to fortify the south while Ukraine was dedicated to Bakhmut.
"And it is very unlikely for Ukraine to be able to concentrate enough power to push along 300 km line - see how the push was attempted in summer of 2023, with all the added tanks." Which is my point, in late fall Ukraine would need to strike down one point on the Zaporizhzhia front, not the whole front. And Russia didnt have anywhere near the amount of fortifications nor manpower to man those fortifications nor had the adapted to using off the shelf drones. But by summer 2023 Ukraine had to pinch different parts of the front to find which ones were least fortified which even made it worse. In fall 2022 there was a whole frontline for Ukraine to attack through using similar methods as they used in Kharkiv since the Russians were not yet prepared.
"the push south in Zaporizhzhia region means there are no soldiers to push for Kherson." My point exactly!, Russian soldiers were across the Dnieper in Kherson city trying to hold it yet it was already completely untenable. So Ukraine didnt need to launch a massive attack on Kherson city BUT an eventual siege, I dont mean leave 0 soldiers on that front but leave enough to hold a defensive line. Because the bulk of forces ended up in Bakhmut instead anyway. Similarly, if presently Ukraine can cut off the land bridge and destroy the Kerch bridge, they wouldnt need to immediately attack to recapture Crimea but could siege it since Russia holding onto the territory would be untenable as they wouldnt be able to resupply the area. So Ukraine didnt need to commit a huge number of troops FOR AN ATTACK!! on Kherson city in my amateur arm chair opinion. They simply needed to siege it by blowing up the bridges and carrying out attacks on resupplies and to prevent the Russians from moving forward past Kherson city, not try to retake the city. Then like the Kharkiv offensive, push the bulk of their forces downward through Zaporizhzhia which is what Zaluzhnyi wanted to do in late Fall 2022. I hope we're on the same page so you can share with me your insights.
Kharkiv offensive was stopped because of lack of ammunition supply.
Bukhmut hot point was organized exactly for winning a time for russians to dig in the south, to build protection line and mine the territory. Zelensky has successfully facilitated this russian objective. Everyone knew russians have started to fortify the south from summer 2022 when established grain deal stopped the offensive in the south. By the way, in addition to reckless tactics used of retaking a Kherson you described, the russians were allowed to go out of the city, around 40K troops, 5K units of military equipment were safely crossing the Dnipro river more than a week.
Thank you!! You get what I was asking. I know I'm not crazy for asking these questions. You bring up very good points and this is why I was asking, because even Russians were saying it openly on Pro Ru twitter to calm each other, that Bakhmut was giving them time to fortify other areas. I remember this chatter on Pro Ru twitter while Ukraine was increasing the number of troops towards Bakhmut.
I also remember before the summer offensive, Ukraine telegraphed clearly that it was going to try and retake Kherson city. So a lot of people including the Russians expected at least a second attack somewhere else. Even on the Kharkiv front the Russians had prepared for some sort of attack, it was just that they didnt have enough men and as well Syrski hit them on the flanks and overwhelmed them moving beyond where even the Ukrainians had expected to reach. It was this that prompted Putin to start the "partial" mobilization. But after Kharkiv offensive for me (and some others), the most logical thing to do was to attack down through Zaporizhzhia at one point to reach as close to the sea of azov. As well as possibly another attack to recapture the Zaporizhzhia NPP as well as land in that area and secure critical Nuclear power. The Kherson city front didnt require a continued push imho since it was going to fall as long as Ukraine cut the lines of communication across the Dnipro river which was the bridges. As well, if they pushed down to the Sea of Azov and then hit the Kerch Bridge, Russia wouldnt be in a position to resupply Kherson Oblast and Kherson city across the Dnipro river through Crimea.
The war would be in a much more dangerous position for Russia and Ukraine would have destabilized Russia by focusing on Zaporizhzhia. I dont think Russia would have committed as many men to Bakhmut if Ukraine had pushed downwards towards Zaporizhzhia seriously. That front would have been just another hot point in the long front. So this is why I was asking about this particular situation. I am a lay man and I have heard Zelensky's reasons for sticking to Bakhmut but I would like a counter for why Zaluzhnyi wanted to attack through Zaporizhzhia as that made more sense to me in 2022.
As you pointed out not only was Kherson city retaken with huge losses but a deal was likely struck for safe passage of the Russian soldiers across which Ukraine honored. And some of these Russian men were then put at the Zaporizhzhia front, battle hardened from the loss at Kherson city and the easy controlled withdrawal. All that fighting yet it was almost impossible for the Russians to resupply Kherson city especially going into the winter!!
They user civilians as a human shield for the crossing.
Any push in a narrow sector would have created a salient that could be surrounded by counterattacking its flanks. And there were no forces to push over the entire 300 km of the southern front.
Right now Avdiivka is a salient and see how it is being attacked from flanks to surround its defenders.
I think you're confusing the 2022 Russian army which had manpower problems and no major fortifications with the mobilized 2023 Russian army that was sitting behind well laid fortifications ready to man them.
Because Russia didnt have the men to man the Zaporizhzhia front as well as keep 30K+ men in Kherson city, which is why they smartly immediately started mining the whole frontline in late 2022 because Ukrainian ground forces could maneuver past their main units on the Zaporizhzhia front. There was a lot and still is a lot of space for Ukraine to maneuver if they can solve the current mine situation. As well the Russians in 2022 consistently failed to counter attack against Ukrainian maneuvers since they didnt have well dug in fortifications to slow down Ukrainian units in both Kharkiv as well as Kherson city.
And they do not have such units today, which is why the Surovikin line is very effective and works to augment their mobilized men and the Ukrainians unfortunately gave them time to set it up. The only thing saving them is the fact they mined the whole front line after Ukraine gave them the time on the Zaporizhzhia frontline which makes counterattacking easier today not in 2022.
For Avdiivka, Ukraine chose to defend the city, we're talking about attacking, and wrt salients, you have to remember the Russians started out by trying to envelope the whole Ukrainian army in Donbas in early 2022 because their was a salient of similar size to the Zaporizhzhia front. This completely failed which is why they resorted to trying to take small towns/cities(Bakhmut). So I dont understand how they could counterattack Ukrainians in 2022 without enough men in an area much larger than they completely failed to do earlier on in 2022 in Donbas. I hope you get me. The Salient would have been too large for the Russians.
But thanks for sharing your insights. I think I will continue to ask until I get more clearer answers.
Thanks Tom. I think you are completely right about the scale and quality of strikes on oil assets needing to increase. Having said that, there are lots of unknowns and success could turn out greater than anticipated. These refineries often have very little redundancy, meaning that the chance of hitting something that "must" be fixed before resuming production is relatively high. Also, Russia has trouble fixing this equipment due to sanctions and manpower shortages. Even after finally fixing a damaged component, it can take days or even weeks to ramp up to production again.
Thank you for the Q&A Tom. It gives quite a good insight.
I just would disagree on the part of hitting the destillation tower. That is the part of the refiniery where you actually produce the final products for sale e.g. fuel, cerosine and so forth. This is not some piece of metal that is easily replaced. You need quite some special steel and manufacturing skills to produce those. Like other things in Russia and as you mentioned already regarding DIB, those times are gone for them, where you could easily replace those. Especially as they are not coming from an automised factory, but are rather manufactured and labour for that is currently also in high demand for the DIB.
So yes, those attacks need to be rolling on a daily bases, but hitting those destillation towers should quite disable the refinieries and that not only includes fuel for the troops, but also for the civilians and the agricultural production (that's why the put a ban on export during last harvest) and the exports.
And you need skilled workers for repairs, something in high demand in Russia now. So every hit hjelps, if not necessarily enough.
Oh, don't think I've 'underestimated' the importance of the distillation towers: actually, have pointed out that a fire of that kind is likely to render the tower non-operational for a few months.
Indeed, I know that distillation towers are relatively sensible.
I do admit, though, I am a bit 'more focused' on control rooms, because over the years have talked with a number of participants about what happened when these were hit - whether in Syria of 1973, or in Iran and Iraq of 1980-1988.
In comparison: when the Iraqis were targeting - for example - the Rey refinery outside Tehran, in 1987-1988, hitting distillation towers had minimal results, because the refinery had four groups of four of these (for a total of 16 towers), and an excellent damage-control team.
I am aware that you mentioned that. I just think if distillation towers are burned down like on the video that is available, it is most likely not a few months, but goes rather into the direction of a year minimum if not replaceable at all during war time, because a lot of the technology of Russian oil infrastructure was imported from the West and companies like Schlumberger won't export to Russia as long as there is a war going on. Additionally, the staff for that equipment was also from the West and I hardly think you will get anyone of those going to Russia any time during a war.
Can only agree with this post of yours: indeed, every single word.
(If for no other reason, then because I know how many of Russian-projected refineries planned for Syria were cancelled due to the economic crisis of 2008, when Russian companies suddenly couldn't pay for all the Western equipment necessary.)
I don't know how much Peter Zeihan's analysis crossed your way. He basically forecasted a war of Russia against Ukraine between 2020 and 2024.
However someone sees his analysis. The key factor regarding education is definitly true. I am for example born in the 80s and am now in my beginning 40s - so the age were you are most productive. My education was in the 90s + 00s -> that was not a time in Russia were anybody was focussed on education and everybody who was, left. So my generation as professionals is missing and male Russians tend to live a lot shorter than their Western counterparts.
So if the Ukrainians manage to destroy those, they are gone and they will stay gone as long as there is war.
I am not sure Ukraine targets oil refineries to hope to limit VSFR army operations directly (i.e. there will be not enough fuel for the army). I think they hope to limit the oil export first. That would hit Russian income hard. Russian income is more dependent on oil export than before the war. (Remember oil shortages in Russian agriculture last summer? They were caused by over-export.) Ukraine have some small short time success with it already and yes - they should be able to do it for long time to have effects on war production etc.
It dosent really matter does it? Both are valuable outcomes.
I think, in cases like this one, one can never know for sure.
Strictly speaking: in 1987-1988, 'it wasn't even the Iraqi air force's strikes on Iranian oil refineries' that forced Tehran into negotiations.
'But'... these strikes knocked out some 4-5 out of 6-7 major refineries, and 'killed' the Iranian oil refining capacity - at the time the mass of the IRGC was concentrated on the northern frontlines. So, that mass of troops was 'paralysed' up there in the north, while urgently necessary in the south, and it was clear that Tehran has no means to get the fuels necessary to re-deploy them from the north to the south for at least 6-9 months.
So, a combination of factors. But, crucial one was the disabling control rooms on 4-5 oil refineries.
Yes, I mean for Russia with it's large oil export it would be hard to knock out so many oil refineries to so they would not have oil for domestic and war consumption. But their shattered economy would go down fast without oil export. So yes, then they may (and probably would have to) decide to keep some oil export but limit oil for the army. (Because limiting the oil for the domestic consumption - agriculture, industry, ... - would cause economy collapse too.)
Do you trust Syrsky that he really wants to reform ZSU in a best way, Tom? He is very unpopular in Ukraine, called butcher in ZSU. Do you know he is a russian, his close relatives (father is ex russian army officer) live in RF. There are many people in Zelensky's office with close relatives russian ties.
Yes, I know all of this. So what?
Strictly speaking, all the political- and military commanders of the American Revolution of 1765–1783, were British citizens.
A few were even traitors, but: the mass was none. On the contrary: they've founded the USA. Is anybody complaining about that?
And how many Russians are fighting for the ZSU - with all of their powers? How many were killed in the defence of Ukraine so far?
Nationality matters little in cases of this kind - except to chauvinists.
But how would you expect such people to fight against enemy if it holds their relatives in his hands?
I know at least 10-15 Ukrainians that either have relatives in Russia, or in the Donbass (including mothers, brothers, sisters etc.). All are fighting. All are using Russian as their every-day-language, and nobody has any kind of doubts about their loyalty.
Enough said.
Thank you for the update. Rather depressing though. The fact that Ukraine kills 700 a day does not really matter because they can and will be replenished and who cares about the Russian infantery soldier… not Putin for sure. But lest be fair, during WW1 losses were much worse. So modern nations can sustain losses. And Russia will. Even without recruiting much from Moscow/St. Pburg. So the only worthwile effort is enough artillerygrenades. To increase the kill rate above 1000 per day, since Russia now can recruit and train 30000 troops per month according to this analysis. Attacking out of the bridgehead across Dnieper is of course an idea, but probably it require to much. Depressing. I hope for a stroke or something for Putin as well.
The goings on in Washington might seem like the USA being an erratic effed up country making terrible decisions. But closer to hand there's a chainlink of extremest criminal fringe under the Trump cult pulling other Republicans along because they vote as a party and try to win, over all. Except that winning comes at the expense of Trump's insanity and his appalling talentless closest supporters wielding the ignorant racist nihilist uncaring and stupid position on every matter, completely without realistic sense of the meaning ramifications or situations they tamper with, that he capriciously undermines. It's not majority America being so feckless and irresponsible, they're more like a criminal organization attempting to destroy the country and destroy its foreign policy and get out from under international law or any consideration of others, and it is they, this Mike Johnson, Don Trump, producing the turbulence and unresolve. All they want is power and control of all the money and laws of the United States government, with the senile and ever idiotic Trump using his practice of torment to foul up the world so he can foul up his political opponents. by schewering America itself with lies and fraud and low intimidation. Trump and his pathetic cohort should have been rounded up and charged with treason long before. And Trump is among all his greasy crimes, bought by Putin, like an ugly doll. It's first of all harmful to people here and harmful to the whole world and the stakes are raised by Trump's unelected meddling on behalf of Putin's disgusting regime.