1) the table of SAMs supplied by NATO is not complete. Poland gave its SA-3s and SA-8s, Czech supllied KUBs (SA-6), Finnish Buks are likely in Ukraine, recently a photo of Romanian SA-9 in Ukraine was revealed. Jordanian SA-8s also should not forgotten. And very important, often NATO supplies are revealed very late or not revraled at all. So, all in NATO supplies are enormous. However, they are enormous for the previous war, not war the "war of drones".
2) Not knowing, of course, the costs of RU missiles production (second table), I doubt the cost of Kinzhal (effectively, modified air-launched Iskander) are 7.5 higher than the land based Iskander.
Yup. You've listed a few examples. Add Polish Osa-AKMs (Jordanian Osas were apparently used foremost for cannibalisation and their missiles)... and then add SHORADs and MANPADs.
After all, these are scoring the mass of confirmed kills against the VKS. Especially Piorun, Mistral and ASRAAMs are proving 'deadly' for the Russians.
"After all, these are scoring the mass of confirmed kills against the VKS. "
Not scoring anything nowadays as both sides loses no aircraft anymore keeping them relatively far from frontline. Of course, could be some exceptions, like R-37s take down on average one UA Fulcrum per week, or RU forces loses a Frogfoot or a copter once per ten days for UA attacks. Still, the war in 2025 is principally the war of drones and corresponding attrition.
Regarding Manpads, my bet is that Piorun and Igla are the best scorers at UA side. The one who will write a book about MANPADs in this war, will be a bestseller.
Sure. No VKS Su-25 was shot down by by a Piorun on 8 Feb 25; none on 5 Feb 25, no two Mi-8s of AV-MF were shot down on 31 Dec 24 either... and the VKS remains soooooooo 'freeeeeee' to operate over the battlefield, that every time it wants to do so (like the last few days in south-western Kursk), it has to organise 'strike packages' including EW-helicopters, a demonstrative element, a SEAD-element, and the stikers protected by additional SEAD-aircraft...
...all of that because the RUSI said that the VKS is not taking part in this war, back in March 2022...? :rolleyes:
(And people then wonder why is this war reminding me so much of the one between Iran and Iraq, back in the 1980s....)
"Always '10% on mark, 90% off'....?" You are using again "proven" UA sources?))))
See no contradiction to what I wrote, actually you are confirming my words. Extremely rare losses for both sides in the air. And check your sources, only one Frogfoot was lost this year, on 8th of February to Igla.
It does not mean that belligerents do not use jets. The manner of airwar changed dramatically. UA Flankers and Fulcrums use "hit and run" tactics with US and French guided bombs, while Mirages and F-16s are hunting drones in Western Ukraine. Fencers are rarely seen, ether short of SCALPs/StormShadows or largely destroyed on ground by constant Russian strikes on airfields.
RU forces act in similar manner. SU-34s hitting UA positions with UMPKs, Mig-31s and SU-35s at free hunt, shooting periodically R-37s at airtargets. Su-25 used sporadically at most important places, of course, being on "secondary roles" comparing with drones and UMPKs.
Regarding Iran-Iraq, right, a lot of similarities. For example, instead of SCUDs drones are being used for the "War of the cities".
Oh yes, but sure: 'proven UA sources' have informed me about things they do not know.
For example: your 'extremely rare losses'.
Mate, absence of evidence is no evidence of absence.
The lack of videos showing more kills doesn't mean nothing is hit. It only means that the hit was not captured on the video.
Next example: remember the Il-22 almost shot down by two Ukrainian Buks, back in 2022? Nowadays it's 'in open storage' at Rostov AB/IAP. With all the 200+ holes from shrapnel still in their place. Right next to the Il-22 almost shot down by SA-5s in December 2023. Regardless how 'crucial' for the VKS (and FSB), neither was brought back to St Petersburg for repairs.
It's much worse in regards of specific types of combat aircraft. About 50% each of the Ka-52- and Su-25-fleets, and even more of the Su-34-leet is 'stored'. Grounded due to combat damage and the inability of the Russian industry at least to provide the spares necessary to repair them, not to talk about actually having the capacity to repair them.
Means: not only are there losses not captured on videos (so many: alone over Hostomel, back on 24 February 2022, the VKS lost at least 1 Ka-52 and 2 Mi-8s the losses of which became known few weeks ago), but lots of aircraft and helicopters are - regularly - 'hit', 'narrowly missed', etc.,.. call it whatever you like.... the crews nurse them back to base, land safely, and that's it: they are 'irrepairable'.
Writing articles announcing their 'delivery' is far, far, far, far, far, far, far simpler than actually training their crews, and establishing the support infra-structure in Ukraine (including connecting AEW aircraft to the PSU's IADS) - which in turn is far, far, far, far, far, far simpler than adapting the 'entire system PSU' (including the way its commanders were taught to think and fight) to the opportunities offered by 'even such', relatively limited platforms like Erieye.
And the Atomausstieg and the anti-nuclearism emanating out of Germany more generally did a huge amount to empower Russia in European energy geopolitics. Hell, had it not been for its power as a fossil fuel exporter, Russia might not have evolved back into the kleptocratic revanchist rentier state it did.
Some people actually think the KGB blew up Chernobyl just to frighten the Germans. OK that's going too far, but, cui bono and all that.
Tom, I have a question. This assessment by European countries, that the F-35 was the best option, was it true, honest, realistic and objective? I am beginning to smell something fishy. What is your take on the F-35 procurement processes in Europa?
Anyone who wanted stealth had no other options in production. I think it's that simple. Whether the decision to require stealth by the respective countries air forces was a good one and made sense is beyond my pay grade.
Up front: there is lots of RUMINT about Lockheed-Martin bribing around. But, AFAIK, no serious evidence ever surfaced. Thus, I can't say if there was anything like the 'Lockheed/Starfighter Affair' of the 1960s (when Germany bought not only 500+ F-104Gs but enough spares for them to last some 100 years or so).
Lets stick to what is confirmed. In this regards, it depended on the country in question, but few things were common for most of European NATO-members that have ordered F-35s.
One of important issues was the Dual Key Arrangement. See: you buy... erm... sorry: you lease F-35s (nobody can outright buy them), and the USA deliver not only the jets, training, and infrastructure for them (as a customer, you have to pay for all of this, of course), but also their B61 nuclear bombs. These are stored in the host country, and can be used by the host air force, under specific conditions, and with agreement of the USA. That way, Europeans have nukes - US-made and possessed nukes - even if not having them (nor any kind of a military nuclear program).
Arguably, France was offering the same already since early 1960s (since Mirage III 'lost' to the F-104G Starfighter'), but; 'why should anybody listen to the high-nosed French', and then the 'holy transatlantic alliance'.
And so, while Rafale was winning most of contests, it was 'more important' that it wasn't 'as stealth' as F-35, nor offered at similarly favourable payment conditions like the F-35. Wherever there was any kind of doubts - like some 5-7 years back, when it turned out that the Rafale F3 and F4 were actually more advanced (in terms of avionics/electronics and weaponry) than the contemporary 'batches' of F-35 (meanwhile, this is not the case any more) - Lockheed-Martin was 'helping' with 'cost assessments' that were pure fantasy... but, it worked.
Finally, the majority of NATO-members that bought them was after 'compatibility with US Air Force'. See: their threat perceptions were, 'we need something new for another expeditionary operation, somewhere in the Middle East, Africa, or Asia, and then our jets better be US-made, so they can cooperate with those of the USA'.
In the case of Switzerland, it was even more ridiculous. The threat perception there was 'unrest within and collapse of the EU & millions of refugees streaming to Switzerland'. Plus, they were 'hell or bent' about getting Patriot SAMs. That made things for Washington simple: 'you'll get Patriots only if you buy F-35s'. Rafale won the contest (two times), but the top brass of the armed forces then developed such 'threat perceptions' like, 'we need jets that are stealth and multi-role'. As if the Swiss F-35s would be necessary to bomb 'millions of refugees streaming from the EU' and these refugees would've been armed with S-400s...
With other words: back then, when the mass of F-35s was ordered by 'Europe', Russia was nowhere in sight.
And what are the differences between EF2000 and Rafale? And maybe even the Gripen? I mean, they are all comparable but what are key points of each one with reference to their increased orders for the defense of Europe? The Gripen can operate from improvised air strips but what else?
No other 5th generation aircraft is available, yet, to the West (the F-22 Raptor is US-only).
So, if you wanted stealth capability, your only option was the F-35. It doesn't have a large payload, but its sensor fusion capabilities and stealth permit it to operate as a mini-AWACS (orchestrating other jets) and a sniper of the sky.
That's why Greece wants to buy the F-35 along the Rafale (which can do the heavy lifting and air superiority role). These complement each other nicely. Hellenic Air Force wants to standardize into four fighter types: F-16V, Rafale, F-35 and the older F-16 Block 52/ADV.
Most other countries are doing a straight swap of the F-16 for the F-35, since there aren't many western single engine alternatives for the older F-16 (for some reason, the Gripen doesn't sell much). Either you get F-16Vs, or you move to the F-35. What's the Sweden policy of selling spare parts and ammunition to countries in war? I remember that was as bad as the Swiss policy of neutrality which caused lots of trouble with the Gepard and other systems in Ukraine?
Tom, I think it's useless to intercept drones with missiles. Drones have many advantages over missiles. The production of missiles is costly, complex, and slow. The West's production of missiles should at least double the Russian's production of drones.
Perhaps in 2024, You called to mind the Italian naval gun OTO Melara 76/62 and the Draco unit. You're right, this weapon is effective against drones. The gun has many advantages over missiles, like the rate of fire and magazine capacity; also, the production of 76mm L62 rounds is larger than the missiles' production. This gun can be used against cruise missiles too.
Guns are just a part if a layered defense network , if just one drone get through and nearing a critical target , say an ammunition depot, a weapons workshops , a command node or a parked aircraft, then suddenly expending that missile from the ground or the air would be super economic and cost effective
It's completely different. You're talking about a warship which costs a few hundred euros, and its air defence and the warship is a target. My message is about a Centavro with the Draco unit or the naval gun on a truck.
APKWS integration on fighters is the near term solution for cheap and plentiful interceptors for cheap/slow drones. US are flying 2*7 packs on one hard point on F-16 right now, but no reason not to mount more.
I see, but it's not a primary air defence weapon. It's like powerful and long range Gepard in addition to other SAMs. One missile IRIS-T costs 400k euro. One shot 35mm ammo costs 50-100 euro. One shot 76/62mm ammo costs perhaps 2-3k euro.
A self guided ballistic round. An impressive weapon, per video, each round correcting to target in mid flight. So why is the system not used more extensively in Ukraine?
I think that Ukraine doesn't use this weapon because there are no ready-to-use land systems, only a few protypes Centauro with Draco modules. The Ukrainian ADA-class corvette has this gun, but he is still being built in Turkey.
Yes, and have covered this sometimes the last year (or even earlier).
Essentially, it's like in the EU and the USA. Design bureaus have 'ready for production' designs of SAMs and AAMs, factories are ready to start manufacturing these - but Zele/Yermak aren't placing any orders.
Explanation: the companies first must become profitable.
...where such companies can't become profitable if there are no orders for their products from the government, and they are prohibited from exporting, too. f
Unsurprisingly, 'that train is away', long time ago: orders should've been placed back in 2022 - where, back then, there was the 'additional argument' (at least in Kyiv) that this is 'going to be a short war'. See: 'USA are going to initiate Lend-Lease, EU is going to deliver, and then we're going to drive the Russians into the Azov Sea'...
Meanwhile, the industry turned around and began running its own business on its own. Zele/Yermak then began claiming this as their own success, only to - about a month ago - literally give up and abandon even attempts to control that industry and the distribution of its products.
As a result, the ZSU is now a 'free market': whatever unit has money and skilled commanders is getting products. The PSU obviously lacks both and thus it's getting nothing (except for 30-40-years-old F-16s and Mirages).
Excellent detail as Always. Ridiculous that western production hasn't kept pace. 3 years of war should be more than enough time to scale up and diversify.
The problems of military Western production are the private nature of this production
For illustration - the only plant in the United States, where managed to quickly increase production of 155mm is a plant in Scranton, which Pentagon as owner
There are two axioms of the Western military-industrial complex
1) The military -industrial complex is very profitable!
It should be noted that this is the first document of this kind with an emphasis on the industrial defense base. It was implied before that everything that needs industry would release. But the war in Ukraine sicked doubts about the brains of American military analysts (I'm not talking about the foolish inhabitants of the television channels of the mainstream media) - are the US seeds - and are the USA cool in terms of military -industrial production?
The Scranton plant is still operated privately (General Dynamics). The key to expanding the military production base is simpler - money for long term contracts. Make contracts for 10 yrs with a guaranteed volume buy, and watch the industrial base sprout like mushrooms after rain.
Good point, but: wherever I ask (privately), and whenever chieftains of major defence corporations are speaking out (in the public), the topic is always the same.
The politics is not placing orders. Therefore, the corporations in question have 'no reason & no money' to expand facilities and ramp-up production.
About a week ago, the CEO Thales in France complained about this fact - and that merely a day after Moron was celebrating Zele in London.
So, WTF? Why should anybody expand production if the governments supposed to pay for that are not even talking about placing the orders that would necessitate that expansion?
...where it not only costs billions, but also takes months - if not years - to expand production. So, we're still were we used to be back in 2022: no orders (from the politics), no production.
"Because they are a lot cheaper to construct and deploy, than it costs to shot them down" Not really true Tom when you shot them down with help of similar drones or with Gepards, Skynex anti drone systems you forgot to mention.
Ukraine received more than 120 units of Gepards alone, 4 Skynex systems (if I'm not wrong) which could have safeguard electricity infrastructure with ease if there were no ruzz puppets Syrsky, Zelensky, Yermak in charge in Ukraine.
Gepard has an effective engagement envelope of 1000m. Skynex, too.
Acquiring them and their ammo, and training crews for them is - relatively - cheap.
Doing so and then operating them in numbers necessary to cover all of Ukraine... entirely pointless.
So, you're talking about very short-range systems, I'm talking about systems that can tackle the threat from (really) safe distances. Equipping modern-day interceptors with missiles or guided rockets cheaper than AIM-9s and similar stuff is a big topic, these days. At least since Israel had to face that threat.
"equipped with a Siemens MPDR 12 S-band search radar ... which provides a 15 km hemispherical detection range and has an integrated MSR 400 Mk XII interrogator for automated target discrimination. The Ku band tracking radar also developed by Siemens-Albis has a 15 km range.
The Gepard utilizes two Oerlikon GDF, 90 calibres (3.15 m (10 ft 4 in)) long,[7] with a muzzle velocity of 1,440 m/s (4,700 ft/s) (FAPDS (Frangible Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot) rounds), giving an effective range of 5.5 km (3.4 miles)"
Thank you Tom. 2 questions. 1. Is it true that Patriot missiles are supplied to Ukraine from Spain and Japan, where they are licensed for production (I read about this in the media)? 2. Is there any work being done anywhere to create drone interceptors against Shaheds and Geraniums?
To push back a bit, there's nothing wrong with the euro fighter, geipen, or fat Amy as far as being "interceptors". Their conventional missile capacity -8+ is about the same as any other comparable aircraft except the new Eagles which can theoretically go to 20+ but pretty sure they aren't flying that way. As far as situational awareness, all three of the jets have excellent radar and data links. The bottleneck in ammunition capacity against small slow drones is being addressed by integration of APKWS, which should make any aircraft have practically more ammo than gas.
What's the issue? All of that is coming forward too slow, is still too expensivem, still not in production of sufficient scale - and still not in service in Ukraine.
Thanks Tom. Isn't the countering of air strikes with such systems conceptually flawed though? My understanding was that it is known that these systems cannot compete in an attritional, drawn-out conflict, and for such situations were only meant to buy time to allow the enemy's means of production of munitions to be taken out. So I guess what I am saying is, in addition to everything you have pointed out, doesn't Ukraine need some serious boosts to long range strike capability and also systems like Gepard?
Ideal solution would be to kill the missiles and drones before they can be launched. Preferably: while still on the ground.
However, for this, the ZSU or PSU would need their own 'Reconnaissance-Strike Complex'. See: sensors capable of seeing deep enough into Russia to detect preparations for their launch, and that in real time, and then weapons capable of being fired in a matter of minutes and reaching deep enough into Russia to hit the launchers.
Sorry, but: no way would anybody in the West ever supply something of that kind to Ukraine. And Kyiv... sigh...
(Besides: even the Russians have their problems with maintaining their RSC.)
Well, as I see it, Putin needs this war, and he needs to win it too, so this will happen eventually - either by equipping Ukraine or by other countries doing it directly... or, we could just all cave to right-wing Kremlin friendly politics and come under Russia's boot (China's in my neighbours)
The way 'he' is fighting this war right now, he can go on for years longer.
Russia is out of regular troops? Mobilise reservists. Out of reservists? Bring in North Koreans. Out of tanks? Fight by infantry. Out of artillery? Bring in FPVs...
Simply because there are always solutions on hand.
On the contrary, the EU-part of NATO and Ukraine have managed to corner themselves by overreliance on the USA. And now both the time and opportunities are running out.
It's _really_ a matter of taking determined decisions right now, these days, these hours - not 'in April', even less so 'in June' or whenever else.
Sorry, another one - does anyone know of the status of Tryzub, and if it works at the claimed 2km, what would rolling this out add to the air defense picture?
A very good work Tom, congrats.
Let me add some minor corrections.
1) the table of SAMs supplied by NATO is not complete. Poland gave its SA-3s and SA-8s, Czech supllied KUBs (SA-6), Finnish Buks are likely in Ukraine, recently a photo of Romanian SA-9 in Ukraine was revealed. Jordanian SA-8s also should not forgotten. And very important, often NATO supplies are revealed very late or not revraled at all. So, all in NATO supplies are enormous. However, they are enormous for the previous war, not war the "war of drones".
2) Not knowing, of course, the costs of RU missiles production (second table), I doubt the cost of Kinzhal (effectively, modified air-launched Iskander) are 7.5 higher than the land based Iskander.
Yup. You've listed a few examples. Add Polish Osa-AKMs (Jordanian Osas were apparently used foremost for cannibalisation and their missiles)... and then add SHORADs and MANPADs.
After all, these are scoring the mass of confirmed kills against the VKS. Especially Piorun, Mistral and ASRAAMs are proving 'deadly' for the Russians.
"After all, these are scoring the mass of confirmed kills against the VKS. "
Not scoring anything nowadays as both sides loses no aircraft anymore keeping them relatively far from frontline. Of course, could be some exceptions, like R-37s take down on average one UA Fulcrum per week, or RU forces loses a Frogfoot or a copter once per ten days for UA attacks. Still, the war in 2025 is principally the war of drones and corresponding attrition.
Regarding Manpads, my bet is that Piorun and Igla are the best scorers at UA side. The one who will write a book about MANPADs in this war, will be a bestseller.
Always '10% on mark, 90% off'....?
Sure. No VKS Su-25 was shot down by by a Piorun on 8 Feb 25; none on 5 Feb 25, no two Mi-8s of AV-MF were shot down on 31 Dec 24 either... and the VKS remains soooooooo 'freeeeeee' to operate over the battlefield, that every time it wants to do so (like the last few days in south-western Kursk), it has to organise 'strike packages' including EW-helicopters, a demonstrative element, a SEAD-element, and the stikers protected by additional SEAD-aircraft...
...all of that because the RUSI said that the VKS is not taking part in this war, back in March 2022...? :rolleyes:
(And people then wonder why is this war reminding me so much of the one between Iran and Iraq, back in the 1980s....)
"Always '10% on mark, 90% off'....?" You are using again "proven" UA sources?))))
See no contradiction to what I wrote, actually you are confirming my words. Extremely rare losses for both sides in the air. And check your sources, only one Frogfoot was lost this year, on 8th of February to Igla.
It does not mean that belligerents do not use jets. The manner of airwar changed dramatically. UA Flankers and Fulcrums use "hit and run" tactics with US and French guided bombs, while Mirages and F-16s are hunting drones in Western Ukraine. Fencers are rarely seen, ether short of SCALPs/StormShadows or largely destroyed on ground by constant Russian strikes on airfields.
RU forces act in similar manner. SU-34s hitting UA positions with UMPKs, Mig-31s and SU-35s at free hunt, shooting periodically R-37s at airtargets. Su-25 used sporadically at most important places, of course, being on "secondary roles" comparing with drones and UMPKs.
Regarding Iran-Iraq, right, a lot of similarities. For example, instead of SCUDs drones are being used for the "War of the cities".
Oh yes, but sure: 'proven UA sources' have informed me about things they do not know.
For example: your 'extremely rare losses'.
Mate, absence of evidence is no evidence of absence.
The lack of videos showing more kills doesn't mean nothing is hit. It only means that the hit was not captured on the video.
Next example: remember the Il-22 almost shot down by two Ukrainian Buks, back in 2022? Nowadays it's 'in open storage' at Rostov AB/IAP. With all the 200+ holes from shrapnel still in their place. Right next to the Il-22 almost shot down by SA-5s in December 2023. Regardless how 'crucial' for the VKS (and FSB), neither was brought back to St Petersburg for repairs.
It's much worse in regards of specific types of combat aircraft. About 50% each of the Ka-52- and Su-25-fleets, and even more of the Su-34-leet is 'stored'. Grounded due to combat damage and the inability of the Russian industry at least to provide the spares necessary to repair them, not to talk about actually having the capacity to repair them.
Means: not only are there losses not captured on videos (so many: alone over Hostomel, back on 24 February 2022, the VKS lost at least 1 Ka-52 and 2 Mi-8s the losses of which became known few weeks ago), but lots of aircraft and helicopters are - regularly - 'hit', 'narrowly missed', etc.,.. call it whatever you like.... the crews nurse them back to base, land safely, and that's it: they are 'irrepairable'.
Excellent analysis.
What happened to those two Swedish Avacs?
Still in Sweden, crews undergoing training.
Writing articles announcing their 'delivery' is far, far, far, far, far, far, far simpler than actually training their crews, and establishing the support infra-structure in Ukraine (including connecting AEW aircraft to the PSU's IADS) - which in turn is far, far, far, far, far, far simpler than adapting the 'entire system PSU' (including the way its commanders were taught to think and fight) to the opportunities offered by 'even such', relatively limited platforms like Erieye.
Thanks Tom, very interesting as usual.
Actually the greens in Germany are the WORST party regarding the tackle of climate change.
It's like with the Neos of Austria and them presenting themselves as 'protectors of families with kids, and kids and schools'...
When the SPD and/or the SPÖ are not doing that, somebody else will... no matter if good or bad.
And the Atomausstieg and the anti-nuclearism emanating out of Germany more generally did a huge amount to empower Russia in European energy geopolitics. Hell, had it not been for its power as a fossil fuel exporter, Russia might not have evolved back into the kleptocratic revanchist rentier state it did.
Some people actually think the KGB blew up Chernobyl just to frighten the Germans. OK that's going too far, but, cui bono and all that.
For some reason beyond my understanding a tsunami in Japan made the Germans go against nuclear power.
Tom, I have a question. This assessment by European countries, that the F-35 was the best option, was it true, honest, realistic and objective? I am beginning to smell something fishy. What is your take on the F-35 procurement processes in Europa?
Anyone who wanted stealth had no other options in production. I think it's that simple. Whether the decision to require stealth by the respective countries air forces was a good one and made sense is beyond my pay grade.
Up front: there is lots of RUMINT about Lockheed-Martin bribing around. But, AFAIK, no serious evidence ever surfaced. Thus, I can't say if there was anything like the 'Lockheed/Starfighter Affair' of the 1960s (when Germany bought not only 500+ F-104Gs but enough spares for them to last some 100 years or so).
Lets stick to what is confirmed. In this regards, it depended on the country in question, but few things were common for most of European NATO-members that have ordered F-35s.
One of important issues was the Dual Key Arrangement. See: you buy... erm... sorry: you lease F-35s (nobody can outright buy them), and the USA deliver not only the jets, training, and infrastructure for them (as a customer, you have to pay for all of this, of course), but also their B61 nuclear bombs. These are stored in the host country, and can be used by the host air force, under specific conditions, and with agreement of the USA. That way, Europeans have nukes - US-made and possessed nukes - even if not having them (nor any kind of a military nuclear program).
Arguably, France was offering the same already since early 1960s (since Mirage III 'lost' to the F-104G Starfighter'), but; 'why should anybody listen to the high-nosed French', and then the 'holy transatlantic alliance'.
And so, while Rafale was winning most of contests, it was 'more important' that it wasn't 'as stealth' as F-35, nor offered at similarly favourable payment conditions like the F-35. Wherever there was any kind of doubts - like some 5-7 years back, when it turned out that the Rafale F3 and F4 were actually more advanced (in terms of avionics/electronics and weaponry) than the contemporary 'batches' of F-35 (meanwhile, this is not the case any more) - Lockheed-Martin was 'helping' with 'cost assessments' that were pure fantasy... but, it worked.
Finally, the majority of NATO-members that bought them was after 'compatibility with US Air Force'. See: their threat perceptions were, 'we need something new for another expeditionary operation, somewhere in the Middle East, Africa, or Asia, and then our jets better be US-made, so they can cooperate with those of the USA'.
In the case of Switzerland, it was even more ridiculous. The threat perception there was 'unrest within and collapse of the EU & millions of refugees streaming to Switzerland'. Plus, they were 'hell or bent' about getting Patriot SAMs. That made things for Washington simple: 'you'll get Patriots only if you buy F-35s'. Rafale won the contest (two times), but the top brass of the armed forces then developed such 'threat perceptions' like, 'we need jets that are stealth and multi-role'. As if the Swiss F-35s would be necessary to bomb 'millions of refugees streaming from the EU' and these refugees would've been armed with S-400s...
With other words: back then, when the mass of F-35s was ordered by 'Europe', Russia was nowhere in sight.
And what are the differences between EF2000 and Rafale? And maybe even the Gripen? I mean, they are all comparable but what are key points of each one with reference to their increased orders for the defense of Europe? The Gripen can operate from improvised air strips but what else?
No other 5th generation aircraft is available, yet, to the West (the F-22 Raptor is US-only).
So, if you wanted stealth capability, your only option was the F-35. It doesn't have a large payload, but its sensor fusion capabilities and stealth permit it to operate as a mini-AWACS (orchestrating other jets) and a sniper of the sky.
That's why Greece wants to buy the F-35 along the Rafale (which can do the heavy lifting and air superiority role). These complement each other nicely. Hellenic Air Force wants to standardize into four fighter types: F-16V, Rafale, F-35 and the older F-16 Block 52/ADV.
Most other countries are doing a straight swap of the F-16 for the F-35, since there aren't many western single engine alternatives for the older F-16 (for some reason, the Gripen doesn't sell much). Either you get F-16Vs, or you move to the F-35. What's the Sweden policy of selling spare parts and ammunition to countries in war? I remember that was as bad as the Swiss policy of neutrality which caused lots of trouble with the Gepard and other systems in Ukraine?
Tom, I think it's useless to intercept drones with missiles. Drones have many advantages over missiles. The production of missiles is costly, complex, and slow. The West's production of missiles should at least double the Russian's production of drones.
Perhaps in 2024, You called to mind the Italian naval gun OTO Melara 76/62 and the Draco unit. You're right, this weapon is effective against drones. The gun has many advantages over missiles, like the rate of fire and magazine capacity; also, the production of 76mm L62 rounds is larger than the missiles' production. This gun can be used against cruise missiles too.
I've found this video where the gun has ammunition firing trials. 3 shots became 3 hits of target. https://youtu.be/61YnsQ1v0mw?si=tU631p19Vt6ov5X8
Guns are just a part if a layered defense network , if just one drone get through and nearing a critical target , say an ammunition depot, a weapons workshops , a command node or a parked aircraft, then suddenly expending that missile from the ground or the air would be super economic and cost effective
It's completely different. You're talking about a warship which costs a few hundred euros, and its air defence and the warship is a target. My message is about a Centavro with the Draco unit or the naval gun on a truck.
APKWS integration on fighters is the near term solution for cheap and plentiful interceptors for cheap/slow drones. US are flying 2*7 packs on one hard point on F-16 right now, but no reason not to mount more.
Add to that, long range strike capability to take out munitions factories, air fields and logistics!
I see, but it's not a primary air defence weapon. It's like powerful and long range Gepard in addition to other SAMs. One missile IRIS-T costs 400k euro. One shot 35mm ammo costs 50-100 euro. One shot 76/62mm ammo costs perhaps 2-3k euro.
A self guided ballistic round. An impressive weapon, per video, each round correcting to target in mid flight. So why is the system not used more extensively in Ukraine?
I think that Ukraine doesn't use this weapon because there are no ready-to-use land systems, only a few protypes Centauro with Draco modules. The Ukrainian ADA-class corvette has this gun, but he is still being built in Turkey.
Dear Tom. May be do You hear something about ukrainian rocket programm( including SAM system), except Franken SAM programm?
Project "Hornet'. Installing of AA-11 Archer missiles on OSA (SA-8) platform. One was lost several days ago.
Yes, and have covered this sometimes the last year (or even earlier).
Essentially, it's like in the EU and the USA. Design bureaus have 'ready for production' designs of SAMs and AAMs, factories are ready to start manufacturing these - but Zele/Yermak aren't placing any orders.
Explanation: the companies first must become profitable.
...where such companies can't become profitable if there are no orders for their products from the government, and they are prohibited from exporting, too. f
Unsurprisingly, 'that train is away', long time ago: orders should've been placed back in 2022 - where, back then, there was the 'additional argument' (at least in Kyiv) that this is 'going to be a short war'. See: 'USA are going to initiate Lend-Lease, EU is going to deliver, and then we're going to drive the Russians into the Azov Sea'...
Meanwhile, the industry turned around and began running its own business on its own. Zele/Yermak then began claiming this as their own success, only to - about a month ago - literally give up and abandon even attempts to control that industry and the distribution of its products.
As a result, the ZSU is now a 'free market': whatever unit has money and skilled commanders is getting products. The PSU obviously lacks both and thus it's getting nothing (except for 30-40-years-old F-16s and Mirages).
Dear Tom. Many thanks.
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/long-neptune-has-reached-range-of-1000-km/
Excellent detail as Always. Ridiculous that western production hasn't kept pace. 3 years of war should be more than enough time to scale up and diversify.
The problems of military Western production are the private nature of this production
For illustration - the only plant in the United States, where managed to quickly increase production of 155mm is a plant in Scranton, which Pentagon as owner
There are two axioms of the Western military-industrial complex
1) The military -industrial complex is very profitable!
2) if not profitably go fuck
It's just that you can't overcome it
This is well stated in NDIS
In October 2023, a national defense-industrial strategy was issued in the USA https://www.businessdefense.gov/ndis.html
https://www.businessdefense.gov/docs/ndis/2023-ndis.pdf
+ A brief presentation for the Congress
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/in/in12310
It should be noted that this is the first document of this kind with an emphasis on the industrial defense base. It was implied before that everything that needs industry would release. But the war in Ukraine sicked doubts about the brains of American military analysts (I'm not talking about the foolish inhabitants of the television channels of the mainstream media) - are the US seeds - and are the USA cool in terms of military -industrial production?
The Scranton plant is still operated privately (General Dynamics). The key to expanding the military production base is simpler - money for long term contracts. Make contracts for 10 yrs with a guaranteed volume buy, and watch the industrial base sprout like mushrooms after rain.
Good point, but: wherever I ask (privately), and whenever chieftains of major defence corporations are speaking out (in the public), the topic is always the same.
The politics is not placing orders. Therefore, the corporations in question have 'no reason & no money' to expand facilities and ramp-up production.
About a week ago, the CEO Thales in France complained about this fact - and that merely a day after Moron was celebrating Zele in London.
So, WTF? Why should anybody expand production if the governments supposed to pay for that are not even talking about placing the orders that would necessitate that expansion?
...where it not only costs billions, but also takes months - if not years - to expand production. So, we're still were we used to be back in 2022: no orders (from the politics), no production.
"Because they are a lot cheaper to construct and deploy, than it costs to shot them down" Not really true Tom when you shot them down with help of similar drones or with Gepards, Skynex anti drone systems you forgot to mention.
Ukraine received more than 120 units of Gepards alone, 4 Skynex systems (if I'm not wrong) which could have safeguard electricity infrastructure with ease if there were no ruzz puppets Syrsky, Zelensky, Yermak in charge in Ukraine.
Gepard has an effective engagement envelope of 1000m. Skynex, too.
Acquiring them and their ammo, and training crews for them is - relatively - cheap.
Doing so and then operating them in numbers necessary to cover all of Ukraine... entirely pointless.
So, you're talking about very short-range systems, I'm talking about systems that can tackle the threat from (really) safe distances. Equipping modern-day interceptors with missiles or guided rockets cheaper than AIM-9s and similar stuff is a big topic, these days. At least since Israel had to face that threat.
"equipped with a Siemens MPDR 12 S-band search radar ... which provides a 15 km hemispherical detection range and has an integrated MSR 400 Mk XII interrogator for automated target discrimination. The Ku band tracking radar also developed by Siemens-Albis has a 15 km range.
The Gepard utilizes two Oerlikon GDF, 90 calibres (3.15 m (10 ft 4 in)) long,[7] with a muzzle velocity of 1,440 m/s (4,700 ft/s) (FAPDS (Frangible Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot) rounds), giving an effective range of 5.5 km (3.4 miles)"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flakpanzer_Gepard
No need to cover all of Ukraine, just the most critical objects where Gepards would have been sufficient against UAS and guided missiles
Thank you Tom. 2 questions. 1. Is it true that Patriot missiles are supplied to Ukraine from Spain and Japan, where they are licensed for production (I read about this in the media)? 2. Is there any work being done anywhere to create drone interceptors against Shaheds and Geraniums?
To push back a bit, there's nothing wrong with the euro fighter, geipen, or fat Amy as far as being "interceptors". Their conventional missile capacity -8+ is about the same as any other comparable aircraft except the new Eagles which can theoretically go to 20+ but pretty sure they aren't flying that way. As far as situational awareness, all three of the jets have excellent radar and data links. The bottleneck in ammunition capacity against small slow drones is being addressed by integration of APKWS, which should make any aircraft have practically more ammo than gas.
So, what's the issue? Did I misunderstand?
https://www.twz.com/air/f-16s-with-larger-laser-guided-rocket-loads-drone-kill-marking-emerge-over-middle-east
What's the issue? All of that is coming forward too slow, is still too expensivem, still not in production of sufficient scale - and still not in service in Ukraine.
I meant more narrowly - what's the issue with euro fighter, F-35 and grippen in an interceptor role? They seem good enough on the surface
They're more than good. But too few and thus not enough to supply any to Ukraine.
Thanks Tom. Isn't the countering of air strikes with such systems conceptually flawed though? My understanding was that it is known that these systems cannot compete in an attritional, drawn-out conflict, and for such situations were only meant to buy time to allow the enemy's means of production of munitions to be taken out. So I guess what I am saying is, in addition to everything you have pointed out, doesn't Ukraine need some serious boosts to long range strike capability and also systems like Gepard?
Of course it is.
Ideal solution would be to kill the missiles and drones before they can be launched. Preferably: while still on the ground.
However, for this, the ZSU or PSU would need their own 'Reconnaissance-Strike Complex'. See: sensors capable of seeing deep enough into Russia to detect preparations for their launch, and that in real time, and then weapons capable of being fired in a matter of minutes and reaching deep enough into Russia to hit the launchers.
Sorry, but: no way would anybody in the West ever supply something of that kind to Ukraine. And Kyiv... sigh...
(Besides: even the Russians have their problems with maintaining their RSC.)
Well, as I see it, Putin needs this war, and he needs to win it too, so this will happen eventually - either by equipping Ukraine or by other countries doing it directly... or, we could just all cave to right-wing Kremlin friendly politics and come under Russia's boot (China's in my neighbours)
The way 'he' is fighting this war right now, he can go on for years longer.
Russia is out of regular troops? Mobilise reservists. Out of reservists? Bring in North Koreans. Out of tanks? Fight by infantry. Out of artillery? Bring in FPVs...
Simply because there are always solutions on hand.
On the contrary, the EU-part of NATO and Ukraine have managed to corner themselves by overreliance on the USA. And now both the time and opportunities are running out.
It's _really_ a matter of taking determined decisions right now, these days, these hours - not 'in April', even less so 'in June' or whenever else.
Sorry, another one - does anyone know of the status of Tryzub, and if it works at the claimed 2km, what would rolling this out add to the air defense picture?
Thanks a lot!