Ukraine War, Q&A Session for June 2024, Part 1

Hello everybody!

For today, I would like to start addressing quite a lots of interesting questions that ‘piled’ over the last month or so. Indeed, there is much to discuss, thus I’ll go straight over to trying to answer.

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1.)    Status of our collection for the Shark UAV, for the 3^rd SSO.

Back in February, March, and April, and ending in early May, we’ve collected enough to enable the 3^rd SSO to place an order for its new Shark UAV system. Following brief negotiations (in order to ‘slightly accelerate’ the delivery date, because the company making Sharks is overburdened by all the orders), a contract for Shark-M-TS worth US$44,500, plus AKB-LE accumulator worth US$6,400 was signed in mid-May. The company has received its money on 22 May.

Regarding delivery date etc: sorry, that’s too sensitive to discuss. Let me just stress, once again, that this collection is closed.

‘Mission accomplished’: thanks a lot, everybody involved!

Now let us be patient and wait for resulting videos (all of which is depending on tactical necessities, of course, which is why it’s too sensitive to discuss anything beyond this point in the public).

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2.)    Status of collections for the 3^rd Assault and the 72^nd Airborne Brigades.

I do know that the former passed the US$4,500-mark, about a week ago, but got no news about the latter. I’ll request an update and then come back with details in the coming days.

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3.)    Back on 18 May, I’ve posted an update about the air war, and, between others, the following ‘statistics’:

Since 24 February 2022, Ukraine (PSU, Army Aviation, Naval Aviation) lost:

-          80 aircraft,

-          48 helicopters.

Since 24 February 2022, Russia (VKS and VF-MA) lost:

-          99 aircraft,

-          117 helicopters.

Different people have then expressed their doubts – apparently without any kind of checking of other sources collecting such statistics, and that although a number of these is easily available (if one only tries to find them). This even more so considering they say they’re so upset by the fact that ‘my’ numbers for Ukrainian losses are ‘dramatically different’ to those from other sources…

Yes, they are different - and that because of different methodology and aims.

So, why this difference?

Because I’m after finding out patterns in this war, after finding out when, where, how, and why combat losses ‘happen’ - and thus only counting losses of OPERATIONAL, COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERs of the PSZSU, the Ukrainian Army- and Naval Aviations, and of the Russian VKS and the VF-MA. See: MiG-29s, Su-24M/MRs, Su-25s, Su-27s, Su-30s, Su-34s, Su-35s, and different helicopters that were operational at the time they were written off (regardless the reason).

Moreover, to me, it doesn’t matter if Oryx counts 20+ Ilyushin Il-76 transports ‘stored’ at Melitopol Airport and then captured by the Russians on 24-25 February 2022 in the grand total - and I’m surely not of the kind who is then going to say that ‘based on Oryx, Ukraine lost 100+ aircraft’.

For me, crucial is that at the time of their loss, the aircraft/helicopters in question were operational and were in operational service. If not in active service, for me, they are irrelevant.

For similar reasons, I’m not counting 20+ different helicopters captured by the Russians at the Chaplynka AB/Kherson Airport, on 26-27 February 2022. These were stored, and most of them not flown already since 2017-2018 (for those that were, see, for example, here). They were not in operational service at the time of their capture, and thus none of them was ‘shot down’ in combat, and there is nothing to learn from their loss (except that the Ukrainian defences of the entire Kherson and southern Zaporizhzhya Oblasts at the time were a huge mess, which is well known). Just like I’m not counting aircraft destroyed for other reasons and then far away from the combat zone. Including them into ‘combat-related statistics’ would be equal to including Aero L-29 Delfins abandoned at the Vovchansk AB since the times of the USSR…. a futile exercise.

Mind: I’ve neither got the time nor the money to go doing such things like when the US Air Force and/or US Navy back in October 2001 were wasting Paveway laser-guided bombs (price tag US$500,000+ per round) to plink wrecked Antonov transports of the former Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Air Force, abandoned at Bagram AB already back in the late 1980s… because nobody in the Pentagon ever came to the idea to study some articles published in the World Air Power Journal Volume 42 ‘or so’, published sometimes back in the late 1990s… even more so considering this would be entirely irrelevant for what I’m really after: becoming capable of telling you how, where, and why are what aircraft/helicopters shot down in this war in Ukraine of the last two years.

Now, how can I be sure, those, for example, 80 Ukrainian- or 99 Russian aircraft (meanwhile it’s more than 85 Ukrainian and over 100 Russian aircraft, but lets remain at figures I’ve mentioned as of 18 May) - were ‘really’ shot down?

Indeed, how can I say these figures are including, for example, 18 Ukrainian Su-25s…? Or 26 Russian Su-34s….? ….or (something for really careful readers here): why the number of destroyed operational Ukrainian combat aircraft ‘jumped’ from 80 to more than 85 in a matter of month….?

Up front, mind that I’m doing this for decades already and thus know where to find what. Or at least how to find out where to search for. Indeed, I’m used to researching far more obscure conflicts and air forces than those of Russia or Ukraine. For example: you think there are online resources about the Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen Air Force at the civil war in (‘South’) Yemen of 1986? Ever tried to find an authoritative source describing official relations between Baghdad/Iraq and Moscow/USSR as of 1978-1979 - so to know if these were really as ‘cordial’ as described by 99,9% of published sources (whether in print or online), or not, and what were their effects upon the Iraqi acquisition of Soviet-made combat aircraft during that period?

Well, ‘but’: such affairs are my ‘bread and butter’, for years already (as can be seen here or here, for example).

Thus, I’m actually used to having nothing to start with. In comparison, the War in Ukraine is sort of ‘over-published’. Whatever happens, there are not just 5, 10, 15, but 100+ reports. And all of them: online. Available ‘at a click or two’ (though frequently: many more). Instead of ‘is there anything at all about that topic(?), the question is rather: which source is ‘good’ (to use)?

Indeed, nowadays there are instances collecting even more comprehensive evidence than Oryx: take LostArmour.info as a good example. Or ukr.warspotting.net. They are geolocating losses they record, too.

Some are more-, others less complete. Nobody is perfect, but: when one cross-checks all of them – which is, arguably, ‘awfully lots of work’ and ‘taking weeks’ (if not months) to do – one does get a very complete insight.

Point is: in nearly all the cases summarised in the statistics I’ve mentioned above, there are, at least, 2-5 photographs of the wreckage. Many of these are showing details of their markings – like ‘Bort’ (that’s the two-digit side-number applied on every Russian- and every Ukrainian aircraft and/or helicopter), and like (in the case of the Russian aircraft/helicopters only) the registration. The latter is a five-digit number prefixed by ‘RF-‘.

A fin of a Russian Su-34 shot down late on 5 March 2022 over Chenihiv. The type of aircraft was easy to recognise by (‘unusual’) camouflage colour and the shape of the fin. And when one has the Bort as clearly visible as in this case, and with help of some online research, it’s easy to find out its registration was RF-81879 - even when this is not visible on the photo, because the aircraft was smashed when hitting the ground.

Indeed, in at least 50% (if not more) of cases even the names of their pilots/crew-members are known. Alternatively: the bort and/or the registration is not known (because, for example, some Su-34 or Ka-52 went in at such a high speed, it completely disintegrated on impact), but names of the crew are known.

How do I know the names of the crew?

Actually, the statistics in question was collected by my colleague and co-author of several books, Milos Sipos. His methodology is to write down every single claim: whether one issued by the Keystone Cops in Moscow, or the officials in Kyiv. Whatever appears in the public - no matter where. Claims are always the primary starting points. And then he’s like a spider: ‘sitting there in his corner and waiting patiently, and silently’. See: patiently scanning hundreds of instances in the mainstream- and the social media.

Sometimes, nothing happens at all. Means: a claim remains a claim. Say: on XYth March 2022, the Keystone Cops claimed to have shot down a MiG, and/or Kyiv claimed to have shot down a Sukhoi… In such cases – in cases for which no evidence ever appears in the public – the claim is never added to the total figure. I.e. the figures I’ve mentioned are not including any kind of unsubstantiated claims (otherwise, Milos, and thus me too, would be at 300+ Ukrainian and some 500+ Russian aircraft and helicopters… that’s at least what the Keystone Cops and official Kyiv are meanwhile claiming).

In other cases, it’s mere hours, sometimes days, and other times weeks or even months, until evidence starts appearing. Evidence in form of photos of the wreckage, in form of obituaries for killed crew-members (see the example of the above-mentioned Su-25 Bort 10, registration RF-91969). Sometimes, it’s so that somebody is badly injured when shot down, and passes away ‘only’ months later. Other times, there’s just a ‘confirmation’ in form of a social-media report that a crew of two recovered from the crash-site somewhere in southern Belarus, was brought to a hospital in Minsk (in [quote], ‘moderately critical condition’). If often takes weeks, months or – meanwhile – even years before at least the crash site is geo-located, and/or there is a clear satellite photograph of the crash site.

Good example: the Ukrainian courts are regularly publishing results of their investigations. So also those into circumstances leading to losses of the PSU. In this instance, they’ve released the results of an investigation into a loss of two Su-27s, back in October 2022. Combined with obituaries of the killed crewman published elsewhere in the social media, it’s easy’ to find out the rest. Alternatively, take this Su-25 of the VKS, shot down back in early March 2022. As can be seen from one of photos on that link, the registration was RF-91969. The rest is then simple: open Google, enter ‘RF-91969’ - yes: just the registration number – and you’ll get pre-war photos of that aircraft, even an ‘accident summary’ from the Aviation Safety Network and similar instances.

…and if not, then check such instances like the (military) database of the Scramble.nl, Soviet Transports Data Files, Planespotters.net, rzjets.net etc., etc., etc….

…and then repeat that exercise for every single other claim you’ve ever heard of… and never stop cross-checking, nor fall for illusion that your data and conclusions are ‘perfect’. They’re never perfect: but, what Milos has collected here is perfectly fine with me.

Bottom line: this is all a lots of work that, arguably, 99.9% of you is never going to even consider doing. Actually, you’re dependent on lots of people like me doing it for you.

Point is: it’s all based on constant, consistent, systematic, patient research, never-ending cross-examination, and lots of work by lots of different people.

For how precise are the results: precise enough that when working on books like this one (to be published in about two weeks from now) we can precisely follow developments on the ground (even name involved units) – although there are no related reports from first-hand sources, the mainstream- or the social media at all. Indeed: although certain of operations in question are something like ‘military secrets’ and thus not to be revealed in the public for a number of years longer.

That’s when deduction is lots of help. For example, we know what unit claimed what aircraft or helicopter as shot down on the given date and place…. or at least we know the area in question. Thus, we can find out what unit was there at the place and time in question: then we check a good map of the area in question, see what’s the terrain, where are what kind of obstacles, urban areas, in what direction was one or the other party moving around the time in question etc… and you do ‘get the picture’.

All of this is why am I so confident that Milos’ statistics I’m using for my work is rock solid.

In the worst case, it’s missing a few of ‘totally unknown losses’. For example: some aircraft is badly damaged; the pilot/crew flew it back to base, landed safely, but the aircraft/helicopter turns out to be too badly damaged for repairs. It’s written off. Or, the aircraft/helicopter is claimed as shot down, then crashes somewhere far away from any inhabited places, or the frontline. None of contacts or sources available to us knows it crashed…

That said, both Milos and me doubt the number of such cases is going into anything more than ‘perhaps a dozen’. The reason is that there is simply no evidence it does. On the contrary: through the first five months of this year, Milos has collected evidence for less than a dozen of unknown Ukrainian and Russian losses from 2022 and 2023, and then few others were lost since May (which is then offering you the answer to the question, ‘how comes the total for Ukrainian losses “jumped” from 80 to 85 in a matter of month’).

Finally… well, you ‘do not believe’ these figures?

No problem. From my point of view,

a) beliefs are something for places of religious worship, and

b) if you have better-substantiated figures: show them.

(…to be continued…)