Ukraine War, 6 February 2025: ZSU Corps Organisation
by Donald Hill & Tom Cooper
Hello everybody!
Few days ago, the Glavcom (General Syrsky) proudly announced a ‘major reorganisation’ of the ground forces ZSU (read: Ukrainian army). Unsurprisingly, lots of commentary is making circles in the social media, and we’ve received requests for our 5 cents.
Actually, the Glavcom’s official release has left quite a few things unexplained and thus lots of details are still unclear. Therefore, the mass of commentary that meanwhile became available is rather guessing than drawing useful conclusions.
Biggest question marks are rosen over the issue of the potential effectiveness of the future corps commands of the ZSU. Theoretically, every corps should receive its own staff to plan, coordinate/integrate and run operations, which is a skill currently almost non-existent in Ukraine. Thus, where does the Glavcom plan to obtain it from?
Related to this issue is the fact that corps commands are the highest form of tactical level organisations: through their emergence, the ZSU should receive a ‘link’ between its current brigades, operational groups and the GenStab-U, but it is unclear how the Glavcom is intending to stop micromanaging the battle and then let such links come into being… and then let them function on their own.
As next, corps commands should receive corps-level units: electronic warfare units, engineers, fire-support units, logistics, UAV-units. Once available, these should be deployed to shape the battlespace, weight main efforts, reinforce success, serve as reserves, patch gaps in the frontline and similar. Currently, there are no such units in the ZSU: indeed, the Glavcom can’t stop complaining he’s got not enough troops (and units), and thus this alone would be a major change.
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Far away from all of this, we think that - for the start - it is a sort of ‘small wonder’ the Glavcom seems to be actually realising Zelensky’s original announcement from around two months ago.
By side the issue of ‘if Ukraine has the necessary officers’ (i.e. the ‘tallent’) for corps commands (we have no doubts this is the case): our conclusion is that the actual purpose of creation of corps commands in the ZSU will be addressing certain very basic needs. Foremost such like communication and coordination of adjacent units (something that, in theory, was the task of operational commands by now, but did not function at all), establishing resiliency and flexibility in tactical responses anhd in regards of logistics (another issue that is not the least working; on the contrary, presently it’s on brigade commands to care about both issues), and standardising a culture of - hopefully - success (shall we say more?).
But, let us go to some depth in this regards.
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Major organisational issues are marring the combat effectiveness of the ZSU right since the original Russian invasion of 2014. Indeed, initially, there was nothing else than disorganisation within the ZSU - which is no surprise considering as of 2014 it was in such a dilapidated state that alone assembling a single mechanised battalion to react to the troubles in the Donbas was considered a ‘major achievement’. Sure, things did get a bit better through the same year, but actually: these issues only grew with the time, and were clearly obvious as of late February 2022. However, back then there was so much energy within the command staff at brigade level, and the ZSU was so much outmatching the Russians in manoeuvring warfare, that they were not badly felt before the final weeks of the battle for Severodonetsk, in June 2022.
Point is this: even if one is ignoring what was happening to the ZSU before 2014, all of these issues were understandable. The force was scrambling to rebuild and defend itself and Ukraine from the Russian onslaught. The problem is what happened ever after: since 2015, instead of fixing the well-known deficiencies, they were left in place. One of the deficiencies was the poor communication and coordination between adjacent units; another was the practice of detaching battalions from brigades and sending them as reinforcements to another sector. Especially the battle of Bakhmut clearly made the problem worse.
In more recent times, these organizational issues directly contributed to the destabilization of the Avdiivka-Prokrovsk (April 2024), and to the destabilization of the Vuhledar-Kurakhove sector (August-October 2024). Indeed, the destabilisation of additional sectors could be monitored already in June 2024, and was accelerated in September.
We began addressing these issues in early November, By the end of the same month, official Kyiv announced it would a battalion-brigade-corps system. They said they would not do a battalion-brigade-division-corps structure because that level of organization would be ‘too expensive’. Also at the end of November, Drapaty was appointed commander of the ground forces, an act that would hopefully advance reforms. Last week, talk moved to action as they announced that they began the transition to the corps structure. Each corps would have 4-5 brigades, a reconnaissance battalion/regiment and other units….
Ironically, this is very much how a division would be organized: just the official designation of that new organizational structure isn’t the same.
Point is: whether such an organisation is then called a ‘division’ or ‘corps’, is nowhere near as important as it actual function.
Now, two days ago, the well-informed Ukrainian journalist Yury Butusov then added some unconfirmed details. From reading his explanation, the future organisational structure was not yet perfectly clear, though. At first, it could be that Operational Strategic Groups (OSGs), Operational Tactical Groups (OTUs), and Tactical Groups (TGs) will be eliminated; alternatively, OTUs will be reduced, OSUs are going to remain as a link between the corps-level command and the GenStab-U etc.; finally, the word was that all the OSGs, OTUs, and TGs will be disbanded…
We’ve heard something else: along the version we’ve got to hear, OTGs are going to remain in place, and act as an ‘interface’ for miscellaneous units. Furthermore, out of some 160 independent brigades, independent regiments, and independent battalions of the ZSU, some 80-100 are going to be assigned to up to 20 newly-established corps commands, while another 60+ are going to be managed directly by the GenStab-U - via the OTGs.
For example: the National Guard (NG) is going to be re-organised into two corps commands. One is going to be anchored on the 12th NG Brigade Azov (and commanded by Denys Prokopenko, CO Azov Regiment in Mariupol, as of February 2022), the other on the 13th NG Brigade Khartia. Within the ZSU Ground Forces, one corps command is going to be created on the basis of the 3rd Assault Brigade (with Andry Biletsky as the CO of a total of five brigades), another anchored on the 92nd Assault Brigade. The airborne forces are also to be re-organised (apparently into two corps commands).
Notably, especially during the last year, the command staffs of all of these brigades have proven their capability to be expanded into corps commands (in fact: some of brigades in question are already operating as ‘mini-corps’). Indeed, ‘corps commands centred on such anchor units’ was one of the concepts we hoped the ZSU would implement. Such a reorganisation would position a ‘solid’ unit as the core of a corps: its proven staff would then ‘automatically’ influence all the procedures within all the units subordinated to them. With other words: the commander of the anchor unit - and the ZSU has not only a number of such commanders, but the commanders in question have created excellent command staffs, i.e. ‘teams’ - promoted to corps commander is going to become able to change the culture of the other units by implementing proven practices, procedures, and training.
Of other details we’ve heard, ten units of the VII Rapid Response Corps (so far a purely ‘administrative’ unit, no operational command), are going to be split into two (combat/operations) corps commands. The 30th Marine Corps - which is yet to recover from all the experiences on the Krynky bridgehead, and whose units are scattered all along the frontline - is going to be converted into a combat corps command, too. Obviously, these and other (‘administrative’) corps commands are going to be completely re-organised (in comparison to their current structure).
Correspondingly: (about) 20 corps commands with 4-5 brigades each, mans that 80-100 brigades are going to become corps formations. The idea was, is, and is going to remain that units assigned to the same corps are going to be better coordinated and meant to fight along each other.
For reasons explained three days ago, even more important would be the fact that the creation of such corps commands ‘anchored’ on proven units/commanders/command staffs would massively reduce the Glavcom’s (incompetent and haphazard) micromanagement. Actually: that would be the major improvement (even if it would be better if there would be an intermediate command layer atop of these 20 corps commands… but then, well, lets not descend into wishful thinking).
Presumably - and contrary to the Glavcom and the disorganised, dysfunctional, over overruled commands of the current OSG, OTGs, etc. - these corps commands are going to be capable of establishing their own reserves, too, so they would have a local reaction force that could respond to any crisis.
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One piece of information that’s ‘disturbing’ the resulting image/impression of the future ZSU are claims along which each corps is going to be responsible for a frontline stretching over some 120-150 kilometres. This is (far) too much. Sure, some of brigades and battalions are currently guarding ‘quiet’ sections of the frontline (or borders), and it is possible that this actually means them. But, expecting a single corps to be enough for, for example, the complete Pokrovsk section… sorry, that’s a daydream.
Therefore, we consider such claims for ‘purely theoretical’.
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Having explained what others have got to hear, and what we have got to hear, let us now ‘warn’ about some of immediate results of all of this, too. ‘Warn’, because while all of these changes - one way or the other - are ‘promising’, there are also ‘hidden dangers’. Especially during the period (some 3-6 months) during which this reorganisation is going to to take place.
Point is: nothing of this reorganisation can be done over the night. Right now, the mass of ZSU’s brigades and battalions are strewn all over the battlefield, and intermixed: there are at least 4-5 brigades whose commanders can’t even say where exactly has the Glavcom sent what of their battalions, or in what condition are the units in question. Moreover, to form coherent corps commands, the ZSU is going to need to withdraw 4-5 brigades from the frontline at once, and then spend at least a week (better: longer) with re-training them.
When so many brigades are withdrawn from (very) different sectors of the frontline, they have to be replaced. In turn, once any resulting corps commands assumes responsibility for specific sectors, it should become possible to return all the detached battalions in that sector back to their brigades. Amid the chaos created by Glavcom’s micromanagement of the last two years, this is entirely impossible to do at once: this can only be done gradually, which is why do we assess that this re-organisation is likely to last ‘months’ (as said above: probably some three to six months).
As next, mind numerous instances in this war where the Russian intelligence units were extremely effective in regards of not only finding out about unit rotation, but also in figuring out ‘borders’ of responsibility between two major Ukrainian units - thus enabling (even) the Keystone Cops in Moscow to attack precisely at such points in time, or along these ‘borders’.
Furthermore, the reorganisation does not mean that the ZSU has ‘promptly’ solved all of its communication and coordination issues. In the worst case scenarios, one unit might pull back without an adjacent unit knowing and that unit would be subjected to flanking fire or encirclement. This - critical - issue (indeed: the core reason for this reorganisation) is going to be solved only once the reorganisation is completed.
This all means that - especially during initial stages of this reorganisation - there will be a lot of movement among units: this is precisely what the Russians became experts in exploiting to their advantage. Means: every major movement of one or another ZSU unit is meanwhile introducing a lot of risk. This is why the ZSU must be expected to - in the coming weeks and months (all provided the reorganisation really takes place, of course) - suffer a number of mishaps, and lose additional terrain (while, hopefully, not losing too many troops, too). This is going to remain that way as long as disparate brigades and battalions are fighting ‘independently’ even if deployed alongside each other.
What matters the most is that, in turn, once the new corps system is in operation, these weaknesses will be reduced by four to five times - alone through the simplification of the battlefield management. Especially considering the quality of potential future corps commanders, one can expect them to mitigate most of the risk of poor coordination with their adjacent units. There is a relatively large core of not only combat-experienced commanders but entire command teams in the ZSU nowadays. They know what are they facing and how to lessen the risks: thus, there is a good chance they might these risks with the proper procedures.
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Bottom line: there’s a big difference between saying something and doing something. Nowhere is this as valid as for a major command reorganisation in the middle of a war.
Drapaty - all provided the Glavcom really lets him do - has proven himself at every level of command to date. His efforts at reform are supported by numerous brigade- and battalion commanders. That is already a ‘good/positive sign’.
Of course, there remain numerous other issues within the ZSU (foremost training), but lets start with the reorganisation of the way it commands its combat formations: if this is implemented as proposed, the combat effectiveness - the power - of the Ukrainian army will be significantly improved. That is offering reasons for (cautious) optimism.
Stalin/Soviets did not want the military to make their own decisions, because they could then overthrow the Soviet Union. Look what happened to Prigozin! This old centrally managed top down system comes from the Soviet days. You forget why Ukraine had this top down micromanaging system, where no decisions were allowed to be made by lower ranks, regiment, brigade division. The Russian, Stalinist, Soviet leaders do not want any power or decision making to exist at lower levels. Because Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, these old structures, management styles and processes were ingrained in society, military and politics. It took the Baltic states, Poland and eastern Europe 10 yrs to get rid of this and some countries (e.g. Hungary) still cannot embrace devolved management structures. Anyway, this is positive if can be done while fighting the war and Russian KGB/FSB cannot infiltrate the new structure. Ukraine has clever, broadminded, innovative and energetic people in the military and all parts of their society. Lets hope that this new structure which makes the Ukrainian military more efficient, powerful and successful, works. Remember, "the old management will embrace change one retirement at a time"!
Thank you so much. Maybe your joint efforts have found over months a listening eye and ear.