When you have good leaders, eventually their subordinates will be good. The leaders named have successfully improvised and solved their way out of many problems since being small militias or battalions up to their present status as brigades. I am confident that they will deal with the upcoming issues.
The first step is to come up with a plan that should improve the army. This plan should theoretically do that.
The second step is to implement the plan. That depends on the leaders and the support they have. The leaders named have done so well that once they are given an objective they have been given a high level of autonomy to figure out how to achieve that objective. I'm sure that will be the case this time, as well. I don't know how much support they might need in terms of equipment and other assets, but these leaders have also established a high level of self sufficiency in acquiring needed equipment when the government isn't able to do so.
Simply said, they get things done. If they can't do it themselves then they find people who can.
The Peter Principle does exist but I would be surprised if this task exceeds their abilities. I also believe they were chosen to implement the corps first so they can identify issues and solutions for those that follow.
But you're right, potential is not the same as achievement and we are all interested in the outcome.
I never understood why they were creating new brigades when existing brigades were short on personnel. The soldiers in the existing brigades thought the same thing. While personnel shortages existed, they were never going to be a good idea. The other failures just made them an even worse idea.
What is there not to understand? After the Ukrainian counter-offensive was stopped in October 2022 by Putin's mobilisation decree and his order to abandon the large Dnepr beachhead around Kherson, the conflict first entered into a stalemate, and then Russia regained the initiative in Bakhmut. The Ukrainians, from then on, could have either reinforced their brigades stuck in positional trench battles all over the country against a Russian Army which is more than formidable on the defensive(as we saw during the disastrous Ukrainian Zaporozhye Offensive in 2023), which would have dragged the conflict out forever and wouldn't have lead to anything other than a negotiated settlement on then-existing borders(Putin's preferred option, by the way), or, they could have tried to form a large reserve corps of fresh brigades and deployed them on one sector of the front(they eventually chose the Melitopol-Berdyansk corridor) in order to break the stalemate and exploit a breakthrough, cut-off Crimea and South Kherson, and negotiate a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine.
Their reserve corps, however, was destroyed in Zaporozhye, so that didn't work out - mostly because Zelensky chose to funnel tens of thousands of men into the Bakhmut meatgrinder against Russian drug dealers, rapists, and murderers from Russian prisons, giving the Russians enough time to reorganise their shambles of an army and fortify in Zaporozhye, at the same time as building a reserve corps. In effect, they chose both options: they reinforced both the front and diverted massive resources to forming the reserve corps, leading to the failure of both options.
After Zaporozhye, the Ukrainians were facing the same dilemma. Either concentrate on reinforcing the front and stop the Russian advance, stalemating the war and leading to a negotiated settlement based on de facto current borders, or sacrifice land in order to build up a reserve corps and go on the offensive with the hope of inflicting a blow so hard and so sudden that the Russians are disorganised and forced to negotiate a withdrawal from Ukraine's de jure borders. Yet again, the Ukrainians chose a compromise solution of both reinforcing the front and forming a reserve corps. Except this time, the situation had detoriated so much at the front in the meanwhile that the new reserve corps was first stripped of much of its strength in order to hold on to land in the Donbass(and then also in Vovchansk), and then deployed to the Donbass in its entirety because the Ukrainian front in the Donbass was on the verge of complete collapse.
The only reason they stopped forming new brigades now is because I) they've abandoned any hope of beating the Russians militarily, so there is no reason to form a reserve corps for the third time and II) there's nothing left to form a new reserve corps from. It's February 2025. The mobilisation reforms were 9 months ago, in May 2024. The mobilisation manpool has been nearly exhausted at this point; there aren't enough men on the street liable for military service now.
The only choice now is to try to stop the Russian offensive operations and try to sign Minsk-3.
The skills of a good staff officer and those of a good leader / general are quite different.
The staff officer's training is intense and critical, but straightforward, whereas the general's skills are less trainable - they include charisma and instinct.
Provided the general listens to, and respects, his staff officers, then he does not need their skills, just as they do not need his.
Wait a sec, you said "Ukraine doesn't have nor skilled generals, nor skilled staff officers" and now, when challenged, you suddenly change it to "some of the officers of Ukrainian army are exceptional, many others are good... But the majority definitely are not". That's a nice upgrade! Maybe, upon closer look, you'll find enough of the good ones to lead the new corps..
RE Soviet army, history etc, - it's more relevant to the old generals but has little connection to the new young officers mentioned in this article as the ones that will lead the new corps. I'm pretty sure Prokopenko, Biletsky etc despise all Soviet traditions and anything Soviet in general.
One interesting aspect of the staff work in the 21st century is that it does not need to be done on-site. Given some translators, and a fair bit of work providing initial information on doctrine, force composition, requirements and capabilities, Ukraine could outsource much of its staff work to European partners.
You may be right, and I'm sure it would not be as good as Ukraine sending a lot of competent officers to staff college - which would be bad in the short term.
So I think it might be helpful.
Staff work is not so much about making decisions, it is about turning a commander's decisions into a detailed plan for approval and then distributing actionable orders.
Co-ordinating the supplies, transport and troop movements to ensure everyone is where they need to be, ready to do what they're supposed to do, with what they need to do it - at the right time.
It is an excel-intensive task, though I expect NATO has some more purpose-built tools.
I assume that Russians are dealing with shortages of vehicles (or repair parts), rather than shortages of gasoline. As you said, shortages of gasoline are very unlikely, while they're running out of armored vehicles to refurbish. I previously thought that they still had plenty of SUV's, motorcycles, and the like, but they might be struggling on that front too. Which if true is good news for Ukraine.
Cambodia… animals tracking something. As a tourist in Cambodia I took an ox-cart for the fun of it. It wasn’t fast exactly. And then the cart passed the house were it lived and the ox (water buffalo) wanted to go home. It turned dead right and the driver couldn’t get it going. This made a pile up (sever cars dragging tourist). Followed by the wife of the driver coming out and yelling at him. Clearly telling him he was an incompetent idiot who couldn’t handle as much as an ox. And then the neighbors coming to enjoy the spectacle. The poor driver enlisted his son and managed to get us going again. Efficient it definetly wasn’t. But on the other hand the tourists did pay for the trip. So also inefficient modes of transport can generate income. But not be war efficient.
'Technically' it's making no sense at all. A properly cared-of 'horse' needs hay, water etc. - a lots of more 'maintenance & supplies' than a motorised vehicle.
For example, a horse is going to need some 40 litres of water and 20-30kg hay a day.
So, if there are really horses and/or donkeys in service now... and besides being terribly sorry for the poor animals - yes, this is a sign of further degeneration of the VSRF.
Yes, definitely a sign of degeneration although not as significant as the 'Crutch Battalions' being sent into battle. If you check the source video (https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1886818429887299757) you can see it is just a couple of horses. But the trajectory is remarkable. Back in 2022, Ukrainian Border Guards were patrolling on horseback in Kharkhiv and Sumy oblasts. Now they're on the reverse trajectory: re-equipped with MRAPs, sensor arrays, and other up-to-date equipment.
Oh, and another sensible piece, Tom. Thank you. And you're right, this corp structure really does sound like what would be considered a division in most other armies. It's a good thing.
It's been one of the most logical, necessary decisions by the Ukrainian army as of late.
With regards to horses/mules, it's not the first time they've been used. There are shortages of logistical vehicles, and some have to walk 10-30 km between locations because of that, but my sense of it is that these are local and isolated events and not widespread. You also can't rule out that they are being kept as working pets.
Dear Tom, thank you! A few more links on the discussion of the topic in local media, though nothing that stands out on details, besides Butusov article: https://t.me/pekhno_news/12018
Thanks Tom for the update, the ZSU "Corps" designation reminds those who have read the historical records of the Soviet Army after the large scale losses of cauldrons before and after the campaign for Moscow in which the Soviet tank Bde's grouping were called Tank Corps.
Interesting months ahead for the reorganization. Would it be correct also that the said "reinvigorated" ZSU/AFU Corps will have also its own Corps level training/replacement units for effective reinforcement of its organic Bde units?
The Glavcom should have realized by now that the training units of the "anchor brigades" being reorganized to Corps level are doing something good about their replacement/training units NOW. It would be another level of incompetence or even outright sabotage of the war effort if the said Corps would not have an input/say/or control about the standing up of the Corps replacement units and the Glavcom would remove said entities from the Corps.
Після інтерв'ю Тома пішла так звана * реорганізації, чи можливо мені здалося, що саме після інтерв'ю.
Боюся щоб це не було окозамилювання(( Сирський на це не здатен, вони просто будуть вилами по воді писати.
Якщо раніше він цього не робив, то і зараз це не буде зроблено, це написано на його обличчі, на жаль((
Висловив свою особисту думку, до речі повністю прослухав інтерв'ю Тома, таких речей в українському інформаційному просторі немає, тому гадаю почувши те що було сказано, почався * рух, або видимість руху змін.
Excellent detail as always Tom and team, thank you. As you says let's hope the positives of this development can be capitalized on and the negatives mitigated 👍.
On the other hand, had you not agreed to the interview, then subsequently you might have kicked yourself for forgoing the opportunity potentially to influence millitary matters in Ukraine however low the probability that influence might actually have some demonstrably positive impact. Just saying ....
I have seen similar criticisms of Ukraine's handling of the war from other sources, which may have been influenced by your writing, and it seems likely that this is a response to hearing the same criticism from multiple sources.
But ultimately, it does not matter who was the first to bring this problem up, as long as it is addressed.
Stalin/Soviets did not want the military to make their own decisions, because they could then overthrow the Soviet Union. Look what happened to Prigozin! This old centrally managed top down system comes from the Soviet days. You forget why Ukraine had this top down micromanaging system, where no decisions were allowed to be made by lower ranks, regiment, brigade division. The Russian, Stalinist, Soviet leaders do not want any power or decision making to exist at lower levels. Because Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, these old structures, management styles and processes were ingrained in society, military and politics. It took the Baltic states, Poland and eastern Europe 10 yrs to get rid of this and some countries (e.g. Hungary) still cannot embrace devolved management structures. Anyway, this is positive if can be done while fighting the war and Russian KGB/FSB cannot infiltrate the new structure. Ukraine has clever, broadminded, innovative and energetic people in the military and all parts of their society. Lets hope that this new structure which makes the Ukrainian military more efficient, powerful and successful, works. Remember, "the old management will embrace change one retirement at a time"!
I think that the success or failure of this reorganization is going to, in large part, depend on the quality of commanders placed in charge of the formations. A new structure with the same old faces is not going to be transformative. I want to see your evaluations of the staffing of this new structure before I'm encouraged.
I'm liking what I am hearing and reading about this. You are spot on about the dangers over the next 3 to 6 months but the payoff is worth the risk. Clearing up the chaos, removing idiots from being able to influence the battlefield badly, and letting the younger, proven Units and Commanders finally take some serious leadership roles is solid gold. I'm just curious why they are calling it a Corps versus a Division, but then again older Soviet descended militaries are not exact matches to the NATO/Western style. A RU division was never as big as a US division (I recall it was roughly 60% to 70% the size, but it's been a while), so things are different. Even today a UA BDE is roughly 50% the size of a US BDE of the same type (Mech for Mech/Heavy) from what I see. Do you know what other Anchor Units are going to be? The initial choices are fantastic. The NG picked well too (question though, was that other NG BDE the Kraken? I didn't not recognize the name). A Marine Corps (heh, there is a joke there somewhere). My candidates would be the 93rd Mech, 1st Armored, 17th Armored (now Mech though I think), 47th Mech, and some of the Airborne/Air Assault BDEs. Hopefully they are thinking about attaching an FA BDE to each one as well. Heh, a whole Azov "Corps", man I bet that pisses the Orcs off.
Kinda depends on the Division really. Standard US is 3 maneuver BDEs, but also has a Recon BDE, FA BDE (or equivalent), and logistical BDE. But some can be larger with additional elements. But yeah, 4 to 5 maneuver BDEs would be bigger than normal. IN Afghanistan my Division had a total of 6 maneuver BDEs and had no issues (granted certainly NOT the type of fight in Ukraine, but shows it has been done).
Another important issue is responsibility of generals above corps - who propose corps leaders and take responsibility for that when such new corps leader fails.
I am afraid if some corps would be lead badly, we will see same problems as today when some brigade does not doing well.
The UA military, in its various branches, need an Inspector General organization that is independent of being bought off or fired by anybody but the guy at the top. BTW who should be the "guy at the top" who can remove or assign the head of an Insector General organization? Someone in the military or a civilian?
Yes, it will be difficult to implement the change, but it is being done at the best time - the mud season will limit Russia's ability to take advantage of the rotation of of battalions and brigades along the front.
When you have good leaders, eventually their subordinates will be good. The leaders named have successfully improvised and solved their way out of many problems since being small militias or battalions up to their present status as brigades. I am confident that they will deal with the upcoming issues.
The first step is to come up with a plan that should improve the army. This plan should theoretically do that.
The second step is to implement the plan. That depends on the leaders and the support they have. The leaders named have done so well that once they are given an objective they have been given a high level of autonomy to figure out how to achieve that objective. I'm sure that will be the case this time, as well. I don't know how much support they might need in terms of equipment and other assets, but these leaders have also established a high level of self sufficiency in acquiring needed equipment when the government isn't able to do so.
Simply said, they get things done. If they can't do it themselves then they find people who can.
The Peter Principle does exist but I would be surprised if this task exceeds their abilities. I also believe they were chosen to implement the corps first so they can identify issues and solutions for those that follow.
But you're right, potential is not the same as achievement and we are all interested in the outcome.
I never understood why they were creating new brigades when existing brigades were short on personnel. The soldiers in the existing brigades thought the same thing. While personnel shortages existed, they were never going to be a good idea. The other failures just made them an even worse idea.
What is there not to understand? After the Ukrainian counter-offensive was stopped in October 2022 by Putin's mobilisation decree and his order to abandon the large Dnepr beachhead around Kherson, the conflict first entered into a stalemate, and then Russia regained the initiative in Bakhmut. The Ukrainians, from then on, could have either reinforced their brigades stuck in positional trench battles all over the country against a Russian Army which is more than formidable on the defensive(as we saw during the disastrous Ukrainian Zaporozhye Offensive in 2023), which would have dragged the conflict out forever and wouldn't have lead to anything other than a negotiated settlement on then-existing borders(Putin's preferred option, by the way), or, they could have tried to form a large reserve corps of fresh brigades and deployed them on one sector of the front(they eventually chose the Melitopol-Berdyansk corridor) in order to break the stalemate and exploit a breakthrough, cut-off Crimea and South Kherson, and negotiate a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine.
Their reserve corps, however, was destroyed in Zaporozhye, so that didn't work out - mostly because Zelensky chose to funnel tens of thousands of men into the Bakhmut meatgrinder against Russian drug dealers, rapists, and murderers from Russian prisons, giving the Russians enough time to reorganise their shambles of an army and fortify in Zaporozhye, at the same time as building a reserve corps. In effect, they chose both options: they reinforced both the front and diverted massive resources to forming the reserve corps, leading to the failure of both options.
After Zaporozhye, the Ukrainians were facing the same dilemma. Either concentrate on reinforcing the front and stop the Russian advance, stalemating the war and leading to a negotiated settlement based on de facto current borders, or sacrifice land in order to build up a reserve corps and go on the offensive with the hope of inflicting a blow so hard and so sudden that the Russians are disorganised and forced to negotiate a withdrawal from Ukraine's de jure borders. Yet again, the Ukrainians chose a compromise solution of both reinforcing the front and forming a reserve corps. Except this time, the situation had detoriated so much at the front in the meanwhile that the new reserve corps was first stripped of much of its strength in order to hold on to land in the Donbass(and then also in Vovchansk), and then deployed to the Donbass in its entirety because the Ukrainian front in the Donbass was on the verge of complete collapse.
The only reason they stopped forming new brigades now is because I) they've abandoned any hope of beating the Russians militarily, so there is no reason to form a reserve corps for the third time and II) there's nothing left to form a new reserve corps from. It's February 2025. The mobilisation reforms were 9 months ago, in May 2024. The mobilisation manpool has been nearly exhausted at this point; there aren't enough men on the street liable for military service now.
The only choice now is to try to stop the Russian offensive operations and try to sign Minsk-3.
The skills of a good staff officer and those of a good leader / general are quite different.
The staff officer's training is intense and critical, but straightforward, whereas the general's skills are less trainable - they include charisma and instinct.
Provided the general listens to, and respects, his staff officers, then he does not need their skills, just as they do not need his.
And how can you know what officers and generals Ukraine has? You're just throwing blanket statements left and right.
Wait a sec, you said "Ukraine doesn't have nor skilled generals, nor skilled staff officers" and now, when challenged, you suddenly change it to "some of the officers of Ukrainian army are exceptional, many others are good... But the majority definitely are not". That's a nice upgrade! Maybe, upon closer look, you'll find enough of the good ones to lead the new corps..
RE Soviet army, history etc, - it's more relevant to the old generals but has little connection to the new young officers mentioned in this article as the ones that will lead the new corps. I'm pretty sure Prokopenko, Biletsky etc despise all Soviet traditions and anything Soviet in general.
One interesting aspect of the staff work in the 21st century is that it does not need to be done on-site. Given some translators, and a fair bit of work providing initial information on doctrine, force composition, requirements and capabilities, Ukraine could outsource much of its staff work to European partners.
You may be right, and I'm sure it would not be as good as Ukraine sending a lot of competent officers to staff college - which would be bad in the short term.
So I think it might be helpful.
Staff work is not so much about making decisions, it is about turning a commander's decisions into a detailed plan for approval and then distributing actionable orders.
Co-ordinating the supplies, transport and troop movements to ensure everyone is where they need to be, ready to do what they're supposed to do, with what they need to do it - at the right time.
It is an excel-intensive task, though I expect NATO has some more purpose-built tools.
One of the most optimistic posts as of late. Let us hope that the reorganization proves effective, and the transition goes as smoothly as possible.
On an unrelated note, I've seen videos of Russian troops using donkeys or horses in the frontline (see https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/1ii9qha/just_when_you_think_it_cant_get_more_crazy_when_a/ and https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1886818429887299757). Does anyone know common this is on the Russian forces? I assume this indicates a shortage of vehicles, but is it possible that using animals over armored/unarmored vehicles makes sense?
I assume that Russians are dealing with shortages of vehicles (or repair parts), rather than shortages of gasoline. As you said, shortages of gasoline are very unlikely, while they're running out of armored vehicles to refurbish. I previously thought that they still had plenty of SUV's, motorcycles, and the like, but they might be struggling on that front too. Which if true is good news for Ukraine.
Ah, thanks for the clarification.
Cambodia… animals tracking something. As a tourist in Cambodia I took an ox-cart for the fun of it. It wasn’t fast exactly. And then the cart passed the house were it lived and the ox (water buffalo) wanted to go home. It turned dead right and the driver couldn’t get it going. This made a pile up (sever cars dragging tourist). Followed by the wife of the driver coming out and yelling at him. Clearly telling him he was an incompetent idiot who couldn’t handle as much as an ox. And then the neighbors coming to enjoy the spectacle. The poor driver enlisted his son and managed to get us going again. Efficient it definetly wasn’t. But on the other hand the tourists did pay for the trip. So also inefficient modes of transport can generate income. But not be war efficient.
Economic participation would probably be enough.
'Technically' it's making no sense at all. A properly cared-of 'horse' needs hay, water etc. - a lots of more 'maintenance & supplies' than a motorised vehicle.
For example, a horse is going to need some 40 litres of water and 20-30kg hay a day.
So, if there are really horses and/or donkeys in service now... and besides being terribly sorry for the poor animals - yes, this is a sign of further degeneration of the VSRF.
Yes, definitely a sign of degeneration although not as significant as the 'Crutch Battalions' being sent into battle. If you check the source video (https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1886818429887299757) you can see it is just a couple of horses. But the trajectory is remarkable. Back in 2022, Ukrainian Border Guards were patrolling on horseback in Kharkhiv and Sumy oblasts. Now they're on the reverse trajectory: re-equipped with MRAPs, sensor arrays, and other up-to-date equipment.
Oh, and another sensible piece, Tom. Thank you. And you're right, this corp structure really does sound like what would be considered a division in most other armies. It's a good thing.
It's been one of the most logical, necessary decisions by the Ukrainian army as of late.
With regards to horses/mules, it's not the first time they've been used. There are shortages of logistical vehicles, and some have to walk 10-30 km between locations because of that, but my sense of it is that these are local and isolated events and not widespread. You also can't rule out that they are being kept as working pets.
Dear Tom, thank you! A few more links on the discussion of the topic in local media, though nothing that stands out on details, besides Butusov article: https://t.me/pekhno_news/12018
https://www.youtube.com/live/PPtXhnpsaE0
There was something said that in the next few days official designations will follow and be published. So let's see.
And yes, it does not matter wether you call it division or corps.
Thank you so much. Maybe your joint efforts have found over months a listening eye and ear.
Thanks Tom for the update, the ZSU "Corps" designation reminds those who have read the historical records of the Soviet Army after the large scale losses of cauldrons before and after the campaign for Moscow in which the Soviet tank Bde's grouping were called Tank Corps.
Interesting months ahead for the reorganization. Would it be correct also that the said "reinvigorated" ZSU/AFU Corps will have also its own Corps level training/replacement units for effective reinforcement of its organic Bde units?
The 'anchor brigades' already have something of that kind in place.
The question is only if the Glavcom is going to let them continue that practice.
The Glavcom should have realized by now that the training units of the "anchor brigades" being reorganized to Corps level are doing something good about their replacement/training units NOW. It would be another level of incompetence or even outright sabotage of the war effort if the said Corps would not have an input/say/or control about the standing up of the Corps replacement units and the Glavcom would remove said entities from the Corps.
Після інтерв'ю Тома пішла так звана * реорганізації, чи можливо мені здалося, що саме після інтерв'ю.
Боюся щоб це не було окозамилювання(( Сирський на це не здатен, вони просто будуть вилами по воді писати.
Якщо раніше він цього не робив, то і зараз це не буде зроблено, це написано на його обличчі, на жаль((
Висловив свою особисту думку, до речі повністю прослухав інтерв'ю Тома, таких речей в українському інформаційному просторі немає, тому гадаю почувши те що було сказано, почався * рух, або видимість руху змін.
I do not believe anybody 'up there in Kyiv' is paying attention about my interview, but thanks a lot for assigning it that much importance.
Could be or couldn't be, but you have the advantage of being a foreign prophet.
Because no one can become a prophet in their home country? That’s a Norwegian proverb, don’t know if exists other places. Most likely it does.
It's in Greece as well
We have the saying here: "A prophet is not honored in his own country." I think that is a general human behavior.
Excellent detail as always Tom and team, thank you. As you says let's hope the positives of this development can be capitalized on and the negatives mitigated 👍.
Tom thanks for hope
BTW Mirrage is announced to be officially delivered https://x.com/SebLecornu/status/1887436710021050400
I assumeas usual too little too late, but big show of from France with only 0.13% GDP of total assistance since 2022 👎
I feel like Tom's interview and his effort here on Substack moved some icebergs.
I do not believe anybody 'up there in Kyiv' is paying attention about my interview, but thanks a lot for assigning it that much importance.
On the other hand, had you not agreed to the interview, then subsequently you might have kicked yourself for forgoing the opportunity potentially to influence millitary matters in Ukraine however low the probability that influence might actually have some demonstrably positive impact. Just saying ....
Tom, I think you're downplaying your impact.
I have seen similar criticisms of Ukraine's handling of the war from other sources, which may have been influenced by your writing, and it seems likely that this is a response to hearing the same criticism from multiple sources.
But ultimately, it does not matter who was the first to bring this problem up, as long as it is addressed.
You are a critical voice from the outside. Out of tradition they need to check you out.
Especially as you allow yourself the luxury of thinking on you own.
Stalin/Soviets did not want the military to make their own decisions, because they could then overthrow the Soviet Union. Look what happened to Prigozin! This old centrally managed top down system comes from the Soviet days. You forget why Ukraine had this top down micromanaging system, where no decisions were allowed to be made by lower ranks, regiment, brigade division. The Russian, Stalinist, Soviet leaders do not want any power or decision making to exist at lower levels. Because Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, these old structures, management styles and processes were ingrained in society, military and politics. It took the Baltic states, Poland and eastern Europe 10 yrs to get rid of this and some countries (e.g. Hungary) still cannot embrace devolved management structures. Anyway, this is positive if can be done while fighting the war and Russian KGB/FSB cannot infiltrate the new structure. Ukraine has clever, broadminded, innovative and energetic people in the military and all parts of their society. Lets hope that this new structure which makes the Ukrainian military more efficient, powerful and successful, works. Remember, "the old management will embrace change one retirement at a time"!
I think that the success or failure of this reorganization is going to, in large part, depend on the quality of commanders placed in charge of the formations. A new structure with the same old faces is not going to be transformative. I want to see your evaluations of the staffing of this new structure before I'm encouraged.
The best news in a while. Let’s hope they can make these combat efficiency improvements as fast as possible.
I'm liking what I am hearing and reading about this. You are spot on about the dangers over the next 3 to 6 months but the payoff is worth the risk. Clearing up the chaos, removing idiots from being able to influence the battlefield badly, and letting the younger, proven Units and Commanders finally take some serious leadership roles is solid gold. I'm just curious why they are calling it a Corps versus a Division, but then again older Soviet descended militaries are not exact matches to the NATO/Western style. A RU division was never as big as a US division (I recall it was roughly 60% to 70% the size, but it's been a while), so things are different. Even today a UA BDE is roughly 50% the size of a US BDE of the same type (Mech for Mech/Heavy) from what I see. Do you know what other Anchor Units are going to be? The initial choices are fantastic. The NG picked well too (question though, was that other NG BDE the Kraken? I didn't not recognize the name). A Marine Corps (heh, there is a joke there somewhere). My candidates would be the 93rd Mech, 1st Armored, 17th Armored (now Mech though I think), 47th Mech, and some of the Airborne/Air Assault BDEs. Hopefully they are thinking about attaching an FA BDE to each one as well. Heh, a whole Azov "Corps", man I bet that pisses the Orcs off.
UAF hopes to rebuild the Brigades to a decent size so the organization would be larger than a division.
Kinda depends on the Division really. Standard US is 3 maneuver BDEs, but also has a Recon BDE, FA BDE (or equivalent), and logistical BDE. But some can be larger with additional elements. But yeah, 4 to 5 maneuver BDEs would be bigger than normal. IN Afghanistan my Division had a total of 6 maneuver BDEs and had no issues (granted certainly NOT the type of fight in Ukraine, but shows it has been done).
Another important issue is responsibility of generals above corps - who propose corps leaders and take responsibility for that when such new corps leader fails.
I am afraid if some corps would be lead badly, we will see same problems as today when some brigade does not doing well.
The UA military, in its various branches, need an Inspector General organization that is independent of being bought off or fired by anybody but the guy at the top. BTW who should be the "guy at the top" who can remove or assign the head of an Insector General organization? Someone in the military or a civilian?
Excellent news!
Yes, it will be difficult to implement the change, but it is being done at the best time - the mud season will limit Russia's ability to take advantage of the rotation of of battalions and brigades along the front.
Great news after a long time