Don's Weekly, 25 November 2024: Part 5 (Equipment & Organisation-related News)

by Donald Hill

(…continued from Part 4…)

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Equipment

Biden reversed an Obama-imposed ban and agreed to send anti-personnel mines to Ukraine. Ukraine had to promise they wouldn’t use them in a populated area, just like they had to promise not to use DPICM shells in populated areas. They were used in depopulated villages and towns, though.

Ukraine’s Dovbush drone can carry up to six FPV drones, allowing them to be dropped further behind enemy lines. They are carried upside down and flip over after launch.

In October 2022, Germany, Denmark and Norway began paying for Slovakian 155 mm self-propelled artillery pieces. The first systems arrived in the summer of 2023 and by January 2024 Ukraine had 16 units. Eight more have since been delivered, and one has been destroyed by a Lancet.

Germany was scheduled to deliver 400 MRAPs by the end of this year but only 26 have been shipped so far.

At one Russian storage site representative of others, only 102 of 749 tanks are left and those remaining are in poor condition. Still, Russia is trying to restore any tank it can.

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Organizational News

As the demand for army reorganization increases, Zelensky said he would support the creation of corps by the end of November if it reduces bureaucracy. How kind from a politician clueless about military affairs to at least start discussing this topic….

Right now they are only planning on adding a corps echelon, not a divisional echelon. A government source said adding a divisional echelon would be more expensive and require greater human, financial, and material resources which Ukraine cannot afford. Probably because Ukraine can afford continuing to lose troops and terrain instead…

This is not the first time corps have been proposed. 18 months ago, three corps with six brigades each were announced: in reality, neither ever did function as a corps. Instead, their units were dispersed across the battlefield. The 100th Brigade was one of the units in a corps and it answered to three different headquarters.

Actually, creating a (serious) corps-level command node could be a positive step but: its usefulness will be determined by how it is implemented.

If corps are assigned 16-20 brigades then all they’ve done is rename the Organizational Tactical Group and nothing will change (divisions usually have 3-4 brigades). If corps are limited to 3-4 brigades then they would functionally be divisions. If they are assigned six brigades then it will still be a dramatic improvement over the current situation but some communication efficiencies and reaction time with logistical support and reinforcements may suffer.

If six brigades will be assigned to each corps then you can regain those efficiencies with the concept of senior and junior brigades. Senior brigades are those who have a proven record of success. Junior brigades are those units that are inexperienced or had less success in past operations. A senior brigade would be responsible for the training and operations for itself and the two junior brigades assigned to it. There have already been several instances in which front line units already formed ad hoc command groups to coordinate activities among themselves.

Theoretically, and for example, in a six-brigade corps, there could be two senior and four junior brigades. They would, in effect, be substituting as a divisional asset. Certainly, the senior brigades would have the same deficiencies in personnel, finances and material resources that prevent Ukraine from forming divisions, but if they are allowed to use their own initiative they will no doubt find a way around these problems. In the meantime, the senior brigades would be able to instill their culture of success in other units.

The corps would be responsible for logistical support, integrating airspace, attacks on long-ranged targets and intelligence. They would also coordinate communications between their senior brigades and adjacent corps, and they would pass consolidated reports to the general staff along with personnel and equipment needs.

The corps have to be assigned a sector small enough that a reserve can be created from the units assigned to it. Defenses are not effective without a reserve to react in a timely manner to enemy actions.

Units that are detached to fill in as a stopgap measure in some other sector must be reassigned to their brigades. Given the continued pressing Russian attacks and the widespread practice of disassembling units, this might take some time to undo.

The potential for this interim step to a more effective fighting force is high, but every institution has inertia. There will no doubt be resistance from some members of the old guard that value their personal aspirations above the security of the nation, but it is clear that the political leadership is responding to some degree to the opinions of the rank and file in the army. Whether they have the desire and ability to see these reforms enacted remains to be seen.