Hello everybody! To address few additional of your questions (via e-mail, private messages, or in commentary): 1.) Frederick wrote: you miss (but you’re not the only one) the best part of the story : AASMs are powered bombs. They actually fit somewhere between a precision bomb and a missile. There is no need to drop them on a ballistic trajectory. When launching them on level flight, the bomb will actually rise and take some altitude by itself to gain some range and impact the target with the desired angle. The great thing with it is that you can launch them from low altitude without exposing yourself while still enjoying a great range…
Just a few thing about the Mirage family, the french air force isn't using the Mirage 2000C anymore, only the 2000-5 and the 2000D.
The 2000-5 is a modernized version of the 2000 C with improved radar and capable of carrying the Mica EM and IR missiles. It's purely an Air to Air plateform, at least in the french air force.
But if such planes as the SU-24 were capable to be modified to carry a SCALP, I think it is more than feasible on the Mirage 2000 (see the Mirage 2000D or 2000-9).
Also one last thing, the nuclear version of the Mirage 2000 is the N and not "K" :)
Have to add that Mirage 2000 family is not good for low-altitude high-speed missions needed in Ukraine the most - it's one of the most vulnerable to turbulent chatter combat planes.
Yup, yup, and yup. And 'Mirage 2000K' was a 'residue' from a larger segment of text originally prepared for this answer - which I've then deleted in order to prevent making things too complex. Is corrected now.
Regarding the use of the Yak-58 to hunt loitering assets, couldn’t the west supply a bunch of Super Tucanoes or like aircraft to supplement the Ukrainian Air Force with training assets that can also help shoot down UAVs relatively inexpensively?
Regarding S-300 - I'm relatively sure the Russians do use it in StS mode extencively, and those who deny it are just idiots, yet the primary purpose of these strikes are not to inflict any direct damage, nor to bring terror, but to force AFU reaction - to spend SAMs, reveal radars, provoke the same unintelligible retalliation strikes to make propaganda (and it works: there are systemic useless strikes on Belgorod city with non-guided and very inaccurate extended-range 122mm Vampire salvos, the same as usual Grad strikes on Donetsk city, with little to no military purpose) and so on, and just to "drive the plan" - make reports about successful strikes regardless of the actual result.
S-300 systems are to be decommissioned in any case in 2 or 3 years, they are replaced with S-400, and nobody would buy this shit, so old missiles became useless and from the Russian sociopathic perspective it's better to just use the stocks before it became a pure burden. They don't care about the accuracy, and all the talks about 30-km guided distance are just dumb.
I'm trying to imagine how many S-300 missiles they had in storage before this conflict. If Ukraine had around 2000-3000 then Russia could have had anywhere between 10,000-30,000 such missiles. It does seem plausible that indeed they're using them as well but also there's a compelling theory presented here that some "S-300 missile" attacks could actually be something else. I think this makes sense as well.
Also I'm not sure Russia has enough S-400s for its defensive needs.
Some strikes were mistook definitely, it's ineviable with these numbers of strikes. I do know at least several cases, yet, well, at least one of these was described as S-300 and I'm quite sure it was S-400 actually, and not in StS mode but a failed attempt to shot down a Ukrainian combat plane.
S-400 are produced in quite a large numbers. Never forget about the enemy's military production.
Thank for answering the question, but I actually meant little bit different. Yes, obviously the number of such strikes grew from beginning of this year, but did anything change after May,when supply of anti air missiles had to increase ? There was also a dozen videos of FPV usage against Zalas and previously mentioned usage of Yaks, so did all this tactics had at least any noticable effect ?
AFAIK, the PSU still hasn't got enough SAMs; FPVs are meanwhile one of primary means of downing Russian battlefield-recce UAVs, Yaks are still hunting recce-UAVs deeper behind the frontline. However, if there is anything having something like 'significant' effect - then electronic warfare. For example, few days ago the Russians began complaining about the Ukrainians switching all their FPV-ops to another new band, and thus their EW being ineffective.
Thanks for the Q&A, I wonder what your thoughts are on the replacement of Sodol and also I heard a former US airforce pilot say Western jets dont have as large fuel tanks as Russian ones because of aerial refueling. Seems like a good opportunity to test one of our experimental aerial refueling drones like MQ-25 stingray far behind enemy lines but in a real conflict.
Re. Sodol: don't know enough to say more than, IF Sodol was in charge of Kherson and Zaporizhzhya, early during the war - then, heck, it was about the time to remove him (or, better said: it's two years too late to do so).
Re. Western jets having smaller internal fuel tanks than Russian: sorry, except in the case of the Su-27/30/34/35-family, that's simply not truth. Generally, Western jets have longer endurance than the Russian - because the Russian were not designed to do more but to fly their mission and return to base. While Western were also made for patrolling, for flying long-range strikes etc.
Thus, no matter if F-16 or MIrage 2000: both are longer-ranged than MiG-29 or Su-25.
Again: Su-27 is a different story.
And yes: delivering MQ-25s to support PSU jets would be a good idea - but I doubt this might happen.
Oh I see, thanks for the clarifications about the jet endurance and fuel tanks.
Wrt to Sodol Hopefully we find out more information in the coming months, A controversial Ukrainian MP called Mariana Bezuhla has some scathing remarks about Sodol and another Ukrainian Gen named Sokol(not the same as the Russian navy general). She claims Sokol fled from the south during the early phase of the war. She's been quite consistently hounding Sodol for some months now. I dont know if she's a case of a broken clock that gets right twice a day or someone who's incessant criticism has some merit.
Otherwise thank you and looking forward to more posts.
Sodol was one of the military executives with Zelensky of course responsible for intentionally leaving Azov brigade with 0.55 million civilian people in Mariupol without any ammunition, medical supplies, etc for ruzzian siege and destruction. When Azov commanders asked Sodol by phone for subsequent instructions what should they do when ruzz encircled the city, Sodol answered them "we are fucked" and ended the call.
Haven't heard anything about Sokol. It was Sodol who fled from the south during the early phase of the war.
You can check Butusov Plus YouTube channel (in Ukrainian unfortunately) for the most extensive information regarding the war in UA. Yuriy Butusov is the best war journalist in UA currently.
Thank you for this, I'll check out Butusov's channel, maybe if he has a telegram account I can get it as well and use auto translate. I think the person I was reading from wrote Sokol meaning Sodol. I'll check out Butusov. What do you think about Mariana Bezhula, she seems to be incessantly critical of the UA General Staff particularly the ones with Soviet training. Do you think there's merit in what she says sometimes at least?
Hard to figure out her real intentions. But you must take into account that M.Bezuhla is a talking head of Yermak-Zelensky, she was the one who promoted a law to shoot down Ukrainian soldiers who disobeyed orders in 2022 and the one who falsified Wagnergate case of parliament commission for Zelensky.
Syrsky is a ruzzian with his close relatives reside in ruzzia who earned a butcher call in ZSU.
She could play a game to distance her with Z from a treason in ZSU command in order to replace Syrsky with the same or even worse candidate.
I see. Btw that article you provided is very informative. Thank you so much. It even mentions General Sokol(actual names Sokolov) who reportedly run away from the south(according to Mariana Bezhula) as well as Sodol's role in the early days of Feb 2022 invasion.
I see now that she is quite linked to Zelensky. There are some things Zelensky definitely got wrong with regards to preparing before the war, etc. Poroshenko also claims Ukraine's preparedness slowed down after Zelensky took over but as an outsider I dont know how true this is.
But one thing I have heard continuously from Ukrainians is Zelensky didnt put the country into the right preparations before the Feb 22 invasion.
You need to compare similar category western and soviet designs.
For example, the Su-27 family should be compared to the F-15 and Rafale twin-engined air superiority jets, while the Mig-29 would be better compared to the F-16, the Mirage 2000 and the Gripen.
I find it increasingly difficult to follow the development of the war here and that has nothing to do with the quality of the mostly great posts, but with the situation itself.
I don't believe in miracle weapons or strategies, one-sided escalation that goes unanswered or a sudden collapse of one side that would lead to a quick and final decision.
What can we expect? The war will probably continue largely as it has in the recent past until at some point in the fairly distant future the wear and tear and costs become so high that it is no longer worthwhile despite the sacrifices already made. I am fairly convinced that - despite all the problems on the Ukrainian side - the Russians will have to give up in some form, but a lot of time will presumably pass before that happens and, above all, a lot of suffering will occur.
And I find it increasingly strange and unpleasant to sit on the sidelines as a passive observer following events for information purposes, knowing full well that despite the constantly updated information nothing will really change for a long time.
My behaviour seems more and more cynical and voyeuristic to me.
Yes, it will probably go on for a while as it is going now. Attrition takes a lot of time even when one party has a clear advantage - look at Germany in WWII, they essentially lost the war in late 1941, but it still took until early 1945 that they became hollow enough to implode.
In this war, neither side has even that advantage, at least not apparently - Russia is fully dedicated, but their efficiency is half-assed, while Ukraine is definitely more efficient, but the dedication of their donors is half-assed at best.
I tend to look for fundraisers and send some cash whenever I can - it's very little, but it improves on the feeling of passive observation on the one hand, and it's always welcome on the other. Attrition keeps chewing up a lot of stuff, and money is one of these.
I want to ask whether you think the Russian top-level political leadership is composed of rational actors.
To me the most logical/feasible Russian theory of victory would be for them to prolong the war until the Western democracies get tired of supporting Ukraine and before that happens staying on the defensive in order to inflict a better loss ratio on the Ukrainians. In line with this strategy of waiting for "Ukraine fatigue" to set in, it would make sense for Russia to frame herself as not a threat to the global world order, while also framing the war as a local conflict rather than an ideologically-driven war against the West.
Instead Russia does the exact opposite. Incidents such as the recent North Korea deal, the recent attempt to give Houthis cruise missiles, Russian sabotage operations in Europe, and the continued aggressive rhetoric of Russian officials is essentially screaming "We are a destabilizing force on the rules-based world order and you should continue arming Ukraine to help bring about the collapse of our criminal regime". This leads me to believe that Russian leadership is not rational at all and major decisions are being made by an unsound mind. Is there an alternative path to "victory" for the Russians that involves doing all of these aggressive theatrics that Im not seeing here?
Regarding this question, I also wonder whether the decision to begin the recent Kharkiv offensive was a political one rather than motivated by military considerations. It doesn't seem to have been a distraction attempt, because no major push on another part of the front has happened. Also the troops partaking in this offensive were to few to make any major territorial gains. All it has achieved is unnecessary manpower losses for the Russians and continued depletion of their Soviet armored vehicle stockpile. This Kharkiv operation would make sense however if it was a politically motivated to send a message: "Russia stronk! look how many offensives we can start!"
Is my assessment of Russian military actions being politically motivated bluffs accurate? Could Russia be in a much worse situation (with regards to manpower and vehicles) than her actions would suggest? or is this all copium?
Thank you very much for the video, it is really very informative and recommendable. I emphasize this so much because it is so rare, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine, that information is not permeated with sentiment and conviction, whereas here the arguments are above all factual and rational.
The advantage of this is that, although there cannot be the slightest doubt about the attitude of the author and his intended audience, he keeps the topic open for further discussion. This is essential because, despite all laudable preferences and beliefs, no one knows how the fundamental, i.e. the civilizational, conflict will develop. And therefore it is so important to understand our own strategy in its basic principles and at the same time to acknowledge and analyse the motives and intentions of the other side.
Because the more transparent the situation becomes, the more clear we are about the prerequisites and counterarguments of the conflict, the better we can position ourselves and serve our interests.
I think you apply too many western concepts of rationality.
Russias's actions are rationale from a Russian socio-cultural and political perspective.
Russia is essentially a medieval dictatorship. It is not a modern western culture.
The people are still essentially serfs (they were only legally liberated ib 1860s but culturally are still serfs).
and the power structure not too disimilar from the age of Tzars and Boyars. Bits of this strucuture date to Russia being ruled by Mongols up to the 1500s.
Indeed Russia is generally so primitive that at least 25% of population doesn't have access to running water or indoor plumbing. In rural areas these numbers go up to at least 67%.
That means displays of violence have a lot of meaning. It doesn't matter that they are not winning, merely that they are not losing.
Didplays of violence shows the state is powerful. So Kharkov offensive is not meant to succeed as I suspect even the Russian political circles understand their army is useless.
But it is a good message of strength to the local population. It keeps the elites cashed up. No prestige is lost from Russian perspectives.
And all of that props up the Tzar (Putin) and his Boyars (pet oligarchs, generals etc.
And if Tzar is dethroned the next Tzar will be expected to doubledown on the war or increase hositility against the west.
A quite persuasive argument. Not a coincidence that Stalin and his successors were called "red czars" - there's the same mentality since the era of the Romanovs (but with nuclear weapons).
Good points. Those of the previous replies are also good.
I can add that framing the war as a local conflict could be a sound strategic decision, but Russia itself doesn't consider it as such, and while they are proficient in spreading disinformation, they are apparently still unable to deny their basic nature. For Russia, the goal is indeed the destabilization of the world order they perceive as having been set up directly against them, robbing them of their empire and expecting them to be content with being just another country. Putin has essentially declared his holy crusade to reestablish Russian imperial power already back in 2007, and has since made it the cornerstone of his legitimacy.
Managing a state is apparently an unworthy task for a Czar. Taking a few oblasts from Ukraine is also below him. He has set out to dismantle Ukraine completely and also break NATO, the hostile imperial arm. Nothing less would suffice, especially after the casualties taken by his army - the more they pile up, the more grandiose the goal should keep getting to offset them and make them worthwhile.
So, basically, yes, even their operations are politically motivated, and they are most probably posing as being in a much better state than they really are. Russia must be perceived as still having intact offensive power, like all their losses so far have been mosquito bites that they are shrugging off and will crush the evil West in the end no matter what (the Black Knight comes to mind from Monty Python and the Holy Grail). If they are seen as unmoved, their populist friends/fans/agents in the West might find it easier to push through their agenda of "Russia is invincible, let's just surrender while we still can", and lose for them the war they can't win themselves.
"Managing a state is apparently an unworthy task for a Czar. "
Up until the late 19th/early 20th, managing the state was not really the concern of any great power. Expansion of power was the primary concern of any country. The state caring about its own people is largely a modern invention.
Hence the illiterate masses lived in abject poverty whilst kings and queens and even presidents played on the great chess board of power politics (both internal and external).
And this is how Russia should be viewed - not as a modern state, but rather pre-modern one.
Same applies to most third world countries including nominal democracies like India and Brazil.
As for Russia’s war on Ukrainian energy infrastructure: it would be great to read an insider view of what’s actually proposed. Chances are, that much of it will be classified and we’ll only find out well after the war.
In the absence of that, there are a few options, but each will have pros and cons.
Adding any large scale generation, regardless of fuel source will take years. Wind, solar and gas could be just a couple, maybe even 2-3. Others much longer. Same for transmission with the EU. You’d be looking at at least 5 years for any meaningful cross border capacity addition, if not more.
Any form efficiency would help, and could be done fairly quickly on a distributed level with a well organised rebate program, but it won’t be enough. Not even close.
Distributed energy generation such as rooftop solar on communal, commercial buildings and people’s homes, again with rebates and a well organised program could also be done in a matter of months and would help much more than energy efficiency measures, but it would also bring a lot of problems. Problems such as issues with system strength and stability, voltage control, low inertia and fault levels, etc. Not to mention that when the sun goes down, no sensible amount of batteries would be able to hold the system together.
As we witnessed here in Greece, the nice thing about solar power generation (photovoltaics) is that these run concurrently with the greatest energy demand (air conditioning in cities).
For large scale energy storage, hydropower has lots of advantages, if you have tall enough hills/mountains with lakes to harness the height difference (potential energy FTW)
Yepp same with solar in Australia here. And pumped hydro is great if you’ve got 3 things: 1. mountains 2. many years to build it 3. enough money in the bank (not the cheapest technology)
Hello Tom, thank you as always for your update.
Just a few thing about the Mirage family, the french air force isn't using the Mirage 2000C anymore, only the 2000-5 and the 2000D.
The 2000-5 is a modernized version of the 2000 C with improved radar and capable of carrying the Mica EM and IR missiles. It's purely an Air to Air plateform, at least in the french air force.
But if such planes as the SU-24 were capable to be modified to carry a SCALP, I think it is more than feasible on the Mirage 2000 (see the Mirage 2000D or 2000-9).
Also one last thing, the nuclear version of the Mirage 2000 is the N and not "K" :)
Otherwise all is good ^^
Have a good day !
Have to add that Mirage 2000 family is not good for low-altitude high-speed missions needed in Ukraine the most - it's one of the most vulnerable to turbulent chatter combat planes.
Hellenic Air Force doesn't seem to have any problem with low altitude missions with the M2000. Neither the French:
https://youtu.be/o1tNyZ5yuJ4?si=r32tII0mR2L3Cg1A
Any combat plane is able to do it. The question is - how long and what a maint cost afterwards.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GQpnOqPWIAAPV8Z?format=jpg&name=4096x4096
Question is: how long can the pilot survive having his brain rattled while flying a Mirage 2000 at very low altitude?
The delta-wing was always ideal for high-altitude operations.
I don't know.
I just watch both the Mirage 2000s and the Rafales doing low level flights without problem (and they don't have to fly at 0.9 Mach at low altitude)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pVgSlaNXHeg
Yup, yup, and yup. And 'Mirage 2000K' was a 'residue' from a larger segment of text originally prepared for this answer - which I've then deleted in order to prevent making things too complex. Is corrected now.
Regarding the use of the Yak-58 to hunt loitering assets, couldn’t the west supply a bunch of Super Tucanoes or like aircraft to supplement the Ukrainian Air Force with training assets that can also help shoot down UAVs relatively inexpensively?
Of course it could. The same is valid for armed Air Tractor AT-802s.
But, why should it....?
Interesting video https://t.me/operativnoZSU/147991
They say one Yak has min 10 succesful downings
Regarding S-300 - I'm relatively sure the Russians do use it in StS mode extencively, and those who deny it are just idiots, yet the primary purpose of these strikes are not to inflict any direct damage, nor to bring terror, but to force AFU reaction - to spend SAMs, reveal radars, provoke the same unintelligible retalliation strikes to make propaganda (and it works: there are systemic useless strikes on Belgorod city with non-guided and very inaccurate extended-range 122mm Vampire salvos, the same as usual Grad strikes on Donetsk city, with little to no military purpose) and so on, and just to "drive the plan" - make reports about successful strikes regardless of the actual result.
S-300 systems are to be decommissioned in any case in 2 or 3 years, they are replaced with S-400, and nobody would buy this shit, so old missiles became useless and from the Russian sociopathic perspective it's better to just use the stocks before it became a pure burden. They don't care about the accuracy, and all the talks about 30-km guided distance are just dumb.
I'm trying to imagine how many S-300 missiles they had in storage before this conflict. If Ukraine had around 2000-3000 then Russia could have had anywhere between 10,000-30,000 such missiles. It does seem plausible that indeed they're using them as well but also there's a compelling theory presented here that some "S-300 missile" attacks could actually be something else. I think this makes sense as well.
Also I'm not sure Russia has enough S-400s for its defensive needs.
Some strikes were mistook definitely, it's ineviable with these numbers of strikes. I do know at least several cases, yet, well, at least one of these was described as S-300 and I'm quite sure it was S-400 actually, and not in StS mode but a failed attempt to shot down a Ukrainian combat plane.
S-400 are produced in quite a large numbers. Never forget about the enemy's military production.
Thank for answering the question, but I actually meant little bit different. Yes, obviously the number of such strikes grew from beginning of this year, but did anything change after May,when supply of anti air missiles had to increase ? There was also a dozen videos of FPV usage against Zalas and previously mentioned usage of Yaks, so did all this tactics had at least any noticable effect ?
None I would know.
AFAIK, the PSU still hasn't got enough SAMs; FPVs are meanwhile one of primary means of downing Russian battlefield-recce UAVs, Yaks are still hunting recce-UAVs deeper behind the frontline. However, if there is anything having something like 'significant' effect - then electronic warfare. For example, few days ago the Russians began complaining about the Ukrainians switching all their FPV-ops to another new band, and thus their EW being ineffective.
Thanks for the Q&A, I wonder what your thoughts are on the replacement of Sodol and also I heard a former US airforce pilot say Western jets dont have as large fuel tanks as Russian ones because of aerial refueling. Seems like a good opportunity to test one of our experimental aerial refueling drones like MQ-25 stingray far behind enemy lines but in a real conflict.
Re. Sodol: don't know enough to say more than, IF Sodol was in charge of Kherson and Zaporizhzhya, early during the war - then, heck, it was about the time to remove him (or, better said: it's two years too late to do so).
Re. Western jets having smaller internal fuel tanks than Russian: sorry, except in the case of the Su-27/30/34/35-family, that's simply not truth. Generally, Western jets have longer endurance than the Russian - because the Russian were not designed to do more but to fly their mission and return to base. While Western were also made for patrolling, for flying long-range strikes etc.
Thus, no matter if F-16 or MIrage 2000: both are longer-ranged than MiG-29 or Su-25.
Again: Su-27 is a different story.
And yes: delivering MQ-25s to support PSU jets would be a good idea - but I doubt this might happen.
Oh I see, thanks for the clarifications about the jet endurance and fuel tanks.
Wrt to Sodol Hopefully we find out more information in the coming months, A controversial Ukrainian MP called Mariana Bezuhla has some scathing remarks about Sodol and another Ukrainian Gen named Sokol(not the same as the Russian navy general). She claims Sokol fled from the south during the early phase of the war. She's been quite consistently hounding Sodol for some months now. I dont know if she's a case of a broken clock that gets right twice a day or someone who's incessant criticism has some merit.
Otherwise thank you and looking forward to more posts.
Sodol was one of the military executives with Zelensky of course responsible for intentionally leaving Azov brigade with 0.55 million civilian people in Mariupol without any ammunition, medical supplies, etc for ruzzian siege and destruction. When Azov commanders asked Sodol by phone for subsequent instructions what should they do when ruzz encircled the city, Sodol answered them "we are fucked" and ended the call.
https://censor.net/en/resonance/3491117/butusov_pro_sodolya_i_syrskogo
Haven't heard anything about Sokol. It was Sodol who fled from the south during the early phase of the war.
You can check Butusov Plus YouTube channel (in Ukrainian unfortunately) for the most extensive information regarding the war in UA. Yuriy Butusov is the best war journalist in UA currently.
Thank you for this, I'll check out Butusov's channel, maybe if he has a telegram account I can get it as well and use auto translate. I think the person I was reading from wrote Sokol meaning Sodol. I'll check out Butusov. What do you think about Mariana Bezhula, she seems to be incessantly critical of the UA General Staff particularly the ones with Soviet training. Do you think there's merit in what she says sometimes at least?
Hard to figure out her real intentions. But you must take into account that M.Bezuhla is a talking head of Yermak-Zelensky, she was the one who promoted a law to shoot down Ukrainian soldiers who disobeyed orders in 2022 and the one who falsified Wagnergate case of parliament commission for Zelensky.
Syrsky is a ruzzian with his close relatives reside in ruzzia who earned a butcher call in ZSU.
She could play a game to distance her with Z from a treason in ZSU command in order to replace Syrsky with the same or even worse candidate.
I see. Btw that article you provided is very informative. Thank you so much. It even mentions General Sokol(actual names Sokolov) who reportedly run away from the south(according to Mariana Bezhula) as well as Sodol's role in the early days of Feb 2022 invasion.
I see now that she is quite linked to Zelensky. There are some things Zelensky definitely got wrong with regards to preparing before the war, etc. Poroshenko also claims Ukraine's preparedness slowed down after Zelensky took over but as an outsider I dont know how true this is.
But one thing I have heard continuously from Ukrainians is Zelensky didnt put the country into the right preparations before the Feb 22 invasion.
You need to compare similar category western and soviet designs.
For example, the Su-27 family should be compared to the F-15 and Rafale twin-engined air superiority jets, while the Mig-29 would be better compared to the F-16, the Mirage 2000 and the Gripen.
Thanks Tom, there are some great questions and answers here that aren’t ordinarily picked up in the regular posts: great stuff!
I find it increasingly difficult to follow the development of the war here and that has nothing to do with the quality of the mostly great posts, but with the situation itself.
I don't believe in miracle weapons or strategies, one-sided escalation that goes unanswered or a sudden collapse of one side that would lead to a quick and final decision.
What can we expect? The war will probably continue largely as it has in the recent past until at some point in the fairly distant future the wear and tear and costs become so high that it is no longer worthwhile despite the sacrifices already made. I am fairly convinced that - despite all the problems on the Ukrainian side - the Russians will have to give up in some form, but a lot of time will presumably pass before that happens and, above all, a lot of suffering will occur.
And I find it increasingly strange and unpleasant to sit on the sidelines as a passive observer following events for information purposes, knowing full well that despite the constantly updated information nothing will really change for a long time.
My behaviour seems more and more cynical and voyeuristic to me.
Yes, it will probably go on for a while as it is going now. Attrition takes a lot of time even when one party has a clear advantage - look at Germany in WWII, they essentially lost the war in late 1941, but it still took until early 1945 that they became hollow enough to implode.
In this war, neither side has even that advantage, at least not apparently - Russia is fully dedicated, but their efficiency is half-assed, while Ukraine is definitely more efficient, but the dedication of their donors is half-assed at best.
I tend to look for fundraisers and send some cash whenever I can - it's very little, but it improves on the feeling of passive observation on the one hand, and it's always welcome on the other. Attrition keeps chewing up a lot of stuff, and money is one of these.
Let's wait for Trump. He's already in the business and he promised to end the war.
Психологічний портрет Дональда Трампа. Psychological portrait of Donald Trump.
https://zemlj.blogspot.com/2016/11/101.html?m=1
Hello, thank you for your insights and analysis!
I want to ask whether you think the Russian top-level political leadership is composed of rational actors.
To me the most logical/feasible Russian theory of victory would be for them to prolong the war until the Western democracies get tired of supporting Ukraine and before that happens staying on the defensive in order to inflict a better loss ratio on the Ukrainians. In line with this strategy of waiting for "Ukraine fatigue" to set in, it would make sense for Russia to frame herself as not a threat to the global world order, while also framing the war as a local conflict rather than an ideologically-driven war against the West.
Instead Russia does the exact opposite. Incidents such as the recent North Korea deal, the recent attempt to give Houthis cruise missiles, Russian sabotage operations in Europe, and the continued aggressive rhetoric of Russian officials is essentially screaming "We are a destabilizing force on the rules-based world order and you should continue arming Ukraine to help bring about the collapse of our criminal regime". This leads me to believe that Russian leadership is not rational at all and major decisions are being made by an unsound mind. Is there an alternative path to "victory" for the Russians that involves doing all of these aggressive theatrics that Im not seeing here?
Regarding this question, I also wonder whether the decision to begin the recent Kharkiv offensive was a political one rather than motivated by military considerations. It doesn't seem to have been a distraction attempt, because no major push on another part of the front has happened. Also the troops partaking in this offensive were to few to make any major territorial gains. All it has achieved is unnecessary manpower losses for the Russians and continued depletion of their Soviet armored vehicle stockpile. This Kharkiv operation would make sense however if it was a politically motivated to send a message: "Russia stronk! look how many offensives we can start!"
Is my assessment of Russian military actions being politically motivated bluffs accurate? Could Russia be in a much worse situation (with regards to manpower and vehicles) than her actions would suggest? or is this all copium?
This video might be an interesting response (from another angle):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3AMdPMoGJus
Thank you very much for the video, it is really very informative and recommendable. I emphasize this so much because it is so rare, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine, that information is not permeated with sentiment and conviction, whereas here the arguments are above all factual and rational.
The advantage of this is that, although there cannot be the slightest doubt about the attitude of the author and his intended audience, he keeps the topic open for further discussion. This is essential because, despite all laudable preferences and beliefs, no one knows how the fundamental, i.e. the civilizational, conflict will develop. And therefore it is so important to understand our own strategy in its basic principles and at the same time to acknowledge and analyse the motives and intentions of the other side.
Because the more transparent the situation becomes, the more clear we are about the prerequisites and counterarguments of the conflict, the better we can position ourselves and serve our interests.
I think you apply too many western concepts of rationality.
Russias's actions are rationale from a Russian socio-cultural and political perspective.
Russia is essentially a medieval dictatorship. It is not a modern western culture.
The people are still essentially serfs (they were only legally liberated ib 1860s but culturally are still serfs).
and the power structure not too disimilar from the age of Tzars and Boyars. Bits of this strucuture date to Russia being ruled by Mongols up to the 1500s.
Indeed Russia is generally so primitive that at least 25% of population doesn't have access to running water or indoor plumbing. In rural areas these numbers go up to at least 67%.
That means displays of violence have a lot of meaning. It doesn't matter that they are not winning, merely that they are not losing.
Didplays of violence shows the state is powerful. So Kharkov offensive is not meant to succeed as I suspect even the Russian political circles understand their army is useless.
But it is a good message of strength to the local population. It keeps the elites cashed up. No prestige is lost from Russian perspectives.
And all of that props up the Tzar (Putin) and his Boyars (pet oligarchs, generals etc.
And if Tzar is dethroned the next Tzar will be expected to doubledown on the war or increase hositility against the west.
A quite persuasive argument. Not a coincidence that Stalin and his successors were called "red czars" - there's the same mentality since the era of the Romanovs (but with nuclear weapons).
Good points. Those of the previous replies are also good.
I can add that framing the war as a local conflict could be a sound strategic decision, but Russia itself doesn't consider it as such, and while they are proficient in spreading disinformation, they are apparently still unable to deny their basic nature. For Russia, the goal is indeed the destabilization of the world order they perceive as having been set up directly against them, robbing them of their empire and expecting them to be content with being just another country. Putin has essentially declared his holy crusade to reestablish Russian imperial power already back in 2007, and has since made it the cornerstone of his legitimacy.
Managing a state is apparently an unworthy task for a Czar. Taking a few oblasts from Ukraine is also below him. He has set out to dismantle Ukraine completely and also break NATO, the hostile imperial arm. Nothing less would suffice, especially after the casualties taken by his army - the more they pile up, the more grandiose the goal should keep getting to offset them and make them worthwhile.
So, basically, yes, even their operations are politically motivated, and they are most probably posing as being in a much better state than they really are. Russia must be perceived as still having intact offensive power, like all their losses so far have been mosquito bites that they are shrugging off and will crush the evil West in the end no matter what (the Black Knight comes to mind from Monty Python and the Holy Grail). If they are seen as unmoved, their populist friends/fans/agents in the West might find it easier to push through their agenda of "Russia is invincible, let's just surrender while we still can", and lose for them the war they can't win themselves.
"Managing a state is apparently an unworthy task for a Czar. "
Up until the late 19th/early 20th, managing the state was not really the concern of any great power. Expansion of power was the primary concern of any country. The state caring about its own people is largely a modern invention.
Hence the illiterate masses lived in abject poverty whilst kings and queens and even presidents played on the great chess board of power politics (both internal and external).
And this is how Russia should be viewed - not as a modern state, but rather pre-modern one.
Same applies to most third world countries including nominal democracies like India and Brazil.
As for Russia’s war on Ukrainian energy infrastructure: it would be great to read an insider view of what’s actually proposed. Chances are, that much of it will be classified and we’ll only find out well after the war.
In the absence of that, there are a few options, but each will have pros and cons.
Adding any large scale generation, regardless of fuel source will take years. Wind, solar and gas could be just a couple, maybe even 2-3. Others much longer. Same for transmission with the EU. You’d be looking at at least 5 years for any meaningful cross border capacity addition, if not more.
Any form efficiency would help, and could be done fairly quickly on a distributed level with a well organised rebate program, but it won’t be enough. Not even close.
Distributed energy generation such as rooftop solar on communal, commercial buildings and people’s homes, again with rebates and a well organised program could also be done in a matter of months and would help much more than energy efficiency measures, but it would also bring a lot of problems. Problems such as issues with system strength and stability, voltage control, low inertia and fault levels, etc. Not to mention that when the sun goes down, no sensible amount of batteries would be able to hold the system together.
As we witnessed here in Greece, the nice thing about solar power generation (photovoltaics) is that these run concurrently with the greatest energy demand (air conditioning in cities).
For large scale energy storage, hydropower has lots of advantages, if you have tall enough hills/mountains with lakes to harness the height difference (potential energy FTW)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pumped-storage_hydroelectricity
Yepp same with solar in Australia here. And pumped hydro is great if you’ve got 3 things: 1. mountains 2. many years to build it 3. enough money in the bank (not the cheapest technology)
Thanks Tom