Ukraine War, 29 June 2024: Q&A Seesion for June 2024, Part 5

Hello everybody!

To address few additional of your questions (via e-mail, private messages, or in commentary):

1.)    Frederick wrote: you miss (but you’re not the only one) the best part of the story : AASMs are powered bombs. They actually fit somewhere between a precision bomb and a missile.  There is no need to drop them on a ballistic trajectory. When launching them on level flight, the bomb will actually rise and take some altitude by itself to gain some range and impact the target with the desired angle. The great thing with it is that you can launch them from low altitude without exposing yourself while still enjoying a great range…

Yes, Frederick, that’s right: the AASM-250 is powered by a rocket engine. The rocket motor is installed in the rear of the weapon, in the section containing its big wings, too.

Thus, a jet launching it from as low level as seen on that video wouldn’t have to climb as much. This is leading to the conclusion that the weapons released in that video were actually some of non-powered, US-made JDAMs (probably GBU-63s, as visible on the photo below).

***

2.)    Denys wrote: Were (Russian) A-50s able to detect such low-flying planes (like the Ukrainian MiG-29 shown on the video posted two days ago) from afar?

AFAIK, yes, and then from around 200 kilometres away (actually, the Russians claimed more than 220km, but that’s where I’m having my own doubts).

Thus, yes: one of purposes of Ukrainian efforts to shoot down A-50s, early this year, was to ‘drive away’ the Russian airborne early warning aircraft: to force them to operate so far away from the frontline, that they can’t detect low-flying fighter-bombers of the PSU.

***

3.)    Zodiac asked:  I've read of this maneuver previously from another source - the reference being how F16s might be deployed, seeing it successfully executed as a graphic was most satisfying. Which leads me to the question, now would you rate an F16 performing this maneuver? It is a nimble, lighter aircraft than a MIG an advantage? There is also the possibility of a Saab JAS 39 Gripen or Dassault Mirage. How would you evaluate their effectiveness? They are both agile and maneuverable. Would they be limited by the missiles they can deploy?

Essentially, an F-16 (regardless what version) would fly this mission in exactly the same fashion. It couldn’t do anything better or significantly different than a MiG-29 can. If there’s a difference then between an F-16 and a Su-27 – because the latter is much bigger, thus having a much bigger radar cross section, and therefore easier to detect for the Russians. Perhaps that’s the reason why (AFAIK, and with some hindsight considering Frederick’s commentary posted above), now it appears that usually it’s Ukrainian Su-27s that are deploying the French-made, and powered, AASM-250s, while Ukrainian MiG-29s are deploying US-made, non-powered, GBU-63s. Because AASM-250s are, thanks to their rocket motors, more flexible in deployment, probably having a longer range, too.

AFAIK, no F-16s are (presently) compatible with AASM-250s, but: this does not mean this cannot change by the time PSU presses the type into operational service.

The same is valid for JAS.39 Gripens.

Re. Mirages… that depends on the version. AFAIK, the French Air Force is arming only its Rafales and Mirage 2000Ds with AASM-250s, while operating its Mirage 2000Cs as interceptors, with next to no training for air-to-ground, even if the jet is compatible with a wide range of very different air-to-ground ordnance. To prevent any kind of confusion, purposes of different Mirage 2000-variants are like this:

-          Mirage 2000C: single-seat, interceptor

-          Mirage 2000D: two-seat, conventional strike (including guided weapons)

-          Mirage 2000N: two-seat, nuclear strike (with ASMP hypersonic missile).

Now, few weeks ago, Macron announced he wants to deliver five Mirage 2000C Mk.5s to Ukraine – and then so these can fly strikes with SCALP-EG guided missiles (essentially the French version of the Storm Shadow). Apparently, to replace Su-24Ms.

However, this is going to require quite a significant modification of the aircraft in question: so far Mirage 2000Cs were not compatible with the SCALP-EG, only 2000Ds were.

AFAIK, the deployment of AASM-250s from any Mirage 2000Cs Paris might donate to Kyiv is going to require a lot less work than the installation of SCALP-EGs.

***

4.)    Josep wrote: I would like to know if a specific chapter can be dedicated to the "energy war." How to implement distributed renewable energy in small facilities, energy savings (LED...), can help to sustain the operation instead of the hits that large facilities and transmission lines are receiving. To know what strategies Ukraine is developing with the help of its partners to replace part of the 9GW destroyed. Especially when energy is needed for increasing local production of weapons.

Excellent idea and question! Sadly, I’m clueless about this topic. But, I’ll check with Adrien Fontanellaz if he could ready something along these lines: he’s working in the energy sector and has far better understanding (and, I hope: insights) into the possible use of alternative energy sources in Ukraine.

***

5.)    Dmitry wrote: I will abstain from commenting UA kills ratios claims of RU missiles. Very often it looks like the following way: all RU missiles and UAVs were downed, but UA depots and factories are burning. Of course, RU officials report in the same manner.

What I procced to challenge is the use of S-300 against land targets. RU sources do confirm that capability but in guided manner for just 30km. For going ballistic (we already discussed it) the warhead is too small. So the picture is the following: RU sources explain remnants of S-300 missiles as UA malfunctioned lauches, while UA sources claim RU S-300 attacks.

My personal IMHO, the Russian forces use very limited (if any) S-300 missiles for land attacks. Needless to say, will be happy to elaborate and discuss.

Oh, official Ukrainian releases? Gauging by them, the VKS lost over 600 aircraft and helicopters by now…. ho-hum…

Problem: when researching, one has to start with something. That’s where official releases are ‘good for orientation’. Shouldn’t mean they ‘must lead’ to finding any kind of confirmation, of course.

Moreover, there is a very interesting pattern in official Ukrainian releases regarding missile attacks: essentially, they report about missile strikes ONLY on days when they can report they have shot down at least one or another of incoming missiles (or attack UAVs like Shaheds), too.

On the contrary: if the Ukrainian air defences haven’t shot down (or claimed to have shot down) anything at all on the given day, then Kyiv is not reporting about missile strikes at all. Good example for this was yesterday (some of details below).

Obviously, this is resulting in plentiful confusion – and is especially valid for missile strikes usually ‘associated’, ‘connected’ or outright claimed as undertaken by Russian S-300 SAMs (and especially so from the Kharkiv- and Pokrovsk areas). It seems that none of these was ever shot down. Therefore, they’re rarely included in any of summaries published by the PSZSU (or whatever other of top instances in Kyiv). Impression is thus created that ‘no S-300s’ (or other ballistic missiles) were fired by the Russians ‘for days’, although when one is ‘scrounging’ the Ukrainian social media, it’s easy to find reports about this being the case.

As said above: yesterday was a good example. Synelnykove was hit by ‘something’, and a power line and a gas pipeline were damaged, as were 6 private- and 3 non-residential buildings….

Except for the obvious ‘no good news are no news at all’-factor, I think another or reasons is that the authorities often simply have no clue what have the Russians deployed in what case.

And there are good reasons for this: don’t forget that the VSRF’s RUK concept is including not only UAVs like Orlan-10 and/or Zala, and Iskander-M/Ks (as, reportedly, deployed to hit an Ukrainian S-300 SAM-site south-west of Odesa, yesterday), but also BM-27/9P140 Uragan and BM-30/9A52 Smerch multiple rocket launchers.

Depending on ammunition used, the BM-27 has a max range of around 35-36km. Similarly, depending on ammunition used, the BM-30 has a range of 120-200km. And, if they’re using the 9S552 command post of an Iskander system for aiming, the operators have it relatively easy: these are equipped with computers that can convert a pointer on a video into geographic coordinates – which are then used for targeting (like this is usually done for aiming the Iskander-M and Iskander-K missiles).

AFAIK, nothing similar can be done with S-300 SAMs (at least I haven’t ever heard of this being done by them).

Bottom line: it’s not only ‘perfectly possible’, but even ‘likely’ that a lot of what Ukrainians report as ‘S-300 strikes’ are, actually, BM-27- or (though especially) BM-30-strikes.

***

6.)    Related to Dmitry’s commentary, Artur asked: Do you have information about a number of reconnaissance drones, that Russian launch and shot down every day? Yesterday I've seen video of strike on c 300 near Odessa, but I can't understand overall tendency. Does a number of the drone guided strikes increased, decrease or stay approximately the same during last month?

Nope. I do not know how many reconnaissance UAVs are the Russians launching every day, nor how many are shot down. Back in 2022, official Kyiv was still reporting the number of Orlans and similar stuff it was shooting down, every day (for example: something like ‘average’ for June 2022 was 8-10). This practice ceased long ago; probably because the total number of UAVs – regardless if reconnaissance- or attack types – grew into incredible proportions. Also because early during the war, the ZSU tended to spend lots of MANPADS to shoot them down: so much so, it drained not only own, but also NATO’s stocks of such weapons to a bare minimum.

But, I can deduct that since early this year, the VSRF has refined its ‘RUK concept’ – and is meanwhile intensively deploying Orlan-30s and Zalas deep inside the Ukrainian airspace. So much so, these are so often ‘patrolling’ the sky over cities like Poltava, Dnipro and Zaporizhzhya, that the PSU – lacking other means to counter them – armed some of its Yak-52 training aircraft with machine guns, so these can hunt the Russian UAVs.

Obviously, this is why we do get to see Russian missile strikes against Ukrainian positions – foremost radar sites and SAM-sites - well behind the frontline: from memory, most of these were something like 70-80km, but some up to 100-150km behind the frontline.

Thus, the answer to your question is positive: yes, the number of such strikes has increased – and then significantly – though this year.