Hundreds of TOS-1s!? I’m not sure the Russians have that many and if true, the areas under Ukrainian control would have been burnt to ground. Anyway, the situation is dire but I hear that the Russians are actually focused on trying to finally get Khromovo under control and cut that road.
Well, if anybody wants me to do so, I'm going to tell ZSU-contacts that people reading my reporting do not believe they've been severely hit by TOS-1s...
Surprisingly enough, yesterday they did mention Klishchivka as under attack: AFAIK, the village should still be under the Russian control, even if the 3rd Assault might have recovered 'that hill over Klishchivka' already 2-3 weeks ago.
Informations about Mykolaiv and what was hit by Kalibr here: Антон Глушко FB pagehttps://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0B8Fm6fR8BSso1ra5SzVi5G1VLzoE2SExA7srAN9GjNr3F7SL99mJ5HpEE27xn5zhl&id=100011171342589 If something elsa was hit I dont know.
About the missile strikes, the Patriot a d IRIS-T are not working? If lots of missiles pass trough, AD net close to frontline is depleted or not working.
It's technically possible to adapt radar guided western missiles to the soviet-origin sistems of the PSU/ZSU? Like Aspide or Sparrow missiles?
The fact PAC-2/3s and IRIS-Ts are 'in Ukraine' and 'operational' - doesn't 'automatically' mean any are deployed in the Kherson area, or 'not working'.
There is not a single SAM-system with an effective engagement range over the entire Ukrainian airspace. And even if there would be: Earth curvature would limit its range against such targets like UCAVs and LPGMs underway at low-altitude to something like 40-50km.
Effectively, that means - just for example - that a SAM-system deployed in the Kyiv area, can engage low-flying targets in the Kyiv area. And that's it. It can't engage targets in Odesa or Kherson area: they're much too far away.
Regarding adapting Western missiles to Soviet-designed SAM-systems: yes, it's possible. The question is whether it's feasible enough to be economic. The idea of installing Sparrows on Buk M1 launchers, for example, seems to have turned out not to be a good solution.
It's not a good *solution* because of the lower range, ceiling, and payload, but the Poles/Raytheon accomplished it a decade ago. So why are there technical difficulties with modifying Ukraine's Buks?
Both the Polish Kub with ESSM (which is kinematicaly superior to Buk-M1 missiles) and the Czech version with Aspide were just mock-ups. There were no test launches and we have no idea what radar was going to be used and how. Instead of RIM-7 Sea Sparrow Ukraine would be better off receiving Kub launchers and missiles from eastern Europe to be used in pairs with BUK radars, they should be backwards compatible. 25% more range than the Sparrow, a lot faster and less integration issues.
Dear Tom. Could You let more info about HAWK SAM-systems ? These systems were delivered to Ukraine ? Could this system help of Ukraine against aircraft bombs? Also This systems could help of Ukrainian troops in offensive
I'm not Tom, but Hawk is useless on the offensive. A lot of components, all towed and when you put them into position they need to be jacked up, sandbaged, tied down and connected with cables. On the offensive they need very mobile, self contained systems able to shoot and scoot in minutes, like pairs of Gepard / OSA (already used in Kherson in autumn) or Tunguska / Tor in with the first echelon, Buk or IRIS-T with the second echelon and at least one Patriot battery loaded mostly with PAC-2 some 30-40 km behind the front, so that they can kill any Ru fighter at medium-high altitude at up to 100 km from the forward edge of battle. This, combined with long range drone attacks on Ru airfields would break the RuAF's back and get it out of the fight, allowing the ground offensive to go about its objectives unimpeded.
Dont want to disaprove that article, but IMO dont bring anything really groundbreaking, but just summarise what is published already - in various Western/Russian/Ukrainean publications incl. RUSI report and on Twitter or what was published by Tom here and on FB.
Russian Aerospace Forces Using ‘New Offensive Tactics’ To Degrade Ukrainian Air Defenses
By Vijainder K Thakur
The change in RuAF tactics was announced by Alexei Dmitrashkovsky, Ukraine’s head of the joint press center of the Tauride direction.
According to Dmitrashkovsky, unlike in the past when RuAF fighters flew defensive air dominance patrols, “Yesterday there was teamwork: two planes lured out our air defense forces, and the third plane struck.”
Understanding RuAF Tactics
Since November 2022, when Russian forces withdrew from the right bank of the Dnieper River in the Kherson region to stabilize and compact the frontline, RuAF fighters have maintained a defensive posture.
They mostly fly air dominance missions along the battlefront, aimed at preventing Ukrainian Air Forces fighters from marauding Russian ground forces while also providing ground support to Russian forces operating along the battlefront.
RuAF fighters have not flown SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) missions aimed at establishing air superiority over Ukraine in order to freely strike into the Ukrainian heartland.
The tactics used by RuAF fighters for air dominance are as follows:
Top-line Russian fighters, such as the Su-35S and Su-30SM, fly air dominance patrols 24 x 7 in designated sectors covering the entire frontline. Occasionally, MiG-31 BM also flies such patrols.
These fighters are armed with air-to-air (A2A) missiles or a combination of A2A missiles and single anti-radiation missiles (ARM). The ARM is used to strike any Ukrainian AD radar that starts to radiate in order to track RuAF aircraft.
On air dominance missions, typically the:
MiG-31BM is equipped with 2 x RVV-BD long-range A2A missiles under the fuselage and 2 x RVV-SD medium-range A2A missiles under the wings.
Su-35S/Su-30SM is equipped with 2 x RVV-BD, 2 x RVV-SD, and 1 x Kh-31 ARM.
The RuAF fighters fly the patrols staying well clear of Ukrainian AD systems and provide defensive cover to Russian bombers (Su-34), attack fighters (Su-30SM, Su-25), and attack helicopters (Mi-28, Mi-35, Ka-52) Striking AFU military facilities and equipment.
As stated earlier, the fighters also prevent Ukrainian attack aircraft (MiG-29, Su-25 & Su-24) from attacking Russian troops along the front line.
The Deadly Kh-31P ARM
The Russian Kh-31P ARM’s ability to destroy any Ukrainian AD radar that switches on to guide Ukrainian AD missiles is a critical component of RuAF air dominance tactics.
The Kh-31P is designed to destroy medium- and long-range SAM systems’ radars, air operations control radars, and early warning radars. It’s honed to strike active (radiating) adversary radars.
The missile uses a passive seeker to operate in several homing modes, including automatic search and external control. The broadband seeker covers the entire range of current and predicted operating frequencies for potential enemy air defense systems.
If illuminated by an adversary radar, the Kh-31P performs an evasive 10-g pull-up maneuver to break the lock.
Russian pilots refer to the Kh-31PD as “Supersonic Death,” contending that the missile is practically invulnerable to enemy anti-aircraft defenses due to its high speed and counter-attack abilities. Russia claims a 98% success rate with the Kh-31PD over several dozen launches against Ukraine.
Risk Aversion To Risk Acceptance
The reason why RuAF fighters stay out of range of Ukrainian AD systems despite the Kh-31P is because using real-time targeting information from US/NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning & Control System), Ukrainian missiles can often target Russian fighters without switching on their search radars, posing a risk to RuAF fighters and pilots.
According to the Ukrainian official, RuAF fighters are no longer staying out of the range of Ukrainian AD systems. They are entering contested airspace to provoke Ukrainian AD attacks and thereby locate Ukrainian AD systems for the attack. In other words, they are accepting increased risk with the aim of attriting Ukrainian AD systems.
As of now, Ukraine is known to be short on AD missiles. Also, Russian fighters fly at medium altitudes and are known to be well-equipped with EW / IR spoofing systems, reducing the chances of a successful missile engagement. Clearly, Russia believes the risks are acceptable, and it’s time to go on the offensive.
Drones Join The Campaign
According to Dmitrashkovsky, Russia has also started using Kamikaze drones differently. It is using Geran-2 drones to draw fire from Ukrainian AD systems and then attacking the AD systems with Lancets drones.
“After the use of the Shaheds, the Lancets appeared. It is also a strategy to locate air defense positions and then strike with the Lancets accordingly,” he said.
Use of Glide Bombs
The RuAF earlier introduced glide bombs, such as the UPAB-1500B, PBK-500U Drel, and Grom (Thunder), in its air campaign against Ukrainian forces. These bombs have a stand-off range of around 60 km and pack between 500 kg to 1500 kg of explosives. The massive blast of these bombs more than makes up for any navigational inaccuracies.
The destructive power of the Russian glide bombs likely presents Ukrainian air defenses with a Hobson’s choice. If an AD system doesn’t attempt to engage the bomb, very bad things happen. If it attempts to engage, it puts itself at risk of being attacked by a Kh-31P missile launched by a RuAF fighter flying an air dominance patrol.
In an earlier EurAsian Times analysis, we reported that Russia is set to operationally deploy its LO Sirius (Inokhodets-RU) heavy attack drone along the Ukrainian battlefront. These drones are capable of dropping 100-kg precision-guided bombs from stand-off distances.
It’s clear that RuAF is tightening the noose around Ukrainian forces through a very well-calibrated switch from a defensive to an offensive posture along the battlefront.
It’s likely that past Russian infrastructure attacks using expensive cruise missiles didn’t negatively impact Ukraine’s war-fighting ability along the battlefront to the extent that Russia had hoped for.
The steady flow of US/NATO arms and ammunition, as well as power generation and grid equipment, prevented the enfeeblement of Ukrainian forces. As a result, Russia has now resorted to hitting Ukrainian forces hard with heavy and accurate air-delivered bombs.
Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot. He is also an author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst. VIEWS PERSONAL
I even have very precise figures from several of ZSU brigades involved there. But, I'm not talking about such issues 'in open'.
Sufficient to say that especially 'KIA' figures are nowhere near what's usually guessed in this regards in the mainstream- and the social media (indeed: not even 1/4 of what is usually reported). Of course, this is always 'relative', because if one asks people like me, every single 'killed in action' is one too much... and, of course, there are exceptions (like in the case of a certain brigade that botched up in Soledar, for example).
That said, the number of wounded is very high. It's thanks to - meanwhile - excellent CASEVAC-system, that there are 'few fatalities'; but, there are brigades with with (literally) 'several hundred' troops undergoing recovery...
Thank you Tom for objectiveness. West bought russian goods on 2.4 trillions $ during 9 years of this war. This is enough to kill ALL ukrainians. Do i need to write calculations here? And provided russian military industry with ALL what it needed. If you not agree - please enumerate here What Moscow wanted and did not get. West impose weapon embargo on Ukraine during 8 years. Ukraine got from USA 0 weapon for this 8 years. USA invested in Ukraine 0$ during 30 years, compare with Moscow empire and China. Which were declared as principal enemies. 30% of ukrainian budget revenue were spent on % for western credits, and now 60%, but debt higher and higher. West damaged Ukraine economic by quotas and high taxes on ukrainian goods. And NO such on russian goods. And now banned import ukrainian wheat, corn and others to several EU countries. West destroyed 2000+ ukrainian tanks and huge amount other weapons, and nuclear weapon. So West did ALL for quick and complete Ukraine destruction. With millions casualties. But plans failed.
West want make money as partner with russian fascists. 600+ billions $ western investments are blocked in Moscow empire. West want from Ukraine quick capitulation - Minsk 3, and make money as usual. This is one of the reason why West not confiscate bloody russian money. Recently putin not only blocked but gave some Unipro property to temporary aaaa management of russian government. USA already made business with Stalin and Hitler. And we know the result.............
USA became the World hegemon. West destroyed 2400 ukrainian thermonuclear bombs. So NOW 0 countries will refuse have nuclear weapon. More and more countries will have more and more nuclear bombs. This is a matter of time ONLY, say 10-30 years and such lovely organisations like ISIS will get thermonuclear bombs. IF you have a business with Evil - result .... the same.
Is there any visual confirmation of the S-25L? (the laser guided version on the S-25 rocket) The picture you included in your last post was of an unguided S-25, likely a S-25-0 from the head of the rocket.
Regarding Iran's ammo shipment: The contract prices given are extremely low (e.g. 74,000 artillery shells for $1.7 million), unless referring to mortar rounds surely.
It does, but we have to assume some sort of "ally" discount. If these were large-caliber arty shells, that discount would effectively be 'on the house.'
Something that may have complicated the battle for both sides is that, contradicting the advance weather forecasts I saw, April turned out to produce near-constant rain in the area, thus limiting Ukraine's capacity to carry out phased withdrawal. But likely in part for the same reason, the Russians focused on grinding UFOR out of Bakhmut frontally instead of closing the encirclement, which was the most convenient approach for UFOR since it helped buy more time around the flanks.
April 2023 has probably been the muddiest month of the war so far, way more than Spring/Fall '22.
It seems the rain is expected to continue well into May...
The Russians are trying to seize Bakhmut before the weather breaks and Ukrain launches its counteroffensive. I suspect the Ukrainians are holding back reserves and munitions from the Bakhmut front to ready for the spring counteroffensive; the Russians know this is their best chance to finally complete their campaign there. IMHO
Dear Tom, in your recent reports about the air war you stated the increase of russian air operations in the theater, both through air-ground attacks, air patrols or electronic warfare flights. So, some of the models that the russians use are already quite old, right? And to my very questionable knowledge russian air planes may not have the life span or flight hour limit of comparable western designs. Mig-31 comes into mind. On the other hand russian/soviet air planes are much cheaper in production, so there is a trade off, especially if you work under the assessment that in a WW3 environment no airplane would live to see its life span.
Okay, the question: to your assessment, do you see a point in the foreseeable future when russian air power declines even if Ukraine is not able to wear them down by own actions? I don't know if some of the factories that produced the russian planes decades ago are still able to refit worn out planes, let alone produce new planes?
is showing destroying 2 5P85S launchers: at least 2 Lancet UAVs and 1 UAV observing. Is is so hard to protect precious stuff with some MANPADs, mobile anti-aircraft guns etc.? (It's possible more UAVs were involved and some of them destroyed, it's not possible to see from these videos.)
Hundreds of TOS-1s!? I’m not sure the Russians have that many and if true, the areas under Ukrainian control would have been burnt to ground. Anyway, the situation is dire but I hear that the Russians are actually focused on trying to finally get Khromovo under control and cut that road.
Well, if anybody wants me to do so, I'm going to tell ZSU-contacts that people reading my reporting do not believe they've been severely hit by TOS-1s...
Is that hundreds of launchers or hundreds of rockets?
Tom clearly said '...hundreds of TOS-1s-ROUNDS', not '...hundreds TOS-1s'.
Which is obviously not the same -)
I think he edited the post to clarify. It didn't say 'rounds' initially hence the confusion.
Possible, but when I read it, the 'rounds' was there already, hence my comment -)
I see - you mean hundreds of rockets or volleys while at the beginning I thought hundreds of launchers.
Hundreds of rockets, of course.
And I just noticed that Khromovo was not mentioned in the report by the ZSU today which means that the assault is ongoing
Surprisingly enough, yesterday they did mention Klishchivka as under attack: AFAIK, the village should still be under the Russian control, even if the 3rd Assault might have recovered 'that hill over Klishchivka' already 2-3 weeks ago.
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1651261066041597958 that video of a UA Army TOR ADF hit by Lancet
Looks like summer. We don't have such green trees yet (a few others are saying the same in this Twitter thread). Hopefully, this happened last year.
Informations about Mykolaiv and what was hit by Kalibr here: Антон Глушко FB pagehttps://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0B8Fm6fR8BSso1ra5SzVi5G1VLzoE2SExA7srAN9GjNr3F7SL99mJ5HpEE27xn5zhl&id=100011171342589 If something elsa was hit I dont know.
Thanks as always, Tom.
About the missile strikes, the Patriot a d IRIS-T are not working? If lots of missiles pass trough, AD net close to frontline is depleted or not working.
It's technically possible to adapt radar guided western missiles to the soviet-origin sistems of the PSU/ZSU? Like Aspide or Sparrow missiles?
The fact PAC-2/3s and IRIS-Ts are 'in Ukraine' and 'operational' - doesn't 'automatically' mean any are deployed in the Kherson area, or 'not working'.
There is not a single SAM-system with an effective engagement range over the entire Ukrainian airspace. And even if there would be: Earth curvature would limit its range against such targets like UCAVs and LPGMs underway at low-altitude to something like 40-50km.
Effectively, that means - just for example - that a SAM-system deployed in the Kyiv area, can engage low-flying targets in the Kyiv area. And that's it. It can't engage targets in Odesa or Kherson area: they're much too far away.
Regarding adapting Western missiles to Soviet-designed SAM-systems: yes, it's possible. The question is whether it's feasible enough to be economic. The idea of installing Sparrows on Buk M1 launchers, for example, seems to have turned out not to be a good solution.
It's not a good *solution* because of the lower range, ceiling, and payload, but the Poles/Raytheon accomplished it a decade ago. So why are there technical difficulties with modifying Ukraine's Buks?
https://www.armyrecognition.com/mspo_2012_show_daily_news_pictures_video_uk/raytheon_evolved_sea_sparrow_missile_essm_modernizes_polish_medium_range_air_defense_system.html
Both the Polish Kub with ESSM (which is kinematicaly superior to Buk-M1 missiles) and the Czech version with Aspide were just mock-ups. There were no test launches and we have no idea what radar was going to be used and how. Instead of RIM-7 Sea Sparrow Ukraine would be better off receiving Kub launchers and missiles from eastern Europe to be used in pairs with BUK radars, they should be backwards compatible. 25% more range than the Sparrow, a lot faster and less integration issues.
two firing units of our KUB (SA-6) were send to Ukraine recently along MiG-29´s
Dear Tom. Could You let more info about HAWK SAM-systems ? These systems were delivered to Ukraine ? Could this system help of Ukraine against aircraft bombs? Also This systems could help of Ukrainian troops in offensive
I'm not Tom, but Hawk is useless on the offensive. A lot of components, all towed and when you put them into position they need to be jacked up, sandbaged, tied down and connected with cables. On the offensive they need very mobile, self contained systems able to shoot and scoot in minutes, like pairs of Gepard / OSA (already used in Kherson in autumn) or Tunguska / Tor in with the first echelon, Buk or IRIS-T with the second echelon and at least one Patriot battery loaded mostly with PAC-2 some 30-40 km behind the front, so that they can kill any Ru fighter at medium-high altitude at up to 100 km from the forward edge of battle. This, combined with long range drone attacks on Ru airfields would break the RuAF's back and get it out of the fight, allowing the ground offensive to go about its objectives unimpeded.
Tom, just found this article wrote by an Indican retired Pilot about the tactics of the VKS. What do you think?
https://eurasiantimes.com/russia-adopts-new-offensive-tactics-to-decimate-ukrainian/?amp
Can't open that link, sorry.
Is there any 'mirror'?
He is posting i'm Twitter the same. Can't find another site that copy his writing:
https://twitter.com/vkthakur/status/1651536125817942017?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet
Yup...and there's a Youtube video with (apparently) the same content, too.
Again: sorry, can't open the link, and thus can't say (and I'm not going to guess).
I can open the link https://eurasiantimes.com/russia-adopts-new-offensive-tactics-to-decimate-ukrainian/
Dont want to disaprove that article, but IMO dont bring anything really groundbreaking, but just summarise what is published already - in various Western/Russian/Ukrainean publications incl. RUSI report and on Twitter or what was published by Tom here and on FB.
Russian Aerospace Forces Using ‘New Offensive Tactics’ To Degrade Ukrainian Air Defenses
By Vijainder K Thakur
The change in RuAF tactics was announced by Alexei Dmitrashkovsky, Ukraine’s head of the joint press center of the Tauride direction.
According to Dmitrashkovsky, unlike in the past when RuAF fighters flew defensive air dominance patrols, “Yesterday there was teamwork: two planes lured out our air defense forces, and the third plane struck.”
Understanding RuAF Tactics
Since November 2022, when Russian forces withdrew from the right bank of the Dnieper River in the Kherson region to stabilize and compact the frontline, RuAF fighters have maintained a defensive posture.
They mostly fly air dominance missions along the battlefront, aimed at preventing Ukrainian Air Forces fighters from marauding Russian ground forces while also providing ground support to Russian forces operating along the battlefront.
RuAF fighters have not flown SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) missions aimed at establishing air superiority over Ukraine in order to freely strike into the Ukrainian heartland.
The tactics used by RuAF fighters for air dominance are as follows:
Top-line Russian fighters, such as the Su-35S and Su-30SM, fly air dominance patrols 24 x 7 in designated sectors covering the entire frontline. Occasionally, MiG-31 BM also flies such patrols.
These fighters are armed with air-to-air (A2A) missiles or a combination of A2A missiles and single anti-radiation missiles (ARM). The ARM is used to strike any Ukrainian AD radar that starts to radiate in order to track RuAF aircraft.
On air dominance missions, typically the:
MiG-31BM is equipped with 2 x RVV-BD long-range A2A missiles under the fuselage and 2 x RVV-SD medium-range A2A missiles under the wings.
Su-35S/Su-30SM is equipped with 2 x RVV-BD, 2 x RVV-SD, and 1 x Kh-31 ARM.
The RuAF fighters fly the patrols staying well clear of Ukrainian AD systems and provide defensive cover to Russian bombers (Su-34), attack fighters (Su-30SM, Su-25), and attack helicopters (Mi-28, Mi-35, Ka-52) Striking AFU military facilities and equipment.
As stated earlier, the fighters also prevent Ukrainian attack aircraft (MiG-29, Su-25 & Su-24) from attacking Russian troops along the front line.
The Deadly Kh-31P ARM
The Russian Kh-31P ARM’s ability to destroy any Ukrainian AD radar that switches on to guide Ukrainian AD missiles is a critical component of RuAF air dominance tactics.
The Kh-31P is designed to destroy medium- and long-range SAM systems’ radars, air operations control radars, and early warning radars. It’s honed to strike active (radiating) adversary radars.
The missile uses a passive seeker to operate in several homing modes, including automatic search and external control. The broadband seeker covers the entire range of current and predicted operating frequencies for potential enemy air defense systems.
If illuminated by an adversary radar, the Kh-31P performs an evasive 10-g pull-up maneuver to break the lock.
Russian pilots refer to the Kh-31PD as “Supersonic Death,” contending that the missile is practically invulnerable to enemy anti-aircraft defenses due to its high speed and counter-attack abilities. Russia claims a 98% success rate with the Kh-31PD over several dozen launches against Ukraine.
Risk Aversion To Risk Acceptance
The reason why RuAF fighters stay out of range of Ukrainian AD systems despite the Kh-31P is because using real-time targeting information from US/NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning & Control System), Ukrainian missiles can often target Russian fighters without switching on their search radars, posing a risk to RuAF fighters and pilots.
According to the Ukrainian official, RuAF fighters are no longer staying out of the range of Ukrainian AD systems. They are entering contested airspace to provoke Ukrainian AD attacks and thereby locate Ukrainian AD systems for the attack. In other words, they are accepting increased risk with the aim of attriting Ukrainian AD systems.
As of now, Ukraine is known to be short on AD missiles. Also, Russian fighters fly at medium altitudes and are known to be well-equipped with EW / IR spoofing systems, reducing the chances of a successful missile engagement. Clearly, Russia believes the risks are acceptable, and it’s time to go on the offensive.
Drones Join The Campaign
According to Dmitrashkovsky, Russia has also started using Kamikaze drones differently. It is using Geran-2 drones to draw fire from Ukrainian AD systems and then attacking the AD systems with Lancets drones.
“After the use of the Shaheds, the Lancets appeared. It is also a strategy to locate air defense positions and then strike with the Lancets accordingly,” he said.
Use of Glide Bombs
The RuAF earlier introduced glide bombs, such as the UPAB-1500B, PBK-500U Drel, and Grom (Thunder), in its air campaign against Ukrainian forces. These bombs have a stand-off range of around 60 km and pack between 500 kg to 1500 kg of explosives. The massive blast of these bombs more than makes up for any navigational inaccuracies.
The destructive power of the Russian glide bombs likely presents Ukrainian air defenses with a Hobson’s choice. If an AD system doesn’t attempt to engage the bomb, very bad things happen. If it attempts to engage, it puts itself at risk of being attacked by a Kh-31P missile launched by a RuAF fighter flying an air dominance patrol.
In an earlier EurAsian Times analysis, we reported that Russia is set to operationally deploy its LO Sirius (Inokhodets-RU) heavy attack drone along the Ukrainian battlefront. These drones are capable of dropping 100-kg precision-guided bombs from stand-off distances.
It’s clear that RuAF is tightening the noose around Ukrainian forces through a very well-calibrated switch from a defensive to an offensive posture along the battlefront.
It’s likely that past Russian infrastructure attacks using expensive cruise missiles didn’t negatively impact Ukraine’s war-fighting ability along the battlefront to the extent that Russia had hoped for.
The steady flow of US/NATO arms and ammunition, as well as power generation and grid equipment, prevented the enfeeblement of Ukrainian forces. As a result, Russia has now resorted to hitting Ukrainian forces hard with heavy and accurate air-delivered bombs.
Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot. He is also an author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst. VIEWS PERSONAL
Eurasian times is an outlet for Russian propaganda and heavily pro-Russian biased people and views. Use with care.
Tom, do you have any estimates about the daily losses of ZSU in Bakhmut?
I even have very precise figures from several of ZSU brigades involved there. But, I'm not talking about such issues 'in open'.
Sufficient to say that especially 'KIA' figures are nowhere near what's usually guessed in this regards in the mainstream- and the social media (indeed: not even 1/4 of what is usually reported). Of course, this is always 'relative', because if one asks people like me, every single 'killed in action' is one too much... and, of course, there are exceptions (like in the case of a certain brigade that botched up in Soledar, for example).
That said, the number of wounded is very high. It's thanks to - meanwhile - excellent CASEVAC-system, that there are 'few fatalities'; but, there are brigades with with (literally) 'several hundred' troops undergoing recovery...
Thanks!
Thank you Tom for objectiveness. West bought russian goods on 2.4 trillions $ during 9 years of this war. This is enough to kill ALL ukrainians. Do i need to write calculations here? And provided russian military industry with ALL what it needed. If you not agree - please enumerate here What Moscow wanted and did not get. West impose weapon embargo on Ukraine during 8 years. Ukraine got from USA 0 weapon for this 8 years. USA invested in Ukraine 0$ during 30 years, compare with Moscow empire and China. Which were declared as principal enemies. 30% of ukrainian budget revenue were spent on % for western credits, and now 60%, but debt higher and higher. West damaged Ukraine economic by quotas and high taxes on ukrainian goods. And NO such on russian goods. And now banned import ukrainian wheat, corn and others to several EU countries. West destroyed 2000+ ukrainian tanks and huge amount other weapons, and nuclear weapon. So West did ALL for quick and complete Ukraine destruction. With millions casualties. But plans failed.
West want make money as partner with russian fascists. 600+ billions $ western investments are blocked in Moscow empire. West want from Ukraine quick capitulation - Minsk 3, and make money as usual. This is one of the reason why West not confiscate bloody russian money. Recently putin not only blocked but gave some Unipro property to temporary aaaa management of russian government. USA already made business with Stalin and Hitler. And we know the result.............
USA became the World hegemon. West destroyed 2400 ukrainian thermonuclear bombs. So NOW 0 countries will refuse have nuclear weapon. More and more countries will have more and more nuclear bombs. This is a matter of time ONLY, say 10-30 years and such lovely organisations like ISIS will get thermonuclear bombs. IF you have a business with Evil - result .... the same.
Can someone block this lunatic?
Russian troll obviously.
Is there any visual confirmation of the S-25L? (the laser guided version on the S-25 rocket) The picture you included in your last post was of an unguided S-25, likely a S-25-0 from the head of the rocket.
Regarding Iran's ammo shipment: The contract prices given are extremely low (e.g. 74,000 artillery shells for $1.7 million), unless referring to mortar rounds surely.
Edit: Could be 100mm.
Even for 100mm, $23 each sounds cheap.
It does, but we have to assume some sort of "ally" discount. If these were large-caliber arty shells, that discount would effectively be 'on the house.'
Something that may have complicated the battle for both sides is that, contradicting the advance weather forecasts I saw, April turned out to produce near-constant rain in the area, thus limiting Ukraine's capacity to carry out phased withdrawal. But likely in part for the same reason, the Russians focused on grinding UFOR out of Bakhmut frontally instead of closing the encirclement, which was the most convenient approach for UFOR since it helped buy more time around the flanks.
April 2023 has probably been the muddiest month of the war so far, way more than Spring/Fall '22.
It seems the rain is expected to continue well into May...
The Russians are trying to seize Bakhmut before the weather breaks and Ukrain launches its counteroffensive. I suspect the Ukrainians are holding back reserves and munitions from the Bakhmut front to ready for the spring counteroffensive; the Russians know this is their best chance to finally complete their campaign there. IMHO
Dear Tom, in your recent reports about the air war you stated the increase of russian air operations in the theater, both through air-ground attacks, air patrols or electronic warfare flights. So, some of the models that the russians use are already quite old, right? And to my very questionable knowledge russian air planes may not have the life span or flight hour limit of comparable western designs. Mig-31 comes into mind. On the other hand russian/soviet air planes are much cheaper in production, so there is a trade off, especially if you work under the assessment that in a WW3 environment no airplane would live to see its life span.
Okay, the question: to your assessment, do you see a point in the foreseeable future when russian air power declines even if Ukraine is not able to wear them down by own actions? I don't know if some of the factories that produced the russian planes decades ago are still able to refit worn out planes, let alone produce new planes?
Have a nice day!
See https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x and look for 4 articles with "Air War Update". Especially the first one https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-4-november-2022-air-war-update-part-1-basics-9058f56438e
Thank you
UAWeapons has published several Lancet attacks on ZSU AD vehicles. E.g. this one
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1651607986719129603
is showing destroying 2 5P85S launchers: at least 2 Lancet UAVs and 1 UAV observing. Is is so hard to protect precious stuff with some MANPADs, mobile anti-aircraft guns etc.? (It's possible more UAVs were involved and some of them destroyed, it's not possible to see from these videos.)