Hello everybody! Still very busy with my ‘usual work’, so just another brief one – this time with full focus on the Kupyansk-Svatove area, and that because so many are asking about what’s going on there… The last 50 ‘or so’ hours have tried to get first-hand info, but without success. Thus, an ‘extra disclaimer’: contrary to what I usually do (which is: ‘first-hand info & little bit of related OSINT, as far as available’), this time I cannot offer more than ‘RUMINT & OSINT’. See: guessing.
Generally, it's not about 'Ukrainians' or 'Russians', or Albanians and Mars People, but about trying to avoid getting influenced by what other people are reporting. Because any kind of studies of warfare is also an 'intervention' of its own, and everybody - including me - is biased.
I've established a small number of contacts over the time and that's, usually, enough: this was actually the first time in months I've 'had to' check what is reported about events in question.
The southern attacks, if successful, open the way for de-occupation of half of the territories in question, including Crimea, by cutting the Russian supply lines. On the other hand, the Luhansk (northeastern direction) does not offer any opportunities. In the best case the Russians will retreat behind their border and will continue shelling from where Ukraine is not allowed to attack.
I wouldn't be surprised if the Svatove push is mostly motivated for domestic PR purpose to cushion the anticipated territorial losses in Bakhmut and the South, so it will be claimed X km2 of land have been captured vs Y km2 lost, ideally if X > Y, or close, then it will be sold as a great RU victory and proof of the failed UA counter offensive.
It's hard to believe they have any faith to reach Borova in the short or midterm, the area they're advancing seems like a blunt attempt to grab as many empty km2 of land "wherever" possible, regardless of strategic value.
However, time will tell if we are underrating the threat.
It may also be motivated to alleviate the pressure in the South and in Bakhmut. Since its close to Russia, it is much more easier to keep up with the logistic and they would not suffer from AFU strikes on logistic the same way they do in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia
. Beside AFU does not have sufficient long range systems anyway.
It makes more sense to commit surplus force here rather than merely wait for formations in the South to be fully exterminated and replace them with equivalent forces to suffer the same fate. Or at least I imagine this is the logic among the VSRF hierarchy. Beside why wait passively when they have surplus of "meat" immediately available for assault ?
Russia use more shell,mines.... more logistic needed. UA has receive many good western trucks and also much less corruption and that means also people in management are there because theirs skills and not political reason , better motivation on all levels, west has always good logistic so UA can learn from west, more partisan's is on UA side. geography, ... all together make big diffrence
I was wondering if Ukraine could send some of the NATO trained units to help deal with this. It would give them some battlefield experience instead of waiting around in reserve. Without the massive minefields they may be able to practice maneuver warfare. Does this make sense?
From what I take reading sources like Mike Kofman or the ISW, force degradation of units is a huge problem, when a unit loses a low % of its combat power it might become combat ineffective faster than you'd expect, at least offensively, and need significant time to be reconstituted. That's why, without being an expert, it seems to me there is so much insistence to keep brigades uncommitted in reserve even when you feel they could be getting good combat experience elsewhere.
I don't think so. Depends on if the defenders are able to hold the line or not.
One point of this attack in Luhansk is to draw forces away from the Donbas, to lower the pressure of the Ukrainian push. Redirecting the NATO trained troops is exactly what Russia would want.
>32nd Mech: this unit was established only in February this year, and I have no clue about it past
32 brigade is a 72 ombr's stepchild with officers, veteran units from 72 taken to be a core replenished with unexperienced mobiks. Like other new brifades before.
"“At least 100 armored vehicles have been used to attack by the enemy on the Orekhov [Russian spelling of Orikhiv] section of the Zaporizhzhya (Russian spelling of Zaporizhzhia) front,” a member of the Russian-installed Zaporizhzhia military-civilian administration, Vladimir Rogov, wrote on Telegram on Wednesday."
Surprising if true as it is generally believed Ukraine has yet to break through the Russian first and second defence lines, I could be mistaken, I often am.
Thanks for the info, Tom. Even if taking it with a pinch of salt, is really interesting to “fulfill” all the contact zone with its own narrative.
Besides the artillery (that every sane person are) demanding to the West, seems that send to every Ukrainian unit a PR specialist, fluent in English (as a bare minimum) could be a good move.
What we get to see in the social media is primarily from 2-3 brigades (foremost the 3rd Assault and the 47th Mech). Is creating the impression of 'other brigades not fighting' or doing very poorly - and attracting much more donations and volunteers for units perceived as 'elite', too.
....while certain other brigades - especially those apparently based on specific political parties or groups in Ukraine - are pampered by the media supporting the groups in question.
Thus, not releasing enough into the social media is de-facto counterproductive for far too many of ZSU's units.
The total amount of donations is fixed as everybody willing to donate is already donating. Changing the PR landscape would just redistribute the existing donations.
I am overwhelmed by the thousands of single pieces of available information and unable to get the big picture. Of course nobody knows, what will happen in the end, but nevertheless a little guidance from an experienced observer is of much help. Thanks a lot for your opinion, Tom.
Thanks once again Tom, interesting developments, but its sounds like the Rats did not make a major breakout anywhere, it maybe tough for the UAF but there fighting hard and doing ok my humble opinion
Спасибо, Том.
Tom, do you read the reports of Mashovets in Tverezo.info or you do not read the sources in Ukrainian?
If Russian is easier for Tom, https://t.me/s/zvizdecmanhustu
Sorry, nope: never heard.
Generally, it's not about 'Ukrainians' or 'Russians', or Albanians and Mars People, but about trying to avoid getting influenced by what other people are reporting. Because any kind of studies of warfare is also an 'intervention' of its own, and everybody - including me - is biased.
I've established a small number of contacts over the time and that's, usually, enough: this was actually the first time in months I've 'had to' check what is reported about events in question.
"25th Mech" - Air Assault?
Ah yes: Airborne, indeed.
Tom, thanks! Excellent analysis despite lack of sufficient information
Thank you very much.
Tom, looks a bit like both a group thinking and wishful thinking. I see no one that is worried about the Svatove direction, including the head of Mi6.
Even Ganna in her optimism was spreading some “rumors” that ZSU was on the offensive at that direction several days ago.
Let’s see...
So, instead of crashing 100 k orcs, ukrainians went for south and cannot stop attack from the east? How smart
The southern attacks, if successful, open the way for de-occupation of half of the territories in question, including Crimea, by cutting the Russian supply lines. On the other hand, the Luhansk (northeastern direction) does not offer any opportunities. In the best case the Russians will retreat behind their border and will continue shelling from where Ukraine is not allowed to attack.
That would be what ruzzians would like Ukrainians to do...
I wouldn't be surprised if the Svatove push is mostly motivated for domestic PR purpose to cushion the anticipated territorial losses in Bakhmut and the South, so it will be claimed X km2 of land have been captured vs Y km2 lost, ideally if X > Y, or close, then it will be sold as a great RU victory and proof of the failed UA counter offensive.
It's hard to believe they have any faith to reach Borova in the short or midterm, the area they're advancing seems like a blunt attempt to grab as many empty km2 of land "wherever" possible, regardless of strategic value.
However, time will tell if we are underrating the threat.
It may also be motivated to alleviate the pressure in the South and in Bakhmut. Since its close to Russia, it is much more easier to keep up with the logistic and they would not suffer from AFU strikes on logistic the same way they do in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia
. Beside AFU does not have sufficient long range systems anyway.
It makes more sense to commit surplus force here rather than merely wait for formations in the South to be fully exterminated and replace them with equivalent forces to suffer the same fate. Or at least I imagine this is the logic among the VSRF hierarchy. Beside why wait passively when they have surplus of "meat" immediately available for assault ?
Everyone says the Russians have bad logistics. But what are the arguments that the Ukrainians have it better?
Did Ukrainians come up with some new ways or what? I'm sure they also use railway.
Russia use more shell,mines.... more logistic needed. UA has receive many good western trucks and also much less corruption and that means also people in management are there because theirs skills and not political reason , better motivation on all levels, west has always good logistic so UA can learn from west, more partisan's is on UA side. geography, ... all together make big diffrence
I was wondering if Ukraine could send some of the NATO trained units to help deal with this. It would give them some battlefield experience instead of waiting around in reserve. Without the massive minefields they may be able to practice maneuver warfare. Does this make sense?
From what I take reading sources like Mike Kofman or the ISW, force degradation of units is a huge problem, when a unit loses a low % of its combat power it might become combat ineffective faster than you'd expect, at least offensively, and need significant time to be reconstituted. That's why, without being an expert, it seems to me there is so much insistence to keep brigades uncommitted in reserve even when you feel they could be getting good combat experience elsewhere.
I don't think so. Depends on if the defenders are able to hold the line or not.
One point of this attack in Luhansk is to draw forces away from the Donbas, to lower the pressure of the Ukrainian push. Redirecting the NATO trained troops is exactly what Russia would want.
Committing reserves to a secondary sector would be exactly what ruzzians would want Ukrainians to do.
>32nd Mech: this unit was established only in February this year, and I have no clue about it past
32 brigade is a 72 ombr's stepchild with officers, veteran units from 72 taken to be a core replenished with unexperienced mobiks. Like other new brifades before.
Our ex-начштаба is there now.
"“At least 100 armored vehicles have been used to attack by the enemy on the Orekhov [Russian spelling of Orikhiv] section of the Zaporizhzhya (Russian spelling of Zaporizhzhia) front,” a member of the Russian-installed Zaporizhzhia military-civilian administration, Vladimir Rogov, wrote on Telegram on Wednesday."
Surprising if true as it is generally believed Ukraine has yet to break through the Russian first and second defence lines, I could be mistaken, I often am.
Is a fabrication created by 'War Gonzo' - with help of previously unpublished videos from early June.
Thanks for the info, Tom. Even if taking it with a pinch of salt, is really interesting to “fulfill” all the contact zone with its own narrative.
Besides the artillery (that every sane person are) demanding to the West, seems that send to every Ukrainian unit a PR specialist, fluent in English (as a bare minimum) could be a good move.
Definitely so!
What we get to see in the social media is primarily from 2-3 brigades (foremost the 3rd Assault and the 47th Mech). Is creating the impression of 'other brigades not fighting' or doing very poorly - and attracting much more donations and volunteers for units perceived as 'elite', too.
....while certain other brigades - especially those apparently based on specific political parties or groups in Ukraine - are pampered by the media supporting the groups in question.
Thus, not releasing enough into the social media is de-facto counterproductive for far too many of ZSU's units.
The total amount of donations is fixed as everybody willing to donate is already donating. Changing the PR landscape would just redistribute the existing donations.
I am overwhelmed by the thousands of single pieces of available information and unable to get the big picture. Of course nobody knows, what will happen in the end, but nevertheless a little guidance from an experienced observer is of much help. Thanks a lot for your opinion, Tom.
Thanks once again Tom, interesting developments, but its sounds like the Rats did not make a major breakout anywhere, it maybe tough for the UAF but there fighting hard and doing ok my humble opinion
Thank you Tom. It seems that Ukrainians keep information flow well controlled in this part of the front line as well.
Ruzzians are screaming about every movement forward they have.
Obviously, this sector of the frontline is 'isolated': far away even from any major roads, not to talk about internet connection etc.