Hello everybody!
Still very busy with my ‘usual work’, so just another brief one – this time with full focus on the Kupyansk-Svatove area, and that because so many are asking about what’s going on there…
The last 50 ‘or so’ hours have tried to get first-hand info, but without success. Thus, an ‘extra disclaimer’: contrary to what I usually do (which is: ‘first-hand info & little bit of related OSINT, as far as available’), this time I cannot offer more than ‘RUMINT & OSINT’. See: guessing.
Russian Forces
Essentially, word is that the VSRF has a ‘huge concentration of forces’ deployed down the Highway 66, in the area between Svatove and Kremina. Some are talking about 100,000 troops. I’m anything else than sure it’s as many, but there you go…
The core of the force in question are:
1st Guards Tank Army (1st GTA),
2nd Guards Combined Arms Army (2nd GCAA), and
XI Army Corps (XI AC), VSRF.
That might sound ‘huge’ at the first look, but: the former two were re-built after all the catastrophes that befell them the last year, and mostly with ‘2nd class’ equipment and mobiks. The XI AC is nothing better in this regards. That’s why all their formations were reinforced by multiple BARS-regiments and ‘Storm-Z’ companies of convicts.
Now, the biggest uncertainty is that of the directions of their attacks: very different directions and areas, and very different units are mentioned by different of ‘open source intelligence’-sources. Thus, I’m not sure where exactly was what of Russian units deployed. Only that there seem to have been (or there still are) three ‘waves’ or three ‘groups’ of the VSRF, as follows.
Wave I (or 1st Group?):
- 11th Tank Regiment
- 27th Motor Rifle Brigade
- 3 additional motor rifle regiments
- BARS-19 & Storm-Z
Wave II (or 2nd Group?):
- 15th Motor Rifle Brigade
- 30th Motor Rifle Brigade
- 1 additional motor rifle regiment
- BARS-2 & Storm-Z
Wave III (or, probably: the ‘operational manoeuvre group’, OMG; i.e. the force aiming to exploit the breach of the Ukrainian frontlines to advance into the depth):
- 4th Tank Division (‘Kantemirovskaya), with 12th and 13th Tank Regiments
- BARS-5 & BARS-9 & Storm-Z….
Fire-support is provided by the 288th and 38i5th Artillery Brigades.
To me, this ‘should be OK’, because it appears as a ‘classic’ Soviet/Russian style mechanised operation: two ‘motor rifle’ groups attacking along a relatively wide frontline, searching for a weak spot, and the third (the OMG, centred on a tank formation) then exploiting whatever success was achieved by the first two. One has to expect there to be the Wave/Group IV (perhaps centred on the 47th Tank Division?), waiting for its turn, further to the rear…
Problem for the ZSU: it has got so few M142s and M270s, so few ammunition for them, and these are so busy supporting the offensive in southern Zaporizhzhya, that it had no means to prevent the Russian build-up. The PSU did try to limit this build-up with sporadic Storm Shadow and JDAM-ER strikes on depots in the Svatove and even the Luhansk area, but that was simply not enough: the Kupyansk-Svatove area is close to south-western Russia, and thus the VSRF had it easy to complete its preparations and build-up the stocks of necessary supplies. And the sole ZSU artillery brigade deployed in this area – the 40th – is doing its best, but simultaneously having to operate along something like 100km of the frontline. Once again: too little.
(Now keep on telling me the ZSU has enough artillery, and – especially – artillery ammunition, or that these ‘do not matter as much as F-16s or tanks’….)
Ukrainian Forces
From what can be guessed on basis of available information, the Russian attack aimed to hit the northern flank of the 66th Mechanised Brigade (66 ОМБр). Perhaps the seam between its northern flank and the ‘next’ ZSU brigade deployed north of it. Not sure (not even sure if this ‘northern’ brigade is the 32nd Mech, or some other ZSU unit).
Now, the 66th is like the 28th Mech, which I’ve mentioned few days ago. One of ‘poorer’ ZSU units. Primarily staffed by reservists, speaking next to no English and thus ‘unknown’: having next to no social media presence in the English-language area (of course, it has a FB-page in Ukrainian). It certainly received very little Western equipment (AFAIK: M113s only), and has very few UAVs. Still, why are some describing the 66th as ‘inexperienced’ – no idea: the 66th played a crucial role in the II Phase of the ZSU offensive into south-eastern Kharkiv, last year in September-October when, between others, it was one of first (if not the first) to cross the Oskil River and thus outflank (and collapse) the Russian defences of Kupyansk. I know it as a ‘though outfit, with a good CO’.
If at all, and if it is really there (on the frontlines north of the 66th), then it could be that with ‘inexperienced’, the people mean the 32nd Mech: this unit was established only in February this year, and I have no clue about it past what can be found here.
Russian Assault
AFAIK, the Russian assault was initiated around 19-20 July. But, exactly where?
Some say, it hit the 66th on both sides (north and south) of Novoselskoye, and went in direction of Berestovo. When the 66th (and the 40th Artillery) stopped this effort, the Russians re-directed their attack to the axis from Karmazynivka past northern Novovodyane: in direction of two islets on the Zherebets River, of which the western is a low hill dominating the entire area. This is my reconstruction of the related RUMINT from around two days ago:
Others say the Russians attacked from ‘in between’ of Kovalivka and Karmazynivka in general direction of Cherneshchyna, and constructed a pontoon bridge over the Zherebets in that area.
Yet others are positioning the Russian attack further north: into the area between Raihorodka-Serhiivka-Nadiya in the north, and Kovalivka in the south: approximately at the seam between the 66th Mech and the ‘northern’ ZSU brigade (32nd Mech or some other).
….and then there are others talking about Russian attacks in both areas…. which, considering the reported size of the VSRF force deployed for this operation: is perfectly possible.
Everybody seems to be in agreement that the ZSU rushed reinforcements to the scene (mentioned are, between others, the 14th and 25th Mech), stabilising the situation, establishing a new frontline etc.
Gauging by the local terrain alone: except in the area of Raihorodka, and from Kovalivka to Tverdokhlibove, where there is plenty of cover, attacks further south must’ve cost the Russians dearly (as indicated by some of videos released by the 66th Mech, released four days ago): they had to cross lots of open fields – all certainly mined by Ukrainians, even if nowhere near as massively as what the Russians are doing in southern Zaporizhzhya) – just in order to reach Novovodiane. Then they had to go through exactly the same while trying to reach the Zherebets, to – reportedly – construct a pontoon bridge there. And even once they did so, on the western side of the river they had to advance uphill, while facing Ukrainians entrenched at elevations above them. However, that (heavy losses already while approaching and breaching the enemy frontline), is something the classic Soviet/Russian doctrine is expecting for operations of this kind, so ‘no surprise’.
Is there a reason to ‘panic’?
Me thinks: nope.
First (and foremost), alone the fact that most of RUMINT & OSINT is already talking about the deployment of the Russian OMG (i.e. the 12th and 13th Tank Regiments of the 4th Division) in the Novovodiane area - but: in relation to these attacking positions of the 66th Mech in that village - means that their initial attacks have suffered ‘enough’ losses for them to be forced to start deploying the OMG ‘too early’: still in attempt to breach the ZSU frontline, ‘instead’ to exploit an already existing breach in that frontline.
Secondly, so far, haven’t seen any evidence for the Russians securing any significant sections of the road connecting Borova with Svatove. On the contrary, the area into which they’re advancing (south of that road) is ‘broken’ (uneven, hilly, with scattered small forests and hedgerows) and contains even very few field paths. And without ‘roads connected to railroads’ the Russians can’t get very far, because their logistics is not working without either. Mind that the lack of roads in this area was one of reasons why the Ukrainian offensive in south-eastern Kharkiv ‘run out of steam’ on approach to Svatove: even the ZSU couldn’t move its supplies at the necessary speed.
That said, and again: keep in mind that all of this is really little else but guessing: I haven’t got any contacts in this part of Ukraine, and the Russian contacts know nothing either.* Thus, at least I do not consider anything of this for ‘sure’, definitely ‘not confirmed’.
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*Those that are talking are talking about a heavy deployment of the VKS’ Su-25s and attack helicopters in reaction to the collapse of their lines in the Klishchivka-Andriivka area, yesterday.
>32nd Mech: this unit was established only in February this year, and I have no clue about it past
32 brigade is a 72 ombr's stepchild with officers, veteran units from 72 taken to be a core replenished with unexperienced mobiks. Like other new brifades before.
Our ex-начштаба is there now.
I wouldn't be surprised if the Svatove push is mostly motivated for domestic PR purpose to cushion the anticipated territorial losses in Bakhmut and the South, so it will be claimed X km2 of land have been captured vs Y km2 lost, ideally if X > Y, or close, then it will be sold as a great RU victory and proof of the failed UA counter offensive.
It's hard to believe they have any faith to reach Borova in the short or midterm, the area they're advancing seems like a blunt attempt to grab as many empty km2 of land "wherever" possible, regardless of strategic value.
However, time will tell if we are underrating the threat.