Thanks for the update, including the section on the DRC war and Zimbabwean troops. A ratio of 4:1 on average and its not enough… well, it seems like the Russians are learning fast enough. Unfortunately. And also it seems like there should be some changes in GenStab U.
I met an ex-ZDF officer who was in a group (I forget how many but was less than 130) that was cut off long-term. What he told me matches what you've reported - their opposition was led intelligently enough to, for example, choose the timing of attacks for when they figured ZDF morale would be lowest, and they were outnumbered, but their training and discipline absolutely saved them. They also knew that they weren't exchanging with "professional soldiers" and that surrender was certain to be unpleasantly fatal.
He was subsequently decorated by Mugabe personally and experienced the guy's charisma.
I think when we talk about western problems with modern war, I think western concepts are still based on obtaining complete sir superiority and using ground troops as a glorified mopping up force (ie Iraq 1991)
Against Russia this might happen as the Russian IADs and Air force have proven poor against a fourth rate Ukrainian opponent. Unless ROEs prevent destruction of Russisn IADs and airforces in Russia, USA probably overwhelms Russian air forces and then the war goes nuclear.
Against China it is a different story - any war against China will be a mainly naval and air war. I don't think US would invade Chinese mainland. Even if it wanted to, US no longer has that kind of capability due to peace dividend. Oh and landing troops in China is a causa belli for nukes.
I don't think the western approach is wrong. They probably won't ever face a Ukrainian type situation.
Even any war against Iran will probably be an air war with limited ground forces.
Russian air defenses are more capable than you think and Ukraine is not fourth rate. NATO held wargames a few months ago and by their own assessments it took them three days to suppress Russian air defenses in order to gain the local air superiority in just one sector. And then, the ground forces had to be ready to immediately attack because the superiority only lasted 45 minutes.
Ground forces in Iraq were more than glorified mopping up forces. Air superiority meant the ground forces didn't have to contend with Iraqi air, and it meant the allied air forces could isolate the battlefield with regards to logistics and enemy troop movements. But it was the ground forces that had to cross the minefields, engage the fortified positions and armored vehicles. The surviving Iraqis also mentioned the impact of the allied artillery quite a lot, as well. Any impression of mopping up was created by the superior technology and training of the allied forces. After the ground forces broke through, they exploited the breakthroughs and the air forces continued to fight the deep battle, such as interdicting retreating Iraqi forces on the so-called "highway of death".
There is no need or plans to invade mainland China.
Wargames are a fantastic tool for strategic practice and scenario planning, especially in logistics. However, they are next to worthless as realistic weapons system simulators. If they were, then the heads of western armed forces wouldn't have talked complete bollocks before the war, about the Russian anti-access/area denial. The mythical a2ad that cannot stop cessnas from flying into refineries all over Russia. Russia has orders of magnitude fewer ground radars, than NATO has the means of destroying them.
The NATO-Russia border is enormous, making the airplanes the only means to protect Russia from the NATO air force, which can come in from virtually any direction. The fabled AA at the frontline is unimportant when everything deep in the rear is destroyed. Defending the nearest trench from NATO glide bombs is the least of Russia's problems.
Agreed Russia is unable to defend its own airspace against USA/NATO.
But also most critically Russia short of nuclear weapons lacks offensive capability to destroy NATO airpower or logistics hubs to initiate a knock out first strike or even temporarily render NATO frontline forces inoperative.
- Look at how Russian airforce operates now - it does not fly over Ukrainian held territory. The Russians have no stealth aircraft capable of penetrating airspace (Su-57 has the RCS of a 1980s F/A-18A-D).
- It lacks long range missiles numbers to neutralise enemy airbases (and most NATO ones are hardened with air shelters), logistics and command hubs.
- It lacks effective SEAD/DEAD (hence Russian jets don't fly over enemy held territory).
- It's army lacks ability to operate coherently in anything bigger than company size groups (and often less).
- They lack ISTAR especially for long range strikes (eg satelites, stealth drones). Their space based recce capability is currently dismal - Russia has only two photographic satellites with photo resolution on par with the 1980s (and a further 7 seven Liana for oceanic electronic reconnaissance satellites). Meanwhile the US launched 7 recce satellites in 2022 alone.
- Their communications systems are dismal and not robust.
So how on earth does Russia attack NATO to neutralise it? Literally it can't. It's suicide for them.
I agree with what you say about an attack of Baltic being an attack of Us and Uk troops there, and I assume the troops will fight. Uk I expect to fight as a nation. But Us? Under Trump/Vance? I really don’t know. Living in Norway I am not happy to say it, but with the wrong leadership US is not to be trusted. But yes, I agree that if NATO reacts as a whole Russia is toast.
Russians air defences are proving themselves to not be exactly stellar. The number of S400s confirmed swatted by Ukrainians amounts to 15% of current battalion sets destroyed or damaged. The Pantsir has continued to be proven a turd, Tor and Buk are better but still vulnerable and seem to be in short supply. Indeed confirmed losses are 80 Buk launchers, 60 Tors launchers as well as as 12 Buk radars. The S300 is still there but is even more vulnerable than S400. The rest is ancient trash - Osas, Strelas.
Lots of drones are making there ways through vast tracts of Russia to as far as Moscow. There have been some Ukrainian airforce raids on Russia itself.
Ukraine's offensive capabilities are 4th rate - no stealth aircraft, no strategic strike capabilities, no dedicated SEAD/DEAD capabilities. It has limited ISTAR and doesn't benefit from full American ISTAR and C3 capabilities.
Not to mention Ukraine is limited by western ROEs as to what weapons it can use where (hence no ATACMS strikes on airbases in Russia for example).
As for Iraq in 1991- the air campaign lasted 42 days, the ground war 4 days (excluding the battle of Khafji in Saudi Arabia). By the time Task Force 1-41 rumbled into Iraq, the Iraqis were no longer capable of any kind of coordinated action and the Americans had complete air dominance.
Yes the US ground (and also naval forces where possible) forces fired a lot of artillery, but the Iraqis themselves were already effectively defeated and their resistance for most part non-existent and certainly non-effective - a lot of it described as sporadic and uncoordinated.
Effectively airpower had smashed the Iraqis. By the way this has been US doctrine since 1944 when airpower was a key ingredient in punching through German lines during Operation Cobra.
Soviets even acknowledged it - they always understood their airforce was going to struggle against Americans so invested heavily in air defences and tube artillery.
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Now the big question here is: under what circumstances is NATO going to have to pump 100,000s of thousands shells but more importantly be subjected to 100,000s of Russian/Chinese shells, drones and loitering munitions?
The answer is never.
Russia invading Estonia or whatever is completely unlikely. The Russian ability to simply smash into Baltics disappeared in March 2004 when those countries joined NATO.
The Russians have also proven completely incompetent at offensive warfare. If they couldn't take on the Ukrainians who had neglected their military for 30 years then how would they fare against NATO and the American behemoth?
The Russian military that emerges from this war will be far more outdated and primitive than even the 3rd rate force that tried to invade Ukraine in 2022. It will have gone through its Soviet reserves (including all precious gun barrels), burnt through the flight hours of its already ageing airforce whilst losing over a hundred jets (remember over 50% of Russian tactical fleet was over 30 years ago in 2022). It's conventional navy is weak and getting weaker - eg those Udaloy and now ironically name Sovremenny destroyers are long due for a replacement and Russians can't replace them due to lack of capability.
Baltic became a NATO lake in 2004 when Estonia joined NATO. Kalinningrad is a liability and the Baltic fleet a sitting duck (hence a lack of investment in that fleet). With entry of Finland into NATO the North Sea Fleet became extremely vulnerable too.
Oh and then there's nukes.
SO WHAT CONVENTIONAL THREAT IS RUSSIA TO NATO? Minimal I'd say. Putin is not stupid.
China and US might get into a fight over Taiwan but again that's an air-sea battle. As we both agree US is not going to invade Chinese mainland. So under what circumstances does China get to lob 100,000s of artillery shells and loitering munitions at US troops?
SO UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES IS CURRENT US AIR POWERED DOMINATED MILITARY DOCTRINE WRONG?
I was with you until you said Ukraine is fourth rate. Ask Gerasimov, Shoigu and a lot of Russian Generals or the hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers getting killed or wounded.
Never said whole Ukrainian military was 4th rate, only their offensive aerial capabilities (ie airforce). It has improved but its still not at the same level as most NATO/western forces.
It's why for most part Ukrainian airforce can't operate over Russian held territory and why it can't fully exploit things like JDAMS (they have to come in low whereas NATO operates at medium-high level).
And the Russian military as a whole is "4th rate" as well which is why they never managed to get any true mileage out of their airforce, their long range strike capabilities or army and why their IADS has suffered massive casualties.
Disagree with this 1:4, loss ratio is likely about 1:1, everything else is propaganda to boost morale or whatever. Acc to you know who it is 7:1. Neither side would admit 1:1 in principle. Bur known by name officers losses 1:1. 1:15 is quite possible in a particular skirmish, even 180:0 is possible when a missile hits right spot.
How is it a 1:1 loss ratio when Russia is using significantly more resources to gain little to no territory? They have emptied at least half of their Soviet store of armored vehicles and artillery. This wouldnt be happening if their troops werent getting blown up in those vehicles to the point they have to take equipment out of storage in addition to increasing domestic production. I find the 10:1 ratios in favour of Ukraine largely unbelievable but if it was a 1:1 loss ratio, Russia would have had a lot more equipment in its stores.
There is little connection between cumulative loss figures and mass of lost russian armour. They have it and can afford this scale of losses. Imagine what it would be without these T-xx and BMPs. UAF can't afford armour losses bcs very little left to lose. Soviet armour has gone, western armour is available in insignificant quantities and need to be spared bcs of uncertainty in future deliveries (I wouldn't count MaxxPro amd M113 etc as a "proper" armour. That's why we haven't seen any successful counterattacks for a year already even in defence this is absolutely critical instrument.
A 1:1 loss ratio IMHO is completely unlikely. There are hundreds of videos from the battlefield where corpses of Russian soldiers are scattered everywhere. Such scale of losses can't be observed in Russian videos about UKR losses. We can be 100% sure if they would exist Russian propagandists would be happily showing them. Additionally an attacker, especially when he is running out of modern equipment is always suffering more losses.
The 1:4 ratio may be propaganda. May. But why is the 1:1 more likely? Actually quite strange if both were equal in killing each other. And talking about propaganda, you see that also a statement of 1:1 can be propaganda?
Because Ukraine without Donna's is approximately 35 Mio. people. Russia is 140 Mio. Hence, the ratio of population is the same ratio. Both are fighting the war based on hybrid system of volunteering and small scale conscription. So the same base of mobilisation.
That is visible on the battlefield so far in 2023 and 2024. Losses without any sign of movement in the one or the other direction (different to autumn 2022, when Russia just used there professional force).
This way the war can continue endless and neither side is currently is trying to politically change that.
So nothing will happen until US elections (except Putin dies and there is a succession crises like during the Korean war) and then there may something happen - whatever that may be...
When I visited Yarvoriv Training Area, we were training roughly reinforced battalion task force a month. The training area couldn't do a full BDE, it may be able to now don't know, so the BDE would pick a battalion and send along extra parts from other units to maximize the training effect. The idea was that the Bn trained could go back and spread the learning and training to the rest of the unit. I found out while there that what was happening in most cases (some exceptions though) was that once back the commanders of the BDE's spent considerable amounts of effort making sure none of the training was passed along. Reasons varied. In some cases it was flat out "I don't get it, and I don't want to look bad", in others it was lack of resources. This could have been fixed if the General Staff had been more direct in ordering units to listen to the guys who were trained and were trying to pass things along. But as you said, lots of the guys in the GS didn't get it, and didn't want to try. Easier to stop it and smile at the allies and go "Thank you so much! We have learned so much from you." I know that a lot of behind the scenes fighting was going on as the forward thinkers were trying hard to push for change, but there were a lot of issues to address and fix so where do you even start? Especially when you are technically still fighting a war in the east. No easy solution.
I am not sure any shake up will change things. It is about training, deep seated, when at the time of war this the only thing they can rely on. And that training was the same as ru army. So this would require massive retraining and best by army institutions that has lots of recent war experiences. And this is only US army. Which means West Point or something. And it is not going to happen any time soon.
On the other hand quite a few units made their own internal rules and conduct. That works for them. So the only workable way currently seems to grow those formations reforming them into divisions and Corpses, giving under their command small units. Consolidating units and command. This would give those units enough weight to influence operational and even strategic level.
By the way, units often call themselves "organisms" quite officially. This is what it is actually, living evolving organisms.
If the Russians recruit 30K every month (paying up to $20K per contract in Moscow these days), and their army does not seem to grow much in numbers, the losses should be a little below 1K / day.
The Ukrainian losses seem to be tracked here https://ualosses.org/statistics/ at about 300 KiA / week which makes below 50 / day. However, there should be a significant % of MiA and many more WiA.
You can also recall Murz's estimate of 15K RU vs 5K UA losses at Avdiivka - and that after the UA troops were nearly encircled.
One can only guess about RU losses, no data, no precise info. Losses are high, no doubts, but 1 to 4? With superiority in the air and in long range missiles? With ubiquitous Lancets and Krasnopols being such numerous nowadays that even secondary targets are fired at?
As per Avdeevka: do not forget it was a stronghold, which was strengthening for years by UA side in anticipation of RU onslaught. And even there, 1 to 3 (giving ground to Murz's assumption).
Ah, Meduza. A research full of indirect guesses. However, if we accept their figure of 120 k dead at RU side, we have 55k confirmed from UA side. Surely, not 1 to 4. Do not forget, that unfavourable ratio is heavily due to huge losses of Wagner released prisonets from jails which were indeed used like cannon fodder.
Nowdays situation is very different. 200 UMPKs per day, thousands of unguided shells and mines, dozens of Lancets and Krasnopols, countless fpv drones. Last but not the least, Iskanders that hitting every day important installation full of UA soldiers. And "just" 50 dead soldiers per day?
Both sides are hiding losses, let's hope the war soon will be over.
I was writing some comprehensive explanation when I realised you were just talking bollocks. Only one army is doing assaults on bikes. Also, how exactly is a prisoner any different from any other Russian mobik? They are all cannon fodder. They even get similar training. Life in Russia has no value.
Once again, we should very carefully read what UA officials are saying. When Zelenskiy mentions 31K UA losses he may be right, as well as mentioning 1:5 rate because he specifically mentioned KIA. When Syrskiy mentions 1:3 ratio he may also be right, because he mentions KIA+WIA ratio. The assumption is that KIA:WIA ration is the same for both armies, but it is not likely. Because most of the ru losses come from attacking, were evacuation and sheltering could be quite difficult. When most of UA losses come from bombardment, not open field, which is most likely lots of WIA that can be evacuated.
So if using those numbers as a guide, total UA losses are 180K where around 35K are KIA. And for ru army it is 550 total with 180 KIA. Ru losses statistically were around 1 KIA to 2 WIA. UA losses 1 KIA to 4 WIA. Confirmation for ru losses ratio are for example Prigozhin numbers, for battle of Bahmut, that were spelled out several times, with totals of around 67K while KIA to be 21K.
So maybe, if you count from 2014 it could be the case. But still needs a check, as having a lie in the first place is a problem. Krynki is nowhere near an indication as it has a very specific arrangement of circumstances, that is not applicable to other battles.
There's one thing that mathematically doesnt add up at all. The slow(almost negligible) rate of advance of Russian military despite their superiority in numbers can only mean one thing, that they are losing resources at a significantly higher rate than the Ukrainians. Doesnt mean Ukrainians arent taking heavy losses. But its easy to deduce that Russians are suffering a higher attrition rate. If they werent they would be rapidly gaining territory and or not emptying half of their Soviet stocks of equipment.
Thanks for the update, and I hope one day you release a book about how the ZIPRA and ZANLA coalesced(through fire) into the ZDF that went on to liberate DRC. Everytime I read the updates about the Russian invasion of the war, despite seeing issues with Ukraine, I'm still impressed they've fought back gallantly despite all the challenges internally and externally. Aluta continua.
Long discussion about kill rates and losses above. I really dont know what is right. It doesnt really matter. The important point here is that Ukrainia needs to improve it. Because if you read what is happening Russia contnues to grind forward. Very very slowly, but if they can continue that progress it might increase and it might be enough. I think we can agree that Putin doesnt care how many soldiers he looses. He simply continues to recruit more. Ukraine needs to kill so many Russian troops that Putin cannot refill the losses. Currently Ukraine isnt doing that. At least it doesnt seem so. So Ukraine needs to improve its rate of killing whatever it is. And avoid taking too many losses themselves. The lack of concern about their own soldiers in Russian society is something the west simply doesn’t understand. And that lack is an important strength for winning a war, but of course loosing whatever peace comes.
"the GenStab-U must introduce sweeping reforms of itself" - did this reforms include keeping old soviet generals in power, giving them medals, big pensions, building mansions, etc? If not, I don't think anyone in our higher-ups will be interested in implementing them then
Thanks for the update, including the section on the DRC war and Zimbabwean troops. A ratio of 4:1 on average and its not enough… well, it seems like the Russians are learning fast enough. Unfortunately. And also it seems like there should be some changes in GenStab U.
I met an ex-ZDF officer who was in a group (I forget how many but was less than 130) that was cut off long-term. What he told me matches what you've reported - their opposition was led intelligently enough to, for example, choose the timing of attacks for when they figured ZDF morale would be lowest, and they were outnumbered, but their training and discipline absolutely saved them. They also knew that they weren't exchanging with "professional soldiers" and that surrender was certain to be unpleasantly fatal.
He was subsequently decorated by Mugabe personally and experienced the guy's charisma.
Well, the book linked above is largely based on interview with veterans of that war - from the ZDF, but also RDF, and even one from the UPDF.
The Zim army was mentored for many years after the end of UDI by the UK army.
I think when we talk about western problems with modern war, I think western concepts are still based on obtaining complete sir superiority and using ground troops as a glorified mopping up force (ie Iraq 1991)
Against Russia this might happen as the Russian IADs and Air force have proven poor against a fourth rate Ukrainian opponent. Unless ROEs prevent destruction of Russisn IADs and airforces in Russia, USA probably overwhelms Russian air forces and then the war goes nuclear.
Against China it is a different story - any war against China will be a mainly naval and air war. I don't think US would invade Chinese mainland. Even if it wanted to, US no longer has that kind of capability due to peace dividend. Oh and landing troops in China is a causa belli for nukes.
I don't think the western approach is wrong. They probably won't ever face a Ukrainian type situation.
Even any war against Iran will probably be an air war with limited ground forces.
Russian air defenses are more capable than you think and Ukraine is not fourth rate. NATO held wargames a few months ago and by their own assessments it took them three days to suppress Russian air defenses in order to gain the local air superiority in just one sector. And then, the ground forces had to be ready to immediately attack because the superiority only lasted 45 minutes.
Ground forces in Iraq were more than glorified mopping up forces. Air superiority meant the ground forces didn't have to contend with Iraqi air, and it meant the allied air forces could isolate the battlefield with regards to logistics and enemy troop movements. But it was the ground forces that had to cross the minefields, engage the fortified positions and armored vehicles. The surviving Iraqis also mentioned the impact of the allied artillery quite a lot, as well. Any impression of mopping up was created by the superior technology and training of the allied forces. After the ground forces broke through, they exploited the breakthroughs and the air forces continued to fight the deep battle, such as interdicting retreating Iraqi forces on the so-called "highway of death".
There is no need or plans to invade mainland China.
Wargames are a fantastic tool for strategic practice and scenario planning, especially in logistics. However, they are next to worthless as realistic weapons system simulators. If they were, then the heads of western armed forces wouldn't have talked complete bollocks before the war, about the Russian anti-access/area denial. The mythical a2ad that cannot stop cessnas from flying into refineries all over Russia. Russia has orders of magnitude fewer ground radars, than NATO has the means of destroying them.
The NATO-Russia border is enormous, making the airplanes the only means to protect Russia from the NATO air force, which can come in from virtually any direction. The fabled AA at the frontline is unimportant when everything deep in the rear is destroyed. Defending the nearest trench from NATO glide bombs is the least of Russia's problems.
Agreed Russia is unable to defend its own airspace against USA/NATO.
But also most critically Russia short of nuclear weapons lacks offensive capability to destroy NATO airpower or logistics hubs to initiate a knock out first strike or even temporarily render NATO frontline forces inoperative.
- Look at how Russian airforce operates now - it does not fly over Ukrainian held territory. The Russians have no stealth aircraft capable of penetrating airspace (Su-57 has the RCS of a 1980s F/A-18A-D).
- It lacks long range missiles numbers to neutralise enemy airbases (and most NATO ones are hardened with air shelters), logistics and command hubs.
- It lacks effective SEAD/DEAD (hence Russian jets don't fly over enemy held territory).
- It's army lacks ability to operate coherently in anything bigger than company size groups (and often less).
- They lack ISTAR especially for long range strikes (eg satelites, stealth drones). Their space based recce capability is currently dismal - Russia has only two photographic satellites with photo resolution on par with the 1980s (and a further 7 seven Liana for oceanic electronic reconnaissance satellites). Meanwhile the US launched 7 recce satellites in 2022 alone.
- Their communications systems are dismal and not robust.
So how on earth does Russia attack NATO to neutralise it? Literally it can't. It's suicide for them.
It is only suicide if NATO as a whole reacts. Russian strategy is bit by bit. So, if they attack the Baltics will the rest of NATO react?
There is no reason to think major NATO players would not respond.
This is why the NATO trip wire forces are stationed in Baltics. An attack on Baltics is an attack on American, British etc troops.
Thus an attack on Baltics is an attack on all participating NATO countries by default.
I agree with what you say about an attack of Baltic being an attack of Us and Uk troops there, and I assume the troops will fight. Uk I expect to fight as a nation. But Us? Under Trump/Vance? I really don’t know. Living in Norway I am not happy to say it, but with the wrong leadership US is not to be trusted. But yes, I agree that if NATO reacts as a whole Russia is toast.
Russians air defences are proving themselves to not be exactly stellar. The number of S400s confirmed swatted by Ukrainians amounts to 15% of current battalion sets destroyed or damaged. The Pantsir has continued to be proven a turd, Tor and Buk are better but still vulnerable and seem to be in short supply. Indeed confirmed losses are 80 Buk launchers, 60 Tors launchers as well as as 12 Buk radars. The S300 is still there but is even more vulnerable than S400. The rest is ancient trash - Osas, Strelas.
Lots of drones are making there ways through vast tracts of Russia to as far as Moscow. There have been some Ukrainian airforce raids on Russia itself.
Ukraine's offensive capabilities are 4th rate - no stealth aircraft, no strategic strike capabilities, no dedicated SEAD/DEAD capabilities. It has limited ISTAR and doesn't benefit from full American ISTAR and C3 capabilities.
Not to mention Ukraine is limited by western ROEs as to what weapons it can use where (hence no ATACMS strikes on airbases in Russia for example).
As for Iraq in 1991- the air campaign lasted 42 days, the ground war 4 days (excluding the battle of Khafji in Saudi Arabia). By the time Task Force 1-41 rumbled into Iraq, the Iraqis were no longer capable of any kind of coordinated action and the Americans had complete air dominance.
Yes the US ground (and also naval forces where possible) forces fired a lot of artillery, but the Iraqis themselves were already effectively defeated and their resistance for most part non-existent and certainly non-effective - a lot of it described as sporadic and uncoordinated.
Effectively airpower had smashed the Iraqis. By the way this has been US doctrine since 1944 when airpower was a key ingredient in punching through German lines during Operation Cobra.
Soviets even acknowledged it - they always understood their airforce was going to struggle against Americans so invested heavily in air defences and tube artillery.
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Now the big question here is: under what circumstances is NATO going to have to pump 100,000s of thousands shells but more importantly be subjected to 100,000s of Russian/Chinese shells, drones and loitering munitions?
The answer is never.
Russia invading Estonia or whatever is completely unlikely. The Russian ability to simply smash into Baltics disappeared in March 2004 when those countries joined NATO.
The Russians have also proven completely incompetent at offensive warfare. If they couldn't take on the Ukrainians who had neglected their military for 30 years then how would they fare against NATO and the American behemoth?
The Russian military that emerges from this war will be far more outdated and primitive than even the 3rd rate force that tried to invade Ukraine in 2022. It will have gone through its Soviet reserves (including all precious gun barrels), burnt through the flight hours of its already ageing airforce whilst losing over a hundred jets (remember over 50% of Russian tactical fleet was over 30 years ago in 2022). It's conventional navy is weak and getting weaker - eg those Udaloy and now ironically name Sovremenny destroyers are long due for a replacement and Russians can't replace them due to lack of capability.
Baltic became a NATO lake in 2004 when Estonia joined NATO. Kalinningrad is a liability and the Baltic fleet a sitting duck (hence a lack of investment in that fleet). With entry of Finland into NATO the North Sea Fleet became extremely vulnerable too.
Oh and then there's nukes.
SO WHAT CONVENTIONAL THREAT IS RUSSIA TO NATO? Minimal I'd say. Putin is not stupid.
China and US might get into a fight over Taiwan but again that's an air-sea battle. As we both agree US is not going to invade Chinese mainland. So under what circumstances does China get to lob 100,000s of artillery shells and loitering munitions at US troops?
SO UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES IS CURRENT US AIR POWERED DOMINATED MILITARY DOCTRINE WRONG?
I was with you until you said Ukraine is fourth rate. Ask Gerasimov, Shoigu and a lot of Russian Generals or the hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers getting killed or wounded.
Never said whole Ukrainian military was 4th rate, only their offensive aerial capabilities (ie airforce). It has improved but its still not at the same level as most NATO/western forces.
It's why for most part Ukrainian airforce can't operate over Russian held territory and why it can't fully exploit things like JDAMS (they have to come in low whereas NATO operates at medium-high level).
And the Russian military as a whole is "4th rate" as well which is why they never managed to get any true mileage out of their airforce, their long range strike capabilities or army and why their IADS has suffered massive casualties.
Disagree with this 1:4, loss ratio is likely about 1:1, everything else is propaganda to boost morale or whatever. Acc to you know who it is 7:1. Neither side would admit 1:1 in principle. Bur known by name officers losses 1:1. 1:15 is quite possible in a particular skirmish, even 180:0 is possible when a missile hits right spot.
How is it a 1:1 loss ratio when Russia is using significantly more resources to gain little to no territory? They have emptied at least half of their Soviet store of armored vehicles and artillery. This wouldnt be happening if their troops werent getting blown up in those vehicles to the point they have to take equipment out of storage in addition to increasing domestic production. I find the 10:1 ratios in favour of Ukraine largely unbelievable but if it was a 1:1 loss ratio, Russia would have had a lot more equipment in its stores.
There is little connection between cumulative loss figures and mass of lost russian armour. They have it and can afford this scale of losses. Imagine what it would be without these T-xx and BMPs. UAF can't afford armour losses bcs very little left to lose. Soviet armour has gone, western armour is available in insignificant quantities and need to be spared bcs of uncertainty in future deliveries (I wouldn't count MaxxPro amd M113 etc as a "proper" armour. That's why we haven't seen any successful counterattacks for a year already even in defence this is absolutely critical instrument.
A 1:1 loss ratio IMHO is completely unlikely. There are hundreds of videos from the battlefield where corpses of Russian soldiers are scattered everywhere. Such scale of losses can't be observed in Russian videos about UKR losses. We can be 100% sure if they would exist Russian propagandists would be happily showing them. Additionally an attacker, especially when he is running out of modern equipment is always suffering more losses.
The 1:4 ratio may be propaganda. May. But why is the 1:1 more likely? Actually quite strange if both were equal in killing each other. And talking about propaganda, you see that also a statement of 1:1 can be propaganda?
Why is the ratio of 4:1 the most likely one?
Because Ukraine without Donna's is approximately 35 Mio. people. Russia is 140 Mio. Hence, the ratio of population is the same ratio. Both are fighting the war based on hybrid system of volunteering and small scale conscription. So the same base of mobilisation.
That is visible on the battlefield so far in 2023 and 2024. Losses without any sign of movement in the one or the other direction (different to autumn 2022, when Russia just used there professional force).
This way the war can continue endless and neither side is currently is trying to politically change that.
So nothing will happen until US elections (except Putin dies and there is a succession crises like during the Korean war) and then there may something happen - whatever that may be...
When I visited Yarvoriv Training Area, we were training roughly reinforced battalion task force a month. The training area couldn't do a full BDE, it may be able to now don't know, so the BDE would pick a battalion and send along extra parts from other units to maximize the training effect. The idea was that the Bn trained could go back and spread the learning and training to the rest of the unit. I found out while there that what was happening in most cases (some exceptions though) was that once back the commanders of the BDE's spent considerable amounts of effort making sure none of the training was passed along. Reasons varied. In some cases it was flat out "I don't get it, and I don't want to look bad", in others it was lack of resources. This could have been fixed if the General Staff had been more direct in ordering units to listen to the guys who were trained and were trying to pass things along. But as you said, lots of the guys in the GS didn't get it, and didn't want to try. Easier to stop it and smile at the allies and go "Thank you so much! We have learned so much from you." I know that a lot of behind the scenes fighting was going on as the forward thinkers were trying hard to push for change, but there were a lot of issues to address and fix so where do you even start? Especially when you are technically still fighting a war in the east. No easy solution.
There are some very alarming reports about Pohres, with Ukrainian troops surrounded. They seem to bear out your arguments about command inadequacies
There was an update earlier today that they disobeyed the orders to stay put and with help from other units broke out: https://t.me/DeepStateUA/19966
I guess that it's necessary a shake up in the higher echelons of the Ukrainian army, and change (hopefully for the best) the way the war is conducted
I am not sure any shake up will change things. It is about training, deep seated, when at the time of war this the only thing they can rely on. And that training was the same as ru army. So this would require massive retraining and best by army institutions that has lots of recent war experiences. And this is only US army. Which means West Point or something. And it is not going to happen any time soon.
On the other hand quite a few units made their own internal rules and conduct. That works for them. So the only workable way currently seems to grow those formations reforming them into divisions and Corpses, giving under their command small units. Consolidating units and command. This would give those units enough weight to influence operational and even strategic level.
By the way, units often call themselves "organisms" quite officially. This is what it is actually, living evolving organisms.
As mentioned above: they've been evacuated during the night from 24th to 25th.
Well, i`m starting to think that it`s time for Syrskyi to get sacked.
He got his chance and we don`t see any results, even i think the things got little worse.
They give him to much slack, because UA did not have the resources, but it don`t look like he is the man to fix ZSU problems.
Today show near Progres, is real prove UA have more than enough competent people, but the system is just killing them slowly.
Asking for a friend, of course: with 200 UMPKs hitting UA positions each day, how come the ratio could be 1:4 in UA favour?
Not mentioning Iskanders, hitting vital UA positions each day. Like this one:
https://t.me/razved_dozor/6763
If the Russians recruit 30K every month (paying up to $20K per contract in Moscow these days), and their army does not seem to grow much in numbers, the losses should be a little below 1K / day.
The Ukrainian losses seem to be tracked here https://ualosses.org/statistics/ at about 300 KiA / week which makes below 50 / day. However, there should be a significant % of MiA and many more WiA.
You can also recall Murz's estimate of 15K RU vs 5K UA losses at Avdiivka - and that after the UA troops were nearly encircled.
One can only guess about RU losses, no data, no precise info. Losses are high, no doubts, but 1 to 4? With superiority in the air and in long range missiles? With ubiquitous Lancets and Krasnopols being such numerous nowadays that even secondary targets are fired at?
As per Avdeevka: do not forget it was a stronghold, which was strengthening for years by UA side in anticipation of RU onslaught. And even there, 1 to 3 (giving ground to Murz's assumption).
The recent Meduza article estimates the ongoing rate of RU deaths at 200-250 men / day https://meduza.io/feature/2024/07/05/120-tysyach-rossiyskih-voennyh-pogibli-v-ukraine-za-dva-s-polovinoy-goda-tempy-poter-rastut-kazhdyy-den-obhoditsya-vs-rf-v-200-250-smertey
At the same time ualosses shows 250 deaths per week.
Again, both sources are not very precise, but they count 7:1 which may turn to 4:1 in reality.
Syrsky claims 3:1 (for an unspecified sector at unspecified time, however) https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/24/i-know-we-will-win-and-how-ukraines-top-general-on-turning-the-tables-against-russia
Ah, Meduza. A research full of indirect guesses. However, if we accept their figure of 120 k dead at RU side, we have 55k confirmed from UA side. Surely, not 1 to 4. Do not forget, that unfavourable ratio is heavily due to huge losses of Wagner released prisonets from jails which were indeed used like cannon fodder.
Nowdays situation is very different. 200 UMPKs per day, thousands of unguided shells and mines, dozens of Lancets and Krasnopols, countless fpv drones. Last but not the least, Iskanders that hitting every day important installation full of UA soldiers. And "just" 50 dead soldiers per day?
Both sides are hiding losses, let's hope the war soon will be over.
I was writing some comprehensive explanation when I realised you were just talking bollocks. Only one army is doing assaults on bikes. Also, how exactly is a prisoner any different from any other Russian mobik? They are all cannon fodder. They even get similar training. Life in Russia has no value.
нахуй пошел ебаный ты бот. Будем надеяться что скоро вас ебаных пидаров мы всех убьем.
Як там, підарок, розмотали угольки вашу иліту в Малі) зграя їбаних військових злочинців
Once again, we should very carefully read what UA officials are saying. When Zelenskiy mentions 31K UA losses he may be right, as well as mentioning 1:5 rate because he specifically mentioned KIA. When Syrskiy mentions 1:3 ratio he may also be right, because he mentions KIA+WIA ratio. The assumption is that KIA:WIA ration is the same for both armies, but it is not likely. Because most of the ru losses come from attacking, were evacuation and sheltering could be quite difficult. When most of UA losses come from bombardment, not open field, which is most likely lots of WIA that can be evacuated.
So if using those numbers as a guide, total UA losses are 180K where around 35K are KIA. And for ru army it is 550 total with 180 KIA. Ru losses statistically were around 1 KIA to 2 WIA. UA losses 1 KIA to 4 WIA. Confirmation for ru losses ratio are for example Prigozhin numbers, for battle of Bahmut, that were spelled out several times, with totals of around 67K while KIA to be 21K.
There are 50K OSINT-confirmed Ukrainian KiA https://ualosses.org/soldiers/
When Zelensky told about 31K this site had 40K.
And, if you remember, Krynky got 250 KiA against 750 MiA.
This website is obviously a bulshit, the the first opened obituary and the date of death is 2015: https://ualosses.org/soldier/marjanovych-borys-stanislavovych-1982-02-25-33-kachkivka-93rd-separate-mechanized-brigade-soldier/
So maybe, if you count from 2014 it could be the case. But still needs a check, as having a lie in the first place is a problem. Krynki is nowhere near an indication as it has a very specific arrangement of circumstances, that is not applicable to other battles.
There's one thing that mathematically doesnt add up at all. The slow(almost negligible) rate of advance of Russian military despite their superiority in numbers can only mean one thing, that they are losing resources at a significantly higher rate than the Ukrainians. Doesnt mean Ukrainians arent taking heavy losses. But its easy to deduce that Russians are suffering a higher attrition rate. If they werent they would be rapidly gaining territory and or not emptying half of their Soviet stocks of equipment.
Thanks to Ukrainian artillery and FPVs.
Thanks for the update, and I hope one day you release a book about how the ZIPRA and ZANLA coalesced(through fire) into the ZDF that went on to liberate DRC. Everytime I read the updates about the Russian invasion of the war, despite seeing issues with Ukraine, I'm still impressed they've fought back gallantly despite all the challenges internally and externally. Aluta continua.
Was trying to organise precisely such a project, few years ago. Sadly, didn't work out... But, one should never say never/never again. ;-)
Thanks Tom
Thank you for the update
Long discussion about kill rates and losses above. I really dont know what is right. It doesnt really matter. The important point here is that Ukrainia needs to improve it. Because if you read what is happening Russia contnues to grind forward. Very very slowly, but if they can continue that progress it might increase and it might be enough. I think we can agree that Putin doesnt care how many soldiers he looses. He simply continues to recruit more. Ukraine needs to kill so many Russian troops that Putin cannot refill the losses. Currently Ukraine isnt doing that. At least it doesnt seem so. So Ukraine needs to improve its rate of killing whatever it is. And avoid taking too many losses themselves. The lack of concern about their own soldiers in Russian society is something the west simply doesn’t understand. And that lack is an important strength for winning a war, but of course loosing whatever peace comes.
"the GenStab-U must introduce sweeping reforms of itself" - did this reforms include keeping old soviet generals in power, giving them medals, big pensions, building mansions, etc? If not, I don't think anyone in our higher-ups will be interested in implementing them then