A) Yes. Manpower is no problem. Artillery, artillery ammunition, heavy infantry weapons, electronic warfare systems, air defence systems, and training - are problems.
B) No NATO armed force is ever going to move into Ukraine. Forget about that.
All talks about Belarus and Wagner - is just that - talks with purpose to distract, scare, pretend to escalate - so there will be something to step down from later.
Thanks Tom. Since the start of the current counteroffensive, ZSU has destroyed at least 3 (and probably 4) major ammo depots - two in Crimea(one of them today) and one in Kherson region (where at least 50 Kadyrovites were rumored to have died - I’m sure you know which strike I mean). Is this felt on the battlefield? Do you hear of any strained logistics for the Russians or shortage of shells?
It's simple, you know: this blog serves the purpose of _informing_ people. If you start misinforming people, you're trolling. And trolling ends with a ban. Last warning.
Tom, I’m not sure if NATO advisors told ZSU to pick Zaporizhiya as the region of their counteroffensive. I have nothing to prove it but I think it was the choice of the Ukrainian government. Look, the Kherson offensive also didn’t make much strategic sense. They could have let the Russians stay overextended there and started a counteroffensive in another direction (for example Zaporizhiya at that time) but as many other moves in this war I think the choice was sentiment driven. Ukraine badly needs some access to Azov sea if any negotiations are to be started willingly. Ukraine could have taken back Svatove, Kremina, Luhansk and no one, including even Putin, would have been impressed. But if only they can liberate if not Mariupol, then Berdyansk ...
Ukraine is not even thinking about any kind of 'negotiations' - without Pudding withdrawing his Dirlewangers first.
The only party thinking about 'negotiations' - is the West.
And, exactly like during the Iran-Iraq War, when it was about 'not letting either win', the West is trying to 'model' the conflict into an outcome the West prefers. Usually, such affairs end in so-called frozen conflicts: the war is going on, there are just no large-scale hostilities....
Feels like their intentionally not ramping things up because their still in a state of denial and hopeful that things go back to the way they were (I mean, just look at COVID; it took about a year or so before people actually started taking things seriously, and even then, they were only beginning to)
Like during the Iran-Iraq War, when it was about 'not letting either win', the West is trying to 'model' the conflict into an outcome of own preference. Usually, such affairs end in so-called frozen conflicts: the war is going on, there are just no large-scale hostilities....
Well, there really is some bad news there... nothing that surprises me unfortunately.
Do you imagine that NATO's behavior will change in the future? That they will become more efficient at sending ammo and heavy equipment?
I'm thinking in the long term because unfortunately talking to some friends I came to the conclusion that this war will probably last until at least 2025...
The way the things are right now: more like until 2030....
NATO's behaviour is not going to change until there is an urgent need to change it. Right now (and to Ukraine's luck) there's nothing of that kind in sight.
Thanks for your work. I always wonder, when I think of such considerations, does the West really want Ukraine to win this war? Or is weakening Russia enough for them regardless of the resulting impact for Ukraine and subsequently the outcome of the war? Because I can't explain the incredible incompetence Western leaders show in effectively supporting Ukraine any other way.
'Win' is relative. For the West, this is 'not really about Ukraine', but 'just about defeating Russia, a little bit, not too much, please'.
Like during the Iran-Iraq War, when it was about 'not letting either win', they're trying to 'model' the conflict into an outcome the West prefers. Usually, such affairs end in so-called frozen conflicts: the war is going on, there are just no large-scale hostilities....
The cynicism of thhe Western "experts" and "advisors" blaming VSU for the "inability to manouvre" in the minefields is really disgusting. In Germany the instructors advised to bypass the minefield.
Thank you very much. One, among many, Intersting point about training. I have allways wondeted why Nato training was so wonderful. As a Norwegian and in a Nato country I have wondeted when the media reports about Ukrainians training in Norway, what have we got to teach them? Should have been the other way round. Of course, in use of equipment I understand, but else? I am not in military myself, so maybe there is something else, but… Well I do hope both Ukrainians and Norwegians learnt, but it seemed strange. Technoguerilla was a wonderful term, and your writing in general explains a lot about what is happening.
Using facts without or out of context is usually used for manipulation. That is what the propaganda do. This allows to interpret facts in a way the propaganda want. Omitting context of 9-12 months of building three lines of defense and fill them to the brim IS manipulating in your example. Hope you do this unconsciously.
NATO can - and should continue - help with basic military training. De-facto 'advanced boot-camp', helping 'weld' platoons and companies together, convert reservists into 'warriors'.
However, at higher tactical levels, there's just nothing NATO can really do, because it has no practical experience.
Perhaps the best solution would be for Ukrainians to explain, precisely, what they expect how NATO should train their troops. That, however, is certain to take some time, alone bacuse NATO-people are usually too high-nosed and much too dogmatic but to be 'taught something by some Ukrainian farmers there'....
May I add problem No.12: The US has no interest in a destabilised Russia. Hence, they are only delivering as much as is necessary so that Russia is not winning.
Not winning Russia sadly doesn't result in Ukraine winning, cause for that objective status quo is more than enough.
Yup, as answered elsewhere, it's like during the Iran-Iraq War, when it was about 'not letting either win'. Nowadays, the West is trying to 'model' the conflict into an outcome the West prefers. Usually, such affairs end in so-called frozen conflicts: the war is going on, there are just no large-scale hostilities....
Yes yes yes! And that is why I hope that Ukraine will surprise the US and do much better than expected. Unfortunately, Ukraine being aid recipients, there is always the option to pull the plug...
"Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense & IMO is the main cause for slow progress. [UA] forces by default have switched to a strategy of attrition relying on sequential fires rather than maneuver. This is the reason why cluster munitions are critical to extend current fire rates into the fall: weakening Russian defenses to a degree that enables maneuver. Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space & slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine’s ability to break through Russian defenses is 🇺🇦s inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale. Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There’s simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe. The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses."
"There is limited evidence of a systematic deep battle that methodically degrades Russian C2/munitions. Despite rationing on the Russian side, ammunition is available and Russians appear to have fairly good battlefield ISR coverage. Russians also had no need to deploy operational reserves yet to fend off Ukrainian attacks.There is also evidence of reduced impact of HIMARS strikes due to effective Russian countermeasures."
"Russian forces, even if severely degraded & lacking ammo, are likely capable of delaying, containing or repulsing individual platoon- or company-sized Ukrainian advances unless these attacks are better coordinated & synchronized along the broader frontline."
"Ukraine will have to better synchronize & adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tac. decisive in the long run."
"The above is also true for breaching operations. Additional mine clearing equipment is needed & will be helpful (especially man-portable mine-clearing systems) but not decisive without better integration of fire & maneuver at scale."
"Monocausal explanations for failure (like lack of de-mining equipment) do not reflect reality."
"So far Ukraine’s approach in this counteroffensive has been first and foremost direct assaults on Russian positions supported by a rudimentary deep battle approach. And no, these direct assaults are not mere probing attacks."
*******
"The narrative that Ukrainian progress thus far is slow just because of a lack of weapons deliveries and support is monocausal & is not shared by those we spoke to actually fighting & exercising command on the frontline... But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination btw. units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. & ...Russians putting up stiff resistance."
Real-talk: Most of the substantive observations in this thread were obvious to me by the end of 2022.
I am no military historian or veteran, but I do know some things about the dynamics of modern warfare, and I do know a fair amount about this war. To say it clear, the evidence is that Ukraine's military still fundamentally lacks the skill - quality and organization - to carry out breakthrough operations.
This assessment is not an insult; the ZSU may well be a global top 10 military at the moment. But it is not enough, which is why both sides' tactics usually closely resemble each other's, and why universal tactical constraints tend to produce similar operational characteristics. A very corroded #2 military will be paralyzed by a synthetic #10 or #5 or whatever, but that #10 or #5 will need a big advantage in either quality or quantity to have a good chance at outright victory in the field. A medium-sized country gaining a quantity advantage is always a sucker's bet.
Ukraine finally has 'enough' materiel. What they need is a radically-reformed military apparatus that is capable of simultaneous execution of division-scale mission tactics, as well as a loss tolerance allowing these to see their work through.
Pure attritional and positional tactics without maneuver are just a recapitulation of WW1, yet without even the mass. If we want to enable Ukraine to reclaim substantial territory, then we need to - should have already - institute an unprecedented civil mobilization on behalf of the ZSU and train and equip divisions from scratch ***as we would*** were we entering a major war in self-defense.
If the US, Germany, UK, etc. are at bottom incapable of this - and we should at least wish to see the question put to the test - well, what can I say.
But hey, if it is indeed the case that the ZSU is destroying regiments by the day, then they're sitting pretty and we will shortly witness the inevitable victory...
***
To add on to this, we should consider whether the ZSU in its current form and level of organization can even absorb much more Western equipment in a proficient manner.
I would not put too much value in Kofman's words or his peers. As ParanoidNow, what "combined arms" ? Truth is they hide behind a lot of fancy and funny words but there is nothing inside. Saved for "NATO stronger", "NATO always prevailing".
If NATO doctrines, planning & capabilities are that much superior and infallible, why did NATO mis-prepared this ZSU offensive this badly. Likewise, why did NATO lost in Afghanistan, Sahel and arguably Syria/Iraq ?
The value of people like him is only to get a glimpse how delusional and inept NATO circles are theses days.
NATO could not defeat rag tag militias fighters only equipped with AKM older than their grandfathers but these people believe NATO knows how to do large scale offensive against well-armed and entrenched enemy. Hubris does not begins to qualify their mindset.
It is a reaction to your first comment where you repost Kofman & friends work.
Their analysis is fubar.
They are the Western equivalent to RuZZians bloggers pretending RU armed forces are the top 1/2 in the world.
Completely delusional.
It reminds me of all the shitty policies and recommendations on Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Tchad, you name it. Just because all these geniuses are incapable to listen to local fighters who actually do the brunt of the fighting but completely convinced NATO knows best and indeed, only NATO knows.
Perhaps some additional staff training in combined arms operations at scale might be useful for ZSU…but would it be MORE useful than some additional artillery, ammo, drones and EW means? I doubt. Now, I wonder, do Kofman at al really think training would be more useful than ammo? I doubt that too, they don’t explicitly say so, they just put the emphasis on training, while not speaking much about material deficiencies – and that doesn’t seem like an objective analysis of the problem and possible solutions.
Not Tom but anytime I read “combined arms” and “ZSU” in one sentence, I’m losing any interest. What arms!? And combined with what!? The ZSU has no air force, no navy, few long-range missiles, and insufficient heavy weaponry and artillery. It has just infantry and to be more precise - light infantry. With what should ZSU combine it!?
At the most elemental, we could speak of one mounted BMP-1, one T-64BV, and one 120/122mm piece, or even battery, say attacking a 50-meter trench.
The ZSU is more or less proficient in this exercise of combined arms. But once we start layering different domains, more and bigger formations, at high mobility and in a compressed schedule, then they've rarely demonstrated the capacity or the will to develop it.
Ukraine assembled a large number of fresh brigades with a good degree of mechanization - not light infantry - for the sole purpose of prosecuting the offensive in the south. They are sufficient on paper to break into the steppe. But they are not adequately disposed of, likely in part because of a lack of training from top to bottom in a complex scale of operations. So they resort to the same old small-scale frontal attacks and infiltration that we've seen predominate on both sides for the past year.
Russia should remain unable to overcome this constraint. So far, Ukraine has not really been able to, but it doesn't have to be this way.
Which kinds of non-frontal combined arms attacks do you propose for penetrating the continuous line of 10 km-deep mine fields? Just to show any options unlike what is going on now in the South.
The Russians have a networked defense in breadth and in depth. The area is heavily covered by artillery, mines, and drones. Grinding positional combat is the best case for the defenders, because they can react with a lot of means at any one point. A large combined-arms attack of multiple brigades across 10-20km would need to simultaneously overwhelm defensive resources and overrun positions, with low-level officers and enlisted having the skill to know how to identify and follow-up on opportunities while avoiding the worst mistakes. RuFOR have so far not demonstrated the skill or flexibility that would be required to coordinate as effective a resistance against this approach as we have seen against sequential small units in discrete packets (which usually fall apart after taking even a few losses, on either side).
Nevertheless the initial effort would see extremely high casualties in even the best case, and efforts to penetrate one line would after 5-10 km of depth run into the next line. Moreover, RuFOR have substantial reserves dedicated exactly to stabilizing the backup lines and blunting penetrations should the time come. So UFOR would need to wisely employ its own reserves in successive (echeloned) offensives to break through each defensive belt (or else focus on sections of the front that aren't the MOST heavily defended!) until they could enter the strategic rear. At that point the bulk of RuFOR forward units would have to begin falling back toward either Melitopol or Mariupol, if counterattacks could not be mounted to break the UFOR salient, at which point high-quality units could initiate the war of maneuver and force meeting engagements with both retreating and relieving RuFOR, causing very high losses, abandonments, and potentially mass surrenders (in the hundreds) among forces that are very unlikely to be able to react to real-time mobile changes in conditions.
If you don't know how to do these kind of large-scale operations, then the fight will wind up just being a day-to-day grind over individual treelines and trenches, which suits the Russians more because they have substantial depth and Ukraine cannot expend too many of its reserves or else risk draining its capacity to ever take advantage of a potential breakthrough for this year.
The level of training and institutional reform required is quite extensive, and would take many months to achieve as an explicit program.
Can you please provide practical advise on how to:
1) "overwhelm defensive resources" when you have no aircraft available and your enemy has more artillery and rounds and uses drones to attack your artillery?
2) "overrun positions" by penetrating continuous 10 km deep minefields under the fire of enemy anti-tank missiles launched from helicopters and hedges, kamikaze drones, artillery, MLRS and remote mining.
If you cannot propose any realistic plan for such an operation, you are just repeating the expectations that the 'psychic energy of a WAAAGH!' is substitutable for ammo, howitzers, rocket launchers, deminers, EW systems, aircraft and military planning, in the exactly same way the Western public expected the Ukrainians to find a way to break through the minefields.
Take the actions of the 47th OMBr in early June. These involved maybe companies attacking in a few positions at once, toward known enemy emplacements. These are easy to react to with combined aviation and artillery, and once they take any losses at all usually they either panic or turn back. Such attacks are fragile. The Russians themselves know how fragile they are; we see dozens of clips a month of the wreckage of such actions.
In my estimation RuFOR doesn't have the command throughput, artillery, nor aviation to react efficiently to dozens of such attacks across a broad front - in which case there is an opportunity to penetrate the screening lines in force. There isn't enough Ka-52 coverage to attack multiple battalions at once, and if they attempt to, Ukrainian AD coverage now has a better chance of inflicting losses, which the VKS is very sensitive to.
The important thing is to be able to, first of all, remove large sections of the defensive line from enemy usage in a short time frame. There is never going to be a 10km breakthrough in a single day. But if you could apply enough pressure to push a kilometer a day, within a few weeks the enemy would lose a critical amount of depth, suffer a good amount of disorganization, and, if not proactively reconsidering their current dispositions in the entire region, would cede all the initiative to the decisive concentration of UFOR reserves.
Well-trained formations are simply better able to avoid getting in situations that cause the worst losses, better able to coordinate actions that can tactically overcome single positions quickly, better able to identify local opportunities and improvise, and better able to bring down available artillery to destroy or suppress key obstacles, such as ATGMS, artillery, remote mining assets. Indeed, being able to do this is essential to being able to secure trenches and bunkers without excessive losses.
I just can't emphasize enough the amount of know-how up to the level of general staff that this requires. If you think Ukraine's *primary* problem here was that they didn't have another 500 Bradleys or Abrams or M109s, or a million more shells, you're not grasping the balance between quality and quantity. For a well-trained force, what was available - hundreds of IFVs, several hundred tanks, a few hundred high-caliber tubes plus HIMARS - would have been enough to do a lot more than has been, even despite the situation in the skies (here a couple more Patriot batteries reserved for 'forward' duty would genuinely be a big force multiplier at a relatively small investment). Just putting thousands of mobiks on even the most modern vehicles with a couple of weeks of training will only replicate Russian mass tactics of the early war, and I don't believe it would achieve a better cost-result ratio.
Even if Ukraine never got a single tranche of resources from the West again, a high level of accumulated institutional skill would at least allow them to maximize the efficiency of available resources. And that's a very big deal.
We saw the UFOR failures to manage large-scale combined arms in Kherson - which Tom has commented on before. That left them simply unable to eject the defense through battle. Clearly GSUA thought they had enough resources to attempt it at the time. But now it's just wishful thinking to imagine that skill doesn't matter and it's just about finding enough bodies and metal to throw straight at a problem...
Mate.... one of reasons why I went into researching modern warfare was that I grew fed up of patronising of everybody's combat experiences, organisation, strategy, tactics etc. - by the West and East alike.
Back then, everybody was '1000% sure' there will be WWIII, any day now - and nobody cared about what was perceived as 'expeditionary warfare', or so-called 'small wars'. Only NATO was competent, and only Warsaw Pact was competent, and nobody else. And nobody else's wars were of any importance....
I was still a teenager at the time, so who was I to say? 'Who cares about your Arabs'.... Ironically, few years later, the USA and allies then didn't fight the WWIII, but found themselves facing an expeditionary operation - and nobody had a trace of clue about the Iraqis and their air force.... 'xcept me.
....and so, over the time, I've participated in conferences where everybody was babbling about theories and what they perceived would be 'Israeli experiences' - usually based on hear-say. I would appear to describe the Iranian infantry tactics of collapsing positions of entire Iraqi brigades by an infiltration of a single company, or Iraqi tactics against Iranian F-14s and MIM-23Bs.... or combat experiences of the Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE.... or Chadian rebels and the government.... and I was watching jaws of generals sitting in the front two rows and hitting the ground really hard: they simply couldn't believe what's going on. Never heard of so many combat experiences of other, 'small' armies. Usually because these are small, and thus nobody cares: so much so, no publishers ever wanted to publish my- and the stuff researched by a group of colleagues (eventually, 20+ years later: we've all found Helion; that's what became the @War series).
....and now the very same characters that screwed up in Iraq and Afghaniastan - principally because they never understood either country, people, nor what's the entire fucking war about - not to talk about never serving in an armed service - are going to advise Ukrainians....?
Well, I've seen where is that leading, as described above....
Yes, they have tanks in the steppe. But combine them with what? No air support, insufficient air defenses against drones and gliding bombs, and artillery is still wanting. So, you have light infantry with tanks...
These guys have been connected with senior defense officials since even before the war, and have been invited multiple times, including to the Bakhmut sector in February, so presumably almost any unit they wish.
The commentary comports well with similar commentary from many sources reaching back to the beginning of the war, as well as observed conditions, so I take it quite seriously.
Yup. Back then, they were reporting assessments like 'widespread corruption', 'aren't going to last for three days' 'Super-Wunderwaffe Gerasimov' and similar....
I honestly think they talked to the Zaporizhzhian "version" of the Soledar Debating Club, ie. low to mid-level commanders that think they know better than the brass. They probably all mean well and are using them to hopefully spread to the West and some decision-makers their way of dealing with the situation. But that's hardly as easy as they think it will be. On top of that, as already mentioned in previous comments, you have those analyst's predilections of using buzzwords and talking about "combined arms at scale", never mind you have to push through 10s of kilometres of minefields, fortifications, arty, ATGMs and attack helos with just limited means at ZSU's disposal.
We had a somewhat similar dynamic in the armed forces during the Homeland War in Croatia, between the old ex-JNA officers and the new. Still, we were extremely lucky to have had Tus and Stipetić to actually run the enormous task of raising, training and equipping all the brigades before those new guys went through their learning process. Even so, at the start of Operation Storm, they still had to bring back Stipetić to deal with the clusterfuck they made around Petrinja. Two days later he had the whole Serbian corps surrounded and capitulated to him.
As said: the 46th Airborne (that was the 'centre' of the Soledar Debating Club).
....BTW, nowadays, that brigade is sitting somewhere 50km north of Berislav and doing nothing - except for spreading wildest conspiracy theories I've heard coming from Ukraine in all the years: it's useless for combat purposes...
If I look back at Kofman's publications in the month before the invasion, I can see he got quite a lot right. The main things IMO he failed to predict were the failure of the VKS/resilience of Ukraine's AD network, and the ability of civil mobilization to blunt unprepared mechanized columns.
Nevertheless, without Western assistance in the form of artillery ordnance, Starlink and ISTAR, much of UFOR would indeed have been overrun as a mathematical certainty over the course of 2022...
Despite the spectacular incompetence of Putin's personal operational plan, it took a lot of hard-fought actions with close results to halt the Russian advance at a strategic standstill. For example, despite the high cost an delay to the seizure of Hostomel, it was seized and used as a rallying point toward sequential advances toward Kyiv. These delays, plus critical actions like a single UFOR platoon with a tank stopping an armored BTG column, or a Irpin bridgehead being forced back on the 26th, or the fact that Irpin happened to be full of trained civilians/reservists, were all pieces of the puzzle.
By comparison IIRC the "blitzkrieg" over the Meuse in 1940 was the result of a few panzer companies taking reckless actions not *that* unlike the Russian thunder runs, which the French were too rigid to try to stop. There's a lot of contingency in war, especially before relevant factors stabilize, which is difficult to predict.
"Mate.... one of reasons why I went into researching modern warfare was that I grew fed up of patronising of everybody's combat experiences, organisation, strategy, tactics etc. - by the West and East alike."
It's a fair criticism, but it doesn't demonstrate that "NATO" doesn't know anything about conventional warfare, or that e.g. Kofman's (a Soviet Jew born in Kyiv btw) observations of the conditions on the ground are inaccurate.
Erm... the 'Blitzkrieg' over the Meuse was the result of Auftragstaktik: one Feldwebel and few other troops crossing the river and then attacking about a dozen of French bunkers, always into the flank or from the rear, and into the depth of about 2,000m (https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/30088/Rubarth-Walter.htm). German Panzers weren't around until around 09.00hrs the following morning.
With other words: of something even the glorious US armed forces didn't manage to fully adapt until this very day.
Ukrainians did, though.
....and the more I think of it, the more I'm of the opinion that the diverse of top US, German, and Austrian 'Experten' who 'know' about the ZSU should be put into one of those green busses the IRGC/Hezbollah used to deport Syrians from Damascene neighbourhoods, back in 2017-2018, and sent to advise the Keystone Cops in Moscow.
They would meet lots of old friends, and quickly find an agreement.
I watched your interview when it came out and I remember you urging caution. I think it would really be great if you appeared more often(maybe once every two months) in such video/audio interviews to point out somethings, like now what you've done here. I think what you've written here is the most sober analysis out there. I for one havent seen anyone point out how the line of contact was the first line of defence or the intelligence failure wrt the scale of Russian mining operations. Or pointing out the gaslighting effort of trying to frame every failure as the end of the Ukrainian army. I worry the Biden WH is in a bubble not realizing Russia is bending over backwards for the no. 1 drone manufacturer in the world China. While Biden WH wonders whether to send ATACMS or not(yet they will after they are less needed) or to ramp up artillery production.
Anyways thank you for the write up as always, I just saw Ukrainians have a system called Shablya which can act as an automated cheap CUAS solution, I think with time it will perform better as one of the many CUAS solutions or as part of an APS system. And A US contractor will try to make a similar system for 10X the price. And yes fully support Biden firing his NATSEC team of closet pro Russian sympathizers hiding behind "no escalation". Imagine Charles Kupchan who helped the Russians tremendously when Obama was president is now trying to negotiate with Russia while also speaking with Biden's NATSEC team. This country is just filled with unique characters(cant insult them properly on here). I dont buy the idea they are fools, I think they genuinely believe Russia shouldn't lose and Ukraine is its sphere of influence. So the current and former pro Russian NATSEC members delay military aid/reforms as much as possible by convincing Biden of "dangers of escalating" and "not putting all your cards on the table".
There hasn't been one moment during this whole war where the West has been ahead of Russia in terms of military support for Ukraine. It's been either Ukrainians ingenuity/preparedness ahead or Russian incompetence keeping Ukraine ahead in the fight. No other country would survive such delayed aid with such a malevolent large army.
For me, just monitoring the US foreign policy.... that's beyond desperation. It's hopeless. And that for 30+ years. It's like watching a doped drunkard stumbling over one obstacle into another...
And yes; the West is all the time 'in reaction mode'. Never acting, never doing something new, never taking the Russians by surprise. There's no strategy, no synergy of efforts. Just pretense of unity and PR-shows.
I heard General Hodges in a recent interview. He commented that the Biden White House is using the same "Russia experts" as Obama. And that those "experts" knew nothing back then and have not added to their knowledge since.
The conclusion is simple, there are no politicians in the West, only business, there is no tool in the world to influence a country with nuclear weapons, which opens a pandora's box, everyone now wants nuclear weapons, which in turn will lead to an even greater war over time. And all because there are no politicians of the level of Thatcher or Reagan, and it is the West that will be guilty of this, since it is the leader in the world in all aspects of human life.
Good times make weak people, weak people make bad times, bad times make strong people, strong people make good times.
The most subtle idea is not that the US is printing their dollars every year - it is that the dollars are owned worldwide:
1) The US keeps its image as the strongest world power.
2) Everyone (both countries and persons) in the world trusts the US position enough to use US dollars as a reserve investment (e.g. most people in Ukraine keep much their belongings in USD cash).
3) (An approximation - real-world formulae differ) When the US government increases the available amount of USD by 10% (by printing, say, 10 tn USD in cash), USD becomes 10% cheaper, everybody in the world who had reserves in USD loses 10% of their reserves' value, while the US government is free to use their newly printed 10 tn USD to buy goods.
4) As the net result, the US as a country became richer by laying a 10% tax on other countries.
Ukraine or any other small country cannot do the trick as its currency is not used outside of the country. Printing more UAH redistributes the value from Ukrainian citizens to the Ukrainian government without making Ukraine as a country any richer. On the other hand, when the US prints USD, the US as a country becomes richer while the remaining world becomes poorer.
This also explains why the US needs to be involved in all those "wars on terrorism" or other military campaigns - the printing of USD trick depends exclusively on the US being the leading world power to make sure USD is used as a reserve currency worldwide.
A) Yes. Manpower is no problem. Artillery, artillery ammunition, heavy infantry weapons, electronic warfare systems, air defence systems, and training - are problems.
B) No NATO armed force is ever going to move into Ukraine. Forget about that.
All talks about Belarus and Wagner - is just that - talks with purpose to distract, scare, pretend to escalate - so there will be something to step down from later.
Street gang tactics.
There are only a few thousands at this time. And even 20k would not be much of a threat to Ukraine.
It is more to scare more ... impressionable people in Europe.
But they may try to ... infiltrate alongside of a few tens of thousands of refugees...
That would be suicidal however.
The port on Danube is Reni.. 👍✊
Thanks Tom. Since the start of the current counteroffensive, ZSU has destroyed at least 3 (and probably 4) major ammo depots - two in Crimea(one of them today) and one in Kherson region (where at least 50 Kadyrovites were rumored to have died - I’m sure you know which strike I mean). Is this felt on the battlefield? Do you hear of any strained logistics for the Russians or shortage of shells?
Here we go again: evidence, Ruslan...?
It's simple, you know: this blog serves the purpose of _informing_ people. If you start misinforming people, you're trolling. And trolling ends with a ban. Last warning.
I have no proof... but style and mood of Bogdan tells me his previous name was Alex Koval ;-)
Roman Koval, actually
Sorry... lost count of his avatars.
Nope. Right now, they're all happy with all the Lancet-videos...
that's not true. diminishing artillery fire is reported from the southern frontlines
That's what Ukrainians are reporting: he's asked me about what do the Russians say, and I replied what the contacts say.
Tom, I’m not sure if NATO advisors told ZSU to pick Zaporizhiya as the region of their counteroffensive. I have nothing to prove it but I think it was the choice of the Ukrainian government. Look, the Kherson offensive also didn’t make much strategic sense. They could have let the Russians stay overextended there and started a counteroffensive in another direction (for example Zaporizhiya at that time) but as many other moves in this war I think the choice was sentiment driven. Ukraine badly needs some access to Azov sea if any negotiations are to be started willingly. Ukraine could have taken back Svatove, Kremina, Luhansk and no one, including even Putin, would have been impressed. But if only they can liberate if not Mariupol, then Berdyansk ...
I think the thinking was along these lines .
Ukraine is not even thinking about any kind of 'negotiations' - without Pudding withdrawing his Dirlewangers first.
The only party thinking about 'negotiations' - is the West.
And, exactly like during the Iran-Iraq War, when it was about 'not letting either win', the West is trying to 'model' the conflict into an outcome the West prefers. Usually, such affairs end in so-called frozen conflicts: the war is going on, there are just no large-scale hostilities....
Feels like their intentionally not ramping things up because their still in a state of denial and hopeful that things go back to the way they were (I mean, just look at COVID; it took about a year or so before people actually started taking things seriously, and even then, they were only beginning to)
Like during the Iran-Iraq War, when it was about 'not letting either win', the West is trying to 'model' the conflict into an outcome of own preference. Usually, such affairs end in so-called frozen conflicts: the war is going on, there are just no large-scale hostilities....
:(
Well, there really is some bad news there... nothing that surprises me unfortunately.
Do you imagine that NATO's behavior will change in the future? That they will become more efficient at sending ammo and heavy equipment?
I'm thinking in the long term because unfortunately talking to some friends I came to the conclusion that this war will probably last until at least 2025...
The way the things are right now: more like until 2030....
NATO's behaviour is not going to change until there is an urgent need to change it. Right now (and to Ukraine's luck) there's nothing of that kind in sight.
Thanks for your work. I always wonder, when I think of such considerations, does the West really want Ukraine to win this war? Or is weakening Russia enough for them regardless of the resulting impact for Ukraine and subsequently the outcome of the war? Because I can't explain the incredible incompetence Western leaders show in effectively supporting Ukraine any other way.
'Win' is relative. For the West, this is 'not really about Ukraine', but 'just about defeating Russia, a little bit, not too much, please'.
Like during the Iran-Iraq War, when it was about 'not letting either win', they're trying to 'model' the conflict into an outcome the West prefers. Usually, such affairs end in so-called frozen conflicts: the war is going on, there are just no large-scale hostilities....
Thank you very much. It is exactly this.
The cynicism of thhe Western "experts" and "advisors" blaming VSU for the "inability to manouvre" in the minefields is really disgusting. In Germany the instructors advised to bypass the minefield.
That would be nice... but again - Western powers deny Ukraine ability to use all tools on ruzzian territory.
Your words - and into God's ears.
Thank you very much. One, among many, Intersting point about training. I have allways wondeted why Nato training was so wonderful. As a Norwegian and in a Nato country I have wondeted when the media reports about Ukrainians training in Norway, what have we got to teach them? Should have been the other way round. Of course, in use of equipment I understand, but else? I am not in military myself, so maybe there is something else, but… Well I do hope both Ukrainians and Norwegians learnt, but it seemed strange. Technoguerilla was a wonderful term, and your writing in general explains a lot about what is happening.
Using facts without or out of context is usually used for manipulation. That is what the propaganda do. This allows to interpret facts in a way the propaganda want. Omitting context of 9-12 months of building three lines of defense and fill them to the brim IS manipulating in your example. Hope you do this unconsciously.
OK Ruslan. We're now going to have a vacation from your truths for a while....
NATO can - and should continue - help with basic military training. De-facto 'advanced boot-camp', helping 'weld' platoons and companies together, convert reservists into 'warriors'.
However, at higher tactical levels, there's just nothing NATO can really do, because it has no practical experience.
Perhaps the best solution would be for Ukrainians to explain, precisely, what they expect how NATO should train their troops. That, however, is certain to take some time, alone bacuse NATO-people are usually too high-nosed and much too dogmatic but to be 'taught something by some Ukrainian farmers there'....
Thank you for your analysis Tom.
May I add problem No.12: The US has no interest in a destabilised Russia. Hence, they are only delivering as much as is necessary so that Russia is not winning.
Not winning Russia sadly doesn't result in Ukraine winning, cause for that objective status quo is more than enough.
Yup, as answered elsewhere, it's like during the Iran-Iraq War, when it was about 'not letting either win'. Nowadays, the West is trying to 'model' the conflict into an outcome the West prefers. Usually, such affairs end in so-called frozen conflicts: the war is going on, there are just no large-scale hostilities....
That is not only nowadays the case. The US did the same basically in WWI and WWII.
Britain already before. Was even visible in the Tudors TV series where Henry constantly flipped sides.
Yes yes yes! And that is why I hope that Ukraine will surprise the US and do much better than expected. Unfortunately, Ukraine being aid recipients, there is always the option to pull the plug...
Wenn ich einen Wusch frei hätte, dann das einer der politischen Entscheidungsträger den Artikel liest und versteht!
Since there are two posts within such a short time, and the other one had run its course, I'll repost my comments:
From the latest field trip to Ukraine by the Kofman et al. group of military analysts:
https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1681240456754077697
"Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense & IMO is the main cause for slow progress. [UA] forces by default have switched to a strategy of attrition relying on sequential fires rather than maneuver. This is the reason why cluster munitions are critical to extend current fire rates into the fall: weakening Russian defenses to a degree that enables maneuver. Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space & slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine’s ability to break through Russian defenses is 🇺🇦s inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale. Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There’s simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe. The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses."
"There is limited evidence of a systematic deep battle that methodically degrades Russian C2/munitions. Despite rationing on the Russian side, ammunition is available and Russians appear to have fairly good battlefield ISR coverage. Russians also had no need to deploy operational reserves yet to fend off Ukrainian attacks.There is also evidence of reduced impact of HIMARS strikes due to effective Russian countermeasures."
"Russian forces, even if severely degraded & lacking ammo, are likely capable of delaying, containing or repulsing individual platoon- or company-sized Ukrainian advances unless these attacks are better coordinated & synchronized along the broader frontline."
"Ukraine will have to better synchronize & adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tac. decisive in the long run."
"The above is also true for breaching operations. Additional mine clearing equipment is needed & will be helpful (especially man-portable mine-clearing systems) but not decisive without better integration of fire & maneuver at scale."
"Monocausal explanations for failure (like lack of de-mining equipment) do not reflect reality."
"So far Ukraine’s approach in this counteroffensive has been first and foremost direct assaults on Russian positions supported by a rudimentary deep battle approach. And no, these direct assaults are not mere probing attacks."
*******
"The narrative that Ukrainian progress thus far is slow just because of a lack of weapons deliveries and support is monocausal & is not shared by those we spoke to actually fighting & exercising command on the frontline... But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination btw. units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. & ...Russians putting up stiff resistance."
*******
Real-talk: Most of the substantive observations in this thread were obvious to me by the end of 2022.
I am no military historian or veteran, but I do know some things about the dynamics of modern warfare, and I do know a fair amount about this war. To say it clear, the evidence is that Ukraine's military still fundamentally lacks the skill - quality and organization - to carry out breakthrough operations.
This assessment is not an insult; the ZSU may well be a global top 10 military at the moment. But it is not enough, which is why both sides' tactics usually closely resemble each other's, and why universal tactical constraints tend to produce similar operational characteristics. A very corroded #2 military will be paralyzed by a synthetic #10 or #5 or whatever, but that #10 or #5 will need a big advantage in either quality or quantity to have a good chance at outright victory in the field. A medium-sized country gaining a quantity advantage is always a sucker's bet.
Ukraine finally has 'enough' materiel. What they need is a radically-reformed military apparatus that is capable of simultaneous execution of division-scale mission tactics, as well as a loss tolerance allowing these to see their work through.
Pure attritional and positional tactics without maneuver are just a recapitulation of WW1, yet without even the mass. If we want to enable Ukraine to reclaim substantial territory, then we need to - should have already - institute an unprecedented civil mobilization on behalf of the ZSU and train and equip divisions from scratch ***as we would*** were we entering a major war in self-defense.
If the US, Germany, UK, etc. are at bottom incapable of this - and we should at least wish to see the question put to the test - well, what can I say.
But hey, if it is indeed the case that the ZSU is destroying regiments by the day, then they're sitting pretty and we will shortly witness the inevitable victory...
***
To add on to this, we should consider whether the ZSU in its current form and level of organization can even absorb much more Western equipment in a proficient manner.
I would not put too much value in Kofman's words or his peers. As ParanoidNow, what "combined arms" ? Truth is they hide behind a lot of fancy and funny words but there is nothing inside. Saved for "NATO stronger", "NATO always prevailing".
If NATO doctrines, planning & capabilities are that much superior and infallible, why did NATO mis-prepared this ZSU offensive this badly. Likewise, why did NATO lost in Afghanistan, Sahel and arguably Syria/Iraq ?
The value of people like him is only to get a glimpse how delusional and inept NATO circles are theses days.
NATO could not defeat rag tag militias fighters only equipped with AKM older than their grandfathers but these people believe NATO knows how to do large scale offensive against well-armed and entrenched enemy. Hubris does not begins to qualify their mindset.
I'm not sure what any of this has to do with any of the material published by this group.
It is a reaction to your first comment where you repost Kofman & friends work.
Their analysis is fubar.
They are the Western equivalent to RuZZians bloggers pretending RU armed forces are the top 1/2 in the world.
Completely delusional.
It reminds me of all the shitty policies and recommendations on Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Tchad, you name it. Just because all these geniuses are incapable to listen to local fighters who actually do the brunt of the fighting but completely convinced NATO knows best and indeed, only NATO knows.
Well, just look where it led the ANA ...
Once again, none of what you're saying reflects the content of their publications.
Perhaps some additional staff training in combined arms operations at scale might be useful for ZSU…but would it be MORE useful than some additional artillery, ammo, drones and EW means? I doubt. Now, I wonder, do Kofman at al really think training would be more useful than ammo? I doubt that too, they don’t explicitly say so, they just put the emphasis on training, while not speaking much about material deficiencies – and that doesn’t seem like an objective analysis of the problem and possible solutions.
Not Tom but anytime I read “combined arms” and “ZSU” in one sentence, I’m losing any interest. What arms!? And combined with what!? The ZSU has no air force, no navy, few long-range missiles, and insufficient heavy weaponry and artillery. It has just infantry and to be more precise - light infantry. With what should ZSU combine it!?
At the most elemental, we could speak of one mounted BMP-1, one T-64BV, and one 120/122mm piece, or even battery, say attacking a 50-meter trench.
The ZSU is more or less proficient in this exercise of combined arms. But once we start layering different domains, more and bigger formations, at high mobility and in a compressed schedule, then they've rarely demonstrated the capacity or the will to develop it.
Ukraine assembled a large number of fresh brigades with a good degree of mechanization - not light infantry - for the sole purpose of prosecuting the offensive in the south. They are sufficient on paper to break into the steppe. But they are not adequately disposed of, likely in part because of a lack of training from top to bottom in a complex scale of operations. So they resort to the same old small-scale frontal attacks and infiltration that we've seen predominate on both sides for the past year.
Russia should remain unable to overcome this constraint. So far, Ukraine has not really been able to, but it doesn't have to be this way.
Which kinds of non-frontal combined arms attacks do you propose for penetrating the continuous line of 10 km-deep mine fields? Just to show any options unlike what is going on now in the South.
The Russians have a networked defense in breadth and in depth. The area is heavily covered by artillery, mines, and drones. Grinding positional combat is the best case for the defenders, because they can react with a lot of means at any one point. A large combined-arms attack of multiple brigades across 10-20km would need to simultaneously overwhelm defensive resources and overrun positions, with low-level officers and enlisted having the skill to know how to identify and follow-up on opportunities while avoiding the worst mistakes. RuFOR have so far not demonstrated the skill or flexibility that would be required to coordinate as effective a resistance against this approach as we have seen against sequential small units in discrete packets (which usually fall apart after taking even a few losses, on either side).
Nevertheless the initial effort would see extremely high casualties in even the best case, and efforts to penetrate one line would after 5-10 km of depth run into the next line. Moreover, RuFOR have substantial reserves dedicated exactly to stabilizing the backup lines and blunting penetrations should the time come. So UFOR would need to wisely employ its own reserves in successive (echeloned) offensives to break through each defensive belt (or else focus on sections of the front that aren't the MOST heavily defended!) until they could enter the strategic rear. At that point the bulk of RuFOR forward units would have to begin falling back toward either Melitopol or Mariupol, if counterattacks could not be mounted to break the UFOR salient, at which point high-quality units could initiate the war of maneuver and force meeting engagements with both retreating and relieving RuFOR, causing very high losses, abandonments, and potentially mass surrenders (in the hundreds) among forces that are very unlikely to be able to react to real-time mobile changes in conditions.
If you don't know how to do these kind of large-scale operations, then the fight will wind up just being a day-to-day grind over individual treelines and trenches, which suits the Russians more because they have substantial depth and Ukraine cannot expend too many of its reserves or else risk draining its capacity to ever take advantage of a potential breakthrough for this year.
The level of training and institutional reform required is quite extensive, and would take many months to achieve as an explicit program.
Can you please provide practical advise on how to:
1) "overwhelm defensive resources" when you have no aircraft available and your enemy has more artillery and rounds and uses drones to attack your artillery?
2) "overrun positions" by penetrating continuous 10 km deep minefields under the fire of enemy anti-tank missiles launched from helicopters and hedges, kamikaze drones, artillery, MLRS and remote mining.
If you cannot propose any realistic plan for such an operation, you are just repeating the expectations that the 'psychic energy of a WAAAGH!' is substitutable for ammo, howitzers, rocket launchers, deminers, EW systems, aircraft and military planning, in the exactly same way the Western public expected the Ukrainians to find a way to break through the minefields.
Take the actions of the 47th OMBr in early June. These involved maybe companies attacking in a few positions at once, toward known enemy emplacements. These are easy to react to with combined aviation and artillery, and once they take any losses at all usually they either panic or turn back. Such attacks are fragile. The Russians themselves know how fragile they are; we see dozens of clips a month of the wreckage of such actions.
In my estimation RuFOR doesn't have the command throughput, artillery, nor aviation to react efficiently to dozens of such attacks across a broad front - in which case there is an opportunity to penetrate the screening lines in force. There isn't enough Ka-52 coverage to attack multiple battalions at once, and if they attempt to, Ukrainian AD coverage now has a better chance of inflicting losses, which the VKS is very sensitive to.
The important thing is to be able to, first of all, remove large sections of the defensive line from enemy usage in a short time frame. There is never going to be a 10km breakthrough in a single day. But if you could apply enough pressure to push a kilometer a day, within a few weeks the enemy would lose a critical amount of depth, suffer a good amount of disorganization, and, if not proactively reconsidering their current dispositions in the entire region, would cede all the initiative to the decisive concentration of UFOR reserves.
Well-trained formations are simply better able to avoid getting in situations that cause the worst losses, better able to coordinate actions that can tactically overcome single positions quickly, better able to identify local opportunities and improvise, and better able to bring down available artillery to destroy or suppress key obstacles, such as ATGMS, artillery, remote mining assets. Indeed, being able to do this is essential to being able to secure trenches and bunkers without excessive losses.
I just can't emphasize enough the amount of know-how up to the level of general staff that this requires. If you think Ukraine's *primary* problem here was that they didn't have another 500 Bradleys or Abrams or M109s, or a million more shells, you're not grasping the balance between quality and quantity. For a well-trained force, what was available - hundreds of IFVs, several hundred tanks, a few hundred high-caliber tubes plus HIMARS - would have been enough to do a lot more than has been, even despite the situation in the skies (here a couple more Patriot batteries reserved for 'forward' duty would genuinely be a big force multiplier at a relatively small investment). Just putting thousands of mobiks on even the most modern vehicles with a couple of weeks of training will only replicate Russian mass tactics of the early war, and I don't believe it would achieve a better cost-result ratio.
Even if Ukraine never got a single tranche of resources from the West again, a high level of accumulated institutional skill would at least allow them to maximize the efficiency of available resources. And that's a very big deal.
We saw the UFOR failures to manage large-scale combined arms in Kherson - which Tom has commented on before. That left them simply unable to eject the defense through battle. Clearly GSUA thought they had enough resources to attempt it at the time. But now it's just wishful thinking to imagine that skill doesn't matter and it's just about finding enough bodies and metal to throw straight at a problem...
Mate.... one of reasons why I went into researching modern warfare was that I grew fed up of patronising of everybody's combat experiences, organisation, strategy, tactics etc. - by the West and East alike.
Back then, everybody was '1000% sure' there will be WWIII, any day now - and nobody cared about what was perceived as 'expeditionary warfare', or so-called 'small wars'. Only NATO was competent, and only Warsaw Pact was competent, and nobody else. And nobody else's wars were of any importance....
I was still a teenager at the time, so who was I to say? 'Who cares about your Arabs'.... Ironically, few years later, the USA and allies then didn't fight the WWIII, but found themselves facing an expeditionary operation - and nobody had a trace of clue about the Iraqis and their air force.... 'xcept me.
....and so, over the time, I've participated in conferences where everybody was babbling about theories and what they perceived would be 'Israeli experiences' - usually based on hear-say. I would appear to describe the Iranian infantry tactics of collapsing positions of entire Iraqi brigades by an infiltration of a single company, or Iraqi tactics against Iranian F-14s and MIM-23Bs.... or combat experiences of the Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE.... or Chadian rebels and the government.... and I was watching jaws of generals sitting in the front two rows and hitting the ground really hard: they simply couldn't believe what's going on. Never heard of so many combat experiences of other, 'small' armies. Usually because these are small, and thus nobody cares: so much so, no publishers ever wanted to publish my- and the stuff researched by a group of colleagues (eventually, 20+ years later: we've all found Helion; that's what became the @War series).
....and now the very same characters that screwed up in Iraq and Afghaniastan - principally because they never understood either country, people, nor what's the entire fucking war about - not to talk about never serving in an armed service - are going to advise Ukrainians....?
Well, I've seen where is that leading, as described above....
Yes, they have tanks in the steppe. But combine them with what? No air support, insufficient air defenses against drones and gliding bombs, and artillery is still wanting. So, you have light infantry with tanks...
I’m no military expert but this sounds delusional.
What unit did they visit? The Kitchen Platoon of the I/46th Airborne?
....that would explain about 99% of that commentary...
These guys have been connected with senior defense officials since even before the war, and have been invited multiple times, including to the Bakhmut sector in February, so presumably almost any unit they wish.
The commentary comports well with similar commentary from many sources reaching back to the beginning of the war, as well as observed conditions, so I take it quite seriously.
Yup. Back then, they were reporting assessments like 'widespread corruption', 'aren't going to last for three days' 'Super-Wunderwaffe Gerasimov' and similar....
I honestly think they talked to the Zaporizhzhian "version" of the Soledar Debating Club, ie. low to mid-level commanders that think they know better than the brass. They probably all mean well and are using them to hopefully spread to the West and some decision-makers their way of dealing with the situation. But that's hardly as easy as they think it will be. On top of that, as already mentioned in previous comments, you have those analyst's predilections of using buzzwords and talking about "combined arms at scale", never mind you have to push through 10s of kilometres of minefields, fortifications, arty, ATGMs and attack helos with just limited means at ZSU's disposal.
We had a somewhat similar dynamic in the armed forces during the Homeland War in Croatia, between the old ex-JNA officers and the new. Still, we were extremely lucky to have had Tus and Stipetić to actually run the enormous task of raising, training and equipping all the brigades before those new guys went through their learning process. Even so, at the start of Operation Storm, they still had to bring back Stipetić to deal with the clusterfuck they made around Petrinja. Two days later he had the whole Serbian corps surrounded and capitulated to him.
As said: the 46th Airborne (that was the 'centre' of the Soledar Debating Club).
....BTW, nowadays, that brigade is sitting somewhere 50km north of Berislav and doing nothing - except for spreading wildest conspiracy theories I've heard coming from Ukraine in all the years: it's useless for combat purposes...
where do you get those rumours (re: them spreading conspiracy theories) from?
If I look back at Kofman's publications in the month before the invasion, I can see he got quite a lot right. The main things IMO he failed to predict were the failure of the VKS/resilience of Ukraine's AD network, and the ability of civil mobilization to blunt unprepared mechanized columns.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-21/russias-shock-and-awe
https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/02/23/michael-kofman-an-expert-on-russias-armed-forces-explains-why-the-kremlin-will-seek-regime-change-in-ukraine
https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/putins-wager-in-russias-standoff-with-the-west/
Nevertheless, without Western assistance in the form of artillery ordnance, Starlink and ISTAR, much of UFOR would indeed have been overrun as a mathematical certainty over the course of 2022...
Despite the spectacular incompetence of Putin's personal operational plan, it took a lot of hard-fought actions with close results to halt the Russian advance at a strategic standstill. For example, despite the high cost an delay to the seizure of Hostomel, it was seized and used as a rallying point toward sequential advances toward Kyiv. These delays, plus critical actions like a single UFOR platoon with a tank stopping an armored BTG column, or a Irpin bridgehead being forced back on the 26th, or the fact that Irpin happened to be full of trained civilians/reservists, were all pieces of the puzzle.
By comparison IIRC the "blitzkrieg" over the Meuse in 1940 was the result of a few panzer companies taking reckless actions not *that* unlike the Russian thunder runs, which the French were too rigid to try to stop. There's a lot of contingency in war, especially before relevant factors stabilize, which is difficult to predict.
"Mate.... one of reasons why I went into researching modern warfare was that I grew fed up of patronising of everybody's combat experiences, organisation, strategy, tactics etc. - by the West and East alike."
It's a fair criticism, but it doesn't demonstrate that "NATO" doesn't know anything about conventional warfare, or that e.g. Kofman's (a Soviet Jew born in Kyiv btw) observations of the conditions on the ground are inaccurate.
Erm... the 'Blitzkrieg' over the Meuse was the result of Auftragstaktik: one Feldwebel and few other troops crossing the river and then attacking about a dozen of French bunkers, always into the flank or from the rear, and into the depth of about 2,000m (https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/30088/Rubarth-Walter.htm). German Panzers weren't around until around 09.00hrs the following morning.
With other words: of something even the glorious US armed forces didn't manage to fully adapt until this very day.
Ukrainians did, though.
....and the more I think of it, the more I'm of the opinion that the diverse of top US, German, and Austrian 'Experten' who 'know' about the ZSU should be put into one of those green busses the IRGC/Hezbollah used to deport Syrians from Damascene neighbourhoods, back in 2017-2018, and sent to advise the Keystone Cops in Moscow.
They would meet lots of old friends, and quickly find an agreement.
I watched your interview when it came out and I remember you urging caution. I think it would really be great if you appeared more often(maybe once every two months) in such video/audio interviews to point out somethings, like now what you've done here. I think what you've written here is the most sober analysis out there. I for one havent seen anyone point out how the line of contact was the first line of defence or the intelligence failure wrt the scale of Russian mining operations. Or pointing out the gaslighting effort of trying to frame every failure as the end of the Ukrainian army. I worry the Biden WH is in a bubble not realizing Russia is bending over backwards for the no. 1 drone manufacturer in the world China. While Biden WH wonders whether to send ATACMS or not(yet they will after they are less needed) or to ramp up artillery production.
Anyways thank you for the write up as always, I just saw Ukrainians have a system called Shablya which can act as an automated cheap CUAS solution, I think with time it will perform better as one of the many CUAS solutions or as part of an APS system. And A US contractor will try to make a similar system for 10X the price. And yes fully support Biden firing his NATSEC team of closet pro Russian sympathizers hiding behind "no escalation". Imagine Charles Kupchan who helped the Russians tremendously when Obama was president is now trying to negotiate with Russia while also speaking with Biden's NATSEC team. This country is just filled with unique characters(cant insult them properly on here). I dont buy the idea they are fools, I think they genuinely believe Russia shouldn't lose and Ukraine is its sphere of influence. So the current and former pro Russian NATSEC members delay military aid/reforms as much as possible by convincing Biden of "dangers of escalating" and "not putting all your cards on the table".
There hasn't been one moment during this whole war where the West has been ahead of Russia in terms of military support for Ukraine. It's been either Ukrainians ingenuity/preparedness ahead or Russian incompetence keeping Ukraine ahead in the fight. No other country would survive such delayed aid with such a malevolent large army.
For me, just monitoring the US foreign policy.... that's beyond desperation. It's hopeless. And that for 30+ years. It's like watching a doped drunkard stumbling over one obstacle into another...
And yes; the West is all the time 'in reaction mode'. Never acting, never doing something new, never taking the Russians by surprise. There's no strategy, no synergy of efforts. Just pretense of unity and PR-shows.
I heard General Hodges in a recent interview. He commented that the Biden White House is using the same "Russia experts" as Obama. And that those "experts" knew nothing back then and have not added to their knowledge since.
Which is no surprise. Though, even if they would be using some other 'Russia experts': where would be the difference...?
The conclusion is simple, there are no politicians in the West, only business, there is no tool in the world to influence a country with nuclear weapons, which opens a pandora's box, everyone now wants nuclear weapons, which in turn will lead to an even greater war over time. And all because there are no politicians of the level of Thatcher or Reagan, and it is the West that will be guilty of this, since it is the leader in the world in all aspects of human life.
Good times make weak people, weak people make bad times, bad times make strong people, strong people make good times.
Почему?
don't feed the Troll. It's forbidden in Internet
Nuclear weapons are only good at deterring nuclear weapons. They have no other use--except to enable trolls to make meaningless threats.
Reagan's team was really good in economics https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reaganomics#Analysis
That ended a decade of stagflation and allowed the US to print money and exchange them for goods.
You don't know if the US would have kept its position of the leading world economy if Reaganomics did not occur.
The most subtle idea is not that the US is printing their dollars every year - it is that the dollars are owned worldwide:
1) The US keeps its image as the strongest world power.
2) Everyone (both countries and persons) in the world trusts the US position enough to use US dollars as a reserve investment (e.g. most people in Ukraine keep much their belongings in USD cash).
3) (An approximation - real-world formulae differ) When the US government increases the available amount of USD by 10% (by printing, say, 10 tn USD in cash), USD becomes 10% cheaper, everybody in the world who had reserves in USD loses 10% of their reserves' value, while the US government is free to use their newly printed 10 tn USD to buy goods.
4) As the net result, the US as a country became richer by laying a 10% tax on other countries.
Ukraine or any other small country cannot do the trick as its currency is not used outside of the country. Printing more UAH redistributes the value from Ukrainian citizens to the Ukrainian government without making Ukraine as a country any richer. On the other hand, when the US prints USD, the US as a country becomes richer while the remaining world becomes poorer.
This also explains why the US needs to be involved in all those "wars on terrorism" or other military campaigns - the printing of USD trick depends exclusively on the US being the leading world power to make sure USD is used as a reserve currency worldwide.
Thank you, Tom. Well said. God bless Ukrainians fighting right now on the damn hot steppes of Ukraine.