Ukraine War, 24 July 2023: Technoguerrillas & Facepalms

Hello everybody!

Amid reports about another Ukrainian UAV-strike on Moscow, plus additional Strom Shadow/SCALP-EG strikes on Russian supply depots on the occupied Crimea, but also the Russian Shahed-strike on the port of Reni, in the Danube Delta – and mere 90 metres (repeat for emphasis: 90 metres) away from the Romanian/EU/NATO territory…. and in reaction to different of ‘readers’ reactions’ to my reporting of the last few days, I caught myself thinking about what a ‘big game’ is played in Ukraine.

….ended putting together a list of problems and results…. Something along the following lines, though constantly growing the longer I think about this affair… 

Principal problem are expectations, intelligence, and training.

Problem No. 1: driven by both the mainstream- and the social media, expectations about this counteroffensive in the Ukrainian public and Western are far too high. They were (and largely remain) ‘maximalist’: creating the impression of ‘ZSU just needs to attack like in eastern Kharkiv last year, and the Russians are going to fold and flee’.

To make sure: have first-hand experience in this regards. During an interview with one of major Ukrainian TV stations, back in February or March, when I ‘warned’ to be patient and not to expect too much of this offensive, especially no quick and easy successes, a Ukrainian TV-commentator snapped back – and that live, and with a cynical smile – that I’m something like ‘professional pessimist’ and that Ukrainians are going to prove me wrong. Had to hold myself back from snapping back that she should go to the frontline, and teach us all how to run this offensive by leading its first assault in person…

….in yet another, similar case, I couldn’t keep myself back and have really asked in return: and, who said the offensive must advance faster and be ended quicker…?
Ask yourself the same questions: I’m curious to hear the answers.

Problem No. 2: such expectations seem to have created a political necessity. A situation where Ukrainian government began expecting from the ZSU to do, and to succeed, regardless the circumstances. Unsurprisingly: the offensive was launched too early, while ill-prepared, and with too-high expectations.

Problem No. 3: both the Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR MO), and all of NATO intelligence services have failed to run proper field intelligence, so to find out about the extension of the Russian minefields, and to find out that the Russians are planning to defend already at the first line of contact.

This, ‘one’, mistake, this failure – has brutal consequences, and is playing straight into Pudding’s-, and the hands of all the hordes of his fans abroad. (So much so that for once I am going to issue a recommendation, which I’m otherwise never doing: if I would be in charge, ‘somewhere up there in Kyiv’, there would be plenty of Ukrainian officers – and at least as many Western advisors – that would be fired on the spot; indeed: the latter would be prohibited from re-entry to Ukraine for the time of their lives.)

Problem No. 4: NATO advisors simply have no combat experience in fighting big, conventional wars with so-called ‘peer’ opponents. They have no combat experience in fighting the VSRF. Correspondingly, they never expected plenty of things. They did not expect the Russians to exploit the opportunity of having almost a year of time to prepare their defence positions. They did not expect the Russians to deploy as huge minefields as they did. They did not expect the Russians to fight ‘already’ on the line of contact, etc., etc., etc….

Problem No. 5: ….and, because ZSU commanders have no experience in running large-scale offensive operations, they were listening to NATO advisors.

Problem No. 6: lacking precise intelligence on the Russian minefields and defence positions, and lacking experience in operations of this kind, neither NATO-advisors nor ZSU-planners have figured out how would the Russians defend. They expected shallow minefields, which are – relatively: this depends on amount of heavy equipment one has – ‘easy’ to either flank or clean and cross; then a drive and assault on the 1^st Line of Russian defences; and then a repeat of the exercise at the 2^nd, and then the 3^rd Line, pending the breakthrough into the operational depth of the VSRF.

Problem No. 7: NATO was late (about a year late) with decision to start delivering heavy equipment, and then late with deliveries of at least enough heavy equipment necessary for an operation of this kind.

Problem No. 8: NATO supplied far too few engineering/de-mining equipment.

Problem No. 9: unsurprisingly, NATO was late in providing training for ZSU on that equipment, too.

Problem No. 10 (though ‘worst of all’): I’m not surprised if idiotic and corrupt CEOs called ‘politicians’ in charge of different NATO-countries can’t comprehend the sheer scope and size, and thus the expenditure of ammunition in this war. If they’re lacking the foresight to understand what shall they do the next month, next six months, a year or longer (anything longer than until the next elections; and in countries like Austria: not even that). And, generally, I taught myself not to have any kind of expectations. Thus I’m not surprised (nor disappointed) if it was only this year – at least 12 months into the all-out Russian invasion – that they came to the idea to seriously increase their ammunition production.

But, and if nothing else, I do ‘happen’ to know, first hand, that our glorious politicians are all depending on advice provided by their intelligence services and political advisors, and orders from their oligarch-masters – all of whom have failed…. ‘miserably’ is far too weak expression how much… and that again, and again, and again. Indeed, it can be said they all have institutionalised the art of strategic failures. Converted them into a profession. Because they’re failing for at least a ‘full generation, if not two or three’ (one generation = 20 years), and that at every opportunity (should there be any doubts, see Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Libya, Syria…. Russia, Ukraine….)

I am, however, surprised that the Ukrainian political leadership is failing at least as miserably, too: after all, the local oligarchy has learned its lessons already long ago – which, except for the spirit of resistance and the will to fight of the majority of Ukrainians (but especially those serving in their armed forces) – is the principal reason why the country is still standing.

…one way or the other, the result of all of this is that NATO was late in delivering necessary guided artillery rockets and other artillery ammunition. 

Problem No. 11: even once NATO has realised that – even once it delivers all the stuff it pledged to deliver in the first half of this year (which is still not the case, and meanwhile it’s late July) – this would still not be enough for a successful offensive, it decided to count on Ukrainian will to fight for its success….

…by this point, I’m typing with just one hand: the other can’t stop making facepalms…thus, I’ll stop listing problems and go over to ‘results’… and there are plentiful of these…

Result No. 1: Thanks to a sea of idiocies of the ‘professional’ mainstream media, and the social media – both of whom are never, or next-to-never explaining the backgrounds and context, but actually serving ‘entertainment’ – the modern-day ‘public’ has developed fish-like memory. People are overwhelmed with ultra-large-crude-carrier-sized amounts of irrelevant information and constantly distracted from what really matters to the degree where most of people have a problem alone with defining what matters.

That’s working in favour of Pudding’s PRBS-machinery and its industrialists. They are creating the impression where every single failure of Ukraine, every single failure of NATO, is multiplying the quasi-success of Pudding and his Dirlewangers in Ukraine.

See: every destroyed Leopard or M2/M3 Bradley = the loss of war. At least creating the impression of ‘fighting the Russians is futile, it’s never going to work’.

Correspondingly, when a counteroffensive is no ‘instant success’ – it’s an ‘instant failure’. And when Ukrainians suffer another handful of losses, ‘they’re loosing 1000 a day’…

Result No. 2: In the IT-sector, they say something like, ‘when in doubt, click on reset’. Unsurprisingly, when in doubt, NATO advisors and ZSU commanders ‘clicked on reset’ and ‘couldn’t but’ plan a ‘classic/typical NATO operation’ – though also one that is easily predictable for the Russians, and then one without aerial superiority. As a consequence (primarily related to the intelligence failure), the ZSU prepared for this operation in inadequate fashion.

For an operation of this size and scope, NATO would’ve bombed the Russians ‘for a month or two’ – from the air (fighter bombers), by tactical ballistic missiles (like ATACMS), by guided artillery rockets (like M142 HIMARS and M270 MRLS), and by conventional artillery. It would first seek to destroy the Russian air defences, then to destroy their command nodes and the logistic system, before switching over to targeting single positions along the frontline. Only once these would all be ‘softened’ enough would NATO send its mechanised formations – see: armour supported by combat engineers - to clear lanes through the minefields. That way, they would expect to destroy the Russian ability to ‘feed’ reinforcements and supplies to the frontline, then destroy the majority of Russian positions protecting minefields, then clear lanes of advance, and then ‘break through’ to run manoeuvre warfare into the depth of the Russian rear.

However, NATO refused (and is still refusing) to deliver air power to Ukraine. Correspondingly, the ZSU had to go on offensive without air power support (see: supported by mere 15-25 air strikes by PSU’s fighter bombers a day), and especially without weeks/months-long air power preparation of the battlefield. And because it remains critically short on artillery shells: also without sufficient artillery preparation of the battlefield… which is bringing me to the next point.

Result No. 2: because NATO was so late with deliveries of heavy equipment and ammunition, the ZSU was late into starting its artillery preparation for this operation. Sure, it began targeting Russian command nodes and logistic centres already in May, but had too few artillery rockets and long-range artillery shells to complete this task to the sufficient degree before the ground forces moved into attack. Actually, most of necessary ammunition arrived only in June, once the offensive already began: it’s only ever since that we can see Ukrainians striking bridges, railways, depots, and Russian command nodes – and that at something like ‘sufficient’, though still far from ‘ideal’ pace. Reason is that the PSU hasn’t got enough aircraft to deploy enough Storm Shadows at once, and the ZSU hasn’t got enough M142 and M270-launchers to deploy enough of their guided artillery rockets at once, so to – simultaneously, or near-simultaneously – strike both command nodes and depots, thus vastly increasing the cumulative effect of such operations.

…and even then: few weeks into the ZSU’s ‘artillery preparation’ (i.e. ‘artillery reaction’), it nearly run out of artillery ammunition, because NATO can’t supply more than – perhaps – 60,000 rounds a month, while the ZSU needs at least 100,000, though ideally would need 300,000 shells a month.

Pay attention: it was only at that point in time (early July), the USA granted permission for delivery of DCIPM artillery ammunition (i.e. ‘cluster bomb’ shells)….

…which is leaving me wonder: why is any of involved advisors in the White House and the Pentagon still paid to do his/her jobs? They should’ve all got fired at least back in May… The same is valid for several of responsible characters in Kyiv: they’ve squandered at least 6, probably 9-10 months with ‘demanding & negotiating F-16s’, instead of taking care for the ZSU to get enough artillery ammunition, artillery pieces, air defence systems, electronic warfare systems, heavy infantry weapons, and mini-UAVs, pronto, already back in autumn the last year.

Result No. 3: indeed, it turns out the ZSU and PSU are so short on such platforms like strike aircraft and multiple rocket launchers for M142 and M270 systems, that ALL of these are preoccupied supporting the offensive in the southern Zaporizhzhya for over 1,5 months now.

Consequence: Ukrainians could not run similar strikes on the concentration of Russian forces in western Luhansk (some say this counts up to 100,000 troops). In turn, this enabled the Russians to launch their counteroffensive in that area….

(…had to stop, then now I’ve made a double-hand facepalm….  Can, somebody, please, lend me few additional hands….?)

…and so on, and on, and on…

Somewhere around the Position ‘No. 90+’ of this ‘charts’ is then the following:

Result No. 99: at least the ZSU was – relatively – quick into the realisation that it can’t go on running this counteroffensive the way it was planned. That it can’t go on running ‘mechanised advances over Russian minefields’. Thus, instead of bolstering the failure (one of mortal sins in military sciences), it switched over to the only way of fighting where it’s clearly outmatching the Russians: ‘technoguerrilla’. See: small squads of (‘usually’, but far from ‘always’) well-trained, well-equipped infantry, frequently undertaken by night.

Why that? The easiest way to defeat an opponent is through the combination of surprise, precision, firepower, and manoeuvre. Essentially, surprise consists of attacking at an unexpected point in time and place (though, almost every single attack is taking an enemy by surprise); manoeuvre consists of bringing your weapons into favourable position (and within their effective range); precision of having both good targeting intel, weapons precise enough to hit, and troops trained to deploy their weapons precisely; and the firepower is the sheer weight of high explosives one can unleash upon the enemy. The more weight one’s artillery can deploy, with better precision, the better the result. Problem: the ZSU can’t manoeuvre due to minefields. It’s highly precise (dogmatically following NATO’s theories about ‘one shot – one kill’), but lacking ammunition necessary to strike all the targets: there are simply too many Russians to hit.

Thus, the ZSU is trying to replace artillery by ‘surgical infantry strikes’ (and, in defence: by mini-UAVs). It hits the local enemy headquarters, perhaps the known ATGM-positions with artillery, while sappers are cleaning the route of approach, and then – and as explained yesterday - raids the position, kills enemy troops etc.

Result No. 100: because the ZSU is trying its best to avoid casualties – because the majority of its brigade-commanders is doing anything else than ‘running meat attacks’ (they’re excelling at letting the Russians do so, though, and that without exception) - this method of offensive operations is resulting in a very, very, slow advance.

Result No. 101: The outcome of ever raid depends on the quality of training the troops in question. For example: the super-clever NATO advisors have trained some of Ukrainian brigades how to assault, but NOT how to retain conquered positions in the case of an enemy counterattack. And if the troops are not trained in holding their position, or not combat-experienced enough so to have learned their lessons on their own….well, then they either have to withdraw or they are suffering unnecessary losses.

…in addition to losses they’re regularly suffering while trying to de-mine approach routes – and to do that silently, so that the Russians do not detect them in time for countermeasures (like artillery/mortar- and air strikes, sowing additional mines etc.).

...fast forward (‘cause I’m reaching the limit for a single post)…

Result No. 159: the sheer time Russia was given (primarily by NATO’s failure to significantly bolster Ukrainian armed forces, and continuous delays in provision of yet more arms and ammo), enabled it to adapt to the loss of its peace-time armed forces. It enabled the Russians to not only deploy huge minefields, but also to start replacing their mauled artillery by drones like Lancet and similar weaponry. These are increasingly felt on the battlefield, and some of involved Ukrainians are describing the situation in terms of the Russians meanwhile vastly outmatching ZSU’s capabilities in this field.

…and so on, and on, and on…

Don’t worry: there are some good thingies in this sea of ‘bad news’.
For example, what’s working in favour of the ZSU is on the tactical plan. For example: the VSRF is traditionally fixed in its position and (still) tied to its vehicles. Means, the Russians are rarely manoeuvring their units (except when bringing reserves to replace losses and when running counterattacks), they are rarely moving their troops away from their positions, and their troops are rarely more than 100m away from their vehicles. This is making them much easier to hit, which is why they’re suffering massive losses even when protected by their fortifications.

(I know: Pudding-fans and all the possible whataboutists are never going to understand and/or accept this, but that’s life….)

Nevertheless, the actual question is now: shall the ZSU stop this operation, and ‘wait’ to better train its troops, and the West to – perhaps – deliver additional heavy equipment and ammunition? Or, shall it continue the way it’s currently fighting?

Me thinks, this is something only the top Ukrainian commanders can answer.

All provided the SBU and the GRU MO have started delivering much better battlefield intelligence (then, obviously, Ukraine can’t really depend on NATO to do that part of the job, at least not in seriously useful fashion), they know about the actual condition of the VSRF. They know how many troops and arms the Russians have lost, what reserves they have in what parts of Ukraine, and how many supplies and ammunition are these receiving. They also know what losses the ZSU has suffered by now, about ZSU’s ammunition expenditures, and how far they can keep on pushing.

Foremost, they know – and that better than any of us – that so far there were at least 4-5 cases where Ukrainian counteroffensives were successful only thanks to deployment of plenty of firepower, infantry raids, and lots of patience. See Kyiv, see Chernihiv, see Sumy, see Lyman, see Kherson. On the contrary, there was just one successful ‘high-speed manoeuvring operation’ (eastern Kharkiv).

The ‘results’ are anything else than ‘sexy’, and even less so as ‘spectacular’ as lots of Ukrainians, and the mass of their supporters in the West would like them to be….but, apparently, that’s the way that works.