Hello everybody! Got up early, this Saturday morning - and not only because of another thunderstorm… and, as usually, started checking what’s up around. And so, while sipping on my mug of cappuccino, couldn’t but conclude that one of funniest… or, well: not really ‘funny’, rather ‘ironic’ – things to monitor is when the media (whether ‘mainstream’ or ‘social’) starts discussing each other. So, for example: when the Russians drop two of their ‘3000-kilogram UMPKs’ upon Ukrainian positions in Lyptsi, in northern Kharkiv, the ‘news’ is not about how comes, what of Russian units did this or how, but the ‘news’ is what has who said…
Shouldnt these glide bombs be easier to shot down by SAM systems? they have big RCS and cant maneuver, and even proximity explosion will damage the glide kit to lose control... yes, it wont prevent it from falling on the ground but it would be better having these explode somewhere in the field than in target location which is usually a town..
They are too cheap and mass-produced to be shot down with such scarcely supplied thing as a long-range SAM, and it's too much dangerous to keep shorter range SAM systems so close to the frontline to enable shooting KABs down with cheaper short-range SAMs.
Focus has to be on the delivery platforms and the impunity with which they can operate at up to 40km (or whatever the range of these JDAM clones is) from the front line. That’s one reason Ukraine needs a lot more Patriot, NSAMS and like batteries - to make the airspace next to the front line sufficiently contested that these kinds of glide bombs can no longer be used broadly.
The problem is - these systems are too large and vulnerable, while the Russians have enough of light spotter drones and Lancet-like strike drones to destroy these systems in case we'll field them en masse at the frontline.
So, first of all, we need enough of EW systems to suppress light spotters - and we need it in any case, regardless of the KAB problem, because Russian drones are targetting nearly all Russian long range weapons, and FPV drones are also one of the major weapons themselves, so EW is a primary factor of the loss rates.
Yes, of course: theoretically, they're easy to track by modern radars and shot down by radar-guided SAMs. But, the PSU is still lacking SAMs needed to at least protect most important urban centres, energy production, and major industry facilities - not to talk about properly covering the frontlines.
That's what happens when an air defence force runs out of missiles...
Dear Tom, thank you for update! Just a small bell rung when you mentioned 1000 m blast radius.
I did some research once, and as far as I remember the formula the blast damage is weakened with distance squared. If you remember there was a video of armor filled with allegedly 6 tons of explosives? It hit the mine or something and was around 100-200 m to UA positions and there was a question if anyone survived. So then there was a rumor that although injured, UA soldiers have survived the blast. And when I did the calculations it seemed they were just slightly beyond lethal range plus entrenched. So without consideration of fragmetation and building collapse, and obstacles, the lethal and damaging range can be estimated here for example: https://unsaferguard.org/un-saferguard/blast-damage-estimation
And FAB 3000 seems to have 1.2 tons of explosives. Though that one definitely not looked like FAB 3000 to my eye.
Blast damage is actually weakening faster then distance squared, because the spherical blast wave dissipates on the run ("flattens", dispersing on the volume), not only disperses on the square. So, actuially, the most effective bombs are as small as it's possible to kill the expected target. The problem is, the smaller bomb is, the more expencive it became to "wrap up" any fixed quantity of explosives into the mass of these bombs - that's why economically weaker powers tend to prefer to pack their explosives into the biggest bombs possible.
Sorry Gentlemen, I understand your theoretical view of it. But I am sure, as was knowing the exact formulas once. Just enter 1 and 2 kg, or anything else, into calculator and see that effective range of double the charge in terms of weight is 1.41 in terms of distance which is square root. This is not in any way to dismiss the danger, or severity, or lethality of those strikes.
These guys who survived 6t blast were cringed in a trench. That 1km radius is lethal (with some high probability) to "fully-exposed people" as Tom has written.
Also, keep in mind that even if the terrain is flat (and soft) such heavy bomb does blast a bit underground, so a "fully-exposed" person should be standing on some higher ground (e.g. in a building in front of a window) So, that 1km radius is more or less theoretical. But sh*t happens.
Mk.84 warhead having a lethal radius of just 34 metres?
Hm... after chatting with veterans from Angola and Syria that recalled being blown off their feet at 500 metres distance from one coming down... sorry: have my doubts about that.
....of course, that's nothing 'scientific', but it's something like 'nobody's talking about that', that the same amount of Western explosives is usually developing about 40% more overpressure than the Soviet/Russian ones.
Given what you described of the size/weight obstacles, do you believe that the FAB 1500 represents the upper limit of what Russia can practically convert to a glide bomb?
Or is it only a matter of time until they figure out how to make an effective glide kit for the FAB 3000?
I think it's 'evidence enough' that they claim 'FAB-3000M-54' for FAB-1500M-54s.
Combined with lack of related photos/videos, for me this means: that idea (with 3000kg bombs) proved too much. They can't make it reality.
This even more so considering that 'platform-wise': with a stronger distancer/separator plug for its centreline pylon (stronger than the one currently in use for UMPKs on FAB-1500M-54), they should be able to deploy the UMPK on FAB-3000M-54. The same is valid for Tu-22M-3s: there's enough space left inside the bomb-bay of that type.
Problem is the weight: 3000kg needs a lots of more 'wing' to fly far enough. As Shoygu has stressed, back in March, 'we need range'.
I wonder what the size/range tradeoff is with these glide bombs... if a carrier has to get closer than 50km, especially if it's a Mig-31 or Tu-22, the utility of the tactic is bound to decline.
What worries me is the orcs managing to slap decent rocket motors on the things to offer a 100km+ range while making them laser guided.
A MiG-31 is not going to have enough ground clearance for anything bigger than UMPK on FAB-1500M-54. Besides, it's 'more important' as a air-launched Iskander/Kinzhal carrier than for such purposes. Moreover, one should keep in mind that there are overpressure limits for what an UMPK-kit can survive: I guess, this is at around 1,000km/h. So, installing a UMPK on MiG-31 is probably a 'no go' solution - from the Russian point of view.
....even more so when there are enough Su-34s to do the job.
...and the VKS is so keen to convert these into Kinzhal-carriers, that already the last year it has offered a state prize to anybody making this possible (and there are two or three teams in competition over solving this issue).
Tu-22M-3s sound like 'logical next UMPK-carriers', but I guess this is not going to happen any time soon. It's one 'pair of shoes' to escort a single or pair of Su-34s by one or two Su-34s carrying the L-175VU ECM pods, than trying to do the same with just one Tu-22M-3. Reason: if the Su-34s has a RCS of a 'family home', the Tu-22M-3 has a RCS of 'the local hospital'.
Moreover, one can't really operate Tu-22M-3s under total EMCON, and they are also not as flexible as to approach at low altitude, then climb and accelerate before the bomb release (that burns helluva lots of fuel in their case) - which in turn means that Ukrainian Kolchugas are picking them up very early (probably from max range of 600-800km). Finally, and as demonstrated when one was shot down, Tu-22M-3s are also more sensitive to SA-5s....
But, they're not going to strap on rocket packs to UMPKs: that would not only drive the design to its survival limits regarding overpressure caused by the speed, but also make it aerodynamically instabile (imagine a paper plane with a rockt motor at its rear end....) - which in turn would require a better guidance section, more powerful control surfaces etc, etc., etc.
The Russians are always after solutions that are best described with 'lowest common denominator'. Thus, they're going to continue adapting UMPKs to Su-34s. Is the simplest solution.
....and seek a simpler solution for the Grom-2 or this UMPB D-30, i.e. probably opt for their SDB with a power pack. Problem: as precisely this massacre in Kharkiv has shown, this is not packing 'enough punch' for the Russian taste.
Thanks! Though I wasn't trying to suggest that MiGs or Tu-22s were better than Su-34s. Not enough of them to play bomb carousel in any case.
Very good to hear that rocket-assisted boosters like the one on the French Hammer probably too much for the orcs to field. There's a sweet spot right now where a Patriot battery about 50km from the front has a chance of surviving drone/missile attacks and can still hit Flankers 50-60km beyond. But if glide bomb ranges start going much past 100km...
That's why I'm curious about the range tradeoff with glide bombs in general. I'd assume that a FAB-1500 has a shorter effective range than a FAB-500. Which in turn can't go as far as a FAB-250. There's not a FAB-100 or equivalent, I don't think. Last thing the world needs is an airborne Grad with a 150km range.
Can an EW suppress a spy drone at 6km height?
Thanks!
Shouldnt these glide bombs be easier to shot down by SAM systems? they have big RCS and cant maneuver, and even proximity explosion will damage the glide kit to lose control... yes, it wont prevent it from falling on the ground but it would be better having these explode somewhere in the field than in target location which is usually a town..
They are too cheap and mass-produced to be shot down with such scarcely supplied thing as a long-range SAM, and it's too much dangerous to keep shorter range SAM systems so close to the frontline to enable shooting KABs down with cheaper short-range SAMs.
Focus has to be on the delivery platforms and the impunity with which they can operate at up to 40km (or whatever the range of these JDAM clones is) from the front line. That’s one reason Ukraine needs a lot more Patriot, NSAMS and like batteries - to make the airspace next to the front line sufficiently contested that these kinds of glide bombs can no longer be used broadly.
The problem is - these systems are too large and vulnerable, while the Russians have enough of light spotter drones and Lancet-like strike drones to destroy these systems in case we'll field them en masse at the frontline.
So, first of all, we need enough of EW systems to suppress light spotters - and we need it in any case, regardless of the KAB problem, because Russian drones are targetting nearly all Russian long range weapons, and FPV drones are also one of the major weapons themselves, so EW is a primary factor of the loss rates.
Yes, of course: theoretically, they're easy to track by modern radars and shot down by radar-guided SAMs. But, the PSU is still lacking SAMs needed to at least protect most important urban centres, energy production, and major industry facilities - not to talk about properly covering the frontlines.
That's what happens when an air defence force runs out of missiles...
Dear Tom, thank you for update! Just a small bell rung when you mentioned 1000 m blast radius.
I did some research once, and as far as I remember the formula the blast damage is weakened with distance squared. If you remember there was a video of armor filled with allegedly 6 tons of explosives? It hit the mine or something and was around 100-200 m to UA positions and there was a question if anyone survived. So then there was a rumor that although injured, UA soldiers have survived the blast. And when I did the calculations it seemed they were just slightly beyond lethal range plus entrenched. So without consideration of fragmetation and building collapse, and obstacles, the lethal and damaging range can be estimated here for example: https://unsaferguard.org/un-saferguard/blast-damage-estimation
And FAB 3000 seems to have 1.2 tons of explosives. Though that one definitely not looked like FAB 3000 to my eye.
Blast damage is actually weakening faster then distance squared, because the spherical blast wave dissipates on the run ("flattens", dispersing on the volume), not only disperses on the square. So, actuially, the most effective bombs are as small as it's possible to kill the expected target. The problem is, the smaller bomb is, the more expencive it became to "wrap up" any fixed quantity of explosives into the mass of these bombs - that's why economically weaker powers tend to prefer to pack their explosives into the biggest bombs possible.
Sorry Gentlemen, I understand your theoretical view of it. But I am sure, as was knowing the exact formulas once. Just enter 1 and 2 kg, or anything else, into calculator and see that effective range of double the charge in terms of weight is 1.41 in terms of distance which is square root. This is not in any way to dismiss the danger, or severity, or lethality of those strikes.
Man, calculators is a theory, and I know not only a slightly deeper theory but also a bit of practice.
Instead of "weakened with distance squared" should be "weakened with distance cubed" in the three-dimensional space.
The blast wave is the surface of the sphere, not the volume of the sphere.
These guys who survived 6t blast were cringed in a trench. That 1km radius is lethal (with some high probability) to "fully-exposed people" as Tom has written.
Also, keep in mind that even if the terrain is flat (and soft) such heavy bomb does blast a bit underground, so a "fully-exposed" person should be standing on some higher ground (e.g. in a building in front of a window) So, that 1km radius is more or less theoretical. But sh*t happens.
A thousand meters of fatal danger distance sounds too large, even with 1.5 tonnes of explosives. Maybe it's possible injury radius from fragmentation?
The JDAM 2000 lb can cause injuries up to 350 meters distance or so, with the kill radius at 34 meters:
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIGaza/Kill_Radius_Compared.pdf
Mk.84 warhead having a lethal radius of just 34 metres?
Hm... after chatting with veterans from Angola and Syria that recalled being blown off their feet at 500 metres distance from one coming down... sorry: have my doubts about that.
....of course, that's nothing 'scientific', but it's something like 'nobody's talking about that', that the same amount of Western explosives is usually developing about 40% more overpressure than the Soviet/Russian ones.
Thanks for explaining what FAB means!
Thanks Tom interesting report
Given what you described of the size/weight obstacles, do you believe that the FAB 1500 represents the upper limit of what Russia can practically convert to a glide bomb?
Or is it only a matter of time until they figure out how to make an effective glide kit for the FAB 3000?
I think it's 'evidence enough' that they claim 'FAB-3000M-54' for FAB-1500M-54s.
Combined with lack of related photos/videos, for me this means: that idea (with 3000kg bombs) proved too much. They can't make it reality.
This even more so considering that 'platform-wise': with a stronger distancer/separator plug for its centreline pylon (stronger than the one currently in use for UMPKs on FAB-1500M-54), they should be able to deploy the UMPK on FAB-3000M-54. The same is valid for Tu-22M-3s: there's enough space left inside the bomb-bay of that type.
Problem is the weight: 3000kg needs a lots of more 'wing' to fly far enough. As Shoygu has stressed, back in March, 'we need range'.
I wonder what the size/range tradeoff is with these glide bombs... if a carrier has to get closer than 50km, especially if it's a Mig-31 or Tu-22, the utility of the tactic is bound to decline.
What worries me is the orcs managing to slap decent rocket motors on the things to offer a 100km+ range while making them laser guided.
A MiG-31 is not going to have enough ground clearance for anything bigger than UMPK on FAB-1500M-54. Besides, it's 'more important' as a air-launched Iskander/Kinzhal carrier than for such purposes. Moreover, one should keep in mind that there are overpressure limits for what an UMPK-kit can survive: I guess, this is at around 1,000km/h. So, installing a UMPK on MiG-31 is probably a 'no go' solution - from the Russian point of view.
....even more so when there are enough Su-34s to do the job.
...and the VKS is so keen to convert these into Kinzhal-carriers, that already the last year it has offered a state prize to anybody making this possible (and there are two or three teams in competition over solving this issue).
Tu-22M-3s sound like 'logical next UMPK-carriers', but I guess this is not going to happen any time soon. It's one 'pair of shoes' to escort a single or pair of Su-34s by one or two Su-34s carrying the L-175VU ECM pods, than trying to do the same with just one Tu-22M-3. Reason: if the Su-34s has a RCS of a 'family home', the Tu-22M-3 has a RCS of 'the local hospital'.
Moreover, one can't really operate Tu-22M-3s under total EMCON, and they are also not as flexible as to approach at low altitude, then climb and accelerate before the bomb release (that burns helluva lots of fuel in their case) - which in turn means that Ukrainian Kolchugas are picking them up very early (probably from max range of 600-800km). Finally, and as demonstrated when one was shot down, Tu-22M-3s are also more sensitive to SA-5s....
But, they're not going to strap on rocket packs to UMPKs: that would not only drive the design to its survival limits regarding overpressure caused by the speed, but also make it aerodynamically instabile (imagine a paper plane with a rockt motor at its rear end....) - which in turn would require a better guidance section, more powerful control surfaces etc, etc., etc.
The Russians are always after solutions that are best described with 'lowest common denominator'. Thus, they're going to continue adapting UMPKs to Su-34s. Is the simplest solution.
....and seek a simpler solution for the Grom-2 or this UMPB D-30, i.e. probably opt for their SDB with a power pack. Problem: as precisely this massacre in Kharkiv has shown, this is not packing 'enough punch' for the Russian taste.
Thanks! Though I wasn't trying to suggest that MiGs or Tu-22s were better than Su-34s. Not enough of them to play bomb carousel in any case.
Very good to hear that rocket-assisted boosters like the one on the French Hammer probably too much for the orcs to field. There's a sweet spot right now where a Patriot battery about 50km from the front has a chance of surviving drone/missile attacks and can still hit Flankers 50-60km beyond. But if glide bomb ranges start going much past 100km...
That's why I'm curious about the range tradeoff with glide bombs in general. I'd assume that a FAB-1500 has a shorter effective range than a FAB-500. Which in turn can't go as far as a FAB-250. There's not a FAB-100 or equivalent, I don't think. Last thing the world needs is an airborne Grad with a 150km range.
Thanks for the clarification on the technical details - very interesting.
One non-technical aspect, though: Intentionally bombing a hospital is still a war crime, isn't it?