Ukraine War, 2 May 2024 (UPDATED)

Hello everybody!

A brief update to catch with developments of the last 48 ‘or so’ hours…

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BATTLE OF DONBAS

As the map below might show, in the Pokrovsk-Avdiivka Sector, the Russians (that is: the 27^th Motor Rifle Division of the Group Tsentr) have continued assaulting ZSU positions north-west of Ocheretyne. They’ve pushed through two lines and are now immediately east of Novooleksandrivka. The ZSU seems to have completed the rotation of several units, and brought in fresh troops – west and north of the Russian penetration. Overall, the pace of the Russian advance has been slowed down to its ‘usual speed’.

Sort of good news is that it seems it’s the 27^th Motor-Rifle Division that’s running this drive, while the 90^th Tank has been identified as the force in charge of assaults further south, in the area between Umanske and Netaliove. This is ‘good’ because it means that the Group Tsentr has already involved the type of units that could be expected to ‘exploit a breakthrough’: to wait in the rear while other units are spent to punch through Ukrainian defence lines - and then to ‘drive deep into Ukraine’, as the traditional Soviet/Russian doctrine demands.

This Russian MT-LB armoured personnel carrier was shot-up by M2/M3 Bradleys of the 47th Mech west of Ocheretyne, back on 30 April.

That said (and I’m going to repeat this for XYth time), this is yet another confirmation that the VSRF has lost its ability to run large-scale mechanised offensive operations at operational level (and thus has none at strategic level).

(Certainly enough, from the Russian point of view this doesn’t matter: the Keystone Cops in Moscow know how bad is their situation since long, and thus have given up all hope of ‘winning wars through single strokes’ already back in 2022. Instead, their ‘new doctrine’ is that of ‘1000 needles’: of relentless, small-scale mechanised infantry assaults. But, this should finally be understood by People in Need of Fresh Air – see NATO in Brussels in particular - where talking-heads are still babbling about Russia preparing a war against the alliance in ‘3-4 years’… Indeed: it means they should rush as much of their heavy equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, because they’re extremely unlikely to ever need on their own.)

Bakhmut… of course, the VKS continues pounding Ukrainian positions with (at least) 150+ UMPK glide bombs a day (again: the Russians claim they’re deploying 500+ a day). However, the last two days the principal target of their air strikes was Chasiv Yar, where the Zhovtnevyi, Novyi, and Kanal quarters were hit by multiple air strikes and an artillery barrage that lasted for something like 12 hours. Usually, such massive air- and artillery attacks means that a massive ground attack is pending…  

South of Chasiv Yar, the Russians have also pushed hard and reached the Siversky Donets – Donbas Canal north-west of Ivanivske. Indeed, in this area, they’ve already crossed the Canal and established a bridgehead west of it (which is never ‘good news’). While trying to stop them, the ZSU has – between others - lost this T-64:

SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA

Must admit, it took me by surprise to hear, three nights ago, that the 141^st Infantry has withdrawn from Robotyne and the Russians rose their flag over the ruins of this village. This was a result of a two-prong attack (from west and south) run on 27-29 April. Apparently, the pressure became too much for current stocks of Ukrainian artillery ammunition and FPVs. Seems, it was the 71st Motor-Rifle Regiment (42nd MRD) that entered the ruins of the village as first.

This is sad because the ZSU paid the capture of this place in so much blood, the last summer…

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Regarding collection for the 3^rd SSO’s Shark (for details, see: Shark Update): tomorrow, I should get the confirmation that the money is ready and this collection is completed.

Once again, special thanks for all the readiness to support them!

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If you’re curious to donate more and that ‘right away’, I would say there are two options:

1.) 3^rd Assault Brigade. Although their designations are similar, the 3^rd Assault Brigade is a different unit than the 3^rd SSO: it’s a ‘line’ unit of the ZSU. A unit fighting in ‘conventional’ style, on the frontlines. We’ve seen it in intensive actions in Klishchivka the last year, and then in the Avdiivka area, the last three months.

Right now, they’re in need of FPV drones (FPV - ‘first person view’). One costs €/US$ 400: ideally, they would like to get 100 FPVs. So, the aimed sum is at €/US$ 40,000 (‘again’).

details for where one can send the money:

PayPal:

strelok1981@gmail.com

or:

https://send.monobank.ua/jar/8xjVKRR6Me

Purpose: For 3^rd Brigade FPVs.

2.) 72nd Mechanised Brigade. The 72nd Mech is the unit that has held off a month-long assault of Russian mechanised formations on Kyiv, in the Moshchun area, in March 2022, and then smashed that Russian winter offensive on Vuhledar, and destroyed two Russian brigades in the process, back in January-February 2023.*

They’re still holding the town of Vuhledar under control, despite re-newed Russian assaults.

Here I’m not in direct contact (any more) but know that three days ago an UMPK-strike by the VKS has hit their positions, and they’re requesting help with medical supplies.

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*I remain stunned that it seems it’s still so that very, very few people know about battles of March 2022 - like Voznesensk, or Moshchun… For clarity:

• Voznesensk: a town with two important bridges over the Buh River and an air base, about 90km north of Mykolaiv. In early March 2022, the Russian 7th VDV and 126th Brigade have attempted to assault it in order to secure a crossing of the Buh and enable the 49th CAA to advance all the way to Osesa (and beyond). That assault was smashed, and thus the Russian advance on Odesa spoiled once and forever. Have told the story already at the time in my daily updates and (with as much details as became available) in this book, too.

• Moshchun: is a village on the Irpin River, 5km north-west of Kyiv outskirts. Essentially: after the failure of the initial coup attempt in Kyiv (24-28 February 2022), in early March 2022, Putin ordered mechanised formations of the 35th CAA to cross the river and advance into Kyiv. The 72nd Mech dug in in the Moshchun area (well-fortified already since around 1941), and held out weeks-long air strikes, artillery barrages, infantry- and mechanised assaults (the 43rd Artillery Brigade destroyed at least 2-3 Russian pontoon bridges and hundreds of armoured fighting vehicles in the process, while supporting the 72nd, too). That story will be told in this one.

Of course, it was Ukrainian resistance everywhere around the country that spoiled Pudding’s ‘Plan A’ - the one for a quick coup and a take-over in a matter of 10-14 days.

And yes, sure: defenders of Czernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Mariupol have played their important roles. But, and just for example: the mythological battle of Hostomel was nowhere near as important as ZSU’s defensive successes in Voznesensk and Moshchun.

No idea why, but probably concerned about the overall safety of the entire nation, official Kyiv wasn’t very keen to report about either of these two battles at the time. Subsequently, few articles about these two battles did appear in the Ukrainian press, but most of involved troops never found the time to tell enough: their units were meanwhile re-deployed somewhere else….and our glorious mainstream media? Was too busy copy-pasting official releases and taking cat photos in Boucha…