It is so sad, that comparable cheap and easy changes (standardized basic training, foxhole defenses, increased mine production) are not adapted, while they apparently could massivly slow down most russian advances.
Regarding the missile warfare: I was also wondering, why the UA is not focussing on one kind of target (i.e. either raffineries OR steelmaking OR locomotives OR something else), I would imagine, it is far better to reduce one crucial infrastructure element to, let’s say 20 percent than five different ones to 80 percent. The only explanation I came up with, was, that after some refinery strikes, the defense of the others are massively increased, such that UA has to switch targets to have air defence moved away again.
But even if this is true, I would expect to solve this by “a night of thousand(s) drones on refineries” instead of ten nights of hundred drones to different targets. Then also only one overwhelming of the air defense is required. Do you have any information, why not following such approach?
I think you'll find that some of Russia's biggest refineries have been hit successfully in the last ten days. And Ukraine only built 6,000 long range drones last year, so maybe give them a break and let their planned huge production increase actually happen before your "night of a thousand drones" occurs?
Well, this is actually my point: They produced thousands of drones and used them in a lot of comparable small strikes, which allows the russians to adapt instead of saving one thousand for one huge strike, i.e. on all 30 huge and mid size refineries (ok, not all are in range, but most of them are).
Having worked in a refinery, I see them as extremely vulnerable infrastructure: Destroy the atmospheric destillation and you will halt most of the whole site. A refinery is like a chain, which is only as strong as the weakest link. Even in big refineries, there are seldomly more than four atmospheric destillations, usually two are sufficient. Those are the very huge ones (50m height, 5m diameter are not unusual). Hit each with two or three warheads and the whole refinery cannot produce a lot for months anymore.
Everything is dependent on the atmospheric destillation. (yes, you can use some other units partly without it, but this will not give huge yields and wreck them in the mid term).
I am not saying, that this would work, but I am wondering, why this approach was not tried.
Counter argument is that Ukraine still doesn't have a capacity to reduce anything to 20 percent; I really doubt refineries attacked have reduced Russia's capacity by more than 5 percent.
Dear Tom, excellent interview, if one is bored, there is a time coded list of topics in description to click around.
Don't forget that he is experienced politician besides being commander of strongest and most successful brigade. So this interview is definitely about being heard and exerting pressure. By the way he mentions Bezugla, and the fact that she is largely unhelpful, although bringing up what can be at times 100% truth, and he is mild. Recently she has received not so mild "praise" from Magyar. So her name is almost a type of swearing around servicemen like them.
In a way Butusov is very similar in his eagerness to Bezugla, tends to forget when it becomes not so helpful. Although thoroughly looking for solutions, it seems. He does not use opportunities to find a channel of communication and influence with those who he really wants to influence. And he has plenty of such opportunities, like Bezugla. Unlike for example you or me.
Bezugla and Butusov share info / feelings which are well known by Russian Army and Ukrainian civilians alike. There is no sabotage or defeatism only a proper civilian overwatch. They ask for solutions on problems which are well known.
There many people that bring up those topics in a much more intelligent and systematic way. So they are not "one and only saviours".
And by the way Butusov has quite adapted his approach, probably understanding that shouting loudest and in a most negative way is firstly not the only way of doing things, but also brings significant unintended consequences, like lowered total donations.
Anyway, it's a bad political culture if you need to turn the volume to max. Means, nation with such political culture would not be able to sustain progress, with often mood and policy swings. So they'll need to learn other ways of doing things.
Yes, Bezouglova is not productive. She has screamed for a year about the state of Ukrainian Army yet Syrsky still messed-up the 155th Brigade which was raised entirely on donations.
So we need to wait for a Ukrainian Eistein, Gates or Turing to find the productive ways for discussing the war.
I think there are quite a few UAV, USV failed attacks SBU is silent about. Russians are adapting, too. So, if SBU succeeds in Crimea with shooting few helicopters and destroying few AD systems, it may not mean they have stopped then. It may just mean next attacks failed.
Also, they play cat & mice game. If they would focus just on one target for a longer time, Russia can concentrate their AD on these targets.
And they have scored some ammo dump hits, it must have impact on battlefield. Also, AD systems defending in the rear are missing on the battlefield.
And that campaign against oil tankers and refineries, it does not have direct impact on the battlefield, because Russia has plenty oil, but it has economic impact - less export of oil products means less income, and even Russia had to increase it's import of oil products from Belarus.
For me the only usage of such long range one way drones would be anti AD. And that preferably in the area where there a chance of establishing no AD zone is possible. Like shallow front in the South. Where you simply continue daily attacks, until no AD system left towards Azov and Black sea shore. And then establishing 24/7 fixed wing monitoring the whole area. And then starting to use own air assets a bit more freely along the front line.
IMO SBU and ZSU would be very happy it they could "simply continue daily attacks, until no AD system left towards (something) ..." That seems simple form a couch but try it in real. VSFR officers are not so stupid to show off their AD systems and keep them on place until Ukraine destroys them.
Well if they allow UA fixed wings fly all the time en masse above South, no problem. But firstly UA is no doing that, so there must be a reason? And I think that reason is AD, that sooner or later should turn it's radar on.
At least I have not heard of anything else used against UA fixed wing UAVs.
Manpads. Russian manpads are good enough against low altitude targets, and high altitude attacks aren't very effective. Additionally, Ukrainian forces are not very good at locating and destroying AD by radar triangulation, if you use aircrafts as bait, you'll be out of aircrafts before enemy would be out of AD. There are probably lots of reasons why it won't work in practice.
Both sides are very good at triangulation of radars. For example all hunting for ru fixed wing recon is done by triangulation of their signals. And radars are much more visible then that.
And those recon drones that ru army use, normally fly 3+ km. Which is good for optical recon at good weather, or SAR and RF recon at any weather. UA has enough of optical and some SAR UAVs capable of this fly height. And for actual strike UAVs use a super low pathway to hide from AD launchers or approach them. UA has specific anti radar drones, auto targeting for radar RF emissions.
And here I am not speaking of any more advanced recon, like flying a base station, where phones on the ground would at least try to connect to it and reveal it's IMEI, and by tracking that geographically, for example any IMEI found within 10 km of front line makes it suspicious, and by tracking those IMEIs geographically you can establish connections and their parhways, concentration areas, command posts, ammo depots, whatever.
I meant not just basic triangulation, but being able to use it as a strategic tool. Being able to discover and destroy any air defence turning on its radar before it shoots and relocates. And it should be done reliably and on a noticeable scale.
Any side which is "good" at air defence triangulation and destruction should be able to keep at least some local parts of the front free from enemy air defence and use aircrafts there with relative impunity; any air defence turning on its radar should be immediately destroyed. We do not witness this on any part of the front; both sides are keeping their air defences on and relatively close to front and planes don't dare to operate freely in any "cleared" zones, or at least I don't see it, for, of course, it may be that such developments went unnoticed for me.
Obviously some air defences are discovered and destroyed, but "being good" means doing it reliably and on scale, so that within range of air-to-ground or ground-to-ground missiles there was no working air defence. I don't see it happening.
Compared to Zelensky & Syrsky + buddies, even Saddam & IrAF CO staff Lt.Gen. pilot Muzahim Saab Hasan al-Tikrity were not so dumb. They, after years of failures of course, were able to learn SOMETHING and introduce LIMITED changes (it didnt help them much, but thats another story). Ukraine still waits for its Raad al-Hamdani a Hameed Shabaan.
Thank you for your excellent work, beyond the sarcasm I also sense a lot of bitterness in your words, bitterness that I have no doubt must be shared by the many contacts you have in Ukraine and on the front lines.
There is a question that I have been asking myself for a long time. I hesitated to ask it to avoid adding polemical remarks but I would like to have your opinion. Beyond the clientelism that you sometimes mention, could the "incompetence" and the "denial" of Zelinski and his teams also be linked to the fear, real or imaginary, that people like Colonel Andrei Biletski, the leaders of Azov, Da Vinci, etc., are seen as opponents and potential political dangers? That the refusal to listen to them is a way, counterproductive in my opinion, of minimizing and discrediting their words in the eyes of public opinion?
I would say both. The question is what proportion. Very rarely will you come across a person with a single-minded, altruistic motivation. For example, i support Ukraine because I am outraged at what's going on, but also because upholding the UN charter is of benefit to me, even living in almost the most geographically and politically shielded country in the world.
Biletsky is political opportunist appointed by a former corrupted minister of internal affairs Avakov. Real leader of Azov is Denys Prokopenko, not Biletsky.
Please don’t forget that he’s also a nazi with a private army , wait a second two armies now , and the Jews paying him and Prokopenko salaries so they could overthrow the government for Avakov.
I can translate all new ones and existing ones for you for free so you have better coverage and people in Ukraine have a chance to read different opinion.
I am native Ukrainian, living in Australia(kangaroo).
A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor continued to complain on January 16 about Russian infantry shortages and high loss rates. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military's current shortage of infantry soldiers initially stemmed from heavy losses in Spring and Summer 2022 and delays in announcing the partial reserve callup in September 2022. The milblogger complained that Russian forces were able to regain the initiative in Fall 2023 but then there was no significant force buildup in 2024, so Russia's current offensive operations are "eating up reinforcements like crazy." The milblogger attributed Russia's high casualty rates to poor combat planning and organization, including problems in interbranch cooperation, due to insufficient communication and aerial reconnaissance assets and incompetency among parts of the Russian command staff. The milblogger complained that the Russian military command is not withdrawing units to the rear for rest and replenishment and to integrate new reinforcements, causing "erosion" within Russia's experienced units.
Same problems but different effect still, the ZSU now has a small percentage still of competent Bde's/units out of the 100 plus established ZSU Bde's, so the attrition will be more felt by the ZSU/Ukrainians because still they "are a small Soviet army fighting a bigger Soviet army" which is not advantageous in the long run for Ukraine.
I would say "not really either Soviet or NATO army vs standard Soviet army". So it's time to decide for ZSU which army they are. Or something different, but entirely logical, not like patch here, patch there.
Russian army has a lot of problems, but they can soak a lot more losses and impact of low morale, military and civilian, is lower because punishment-based Soviet army is designed to be run in low morale environment. We should strive to improve our side, not hope for failures of other.
The Russians have been on offensive for 1 f**ng year. They don't have infantry problems for this war.
They have a general drone problem, just like the Ukrainians or US or China.
Suppose that all drones return to filming weddings and picturesque cities. The Russians would drive big breakthroughs and there will be maneuver warfare again.
Please see my original comment (the root of this discussion) where Russians are complaining that their ongoing assaults are draining their reinforcements.
The Russians afford a stupid diversionary attack over the Oskil towards Kupyansk. It can not be developed into a full offensive yet they have infantry to pump there.
Their units consume a large number of replacements yet they stay fully manned and advance. Ukrainian veteran units are starved of replaceme ts and get mauled.
Thank you for you reporting, Tom. Among all the bad news in the front, knowing that in as little as six months the ZSU could be reformed to be much more effective should give us a bit of hope.
Regarding the Ukrainian long range strikes, you criticize them for spreading their efforts too thin, instead of going after one specific set of targets. What should Ukraine target in your opinion? The oil industry, air bases and ammunition depots, military factories,...? Or is this more of a situation where Ukraine should choose one set of targets and stick to them?
I think that biggest problem is spending drones to hit some training facilities in Checna. Drones makes very little damage there. Ammunition depot is always a prio 1 target( if you can destroy it with drone). Next target should be airports( if there is change to hit some planes) if not then oil and chemical, where drones can be trigger for secondaries explosions'. And of course all attacks must be coordinated to better use gaps and overhelming air defence.
My guess is that attacking Checnya barracks has a goal of withdrawing some AD there. Plainly because Kadyrov has quite an influence at putin's court, and his request for additional AD is likely to be heard. And it is important for him to look like a powerful leader and protector of Chechen people.
As for me, the priority for attack targets in Russia is the next: military camps and headquarters of military units, air bases, military factories, and in the end oil refineries. What is the point of attacking an oil refinery if a gunpowder factory produces enough gunpowder? Fuel is easier to import than gunpowder or explosives. Ukraine should attack the targets which impact the battlefield directly.
Of course. It is not easy to lose the war. Ukrainians may agree to some kind of bad peace, but Putin doesn't want anything but full capitulation. So no matter how bad it goes, Ukraine will continue to fight. Worst case scenario is 15-20 more years of war until Putin dies of natural reasons. Eventually Ukrainians would have no choice but improve their command.
It can sounds weird - why I am recomending this when it has no relation to Ukraine & Zelensky.
But IMO, it has: It is about possibility that Péter Magyar can replace Viktor Orbán - but some argue that he can be even worse dictator.
Autor points to the fact that
"...The "if MP wins, he will do the same or worse than Orban" trope treats Hungarian society and its political representatives as a sheep, incapable of learning lessons and unable to live with the freedom of action they have acquired, but instead allowing the noose to be put around their necks again and again. But if this is so, unchangeably, then why shouldn't everything remain as it was?"
"...the thought process is "I'd rather starve to death at home, because if I go to buy food, a brick might fall on my head"
UA need to find power and agility to change the things, as they dont have time to do it sometimes "after the war".
Ukraine could lower the mobilization age, recruit 500 000 young people and ship them off to the US and Germany to train and equip.
Along with the recruits they should have sent a bunch of younger officers with them to learn the "proper" way of doing things so they can then train other officers.
The US and other NATO partners have told Zelensky many times to lower the conscription age to 18 yo. He cant expect NATO countries to send their troops to fight and die in Ukraine if he is not willing to take this step.
Or my, I understand layman would be oblivious of the real situation, but when I hear that from high standing officials it is cringe. There are thousands upon thousands quite fit men around Ukraine, including those having military training, that are still neither drafted, nor even called to recruiting point. Not even say about those that were called, but have not appeared. I fail to understand how changing minimum age can change that? And it seems that mobilisation and training in UA is already at its maximum in terms of monthly capacity. At least in terms of number of trained people, even if quality is poor.
And sending those to other countries to train is even more bulshit.
The system of mobilisation and training in UA needs to change.
And West still needs to work on the home task of supplying ammo, explosives, spares and components, heavy infantry weapons, artillery small and large. And then it is to be seen what comes out of this, and what next. 🫠🙈
You’re right, this is an “All Hands On Deck”! time for them. By not using everyone they can now, then when? It’s reform or else. If Ukraine is not Russia then show it.
It is not my plan. This is a request by NATO countries who I trust have many military experts who know much more about the general situation than you with your wikipedia article.
LOL. so you're still grasping at straws instead of taking the time to learn about the subject you post so overconfidently about. Not the way to persuade anyone.
100K UA loses are not so critical when couple of millions are already conscripted. That's kremlin propaganda BS that NATO partners demand to lower the conscription age to 18 yo.
'Speaking to reporters, the official said Ukraine was not mobilizing or training enough new soldiers to replace those lost on the battlefield.
"The need right now is manpower," he said. "The Russians are in fact making progress, steady progress, in the east, and they are beginning to push back Ukrainian lines in Kursk ... Mobilization and more manpower could make a significant difference at this time as we look at the battlefield today."
Where do you see there any word about lowering the age to 18 yo if you are not blind?
Ukrainian big mass media cannot be trusted, as they are not free and politicaly independent. They usually repeat all BS what Ze used to produce every evening.
Tom wrote before, with 2 million UA army (defence forces) against 500K ruzz terrorists there is no need to lower conscription age. The problem is Ze, Syrsky with budies do not send new troops to exhausted brigades to recover them but to wype them up completely to ease the enemy occupation of UA territories.
Just repeating politicians saying stuff is not evidence. Has it occurred to you they might not be interested in or are unaware of Ukraine's problem with your plan? You're locked in a downward spiral of repeating poor information. Do yourself a favor and take five minutes to learn why your plan won't work.
So, senior officials of NATO countries stating on many occasions that Ukraine needs to lower mobilization age is not evidence that they want Ukraine to lower the mobilization age ??
First of all let's get numbers straight, the total losses is 400K+ including KIA, MIA, and WIA. Probably as much as 75K, or maybe less are KIA plus MIA, the rest 325K is WIA, of which maybe 50+% are back to serve. The total conscription for 3 years is unlikely above 700K. So the total standing army may have increased by 300-400K. With maybe total of combat available to be around 400K. So all is needed is to double monthly capacity for recruitment and training. To get another 400K. And maybe not so much conscription, but finally an introduction of sign up bonus at the 3rd year of all out war may happen?
Ukraine has 980,000 people in arms as it fights Russia's all-out war, President Volodymyr Zelensky said in an interview with U.S. podcaster Lex Fridman published on Jan. 5.
Yes, correct, that is total including infrastructure, support, logistics and training forces. It is in the same way as ru has 2.7 million army, but can only commit 600K to UA battle. 400K available for combat is rather gross estimate, considering serious restructuring of support forces that is going probably for already 12 months.
He must told about ZSU only. Defence forces total are close to 2 million already. If you count still not conscripted law enforcement personnel in Ukraine, it's another 500K already trained troops.
The principle of small strongholds instead of long trenches is not a new thing.
The Wehrmacht employed such a tactics in WW2 when they were in danger of being routed from Moscow.
Hitler gave the famous not a step back order, the ground was frozen and very difficult to dig long trenches and so the Germans turned every small village, every house, every barn into a stronghold. A string of many hundreds of such strongholds managed to halt the red army.
Of course, now we have satellites, FABs, fiberoptic drones with night vision and many other weapons, that did not exist in winter of 1941.
Just want to thank you for the insight analysis, which helps me as a journalist to draw my conclusions. I still hope, there might be a slight chance to solve this conflict by political means and an armistice as a first step. As the Korean Peninsula shows sometimes also the freezing of a conflict is an option, although not the best one.
I defer to whatever the Ukrainians decide they want to do. My hope is that the Russian threat to others is broken. If it isn't, there is every indication that there will be more aggression in the future.
Freezing this conflict like in Korea would require strong EU and US military presence in free (western) Ukraine to deter any Russian attacks. E.g. mind that in Georgia "frozen" conflict means that Russia is e.g. pushing boundaries because they know Georgians cannot stop that. Never trust to Putin.
No. There is no incentive whatsoever for Putin to freeze the conflict. Putin had not started this war to get some more pieces of land. Absolutely minimal war goal is Russian puppet government in Kiyv. There is no pressing needs for Putin to let go of his plans. Therefore freeze is not an option.
just want to thank you for your insight analysis, which helps me as a freelance journalist to draw my conclusions. I still hope for an end of the war by a political solution.
Thank you very much for your continous reports.
It is so sad, that comparable cheap and easy changes (standardized basic training, foxhole defenses, increased mine production) are not adapted, while they apparently could massivly slow down most russian advances.
Regarding the missile warfare: I was also wondering, why the UA is not focussing on one kind of target (i.e. either raffineries OR steelmaking OR locomotives OR something else), I would imagine, it is far better to reduce one crucial infrastructure element to, let’s say 20 percent than five different ones to 80 percent. The only explanation I came up with, was, that after some refinery strikes, the defense of the others are massively increased, such that UA has to switch targets to have air defence moved away again.
But even if this is true, I would expect to solve this by “a night of thousand(s) drones on refineries” instead of ten nights of hundred drones to different targets. Then also only one overwhelming of the air defense is required. Do you have any information, why not following such approach?
I think you'll find that some of Russia's biggest refineries have been hit successfully in the last ten days. And Ukraine only built 6,000 long range drones last year, so maybe give them a break and let their planned huge production increase actually happen before your "night of a thousand drones" occurs?
Well, this is actually my point: They produced thousands of drones and used them in a lot of comparable small strikes, which allows the russians to adapt instead of saving one thousand for one huge strike, i.e. on all 30 huge and mid size refineries (ok, not all are in range, but most of them are).
Having worked in a refinery, I see them as extremely vulnerable infrastructure: Destroy the atmospheric destillation and you will halt most of the whole site. A refinery is like a chain, which is only as strong as the weakest link. Even in big refineries, there are seldomly more than four atmospheric destillations, usually two are sufficient. Those are the very huge ones (50m height, 5m diameter are not unusual). Hit each with two or three warheads and the whole refinery cannot produce a lot for months anymore.
Here is nice flow chart: Rohöl = raw oil:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erd%C3%B6lraffinerie#/media/Datei:Raffinerie2.png
Everything is dependent on the atmospheric destillation. (yes, you can use some other units partly without it, but this will not give huge yields and wreck them in the mid term).
I am not saying, that this would work, but I am wondering, why this approach was not tried.
Counter argument is that Ukraine still doesn't have a capacity to reduce anything to 20 percent; I really doubt refineries attacked have reduced Russia's capacity by more than 5 percent.
The fortified area with many individual positions can be used only by well trained and integrated brigades.
Fresh brigades need trenches to pass orders and also to show the soldiers they are not alone.
A reason more to - urgently - improve training of the troops.
...otherwise, they're all going to be not alone - in being dead.
Dear Tom, excellent interview, if one is bored, there is a time coded list of topics in description to click around.
Don't forget that he is experienced politician besides being commander of strongest and most successful brigade. So this interview is definitely about being heard and exerting pressure. By the way he mentions Bezugla, and the fact that she is largely unhelpful, although bringing up what can be at times 100% truth, and he is mild. Recently she has received not so mild "praise" from Magyar. So her name is almost a type of swearing around servicemen like them.
And also an interesting "old" article there, by Glen Grant (on Butusov website) on the role of CnC: https://m.censor.net/ua/blogs/3530647/na-zahod-rol-gkzs-z-rokami-evolyuts-onuvala
In a way Butusov is very similar in his eagerness to Bezugla, tends to forget when it becomes not so helpful. Although thoroughly looking for solutions, it seems. He does not use opportunities to find a channel of communication and influence with those who he really wants to influence. And he has plenty of such opportunities, like Bezugla. Unlike for example you or me.
Bezugla and Butusov share info / feelings which are well known by Russian Army and Ukrainian civilians alike. There is no sabotage or defeatism only a proper civilian overwatch. They ask for solutions on problems which are well known.
There many people that bring up those topics in a much more intelligent and systematic way. So they are not "one and only saviours".
And by the way Butusov has quite adapted his approach, probably understanding that shouting loudest and in a most negative way is firstly not the only way of doing things, but also brings significant unintended consequences, like lowered total donations.
Anyway, it's a bad political culture if you need to turn the volume to max. Means, nation with such political culture would not be able to sustain progress, with often mood and policy swings. So they'll need to learn other ways of doing things.
Yes, Bezouglova is not productive. She has screamed for a year about the state of Ukrainian Army yet Syrsky still messed-up the 155th Brigade which was raised entirely on donations.
So we need to wait for a Ukrainian Eistein, Gates or Turing to find the productive ways for discussing the war.
I think there are quite a few UAV, USV failed attacks SBU is silent about. Russians are adapting, too. So, if SBU succeeds in Crimea with shooting few helicopters and destroying few AD systems, it may not mean they have stopped then. It may just mean next attacks failed.
Also, they play cat & mice game. If they would focus just on one target for a longer time, Russia can concentrate their AD on these targets.
And they have scored some ammo dump hits, it must have impact on battlefield. Also, AD systems defending in the rear are missing on the battlefield.
And that campaign against oil tankers and refineries, it does not have direct impact on the battlefield, because Russia has plenty oil, but it has economic impact - less export of oil products means less income, and even Russia had to increase it's import of oil products from Belarus.
For me the only usage of such long range one way drones would be anti AD. And that preferably in the area where there a chance of establishing no AD zone is possible. Like shallow front in the South. Where you simply continue daily attacks, until no AD system left towards Azov and Black sea shore. And then establishing 24/7 fixed wing monitoring the whole area. And then starting to use own air assets a bit more freely along the front line.
IMO SBU and ZSU would be very happy it they could "simply continue daily attacks, until no AD system left towards (something) ..." That seems simple form a couch but try it in real. VSFR officers are not so stupid to show off their AD systems and keep them on place until Ukraine destroys them.
Well if they allow UA fixed wings fly all the time en masse above South, no problem. But firstly UA is no doing that, so there must be a reason? And I think that reason is AD, that sooner or later should turn it's radar on.
At least I have not heard of anything else used against UA fixed wing UAVs.
Manpads. Russian manpads are good enough against low altitude targets, and high altitude attacks aren't very effective. Additionally, Ukrainian forces are not very good at locating and destroying AD by radar triangulation, if you use aircrafts as bait, you'll be out of aircrafts before enemy would be out of AD. There are probably lots of reasons why it won't work in practice.
Both sides are very good at triangulation of radars. For example all hunting for ru fixed wing recon is done by triangulation of their signals. And radars are much more visible then that.
And those recon drones that ru army use, normally fly 3+ km. Which is good for optical recon at good weather, or SAR and RF recon at any weather. UA has enough of optical and some SAR UAVs capable of this fly height. And for actual strike UAVs use a super low pathway to hide from AD launchers or approach them. UA has specific anti radar drones, auto targeting for radar RF emissions.
And here I am not speaking of any more advanced recon, like flying a base station, where phones on the ground would at least try to connect to it and reveal it's IMEI, and by tracking that geographically, for example any IMEI found within 10 km of front line makes it suspicious, and by tracking those IMEIs geographically you can establish connections and their parhways, concentration areas, command posts, ammo depots, whatever.
I meant not just basic triangulation, but being able to use it as a strategic tool. Being able to discover and destroy any air defence turning on its radar before it shoots and relocates. And it should be done reliably and on a noticeable scale.
Any side which is "good" at air defence triangulation and destruction should be able to keep at least some local parts of the front free from enemy air defence and use aircrafts there with relative impunity; any air defence turning on its radar should be immediately destroyed. We do not witness this on any part of the front; both sides are keeping their air defences on and relatively close to front and planes don't dare to operate freely in any "cleared" zones, or at least I don't see it, for, of course, it may be that such developments went unnoticed for me.
Obviously some air defences are discovered and destroyed, but "being good" means doing it reliably and on scale, so that within range of air-to-ground or ground-to-ground missiles there was no working air defence. I don't see it happening.
I think they recently focused on the Engels airbase? And did repeated strikes?
Compared to Zelensky & Syrsky + buddies, even Saddam & IrAF CO staff Lt.Gen. pilot Muzahim Saab Hasan al-Tikrity were not so dumb. They, after years of failures of course, were able to learn SOMETHING and introduce LIMITED changes (it didnt help them much, but thats another story). Ukraine still waits for its Raad al-Hamdani a Hameed Shabaan.
Thank you for your excellent work, beyond the sarcasm I also sense a lot of bitterness in your words, bitterness that I have no doubt must be shared by the many contacts you have in Ukraine and on the front lines.
There is a question that I have been asking myself for a long time. I hesitated to ask it to avoid adding polemical remarks but I would like to have your opinion. Beyond the clientelism that you sometimes mention, could the "incompetence" and the "denial" of Zelinski and his teams also be linked to the fear, real or imaginary, that people like Colonel Andrei Biletski, the leaders of Azov, Da Vinci, etc., are seen as opponents and potential political dangers? That the refusal to listen to them is a way, counterproductive in my opinion, of minimizing and discrediting their words in the eyes of public opinion?
That leads finally to the question: Whom do those people serve? Ukraine or just themselves?
I would say both. The question is what proportion. Very rarely will you come across a person with a single-minded, altruistic motivation. For example, i support Ukraine because I am outraged at what's going on, but also because upholding the UN charter is of benefit to me, even living in almost the most geographically and politically shielded country in the world.
Biletsky is political opportunist appointed by a former corrupted minister of internal affairs Avakov. Real leader of Azov is Denys Prokopenko, not Biletsky.
Please don’t forget that he’s also a nazi with a private army , wait a second two armies now , and the Jews paying him and Prokopenko salaries so they could overthrow the government for Avakov.
Hi Tom,
Can I read your articles anywhere in ukrainian?
I can translate all new ones and existing ones for you for free so you have better coverage and people in Ukraine have a chance to read different opinion.
I am native Ukrainian, living in Australia(kangaroo).
Regards
Vitaliy
Yes, you can. This one is already translated (I didn't check the translation quality though, just googled it):
https://ipress.ua/articles/tse_ne_na_chasi_zaraz_potribna_zmina_pryntsypiv_i_shemy_pobudovy_ukriplen__tom_kuper_367007.html
A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor continued to complain on January 16 about Russian infantry shortages and high loss rates. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military's current shortage of infantry soldiers initially stemmed from heavy losses in Spring and Summer 2022 and delays in announcing the partial reserve callup in September 2022. The milblogger complained that Russian forces were able to regain the initiative in Fall 2023 but then there was no significant force buildup in 2024, so Russia's current offensive operations are "eating up reinforcements like crazy." The milblogger attributed Russia's high casualty rates to poor combat planning and organization, including problems in interbranch cooperation, due to insufficient communication and aerial reconnaissance assets and incompetency among parts of the Russian command staff. The milblogger complained that the Russian military command is not withdrawing units to the rear for rest and replenishment and to integrate new reinforcements, causing "erosion" within Russia's experienced units.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2025
The Russians have the same problems, thus we should be optimistic.
The same but much worse, which is why Tom scored them lower than Ukraine in his 'Evanescence' piece.
Same problems but different effect still, the ZSU now has a small percentage still of competent Bde's/units out of the 100 plus established ZSU Bde's, so the attrition will be more felt by the ZSU/Ukrainians because still they "are a small Soviet army fighting a bigger Soviet army" which is not advantageous in the long run for Ukraine.
I would say "not really either Soviet or NATO army vs standard Soviet army". So it's time to decide for ZSU which army they are. Or something different, but entirely logical, not like patch here, patch there.
Russian army has a lot of problems, but they can soak a lot more losses and impact of low morale, military and civilian, is lower because punishment-based Soviet army is designed to be run in low morale environment. We should strive to improve our side, not hope for failures of other.
They have more people, more resources. "A small Soviet army cannot defeat a big Soviet army." https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/01/03/why-is-ukraine-losing-ground-deep-analysis-of-military-problems-in-2025/?swcfpc=1
The Russians have been on offensive for 1 f**ng year. They don't have infantry problems for this war.
They have a general drone problem, just like the Ukrainians or US or China.
Suppose that all drones return to filming weddings and picturesque cities. The Russians would drive big breakthroughs and there will be maneuver warfare again.
Please see my original comment (the root of this discussion) where Russians are complaining that their ongoing assaults are draining their reinforcements.
The Russians afford a stupid diversionary attack over the Oskil towards Kupyansk. It can not be developed into a full offensive yet they have infantry to pump there.
Their units consume a large number of replacements yet they stay fully manned and advance. Ukrainian veteran units are starved of replaceme ts and get mauled.
Thank you for you reporting, Tom. Among all the bad news in the front, knowing that in as little as six months the ZSU could be reformed to be much more effective should give us a bit of hope.
Regarding the Ukrainian long range strikes, you criticize them for spreading their efforts too thin, instead of going after one specific set of targets. What should Ukraine target in your opinion? The oil industry, air bases and ammunition depots, military factories,...? Or is this more of a situation where Ukraine should choose one set of targets and stick to them?
I think that biggest problem is spending drones to hit some training facilities in Checna. Drones makes very little damage there. Ammunition depot is always a prio 1 target( if you can destroy it with drone). Next target should be airports( if there is change to hit some planes) if not then oil and chemical, where drones can be trigger for secondaries explosions'. And of course all attacks must be coordinated to better use gaps and overhelming air defence.
My guess is that attacking Checnya barracks has a goal of withdrawing some AD there. Plainly because Kadyrov has quite an influence at putin's court, and his request for additional AD is likely to be heard. And it is important for him to look like a powerful leader and protector of Chechen people.
Yes, it can be true but still it can be some oil depot instead of training facilities. But maybe it worked.
As for me, the priority for attack targets in Russia is the next: military camps and headquarters of military units, air bases, military factories, and in the end oil refineries. What is the point of attacking an oil refinery if a gunpowder factory produces enough gunpowder? Fuel is easier to import than gunpowder or explosives. Ukraine should attack the targets which impact the battlefield directly.
Where would ammo storage sit in this ranking?
Is there any hope?
Absolutely. The Russians have even more problems.
Of course. It is not easy to lose the war. Ukrainians may agree to some kind of bad peace, but Putin doesn't want anything but full capitulation. So no matter how bad it goes, Ukraine will continue to fight. Worst case scenario is 15-20 more years of war until Putin dies of natural reasons. Eventually Ukrainians would have no choice but improve their command.
I can recomend this reading: https://www.facebook.com/amministratore.montefiore/posts/pfbid02tiJ6gMU1Dk535QggiYSLoA5DbVxeS7LWXc2HYGfkLjjaHanKTJySXYEQE7baitfUl
It can sounds weird - why I am recomending this when it has no relation to Ukraine & Zelensky.
But IMO, it has: It is about possibility that Péter Magyar can replace Viktor Orbán - but some argue that he can be even worse dictator.
Autor points to the fact that
"...The "if MP wins, he will do the same or worse than Orban" trope treats Hungarian society and its political representatives as a sheep, incapable of learning lessons and unable to live with the freedom of action they have acquired, but instead allowing the noose to be put around their necks again and again. But if this is so, unchangeably, then why shouldn't everything remain as it was?"
"...the thought process is "I'd rather starve to death at home, because if I go to buy food, a brick might fall on my head"
UA need to find power and agility to change the things, as they dont have time to do it sometimes "after the war".
Thanks
Ukraine could lower the mobilization age, recruit 500 000 young people and ship them off to the US and Germany to train and equip.
Along with the recruits they should have sent a bunch of younger officers with them to learn the "proper" way of doing things so they can then train other officers.
They should have done that a year ago.
You need to learn about Ukraine's demographic squeeze. It's why your plan won't work. Here you go:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Ukraine
The US and other NATO partners have told Zelensky many times to lower the conscription age to 18 yo. He cant expect NATO countries to send their troops to fight and die in Ukraine if he is not willing to take this step.
Or my, I understand layman would be oblivious of the real situation, but when I hear that from high standing officials it is cringe. There are thousands upon thousands quite fit men around Ukraine, including those having military training, that are still neither drafted, nor even called to recruiting point. Not even say about those that were called, but have not appeared. I fail to understand how changing minimum age can change that? And it seems that mobilisation and training in UA is already at its maximum in terms of monthly capacity. At least in terms of number of trained people, even if quality is poor.
And sending those to other countries to train is even more bulshit.
The system of mobilisation and training in UA needs to change.
And West still needs to work on the home task of supplying ammo, explosives, spares and components, heavy infantry weapons, artillery small and large. And then it is to be seen what comes out of this, and what next. 🫠🙈
Are you in Ukraine ?
Are you in outer space?
What is that supposed to mean.
Are you in Ukraine or not ?
You’re right, this is an “All Hands On Deck”! time for them. By not using everyone they can now, then when? It’s reform or else. If Ukraine is not Russia then show it.
He isn’t expecting them to come and fight with boots on the ground. So he needs to think about the domestic situation.
So did you bother to read up on how little difference your plan would make? You reply seems to imply not.
It is not my plan. This is a request by NATO countries who I trust have many military experts who know much more about the general situation than you with your wikipedia article.
LOL. so you're still grasping at straws instead of taking the time to learn about the subject you post so overconfidently about. Not the way to persuade anyone.
100K UA loses are not so critical when couple of millions are already conscripted. That's kremlin propaganda BS that NATO partners demand to lower the conscription age to 18 yo.
You must be living in a cave if you are not aware of this.
https://kyivindependent.com/as-us-pushes-for-ukraine-to-lower-draft-age-why-wont-ukraine-conscript-younger-men/
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-urges-ukraine-lower-fighting-age-18-bolster-ranks-official-says-2024-11-27/
It seems like you are living in the cave.
From your link:
'Speaking to reporters, the official said Ukraine was not mobilizing or training enough new soldiers to replace those lost on the battlefield.
"The need right now is manpower," he said. "The Russians are in fact making progress, steady progress, in the east, and they are beginning to push back Ukrainian lines in Kursk ... Mobilization and more manpower could make a significant difference at this time as we look at the battlefield today."
Where do you see there any word about lowering the age to 18 yo if you are not blind?
Ukrainian big mass media cannot be trusted, as they are not free and politicaly independent. They usually repeat all BS what Ze used to produce every evening.
Tom wrote before, with 2 million UA army (defence forces) against 500K ruzz terrorists there is no need to lower conscription age. The problem is Ze, Syrsky with budies do not send new troops to exhausted brigades to recover them but to wype them up completely to ease the enemy occupation of UA territories.
Here's Blinken
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/blinken-says-ukraine-needs-get-younger-people-fighting-russia-2024-12-04/
Just repeating politicians saying stuff is not evidence. Has it occurred to you they might not be interested in or are unaware of Ukraine's problem with your plan? You're locked in a downward spiral of repeating poor information. Do yourself a favor and take five minutes to learn why your plan won't work.
So, senior officials of NATO countries stating on many occasions that Ukraine needs to lower mobilization age is not evidence that they want Ukraine to lower the mobilization age ??
This blog is fool of crazies.
🙈 Couple of millions conscripted? 100K losses?
First of all let's get numbers straight, the total losses is 400K+ including KIA, MIA, and WIA. Probably as much as 75K, or maybe less are KIA plus MIA, the rest 325K is WIA, of which maybe 50+% are back to serve. The total conscription for 3 years is unlikely above 700K. So the total standing army may have increased by 300-400K. With maybe total of combat available to be around 400K. So all is needed is to double monthly capacity for recruitment and training. To get another 400K. And maybe not so much conscription, but finally an introduction of sign up bonus at the 3rd year of all out war may happen?
Ukraine has 980,000 people in arms as it fights Russia's all-out war, President Volodymyr Zelensky said in an interview with U.S. podcaster Lex Fridman published on Jan. 5.
https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-military-is-980-000-soldiers-strong-zelensky-says/
Yes, correct, that is total including infrastructure, support, logistics and training forces. It is in the same way as ru has 2.7 million army, but can only commit 600K to UA battle. 400K available for combat is rather gross estimate, considering serious restructuring of support forces that is going probably for already 12 months.
He must told about ZSU only. Defence forces total are close to 2 million already. If you count still not conscripted law enforcement personnel in Ukraine, it's another 500K already trained troops.
The principle of small strongholds instead of long trenches is not a new thing.
The Wehrmacht employed such a tactics in WW2 when they were in danger of being routed from Moscow.
Hitler gave the famous not a step back order, the ground was frozen and very difficult to dig long trenches and so the Germans turned every small village, every house, every barn into a stronghold. A string of many hundreds of such strongholds managed to halt the red army.
Of course, now we have satellites, FABs, fiberoptic drones with night vision and many other weapons, that did not exist in winter of 1941.
Just want to thank you for the insight analysis, which helps me as a journalist to draw my conclusions. I still hope, there might be a slight chance to solve this conflict by political means and an armistice as a first step. As the Korean Peninsula shows sometimes also the freezing of a conflict is an option, although not the best one.
I defer to whatever the Ukrainians decide they want to do. My hope is that the Russian threat to others is broken. If it isn't, there is every indication that there will be more aggression in the future.
Freezing this conflict like in Korea would require strong EU and US military presence in free (western) Ukraine to deter any Russian attacks. E.g. mind that in Georgia "frozen" conflict means that Russia is e.g. pushing boundaries because they know Georgians cannot stop that. Never trust to Putin.
No. There is no incentive whatsoever for Putin to freeze the conflict. Putin had not started this war to get some more pieces of land. Absolutely minimal war goal is Russian puppet government in Kiyv. There is no pressing needs for Putin to let go of his plans. Therefore freeze is not an option.
Dear Tom,
just want to thank you for your insight analysis, which helps me as a freelance journalist to draw my conclusions. I still hope for an end of the war by a political solution.
Ursula Stenzel
Gerne. Einer der Gründe warum ich hier schreibe was ich schreibe (und auch viele meiner Bücher schreibe; ein 'klassischer Exemplar' wäre das Projekt hier gewesen: https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/hot-skies-over-yemen-volume-2-aerial-warfare-over-the-southern-arabian-peninsula-1994-2017.php) ist es eben 'Mainstream'-Journalisten zu helfen die Öffentlichkeit mit mehr Hintergrund- und Kontext zu versorgen.
In unseren Zeiten bleiben diese so gut wie immer 'auf der Strecke'...