Ukraine War, 17 January 2025: There's no Time for that... now
by Tom Cooper
Hello everybody!
Don’t worry, you didn’t miss anything important: nothing changed the last few days in the war in Ukraine – especially not in Kyiv. There, characters like Zelensky and Syrsky remain stoically insistent on ideas similar to those of directors of the Soviet nuclear authorities in 1986: ‘Soviet nuclear reactors do not explode. Period’…
Therefore - and also because so many are still asking me if a reform of the ZSU would be possible at war, if reforming the force would make sense, and similar – let me start with a recommendation for ‘must see’: an interview with Colonel Andrei Biletsky, CO 3rd Assault Brigade.
Might be a lot to watch and listen to, but, everything’s said there. Foremost, as Biletsky has explained it: the most fundamental part of the (urgently necessary) reform of the ZSU – standardisation of the basic training, and re-training of existing corps of non-commissioned officers – wouldn’t take longer than six months, but would dramatically increase the combat effectiveness of the force and retention.
….alas, according to Syrsky & Buddies, this ‘can’t be done’: it’s ‘not the right time’ to do so… it is not the right time now, it was not the right time back in 2022, not in 2023, not in 2024, and it is not going to be the right time any time in the future, either…
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AIR/MISSILE WARFARE
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian SBU is continuing its private war against Russia – and, as usually, it’s doing that without a trace of something like single inter-operational plan (SIOP). After deploying unmanned surface vehicles to down two helicopters of the Russian Naval Aviation in early January, on 6 January the SBU then attacked the Russian air defences along the Kinburn Spit, and knocked out two Pantsyrs and one Osa-AKM surface-to-air missile systems. Meanwhile, it switched back to oil & gas industry: between targets hit since 4 January were the port of Ust Luga (outside St Petersburg, about 800km away from Ukraine), Taneco refinery (outside Niznekamsk, in Tatarstan, about 1,200km away from Ukraine), Kazan Petrochemical Works, the Engels AB and the nearby Saratov refinery, Aleksin Chemical Works (outside Moscow), the Lukoil refinery (outside Volgograd), the Liski POL-depot, and the 1060th Support Centre…
Sure, the local Russian authorities are always insistent that all the incoming missiles and attack UAVs have been shot down, and that if anything was ‘hit’, then by ‘falling debris’. However, there is little doubt that such strikes are becoming ever more effective – which is a reason more to be sad about their poor coordination at strategic level. The reason for their success is that in combination of decoys and electronic warfare, both Ukrainian attack UAVs, and guided missiles like Neptun/Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG are regularly penetrating the Russian air defences and scoring direct hits. This is obvious from the fact that something like ‘at the start’ of another such – periodic – campaign – a number of Russian SAM-systems are knocked out. Except for above-mentioned Pantsyrs and Osas, lately this included at least one of S-400s deployed along the border between Russia and Ukraine.
With other words: at least at the tactical level, the SBU has learned how to conduct such operations. First it’s ‘drilling gaps/holes’ in the Russian ‘SAM-wall’ along the border, then actually striking selected targets. If it could now, finally, decide what it wants to hit, with what effects in the long term, too….
…what a surprise then, long-term results of this campaign are still to be seen.
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GRUND WAR
Kursk.. the ZSU’s ‘counteroffensive’, run on Zelensky’s order to impress NATO during the last Rammstein meeting, captured one village on 5 January, and that was that. A day later, Russians counterattacked along a wide frontline in the north-west, and that was that. Now both sides are back to ‘positional warfare’. See: minor assaults here and there…
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Kupyansk-Svatove… the Russians are continuing to widen their penetration in the Pishchanve area – foremost in form of assaulting on almost the entire width of its southern side, from Zahryzove and Lozova to Zelenyi Hai and Stepy. Ukrainians are hitting back by FPVs.
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Bakhmut.. in Chasiv Yar, the Ukrainians have recovered at least a part of the main railway station, but in turn the Russians managed to enter the Refactory Works, and seize the southern side of the Kanal District. Meanwhile, they’re assaulting in direction of the main local hospital.
Ah yes, while we’re at Chasiv Yar: as can be heard in Biletsky’s interview, all the digging and construction of those ‘long lines of big trenches and fortifications’ is, essentially, a complete waste of time, of money, of resources necessary, and of troops. Not even the Russians are doing that any more.
Reason?
Such field fortifications are too obvious and too easy to hit.
Instead, based on experiences by the Wagner PMC in Syria, the Russians were the first to switch from this practice to constructing thousands of single, but well-concealed ‘foxholes’ for 1-2 combatants. In this fashion, they’re also constructing ‘defence in depth’: forcing the Ukrainians to search, find and neutralise every single of hundreds (indeed: thousands) of such holes if they want to advance even for 100 metres (not to talk about ‘kilometres’).
Contrary to the Ukrainians, though, the Russians have plentiful of mines to block approaches to their foxholes, too…
Another sad side of this ‘medal’: not only that nobody in the Ministry of Defence in Kyiv cares, but the GenStab-U cares even less. Correspondingly, the Ukrainians are extremely slow in adapting: millions of Hrynas are still wasted to commission civilian companies to construct biiiiiiiiiiiig fortification lines in wrong positions (or at least in wrong directions), while this adapted tactics of constructing defence lines consisting of dozens of ‘small’ positions is applied by – at most – perhaps a dozen of ZSU brigade commanders. Those professional enough to constantly adapt.
The others… ‘there’s no time for that now’…
Correspondingly, people complaining Chasiv Yar was not well-enough fortified because there are no ‘long, big lines of trenches visible on satellite photos’, or complaining about things like ‘oh, this big trenchline was not occupied by Ukrainian troops at all: what a waste of position’… sigh…
Might be important to understand the following, too (though: who am I to say…).
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Toretsk… yes, sure, the Ukrainian FPVs are decimating the Russian troops all over the ruined town; and, yes, sure, the ZSU has shot down dozens of Russian UAVs over this sector, the last few days. However, the Russians are still assaulting – and advancing. Meanwhile, up to 95% of Toretsk is under their control, and the fighting is focusing on the road out of the town in north-western direction, and the mine on the northern side.
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Pokrovsk… ‘completely unexpectedly’, the fighting of the last few days focused primarily on two sections of this sector. The first is east of Pokrovsk, where Russians are trying to seize Yelyzavetivka, thus widening their approach from Vozdvyzhenka and Tymohivka to the Highway T0504 west of Vodiane Druhe. ‘Unexpectedly’ precisely because these assaults are run along an entirely useless line of Ukrainian fortifications constructed between Vodyane and Tymohivka (i.e. on north-south axis) – and that especially from within four complexes of entirely useless Ukrainian fortifications in the Tymohivka area….
The second is the Russian assaults from Pishchane, Vovkove and Solone on the Zvirove, the railway berm between Kotlyne and Udachne, and Uspenivka, respectively. That’s south/south-east of Pokrovsk (actually: some five kilometres outside the town). Arguably, ZSU fortifications in this area have been constructed in better fashion (no ‘big trench lines’, rather ‘lots of minor field fortifications), but: the latter are still much too easy to be seen, and thus easy for the Russians to target – both by UMPK glide bombs, but especially by FPVs. Combined with the, meanwhile, endemic shortage of mines within the Ukrainian armed forces, and the fact it’s nobody less than the General of Fantastic News who is in charge of the ZSU in this sector… sigh… what a surprise the Russian advance continues…
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Andriivka… (former Kurakhove) Yes, sure, the ZSU salient between Dachne and Ulakiy is ‘still holding’. That is so because the Ukrainian units there have no other option but to stick to the Zelensky’s ‘no step back’-order as long as they can. Even if everybody involved knows it’s pointless: the Russians are meanwhile driving further into their back, through assaulting from Shevchenko to Andriivka, and from Zelenivka on Ulakiy and Kostiantynopil…
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Velyka Novosilka… The Russians are meanwhile assaulting the town from six different directions: north, north-east, south-east, south, south-west, and west…
…and I’m really sorry, but following this war without lots of sarcasm… that’s, meanwhile, entirely impossible…
A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor continued to complain on January 16 about Russian infantry shortages and high loss rates. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military's current shortage of infantry soldiers initially stemmed from heavy losses in Spring and Summer 2022 and delays in announcing the partial reserve callup in September 2022. The milblogger complained that Russian forces were able to regain the initiative in Fall 2023 but then there was no significant force buildup in 2024, so Russia's current offensive operations are "eating up reinforcements like crazy." The milblogger attributed Russia's high casualty rates to poor combat planning and organization, including problems in interbranch cooperation, due to insufficient communication and aerial reconnaissance assets and incompetency among parts of the Russian command staff. The milblogger complained that the Russian military command is not withdrawing units to the rear for rest and replenishment and to integrate new reinforcements, causing "erosion" within Russia's experienced units.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2025
The Russians have the same problems, thus we should be optimistic.
Thank you very much for your continous reports.
It is so sad, that comparable cheap and easy changes (standardized basic training, foxhole defenses, increased mine production) are not adapted, while they apparently could massivly slow down most russian advances.
Regarding the missile warfare: I was also wondering, why the UA is not focussing on one kind of target (i.e. either raffineries OR steelmaking OR locomotives OR something else), I would imagine, it is far better to reduce one crucial infrastructure element to, let’s say 20 percent than five different ones to 80 percent. The only explanation I came up with, was, that after some refinery strikes, the defense of the others are massively increased, such that UA has to switch targets to have air defence moved away again.
But even if this is true, I would expect to solve this by “a night of thousand(s) drones on refineries” instead of ten nights of hundred drones to different targets. Then also only one overwhelming of the air defense is required. Do you have any information, why not following such approach?