Thanks for the report. When will make report about other directions like Bakmut and Maryanka? It seems that situation there is more critical than near Kupyansk. But why do they advance? Is it combination of deficit of shells and people in ZSU as well as big drone advantage of Russian on those directions
Please mind that the frontline of this war is HUGE. Stretching over thousands of kilometres, and then of different terrain, with different connections to the rear. Also, both sides have their own priorities in regards of different sectors of the frontline. Nowhere in this war - on no section of the frontline - is the situation always exactly the same. Every sector of the frontline has its own peculiarities: one side is in better geographic position (for example: dominating heights), or in better position regarding artillery, or drones, or electronic warfare. And these factors are constantly changing, depending on amount of troops and material deployed by one, other, or both sides.
Results in this: the Russians enjoyed a huge advantage in drones in the Avidiivka area through October and November, now Ukraine seems to have stabilised the situation. At least for a while. In Kupyansk, the Russians are enjoying superiorities in almost all aspects: Ukrainians have just enough units and equipment to hold out.
It is only atop of this that the flow of supplies from the West starts to matter: this is hopelessly insufficient for all the sectors of the ZSU's frontline. Currently, Avidiivka has priority, followed by Dnipro/Kherson, then come Bakhmut and then Kupyansk. Result: whatever the Russians do there, in the Kupyansk area, Ukrainians have it harder to defend.
Must be a single occurrence rather then some scalable tactics. Maybe the tunnel existed before as smbd on youtube mentioned.
1. How long does it take to dig a tunnel that big?
2. HOw safe it is?
3. What kind of tunnel should be able to sustain and explosion without collapsing and burring everybody in it.
4. what about shock wave from explosion in the closed tunnel?
5. It takes a while to clear the exit after explosion to get out in such a quantity.
6. defenders should have enough time to get ready and just shoot like in a shooting gallery from a higher point everybody leaving the tunnel from below.
Speed of tunnelling by picks shovels and wheelbarrows depends very much on the ground, but between 2 and 20 metres / day. Less as you get closer, because you don't want to be heard.
Tunnelling is not safe, but it is a lot safer than advancing over observed open ground when the other guys have remote-control machineguns..
There's no-one in the tunnel when the explosion occurs. The tunnel collapses, leaving a crater. That's where they dig upwards into the crater.
Offensive tunnels seem to be rare. I've only read about one tunnel in the Stepove direction and read/seen one tunnel in the industrial park southeast of Avdiivka. Defensive tunnels are more widespread but still not universal. Much more prevalent are deep trenches that are later given overhead cover. Some of the better Ukrainian positions have that.
I would like more details on the construction of the tunnels, as well. It likely took several weeks to build. If you read about the details of the three tunnels of the POW camp Stalag Luft III then you will have the same questions about the Avdiivka tunnels. How was the dirt removed? How were the walls shored up? How did they set up the air lines? What was the height of the tunnels?
Even with the video of the industrial park tunnel there are a lot of unanswered questions leaving us only with speculations. In both the American Civil War and Ww1, there was a certain amount of shock involved among the defenders. I don't believe there were Russians close to the explosion site but how far back were they? Were they completely out of the tunnel or only further back with some sort of shielding? Wherever they were, how far back were they and how long did it take them to travel to the point where they dug to the surface? How long did it take to dig to the surface?
There are more unknowns with the Ukrainian defenders. How many were there in this sector? How easy was it to send reinforcements? (In some sectors they send robot cargo vehicles to deliver supplies because of the danger). This wasn't of case of manning WW1 ramparts and readying the machine guns. The Russians massed in the opening of the tunnel and emerged as if they were dropped off from vehicles. The video is limited and likely edited, but it seemsed that the Ukrainians were outnumbered as the Russians conducted standard trench clearing operations.
As I understand, in this specific case, the Russians exploded the tunnel beneath AFU position and led an assault through it the following day. At least thats how auto translation on RU TG channels putted it. BTW it seems it was done by one of the old LDNR militia.
Tunnels / sapping can be time consuming but they arent impossible to use on a regular basis. Especially in a conflict of this scale.
Syrians rebels used it regularly with great effect. And they are actually small groups, most of few hundreds/thousands combattants, frequently lacking everything due to poverty.
It was actually a recuring theme in Russian feedback as soon as they fully joined the pro-Assad coalition in 2015 : That underground warfare was widescale, Syrians rebels had the advantage, and it required a lot of work to adjust.
I am repeating it like a broken record but it is shocking how Western military institutions refuse to learn anything or even look at MENA war actors tactics out of bigotry. Only to be caught by surprise where common tactics used by in MENA are replicated elsewhere. Especially given how Western states have been involved in literally all of MENA conflicts in the past 2 decades.
Then again, most MENA conflicts ended in either political defeat or total military defeat for Western states so maybe it is not surprising. Even now the dominant thought in the US seems to consider Taliban as sub-human incompetent "militant" incapable of "true" "conventional" "warfare" as if said Afghans did not decisively defeated them.
Im not sure but my assumption is its much easier to dig through sand rather then all sorts of soil here in Ukraine.
Regarding your second note, It must be due to proaganda and how it makes us believe the other side is subpar or stupid. We had it alot for 1.5 year here in Ukraine and look where it brought us. Now i do not see a lot of this mockery any more. Maybe some european accounts still do it but to much lesser scale.
Most of Syria is not desertic. Even the desert (Badiya) is not sandy. It is an orientalist misconception.
Rebels used tunnels and fortifications, offensively or defensively, in Western part of the country. Since by 2013/2014 they had no presence in the more arid East anyway.
In the regions of Latakia, Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Ghouta (Damascus' region) and Daraa.
Some pictures so you can see how much rocky it can be.
Unfortunately, most Westerners are under-estimating the Russians while adopting wishful thinking on Ukraine current states. A lot of it echoes their War on Terror delusions. For exemple most of the French ex militaries turn blogger talked about Russians being trash while Ukrainians "monté en puissance" ("growth in power") exactly how they used to talk about ANA vs Taliban in Afghanistan or West African armies. My impressions is Americans and Britishs act the same.
On the other hand, talks about "not underestimating" the Russians is a common theme I notice on the few first hand accounts by Ukrainian officers I watched. Though it tragically may not be universal among AFU. I admit I have some doubts about the upper echelon AFU command since this summer offensive.
I grew fed up - 'to death' - of Hollywood-style 'descriptions' of Syria as a 'sand sea': only about a half is covered by gravel-semi-desert, for fuck's sake! ....and even this is full of lavendel bushes. The rest is actually lush green!
Thanks for the update. Ukraine's going to need a lot of help with the EW equipment as well as EU military industrialization. I suppose they have underground tunnels where they expect to build equipment but that wont be enough. EU & US need to increase their production of military equipment and ammunition.
The critical problem is: how many men/women can Ukraine train as soldiers monthly?
Because training facilities are prime targets for Russian ballistic missiles, Ukraine will have either to use dispersed facilities, or send the recruits outside Ukraine for training according to NATO standards etc. Not easy, nor simple
Another problem is morale. Everybody who was eager to fight is already in the army, lost limbs or was killed. New recruits are only caught by police in the streets and sent to the war.
Butusov has mentioned this issue as well. He said ukraine has a lot of training grounds (much more then needed), but its way ineffective. And the most effective and tested by time option is to train newcomers within the brigade they will serve. This way they can get in line much faster and in the meanwhile can be used for some backup tasks in the rear.
You have to do the very basic training like carrying your gun in a way you don't harm yourself, outside a dangerous battleground - you don't want to make it more dangerous.
And you need to train NCOs, learn to do exercises and movements at brigade level and higher, etc. - this takes time and not fighting for your survival at the same moment
Do not see any problem to have boot camp in 50km zone from line zero ( or whatever place brigade is located). Its much more dangerous to live in dorms in the middle of the country and get smashed with rockets. I think the logic behind such option is that both conscripts and trainers will be motivated more to train well. And once the conscripts reach some level of proficiency they will be used little by little for other non combatant tasks. Moreover they will be taught to what is important and required right now and by people with real and recent combat experience. Plus, i assume the level of discipline is much higher there.
Regarding NCO, not sure we have any success in preparing those. So the same logic as above applies.
Moreover that is exactly what some new brigades have been doing for year now. First they enlist motivated people and then train them themselves.
"Cold fact is: this is the price not only ‘System Putin’, but - apparently - most of Russia is willing and able to pay. At this point, Russia suffered over 10,000 casualties. Ukrainian casualties haven’t been posted but if they are in the 2-3,000 range, that’s a lot."
Russia's willingness to pay the price was never in question but what remains to be seen is its capability to do so.
This channel remains the most reliable source at tactical overview, while Perun's is the same for the strategic view. Everything else I've found on the web is cringe, sometimes on the extreme. But even Perun, when talking about western help, tends to skip some things. Like for example how the slow rollout of Europe's artillery shell production is a blessing in disquise. Because it was established very early that the reason for this slow rollout is longevity - factories need 10-year or longer contracts to ensure they break even. That means that Ukraine's current supply is sustainable, as factories that have opened recently or opening now must have received government guarantees that some EU government or another has already contracted them to buy 155mm shells long after the war is over. This pretty much "locks" the support in the long run.
The sustainability ot Russia's supply on the other hand is hard to measure. Only their own command knows how much of their current usage is a temporary boost from NK stockpiles and how much is sustainable production. And there's also the problem of $ as they're running on oil revenues and whatever credit China is willing to extend them. Overall Russia would be expected to project confidence all the way until the last minute when critical shortages materialize and Ukraine may indeed lose its nerve before that happens (especially with the stupid "We win next month" and "We lose next month" narratives) but it's kind of a certainty Russia's war material situation is less sustainable than Ukraine's, even with bare minumum western support going forward.
...This is so wrong I had to comment. NK barely has industry at all. By most accounts it has sent Russia 1m shells but that's a stockpile they've accumulated over more than 50 years, and probably that includes donations from the USSR and not only local production. I can't find any current production figures but if they're still producing any ammo it's negligible amounts. Still, the sheer amount of this stockpile is so large that if Russians are using it carefully it will delay any shortage.
And China as far as I know isn't producing 152mm shells at all and has no plans to produce such. Also it's not really an "if" question about supporting Russia, based on news reports it seems obvious they're selling drones to Russia and masking it as Iranian or Russian local production. And this is likely to be just the tip of the iceberg, with China probably providing tons of dual-usage items and loaning Russia money to buy stuff. Then again this help is very different from the one the west gives Ukraine. China is giving it as a loan to be repaid with future deliveries of Russian resources. So even if Russia wins the war it will just become a Chinese resource colony, its population slaving away for decades to repay the war loans. But there's numerous reasons to believe China's own ability to extend loans is limited and on a downward trajectory, due to poor past investments.
The problem with the industry of US, EU, Canada, Japan, Australia, Norway, ect. is the governments. If they so wish, they can easily provide economic incentives for whatever quantities of military production they need, they're just trying to do it on the cheap, bordering on for free. Which is actually better than the historic norm for similar situations but at the same time laughably small in comparrison to public perceptions of what is happening.
btw ISW's tactical news is nice but I kind of feel it lacks the depth and insight of Tom and Don's analysis. And their "strategic analysis" is usually just describing soap opera drama between Russian generals, highlighting curious comments found on Russian and other media channels and repeating well-known arguments why the west should provide more stuff. That's neither strategic nor analysis.
I am always amazed by the shortsightedness of American politics, which has a horizon up to the next elections.
And battling in Congress and Senate about parochial and local interest groups and pet projects instead of focusing on the BIG picture, because they want to score some minute election victory, beats me.
If USA voters elect Trump or a similarly inadequate president, they deserve what they will get. Trouble is, their decisions have consequences for us as well.
If you read/listen to it without knowing who is who it will sound like hei talking about ru...
Few summary points:
1. Absence of strategic planning
2. Absence of timely and trustworthy information up the ladder.
3. Absence of any kind of industrial level fortifications on the main and supporting lines of defence
4. Absence of second line of defense and any reserves
5. 1 stretched defensive line with lack of support, rotation and reserves.
6. UA loses cities according to the same scenario and nothing changes (bakhmut, severodonets, lisichansk, and now avdiivka
6.1. I line with no rotation. No support and reserve. verybody knows what happens but say everything is ok in publick and we do not have any reservers to help you. Once the first line is broken they suddenly find 2x resserves then inititally required but now they have to fight on the go with higher attrition rate and losing ground. Then zelensky comes with medals and bulshit about heroes.
7. ru has a plan and follows it. with huge loses but it works.
8. ua has no plan and in fact is wasting people as much as ru does.
9. zelensky and genshtab are incompetent. Yes he literally said exactly this.
10. Ukraine as a state provides less then 10% of fpv drones.
11. OP preferes to spend money on propaganda rather then drones and fortifications.
12. same for large citites and local budgets.
13. the war is fought with infantry rather then with well established and planned fortifications artilery and machineguns. Thus ua needs more and more peple from mobilization. But it does not solve any problem. Those people will be wasted soon as well if nothing changes.
14. ru is supported with drones providede by state while ua troops are asking funds and volunteers to get some or buy for own money.
By the way, Perun has uploaded a video/interview with LGT (ret.) Hodges, with the focus of the discussion on training (both NATO and Ukraine), this might be of interest:
Thanks for the report. When will make report about other directions like Bakmut and Maryanka? It seems that situation there is more critical than near Kupyansk. But why do they advance? Is it combination of deficit of shells and people in ZSU as well as big drone advantage of Russian on those directions
Please mind that the frontline of this war is HUGE. Stretching over thousands of kilometres, and then of different terrain, with different connections to the rear. Also, both sides have their own priorities in regards of different sectors of the frontline. Nowhere in this war - on no section of the frontline - is the situation always exactly the same. Every sector of the frontline has its own peculiarities: one side is in better geographic position (for example: dominating heights), or in better position regarding artillery, or drones, or electronic warfare. And these factors are constantly changing, depending on amount of troops and material deployed by one, other, or both sides.
Results in this: the Russians enjoyed a huge advantage in drones in the Avidiivka area through October and November, now Ukraine seems to have stabilised the situation. At least for a while. In Kupyansk, the Russians are enjoying superiorities in almost all aspects: Ukrainians have just enough units and equipment to hold out.
It is only atop of this that the flow of supplies from the West starts to matter: this is hopelessly insufficient for all the sectors of the ZSU's frontline. Currently, Avidiivka has priority, followed by Dnipro/Kherson, then come Bakhmut and then Kupyansk. Result: whatever the Russians do there, in the Kupyansk area, Ukrainians have it harder to defend.
This tunnel thing is so bizarre.
Must be a single occurrence rather then some scalable tactics. Maybe the tunnel existed before as smbd on youtube mentioned.
1. How long does it take to dig a tunnel that big?
2. HOw safe it is?
3. What kind of tunnel should be able to sustain and explosion without collapsing and burring everybody in it.
4. what about shock wave from explosion in the closed tunnel?
5. It takes a while to clear the exit after explosion to get out in such a quantity.
6. defenders should have enough time to get ready and just shoot like in a shooting gallery from a higher point everybody leaving the tunnel from below.
Speed of tunnelling by picks shovels and wheelbarrows depends very much on the ground, but between 2 and 20 metres / day. Less as you get closer, because you don't want to be heard.
Tunnelling is not safe, but it is a lot safer than advancing over observed open ground when the other guys have remote-control machineguns..
There's no-one in the tunnel when the explosion occurs. The tunnel collapses, leaving a crater. That's where they dig upwards into the crater.
Well this makes it even more dangerous to use the tunnel and leaves more time and options for defenders to get ready.
Offensive tunnels seem to be rare. I've only read about one tunnel in the Stepove direction and read/seen one tunnel in the industrial park southeast of Avdiivka. Defensive tunnels are more widespread but still not universal. Much more prevalent are deep trenches that are later given overhead cover. Some of the better Ukrainian positions have that.
I would like more details on the construction of the tunnels, as well. It likely took several weeks to build. If you read about the details of the three tunnels of the POW camp Stalag Luft III then you will have the same questions about the Avdiivka tunnels. How was the dirt removed? How were the walls shored up? How did they set up the air lines? What was the height of the tunnels?
Even with the video of the industrial park tunnel there are a lot of unanswered questions leaving us only with speculations. In both the American Civil War and Ww1, there was a certain amount of shock involved among the defenders. I don't believe there were Russians close to the explosion site but how far back were they? Were they completely out of the tunnel or only further back with some sort of shielding? Wherever they were, how far back were they and how long did it take them to travel to the point where they dug to the surface? How long did it take to dig to the surface?
There are more unknowns with the Ukrainian defenders. How many were there in this sector? How easy was it to send reinforcements? (In some sectors they send robot cargo vehicles to deliver supplies because of the danger). This wasn't of case of manning WW1 ramparts and readying the machine guns. The Russians massed in the opening of the tunnel and emerged as if they were dropped off from vehicles. The video is limited and likely edited, but it seemsed that the Ukrainians were outnumbered as the Russians conducted standard trench clearing operations.
Definitely an orc thing to do though
This is the sort of bigotry which may lead Ukraine straight to defeat.
Nah man, it 's that thing called humour.
it is stupid. really.
might be funny from outside. but not from inside.
Зсередини чого? У якій бригаді служиш?
As I understand, in this specific case, the Russians exploded the tunnel beneath AFU position and led an assault through it the following day. At least thats how auto translation on RU TG channels putted it. BTW it seems it was done by one of the old LDNR militia.
Tunnels / sapping can be time consuming but they arent impossible to use on a regular basis. Especially in a conflict of this scale.
Syrians rebels used it regularly with great effect. And they are actually small groups, most of few hundreds/thousands combattants, frequently lacking everything due to poverty.
It was actually a recuring theme in Russian feedback as soon as they fully joined the pro-Assad coalition in 2015 : That underground warfare was widescale, Syrians rebels had the advantage, and it required a lot of work to adjust.
I am repeating it like a broken record but it is shocking how Western military institutions refuse to learn anything or even look at MENA war actors tactics out of bigotry. Only to be caught by surprise where common tactics used by in MENA are replicated elsewhere. Especially given how Western states have been involved in literally all of MENA conflicts in the past 2 decades.
Then again, most MENA conflicts ended in either political defeat or total military defeat for Western states so maybe it is not surprising. Even now the dominant thought in the US seems to consider Taliban as sub-human incompetent "militant" incapable of "true" "conventional" "warfare" as if said Afghans did not decisively defeated them.
Im not sure but my assumption is its much easier to dig through sand rather then all sorts of soil here in Ukraine.
Regarding your second note, It must be due to proaganda and how it makes us believe the other side is subpar or stupid. We had it alot for 1.5 year here in Ukraine and look where it brought us. Now i do not see a lot of this mockery any more. Maybe some european accounts still do it but to much lesser scale.
Most of Syria is not desertic. Even the desert (Badiya) is not sandy. It is an orientalist misconception.
Rebels used tunnels and fortifications, offensively or defensively, in Western part of the country. Since by 2013/2014 they had no presence in the more arid East anyway.
In the regions of Latakia, Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Ghouta (Damascus' region) and Daraa.
Some pictures so you can see how much rocky it can be.
Latakia :
https://twitter.com/QalaatM/status/1639666041943891970
Aleppo
https://twitter.com/QalaatM/status/1389115004390100993
Idlib :
https://twitter.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1170047865038749697
https://twitter.com/QalaatM/status/1698026753329881572
Damascus :
https://twitter.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/904740530193666049
Daraa :
https://twitter.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/830851827751063552
https://twitter.com/worldonalert/status/831649510430482432
Unfortunately, most Westerners are under-estimating the Russians while adopting wishful thinking on Ukraine current states. A lot of it echoes their War on Terror delusions. For exemple most of the French ex militaries turn blogger talked about Russians being trash while Ukrainians "monté en puissance" ("growth in power") exactly how they used to talk about ANA vs Taliban in Afghanistan or West African armies. My impressions is Americans and Britishs act the same.
On the other hand, talks about "not underestimating" the Russians is a common theme I notice on the few first hand accounts by Ukrainian officers I watched. Though it tragically may not be universal among AFU. I admit I have some doubts about the upper echelon AFU command since this summer offensive.
holly molly. So many stones))
thanks for insight.
I will post a link to a video and short summary that addresses some of the issues you point to.
Thank you for pointing this out!
I grew fed up - 'to death' - of Hollywood-style 'descriptions' of Syria as a 'sand sea': only about a half is covered by gravel-semi-desert, for fuck's sake! ....and even this is full of lavendel bushes. The rest is actually lush green!
Thanks for the update. Ukraine's going to need a lot of help with the EW equipment as well as EU military industrialization. I suppose they have underground tunnels where they expect to build equipment but that wont be enough. EU & US need to increase their production of military equipment and ammunition.
How many men can ukraine mobilize monthly?
It got to the news that the military say they need 20 000 but they get much fewer.
I don't know if the claim was true, could have been a part of Zelensky vs Zaluzhny campaign.
The critical problem is: how many men/women can Ukraine train as soldiers monthly?
Because training facilities are prime targets for Russian ballistic missiles, Ukraine will have either to use dispersed facilities, or send the recruits outside Ukraine for training according to NATO standards etc. Not easy, nor simple
Another problem is morale. Everybody who was eager to fight is already in the army, lost limbs or was killed. New recruits are only caught by police in the streets and sent to the war.
Butusov has mentioned this issue as well. He said ukraine has a lot of training grounds (much more then needed), but its way ineffective. And the most effective and tested by time option is to train newcomers within the brigade they will serve. This way they can get in line much faster and in the meanwhile can be used for some backup tasks in the rear.
I am not sure that's a good idea.
You have to do the very basic training like carrying your gun in a way you don't harm yourself, outside a dangerous battleground - you don't want to make it more dangerous.
And you need to train NCOs, learn to do exercises and movements at brigade level and higher, etc. - this takes time and not fighting for your survival at the same moment
Do not see any problem to have boot camp in 50km zone from line zero ( or whatever place brigade is located). Its much more dangerous to live in dorms in the middle of the country and get smashed with rockets. I think the logic behind such option is that both conscripts and trainers will be motivated more to train well. And once the conscripts reach some level of proficiency they will be used little by little for other non combatant tasks. Moreover they will be taught to what is important and required right now and by people with real and recent combat experience. Plus, i assume the level of discipline is much higher there.
Regarding NCO, not sure we have any success in preparing those. So the same logic as above applies.
Moreover that is exactly what some new brigades have been doing for year now. First they enlist motivated people and then train them themselves.
Note that in the Perun video I linked to above, it's noted that Yavoriv was a prime target of Russian missiles in 2022...
"Cold fact is: this is the price not only ‘System Putin’, but - apparently - most of Russia is willing and able to pay. At this point, Russia suffered over 10,000 casualties. Ukrainian casualties haven’t been posted but if they are in the 2-3,000 range, that’s a lot."
Russia's willingness to pay the price was never in question but what remains to be seen is its capability to do so.
This channel remains the most reliable source at tactical overview, while Perun's is the same for the strategic view. Everything else I've found on the web is cringe, sometimes on the extreme. But even Perun, when talking about western help, tends to skip some things. Like for example how the slow rollout of Europe's artillery shell production is a blessing in disquise. Because it was established very early that the reason for this slow rollout is longevity - factories need 10-year or longer contracts to ensure they break even. That means that Ukraine's current supply is sustainable, as factories that have opened recently or opening now must have received government guarantees that some EU government or another has already contracted them to buy 155mm shells long after the war is over. This pretty much "locks" the support in the long run.
The sustainability ot Russia's supply on the other hand is hard to measure. Only their own command knows how much of their current usage is a temporary boost from NK stockpiles and how much is sustainable production. And there's also the problem of $ as they're running on oil revenues and whatever credit China is willing to extend them. Overall Russia would be expected to project confidence all the way until the last minute when critical shortages materialize and Ukraine may indeed lose its nerve before that happens (especially with the stupid "We win next month" and "We lose next month" narratives) but it's kind of a certainty Russia's war material situation is less sustainable than Ukraine's, even with bare minumum western support going forward.
Unless Russia gets help from NK and PRC which have much stronger and more flexible industry than the US + EU.
Unless Russia moves to war footing by building new plants and mobilizing women to work there.
BTW, check https://www.understandingwar.org/ for daily tactical and strategic overviews.
"stronger and more flexible industry"
...This is so wrong I had to comment. NK barely has industry at all. By most accounts it has sent Russia 1m shells but that's a stockpile they've accumulated over more than 50 years, and probably that includes donations from the USSR and not only local production. I can't find any current production figures but if they're still producing any ammo it's negligible amounts. Still, the sheer amount of this stockpile is so large that if Russians are using it carefully it will delay any shortage.
And China as far as I know isn't producing 152mm shells at all and has no plans to produce such. Also it's not really an "if" question about supporting Russia, based on news reports it seems obvious they're selling drones to Russia and masking it as Iranian or Russian local production. And this is likely to be just the tip of the iceberg, with China probably providing tons of dual-usage items and loaning Russia money to buy stuff. Then again this help is very different from the one the west gives Ukraine. China is giving it as a loan to be repaid with future deliveries of Russian resources. So even if Russia wins the war it will just become a Chinese resource colony, its population slaving away for decades to repay the war loans. But there's numerous reasons to believe China's own ability to extend loans is limited and on a downward trajectory, due to poor past investments.
The problem with the industry of US, EU, Canada, Japan, Australia, Norway, ect. is the governments. If they so wish, they can easily provide economic incentives for whatever quantities of military production they need, they're just trying to do it on the cheap, bordering on for free. Which is actually better than the historic norm for similar situations but at the same time laughably small in comparrison to public perceptions of what is happening.
btw ISW's tactical news is nice but I kind of feel it lacks the depth and insight of Tom and Don's analysis. And their "strategic analysis" is usually just describing soap opera drama between Russian generals, highlighting curious comments found on Russian and other media channels and repeating well-known arguments why the west should provide more stuff. That's neither strategic nor analysis.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine "That's neither strategic nor analysis"
I am always amazed by the shortsightedness of American politics, which has a horizon up to the next elections.
And battling in Congress and Senate about parochial and local interest groups and pet projects instead of focusing on the BIG picture, because they want to score some minute election victory, beats me.
If USA voters elect Trump or a similarly inadequate president, they deserve what they will get. Trouble is, their decisions have consequences for us as well.
Tom, Don. Here is a link to Yuri Butusov latest commentary on situation in Avdiivka (first of all) as well as general state of affairs in UA Genshtab, OP, Army and country. Very grim video but very much worth the time. Here is the link - https://www.youtube.com/live/GxSnjplfbto?si=vU29B8FhSldkqVpm and here is the link for chatgpt summary - https://www.summarize.tech/www.youtube.com/live/GxSnjplfbto?si=vU29B8FhSldkqVpm
If you read/listen to it without knowing who is who it will sound like hei talking about ru...
Few summary points:
1. Absence of strategic planning
2. Absence of timely and trustworthy information up the ladder.
3. Absence of any kind of industrial level fortifications on the main and supporting lines of defence
4. Absence of second line of defense and any reserves
5. 1 stretched defensive line with lack of support, rotation and reserves.
6. UA loses cities according to the same scenario and nothing changes (bakhmut, severodonets, lisichansk, and now avdiivka
6.1. I line with no rotation. No support and reserve. verybody knows what happens but say everything is ok in publick and we do not have any reservers to help you. Once the first line is broken they suddenly find 2x resserves then inititally required but now they have to fight on the go with higher attrition rate and losing ground. Then zelensky comes with medals and bulshit about heroes.
7. ru has a plan and follows it. with huge loses but it works.
8. ua has no plan and in fact is wasting people as much as ru does.
9. zelensky and genshtab are incompetent. Yes he literally said exactly this.
10. Ukraine as a state provides less then 10% of fpv drones.
11. OP preferes to spend money on propaganda rather then drones and fortifications.
12. same for large citites and local budgets.
13. the war is fought with infantry rather then with well established and planned fortifications artilery and machineguns. Thus ua needs more and more peple from mobilization. But it does not solve any problem. Those people will be wasted soon as well if nothing changes.
14. ru is supported with drones providede by state while ua troops are asking funds and volunteers to get some or buy for own money.
Grim reading, indeed
By the way, Perun has uploaded a video/interview with LGT (ret.) Hodges, with the focus of the discussion on training (both NATO and Ukraine), this might be of interest:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n9CBdzpZEmw