In this small reports he mentions, "naked" armors, in the last couple of weeks. So I am still wondering on the small mystery of 4 months of armor restoration/production, where did they all go? It is unthinkable they would not be cope caged for all this time.
It is as if sitting somewhere in secret reserve, and small part is squeezed to Kursk? Have no idea.
F-16 wasted time and dollars, lost lives of white Ukrainians: it still hasn't shot down a single Su-30, -34, -35 as a carrier of KABs. And you can chase the Shaheds with cruise missiles on a significantly cheaper second-hand aircraft of the 3rd or even the 2nd generation. What is it? Under-modernization? Undelivered AIM-120D-8? Subtle sabotage to take out the Mirage-2000D-5 and Grippen with their 200km Meteor missile? Khzna Explain to me in simple words. I clearly do not understand something?
First 2. Purpose of promised F16 wasn',t to shot down su 34 due to their inability to compete with su 35(only block 70 and 72 can do it), but to replace mig29 and su 27 in strike roles as a Jdam carrier, anti SAM launcher. Moreover the weapon of NATO is more compatible. For example, there are containers, that allows to choose Harms trajectory and change the target during flight. Now there are only 5 F 16, hence they are used in the safest role. And, sorry but exchange of old Aim120 A/B on X 101 is very good deal(Shaheds is worse but it is still more useful than do suicide charge in Russian front Sam's). Regard Gripens, yes I believe that they had to work on them firstly, but looks like it is usual "who goes first" game. Anyway, there are too few Gripens to replace majority of old mig 29 and su 27, whereas f 16 can do it.
Thanks for the update. You wrote: «Always comforting to see the Keystone Cops in Moscow continue to outmatch those of the GenStab-U - and that by a wide margin.»… I think this is the closest thing to praise I of the GenStab U I have seen from you in the last months…
Thank you for the update. Glad to see the Ukrainians using the F-16. Range probably overreported, but at least a hit. And do trademark Gen-Stab U while you are at it, who knows there might be merchandizing possibilities.
How is that different from the way those officers treat 50 something conscripts they throw into chaotic independent battalions supervised by pastiche army corps command ?
Ich habe eine Frage, sagen Sie mir bitte: Sind die Verluste der Russen bei der Artillerie wirklich so beeindruckend, wie unser Generalstab behauptet, oder handelt es sich um Propaganda? oder was schießen die Russen von da an? Gibt es eine beeindruckende Anzahl von Fässern?
An manchen Tagen sind's 'nur' 2-3, an anderen 6-7, und anderen mehr. Insgesamt so viele aber, dass moderne Artilleriestücke - wie MSTA-S und ähnliches - kaum noch zu sehen sind. Wurden alle abgeschossen und es kommt kein Ersatz aus dem Russland. Eigentlich 'ersetzt' VSRF die fehlende Artillerie durch Uraltstücke aus Reserve (und dann aus den 1940er und 1950er Jahren), durch die UMPK-Bomben der Luftwaffe, und durch FPV-Drohnen. Guenauso wie sie fehlende Panzerfahrzeuge durch Infanterie-Massen ersetzen.
Also, eine Armee deren Fundament eine Kombination aus Artillerie und Panzerfahrzeugen war, ist heutzutage eine aus der Luft unterstützte Infanterie-Arme.
"if patched up by single battalions from diverse brigades"
Patching up with some whole battalions is actually a very good case. Even companies are on the best side of reality. The usual case here around Pokrovsk is to get orders to patch up neighboring brigades with mixed squads, 10 to 15 men in average, and it's micromanaged from the very top levels. Dozens of such orders per month, brigade HQs overloaded just with managing all these micro-transfers (wich are not just full transfers, but temporary ones, so the "maternal" HQ have to watch on these squads anyway). That's just madness.
Dont you know ad hocs formations are always the best because ad hocs formations are the best.
So much that they were mentioned in the heavily redacted duology "The U.S. Army in the Iraq War" books released by the US Army War College Press as ... an inefficient practice.
I wont quote it here since it is a tad too big for a comment. It is Book 2 pages 623-625
Likewise, Brigade used as the main formation instead of Division is mentioned diplomatically as perhaps not the best although that may be just my personal interpretation.
It is rather depressing how much of the AFU practices in command structure appear to be similar as the ones mentioned in the conclusion as "something to think about and potentially rework/avoid for the next war ..."
Edit : worth mentioning too is the part about SOF. Even if frankly, one had to live under a rock to not realize how inefficient and highly toxic the mythos of SOF has become during the so called "War on Terror". But it is difficult reading the relevant part in the conclusion and not think about that Ukrainian SOF commander who went on an interview and talked as if SOF and SOF alone the ones were fighting this war and achieving victories.
Instead of changing Commanders in Chiefs yearly, I would suggest bringing back the old Roman Republic habit of having both presiding Consules alternating command between themselves, on a daily basis. Can go even further and appoint 2-3-4 CICs in the same time and see which one of them does better than the others. One for the odd days, another for the even ones and another for Weekends and national holidays.
There are some variables in the narrative of the possible kill of the SU-30 by an Ukrainian F-16, which I like to address.
There is he report that it was behind the frontline, which is an undefined term in this conflict. Once it was easy, it was the contact line of ground forces, what is it now with long range air defence systems, drones and a variable contact line? Not more than a guess on the map, depending which side takes this guess.
The effective envelope of a missile depends on many variable, the speed of the launch aircraft, the pressure altitude it is launched, the pressure altitude of the target and its speed, and even the wind aloft can influence the range. It all breaks down to the two extreme scenarios: Unfavorable is low altitude of shooter and target , the target moving the same direction as the shooter having lower speed than the target, resulting in a bad tail chase. The most range will result from target and shooter at high altitude and high speed in a pure head on.
Now we can guess on what parameters published max and min ranges depend on.
Yup. This is why I'm skeptic about something like 'F-16 shot down a Su-34 from 50km range, using AIM-120B, fired from low altitude'.
That's simply not going to work.
If it was an F-16, and the Su-34 was 50km from the frontline, then the Ukrainian must've crossed some 20+ km over the Russia-controlled territory. Of course, if the route was carefully planned, and if they knew some Su-34 was coming, well in advance: is possible to arrange. In such a case, even an F-16 involved in one of ops of lobbing JDAMs could've done this. But, I do not expect this to happen very often.
Let me elaborate a bit more in order to not looking at it being black or white.
Do we talk about range in the moment of firing , the moment when the target was (if it was ) hit or the moment when the target reached its final resting place? The narrative I'm aware of at the moment its the last one, the final resting place. Where it was when it was hit and what the range was at the moment of firing we might never know. Air war with fast jets is 3-dimensional , very fast and with permanently changing odds.
What do we consider being russian controlled territory, and by whom controlled? Afaik neither party has unrestricted control over that mentioned airspace.
Bare in mind, if a F-16 would penetrate in low level (below 100 meters) into hostile airspace, it would fly above 540 KIAS, that makes it 9 NM per minute, 278 meters/ second. Acquisition, tracking and targeting by ground based systems gets extremly difficult, short range weapons like manpads or rifles would need information in advance and a very lucky shot to get such a target.
Is it useful to risk an expensive Mxl on a long range shot with limited chance to down the opposing target with acceptable risk for the own aircraft? Sure it is. The main task of the engagement is to hinder the hostile target to employ its weapons successfully, to hit and destroy the target is the topping.
Wether it was really shot down by the F16 or crashed due to other means, we will maybe never know, the russian narrative though speaks for itself, they confirmed the crash, a F-16 was obviously within 50 km of the crash site and they neither used the usual nonsense like technical failure or friendly fire. What answer do we have that they blamed a hostile F16 for the crash, if they knew it wasn't the case? I cant't think of any.
It's what the Ukrainians have to do anyway, get the Jets airborne as often as possible, their presence alone forces the opponents to rethink their modus operandi, to cover for the possible presence of air assets, to reduce the exposure time and break their routine.
We will see more of it, and sadly there will be losses too.
Newest info is that the Su-34 was still loaded with four UMPKs when hit, that it crashed 50km inside Russia, and the crew was KIA. According to same contact, the F-16 was 'inside Russia' at the time it fired. No other details.
When I read the supposed reason for the organisational bardak in the ZSU, I couldn't hold my laughter. Humour is all that keeps us sane. The reason is so stupid and absurd, that I am happy to believe it.
As far as Syrskyi is concerned, Zaluzhny deserved his criticism, but at least the CinC behaved like a CinC, rather than a major general. It is really difficult to imagine another person who misunderstands his position and his actual job, as much as Syrskyi. Promoted well above his station. He will lose UA the war.
Somewhere in the Ukrainian Army there may be a man or woman made from the same mettle as Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister. I’ll follow later with a link about him. Zelenskyy’s task is to find this guy or gal and put them in charge. No small order. And if they cannot find him or her, at least learn about him. And try to emulate him.
Somewhere there are our true general, general Zaluzhnuy, dismissed and silenced because he wasn't so cooperative with our "heroic" prezident and his "team". What a waste.
Indeed, thank you for report!
By the way on you mentioning 46th, https://sprotyv.info/analitica/vorog-posilyu%d1%94-shturmovi-di%d1%97-na-kurahivskomu-napryamku-zastupnik-komandira-46-%d1%97-brigadi-dshv-zsu/
In this small reports he mentions, "naked" armors, in the last couple of weeks. So I am still wondering on the small mystery of 4 months of armor restoration/production, where did they all go? It is unthinkable they would not be cope caged for all this time.
It is as if sitting somewhere in secret reserve, and small part is squeezed to Kursk? Have no idea.
F-16 wasted time and dollars, lost lives of white Ukrainians: it still hasn't shot down a single Su-30, -34, -35 as a carrier of KABs. And you can chase the Shaheds with cruise missiles on a significantly cheaper second-hand aircraft of the 3rd or even the 2nd generation. What is it? Under-modernization? Undelivered AIM-120D-8? Subtle sabotage to take out the Mirage-2000D-5 and Grippen with their 200km Meteor missile? Khzna Explain to me in simple words. I clearly do not understand something?
First 2. Purpose of promised F16 wasn',t to shot down su 34 due to their inability to compete with su 35(only block 70 and 72 can do it), but to replace mig29 and su 27 in strike roles as a Jdam carrier, anti SAM launcher. Moreover the weapon of NATO is more compatible. For example, there are containers, that allows to choose Harms trajectory and change the target during flight. Now there are only 5 F 16, hence they are used in the safest role. And, sorry but exchange of old Aim120 A/B on X 101 is very good deal(Shaheds is worse but it is still more useful than do suicide charge in Russian front Sam's). Regard Gripens, yes I believe that they had to work on them firstly, but looks like it is usual "who goes first" game. Anyway, there are too few Gripens to replace majority of old mig 29 and su 27, whereas f 16 can do it.
Thanks for the update. You wrote: «Always comforting to see the Keystone Cops in Moscow continue to outmatch those of the GenStab-U - and that by a wide margin.»… I think this is the closest thing to praise I of the GenStab U I have seen from you in the last months…
Ok, reading the whole post I feel you really balanced out the small praise you gave.
Thank you for the update. Glad to see the Ukrainians using the F-16. Range probably overreported, but at least a hit. And do trademark Gen-Stab U while you are at it, who knows there might be merchandizing possibilities.
"why not re-training him or her for some other purpose"
In that age retraining them for demining is a death sentence.
How is that different from the way those officers treat 50 something conscripts they throw into chaotic independent battalions supervised by pastiche army corps command ?
Both are going to die.
Issue is just, that the generals have leverage that put them there in the first place. That leverage will cause troubles what 50 conscripts won't.
Not saying that I disagree with Tom that it is the most useful way forward, but getting rid of incompetent people is very hard and dangerous.
I think this is intended by the author. He assumes that each surplus general will only remove 1 mine, which is easiest done by stepping on it.
sehr geehrte Herr Kuper.
Ich habe eine Frage, sagen Sie mir bitte: Sind die Verluste der Russen bei der Artillerie wirklich so beeindruckend, wie unser Generalstab behauptet, oder handelt es sich um Propaganda? oder was schießen die Russen von da an? Gibt es eine beeindruckende Anzahl von Fässern?
Mit freundlichen Grüßen Mykhailo.
Servus Michailo,
die Verluste sind sehr hoch. Genau wie hoch - so fern auf Video dokumentiert - kann man hier sehen: https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1845031249942921572
An manchen Tagen sind's 'nur' 2-3, an anderen 6-7, und anderen mehr. Insgesamt so viele aber, dass moderne Artilleriestücke - wie MSTA-S und ähnliches - kaum noch zu sehen sind. Wurden alle abgeschossen und es kommt kein Ersatz aus dem Russland. Eigentlich 'ersetzt' VSRF die fehlende Artillerie durch Uraltstücke aus Reserve (und dann aus den 1940er und 1950er Jahren), durch die UMPK-Bomben der Luftwaffe, und durch FPV-Drohnen. Guenauso wie sie fehlende Panzerfahrzeuge durch Infanterie-Massen ersetzen.
Also, eine Armee deren Fundament eine Kombination aus Artillerie und Panzerfahrzeugen war, ist heutzutage eine aus der Luft unterstützte Infanterie-Arme.
Schöne Grüße!
"if patched up by single battalions from diverse brigades"
Patching up with some whole battalions is actually a very good case. Even companies are on the best side of reality. The usual case here around Pokrovsk is to get orders to patch up neighboring brigades with mixed squads, 10 to 15 men in average, and it's micromanaged from the very top levels. Dozens of such orders per month, brigade HQs overloaded just with managing all these micro-transfers (wich are not just full transfers, but temporary ones, so the "maternal" HQ have to watch on these squads anyway). That's just madness.
Dont you know ad hocs formations are always the best because ad hocs formations are the best.
So much that they were mentioned in the heavily redacted duology "The U.S. Army in the Iraq War" books released by the US Army War College Press as ... an inefficient practice.
I wont quote it here since it is a tad too big for a comment. It is Book 2 pages 623-625
Likewise, Brigade used as the main formation instead of Division is mentioned diplomatically as perhaps not the best although that may be just my personal interpretation.
It is rather depressing how much of the AFU practices in command structure appear to be similar as the ones mentioned in the conclusion as "something to think about and potentially rework/avoid for the next war ..."
Links :
Book 1 : https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/386/
Book 2 : https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/940/
Edit : worth mentioning too is the part about SOF. Even if frankly, one had to live under a rock to not realize how inefficient and highly toxic the mythos of SOF has become during the so called "War on Terror". But it is difficult reading the relevant part in the conclusion and not think about that Ukrainian SOF commander who went on an interview and talked as if SOF and SOF alone the ones were fighting this war and achieving victories.
The use of SOF is also very limited now by the ubiquitous drone presence.
Instead of changing Commanders in Chiefs yearly, I would suggest bringing back the old Roman Republic habit of having both presiding Consules alternating command between themselves, on a daily basis. Can go even further and appoint 2-3-4 CICs in the same time and see which one of them does better than the others. One for the odd days, another for the even ones and another for Weekends and national holidays.
Every time you write about the attack on Feodosia, I read it as Fredonia. Which means Fredonia is Going to War! Hail Fredonia!
There are some variables in the narrative of the possible kill of the SU-30 by an Ukrainian F-16, which I like to address.
There is he report that it was behind the frontline, which is an undefined term in this conflict. Once it was easy, it was the contact line of ground forces, what is it now with long range air defence systems, drones and a variable contact line? Not more than a guess on the map, depending which side takes this guess.
The effective envelope of a missile depends on many variable, the speed of the launch aircraft, the pressure altitude it is launched, the pressure altitude of the target and its speed, and even the wind aloft can influence the range. It all breaks down to the two extreme scenarios: Unfavorable is low altitude of shooter and target , the target moving the same direction as the shooter having lower speed than the target, resulting in a bad tail chase. The most range will result from target and shooter at high altitude and high speed in a pure head on.
Now we can guess on what parameters published max and min ranges depend on.
Thanks for your work!
Yup. This is why I'm skeptic about something like 'F-16 shot down a Su-34 from 50km range, using AIM-120B, fired from low altitude'.
That's simply not going to work.
If it was an F-16, and the Su-34 was 50km from the frontline, then the Ukrainian must've crossed some 20+ km over the Russia-controlled territory. Of course, if the route was carefully planned, and if they knew some Su-34 was coming, well in advance: is possible to arrange. In such a case, even an F-16 involved in one of ops of lobbing JDAMs could've done this. But, I do not expect this to happen very often.
Let me elaborate a bit more in order to not looking at it being black or white.
Do we talk about range in the moment of firing , the moment when the target was (if it was ) hit or the moment when the target reached its final resting place? The narrative I'm aware of at the moment its the last one, the final resting place. Where it was when it was hit and what the range was at the moment of firing we might never know. Air war with fast jets is 3-dimensional , very fast and with permanently changing odds.
What do we consider being russian controlled territory, and by whom controlled? Afaik neither party has unrestricted control over that mentioned airspace.
Bare in mind, if a F-16 would penetrate in low level (below 100 meters) into hostile airspace, it would fly above 540 KIAS, that makes it 9 NM per minute, 278 meters/ second. Acquisition, tracking and targeting by ground based systems gets extremly difficult, short range weapons like manpads or rifles would need information in advance and a very lucky shot to get such a target.
Is it useful to risk an expensive Mxl on a long range shot with limited chance to down the opposing target with acceptable risk for the own aircraft? Sure it is. The main task of the engagement is to hinder the hostile target to employ its weapons successfully, to hit and destroy the target is the topping.
Wether it was really shot down by the F16 or crashed due to other means, we will maybe never know, the russian narrative though speaks for itself, they confirmed the crash, a F-16 was obviously within 50 km of the crash site and they neither used the usual nonsense like technical failure or friendly fire. What answer do we have that they blamed a hostile F16 for the crash, if they knew it wasn't the case? I cant't think of any.
It's what the Ukrainians have to do anyway, get the Jets airborne as often as possible, their presence alone forces the opponents to rethink their modus operandi, to cover for the possible presence of air assets, to reduce the exposure time and break their routine.
We will see more of it, and sadly there will be losses too.
Newest info is that the Su-34 was still loaded with four UMPKs when hit, that it crashed 50km inside Russia, and the crew was KIA. According to same contact, the F-16 was 'inside Russia' at the time it fired. No other details.
When I read the supposed reason for the organisational bardak in the ZSU, I couldn't hold my laughter. Humour is all that keeps us sane. The reason is so stupid and absurd, that I am happy to believe it.
As far as Syrskyi is concerned, Zaluzhny deserved his criticism, but at least the CinC behaved like a CinC, rather than a major general. It is really difficult to imagine another person who misunderstands his position and his actual job, as much as Syrskyi. Promoted well above his station. He will lose UA the war.
Yup, one can only laugh about the mess. ....and mind: I've only just began about Syrsky... and the current MOD...
So much sarcasm that my head hurts
Bardak for sure!
What does Gen-Stab refer to? I get that it is the army general staff?
Yes, General Staff.
Somewhere in the Ukrainian Army there may be a man or woman made from the same mettle as Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister. I’ll follow later with a link about him. Zelenskyy’s task is to find this guy or gal and put them in charge. No small order. And if they cannot find him or her, at least learn about him. And try to emulate him.
This is a good summary of Hoffy as he was known by his men
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=cmh
That was a great read, thank you.
Somewhere there are our true general, general Zaluzhnuy, dismissed and silenced because he wasn't so cooperative with our "heroic" prezident and his "team". What a waste.