UA generals and high officers are siting in line of fire and instead of "learning quickly" from their own mistakes - even better from Russian mistakes - they act without any care and act like bunch of idiots.
Total defeat obviously hasnt arrived. There is hope. But regarding the ethics of sitting in safety and blaming people in the fight of mistakes. That is an intriguing statements. First, the piece clearly stated this, so the reader is warned of the situation and can take that into account when reading. Second, being an outsider whatching offers some benefits in analysing. You can see patterns that insiders might miss because they are too close, or focusing too strongly on their own experiences, since you dont have so much skin in the game it might be easier to offer needed criticism etc. the outsider is an outsider, But might still contribute. And takling of ethics, if you generalløytnant think there are serious problems is it ethics not to offer your insights? You criticised the ethics, But do you disagree with the conclusion?
Well, it doesnt necessarry include all commanders. But honestly I think Putin has (or more accurate IS the same problem for Russia, which of course is a saving grave. But I think the main point here is systematisk fact finding, critical analysis of the situation, and then identifying improvement actions based on this. And please listen to the voices in the field, critically is fine, But still.
Yep. Regarding the Air Force, the only unit that demonstrated it's competence through all the war is 7th TAB (Starokostyantyniv AB) - these are excellent.
The Air Force overall... well, they did nothing to use Su-25s in any kind of useful way, they did nothing to organize anti-drone rear interceptor squads from their numerous training planes, did nothing to order the development of unmanned anti-drone interceptors, did nothing to build fortified hangars for the major ABs at least, did nothing to prepare the pilots aforehead for the inevitable foreign training program... And even their spokeperson is just so incompetent the journos are well aware of this, not to say about my fellow signals officers.
Alot of very good pilots and other personnel, yet the higher command is just plain dumb.
Please read what exactly I've said about journos (and try to follow what I am from what I've wrote) and never again write to me anything without bothering to read what are you replying to.
The majority of our losses in planes were inflicted by near hits and direct hits with light weapons like drones and loitering munitions (Lancets), not by direct hits with heavy missiles; the Russians lack precision. In addition, hangars make much harder to track the planes and so to order the strikes in time. The cost of building hangars is very minor comparing to the overall cost of maintaining the air fleet.
"and there are very few aircraft destroyed in the parking lot."
There=were. Now that the Russians have worked out how to get ISR drones deep into Ukrainian airspace and use repeater links to deliver accurate speedy targeting, many airbases DO need hard shelters. And there's the bonus that you can play a shell game with them using decoys. There is clearly institutional inertia within the air force to do anything creative at all let alone improvise defences. And we were laughing at the VKS and their rubber tires last year. Jokes on us now.
Very true but only if what you suggest is the reality. Sadly, the evidence is that sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't. And when it isn't, a heavy price is paid. Of course shelters are expensive, but are they as expensive as the aircraft that have been destroyed? Sarcastosaurus suggests there is widespread inertia. It's hard to argue against that because energetic leadership would have pushed for better dispersal and improvised revetments. It did not happen at the air bases attacked recently, so it is justified to ask why not? Sarcastosaurus points to the Mobutu Syndrome. It might be better to argue about that instead of denying what is clear for anyone to see.
Greetings! Just one minor note, while not understanding fully or underestimating performance of Starkon AB staff, isn't this base is very technically different from all or majority of others?
Container hangars are cheap. Fill containers with sand or stones. Does not prevent from direct hit, but save planes from indirect hits. And it's possible to build many of them so it would be hard to track which are empty and which have jet inside.
Sadly, it is common for people to rise in bureaucracies to their own level of incompetence. Competence is maintained at lower levels because it's where fewer people have achieved peak incompetence and even if they have, any decisions they make have less wide-ranging consequences. The wise, the very few wise, recognise this and step back down to a level where they excel. It's heart-breaking to read your account because this will only continue until someone exceptional reaches high command. Leadership demands so much of individuals that mistakes are inevitable, it's when they become institutionalised that it is not forgivable. Even Napoleon was bedevilled with this problem. It's so widespread there's a name for it: the Peter Principle.
I think there's another, much underrated factor: those already on higher posts are usually more afraid of capable close subordinates then of failing their tasks. After failing a task it's always possible to blame some subordinate, and if the subordinate is incompetent - that's not only ok, that's just good, easier to blame him and so save your own position. Having a close and capable subordinate is simultaneously uncomfortable and dangerous, because you'd then be more likely to make a critical mistake and irritate someone powerful and be fired. So, the best strategy in a hierarchy is to place blockheads as your closest subordinates, while forcing them to pick capable subordinates for them. They'll try to avoid and deceive you, you'll press, the balance will be found somewhere.
Napoleon was an obvious prisoner of the same mechanics, by the way: he never risked to promote capable men too close to the top, because they were the major threats for himself; he lacked historically funded, stable legitimacy to back him up and let more room for capable subordinate generals.
Yet, actually, the same mechanics saves us - Putin's clique is on the same spot, their own generals are their primary threat, so they never let any capable general to be promoted at the top.
I kind of thought that with so many Soviet-built ABs, PSU had lots of concrete hangars for their planes, so was always surprised to see them losing planes in plain sight from above.
Soviet and Warsaw Pact air bases near the Iron curtain had many hardened shelters. Seems like they invested their limited resources into areas where they thought they'll need them in case of a major war against the NATO. Air bases in Ukraine and Russia, having been so far away from the expected battlegrounds received none of the funding, so they just decided to park their aircraft in simple revetments.
There are definitely some hangars, at least at those few ABs I've been to or around. Moreover, they don't look like a white concrete box - usually, it looks like a hill or a mound, covered with grass, with a large iron-concrete gate on one side. So they are not that easy to spot from above.
A Mobutu to FiFi-FoFo approach. Your fact finder and filter is great input. What needs to be done: format and focus discussion - like to learn your recommendations.
To make things worse - Chuhuyv AB was such a mess that: “…on February 24, 2022, after missile strikes on military unit A4104, which is deployed in the Aviator microdistrict in the city of Chuguev, Kharkiv region, an unmanned aerial vehicle control group from the city of Starokonstantinov, Khmelnytsky region (25 military personnel in total) under the command of the senior group of the captain of the Air During the period from 06:25 to 08:25, the Armed Forces of Ukraine left the place of duty, as well as military equipment, in particular, two UAV ground control stations, four Bayraktar TB2 UAVs, along with ammunition and other property of the specified military unit. On the same day, the indicated ground control stations, UAVs, ammunition and other property were destroyed by servicemen of military unit A4104 in order to prevent their capture by the RF Armed Forces..” https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/107759506
Dear Tom, as always great analysis! But I owe you a few thoughts on that topic as well. This was so since you mentioned Sodol and related events.
This matter seems to me to be much more complicated then "Sodol", "Oleschuk", "Syrskiy" or "Zelenskiy".
The way you described before system Putin, and there is a certain feeling connected to this, as I have observed those "minions" of that system in the hotels afters few vodkas blabbering about oil, gas, and so, and how they would have someone or something or everyone and everything.
But also I had shorts glimpses into system ZSU, and system Ukraine. It is distinctly different from system Putin, but also for example distinctly different from system Sweden. So "Sodol" is simply a face to that system. And the system is such, those "reforms", means something quite radical. For example two reforms to mention, NBU and UA national police, one involved firing 5000 people and that about 50% of the system, the other required starting new units along with old ones, effectively firing all of "old staff". Still, both systems as observed now after many years after "reform" are bearing some features of old systems.
So it is chicken and an egg problem. Is that leader of that system that exerts his or her influence or the other way around? Unfortunately.
Just for example have you heard of huge problems with online gambling with frontline and otherwise soldiers? Who is the "culprit" in that one? No so easy to resolve.
So there are very smart and motivated people, but they avoid such systems as "wildfires". All in all it looks extremely "blessed", as far as it gets. But, without serious internal change, it will not get much further.
It depends on the situation for specifics but it;s a process. For infantry operations, the better units always conduct after action reviews and finding out what did and did not work. They also communicate with other like minded units to share lessons learned. Drone units do that a lot, as well. In this conflict, the availability of videos really help at the tactical level.
The only solution that is visible to me now is aggressively growing those units, which are effective and attract people. This is what is happening already. Just further cooperation from the state should be ensured. The bigger those units are, even if they become an equivalent of army or corpse, the better.
Analysing a situation and identifying problems is possible from a distance. Fixing them requires a certainly level of indepth knowledge of the situation that cannot be seen from outside. But I guess an honest and frank description of the actual situation would be a good start, then those participating could come up with ideal for improvement. And the higher ups could listen to all that, Ask questins and look for local solutions because they dont know everything.
It similar to a big company, it's about good leadership: accept bad news and critique, learn from it and try to improve himself and your team from mistakes. Everybody makes mistakes. Provide support for those who want to learn from own mistakes, fire those who are reluctant to learn and improve.
It is not easy, and of course the problems are larger than the individuals. But one, mind you only one, of the reforms you have to do is to get rid of the most incompetent/corrupt etc leaders. As a minimum to show what values you are trying to avoid/ punish. Then you have to try to build on the good parts as much aspossivle. And it is time consuming and frustrating.
And Colonel-General Valerii Zaluzhnyi lied too. He said that he contacted with each commander in the AFU. Zaluzhniy didn't say about the period of time, but he mentioned when everything started.
Please read the third paragraph from the bottom more closely. Electronic warfare cut off GenStab-U from communication at all. General Sokolov proved these words. Radio communication didn't work. He lost communication right away after the first shot. https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2023/09/18/7420200/
Here you've confused "lost radio-comms" with "lost all comms". Read more about the UA communications of the first days, looks like you may see a lot of surprising things.
It's Sokolov who's lying (to hide his obvious incompetence in the best case|).
Please show me your source. Perhaps Sokolov lied in this interview, but I don't see proof. It's elementary to say in general: read more about the first days or he's lying.
Thank you for this. Its aptly named as well. Adds up that Ukrainian military was not as fully prepared as initial impressions led us to believe. And yes the fish rots from the head. But I trust in the end Ukraine will prevail
Good start Tom. Militaries that can’t do self criticism/reflection are bound to make more mistakes that gets people killed… too bad ego/ putting a positive face is more important to some higher ups than to face the issues and deal with it.
The Mobutu Syndrom… almost 30 years since his fall and death, But I am sure the description is apt. One reflection on this as a project manager. It is foten an important part of the managerial work to project confidence and success Even when realityserien are different. Hence the President will be optimistisk and skewed towards good News, the Chief of the Army likewise etc. because to some degree they need to fake it til they make it. Having said that I also strongly believe these figurens need to know about this, need to try to learn etc. and it is Zalushnys duty to be too optimistic towards foreingers he also need to learn about what is going on. And his officers who doesnt have the same duty towards externals should do it even more. But it is very easy to see how such practices (malpractices really) are created. And will sustain for a long period unless external shocks make it necessary to change. Lets hope these shocks have arrived.
Ouch. Just ouch. Someone should have been shot for that. The fact that any UAF units survived at all seems to be more out of luck and Russian failure than anything smart on their part.
Your response was predicted.
UA generals and high officers are siting in line of fire and instead of "learning quickly" from their own mistakes - even better from Russian mistakes - they act without any care and act like bunch of idiots.
Total defeat obviously hasnt arrived. There is hope. But regarding the ethics of sitting in safety and blaming people in the fight of mistakes. That is an intriguing statements. First, the piece clearly stated this, so the reader is warned of the situation and can take that into account when reading. Second, being an outsider whatching offers some benefits in analysing. You can see patterns that insiders might miss because they are too close, or focusing too strongly on their own experiences, since you dont have so much skin in the game it might be easier to offer needed criticism etc. the outsider is an outsider, But might still contribute. And takling of ethics, if you generalløytnant think there are serious problems is it ethics not to offer your insights? You criticised the ethics, But do you disagree with the conclusion?
Well, it doesnt necessarry include all commanders. But honestly I think Putin has (or more accurate IS the same problem for Russia, which of course is a saving grave. But I think the main point here is systematisk fact finding, critical analysis of the situation, and then identifying improvement actions based on this. And please listen to the voices in the field, critically is fine, But still.
Yep. Regarding the Air Force, the only unit that demonstrated it's competence through all the war is 7th TAB (Starokostyantyniv AB) - these are excellent.
The Air Force overall... well, they did nothing to use Su-25s in any kind of useful way, they did nothing to organize anti-drone rear interceptor squads from their numerous training planes, did nothing to order the development of unmanned anti-drone interceptors, did nothing to build fortified hangars for the major ABs at least, did nothing to prepare the pilots aforehead for the inevitable foreign training program... And even their spokeperson is just so incompetent the journos are well aware of this, not to say about my fellow signals officers.
Alot of very good pilots and other personnel, yet the higher command is just plain dumb.
Please read what exactly I've said about journos (and try to follow what I am from what I've wrote) and never again write to me anything without bothering to read what are you replying to.
The majority of our losses in planes were inflicted by near hits and direct hits with light weapons like drones and loitering munitions (Lancets), not by direct hits with heavy missiles; the Russians lack precision. In addition, hangars make much harder to track the planes and so to order the strikes in time. The cost of building hangars is very minor comparing to the overall cost of maintaining the air fleet.
Read before replying, what's so difficult in this concept?
Currently there's no sign you understand what are you replying to.
"and there are very few aircraft destroyed in the parking lot."
There=were. Now that the Russians have worked out how to get ISR drones deep into Ukrainian airspace and use repeater links to deliver accurate speedy targeting, many airbases DO need hard shelters. And there's the bonus that you can play a shell game with them using decoys. There is clearly institutional inertia within the air force to do anything creative at all let alone improvise defences. And we were laughing at the VKS and their rubber tires last year. Jokes on us now.
Very true but only if what you suggest is the reality. Sadly, the evidence is that sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't. And when it isn't, a heavy price is paid. Of course shelters are expensive, but are they as expensive as the aircraft that have been destroyed? Sarcastosaurus suggests there is widespread inertia. It's hard to argue against that because energetic leadership would have pushed for better dispersal and improvised revetments. It did not happen at the air bases attacked recently, so it is justified to ask why not? Sarcastosaurus points to the Mobutu Syndrome. It might be better to argue about that instead of denying what is clear for anyone to see.
I've replied on this by a comment above. Read it and never write to me anything without bothering to read what are you replying to. Buy.
Greetings! Just one minor note, while not understanding fully or underestimating performance of Starkon AB staff, isn't this base is very technically different from all or majority of others?
I don't think the cause is AB equipment.
Container hangars are cheap. Fill containers with sand or stones. Does not prevent from direct hit, but save planes from indirect hits. And it's possible to build many of them so it would be hard to track which are empty and which have jet inside.
Sadly, it is common for people to rise in bureaucracies to their own level of incompetence. Competence is maintained at lower levels because it's where fewer people have achieved peak incompetence and even if they have, any decisions they make have less wide-ranging consequences. The wise, the very few wise, recognise this and step back down to a level where they excel. It's heart-breaking to read your account because this will only continue until someone exceptional reaches high command. Leadership demands so much of individuals that mistakes are inevitable, it's when they become institutionalised that it is not forgivable. Even Napoleon was bedevilled with this problem. It's so widespread there's a name for it: the Peter Principle.
I think there's another, much underrated factor: those already on higher posts are usually more afraid of capable close subordinates then of failing their tasks. After failing a task it's always possible to blame some subordinate, and if the subordinate is incompetent - that's not only ok, that's just good, easier to blame him and so save your own position. Having a close and capable subordinate is simultaneously uncomfortable and dangerous, because you'd then be more likely to make a critical mistake and irritate someone powerful and be fired. So, the best strategy in a hierarchy is to place blockheads as your closest subordinates, while forcing them to pick capable subordinates for them. They'll try to avoid and deceive you, you'll press, the balance will be found somewhere.
Napoleon was an obvious prisoner of the same mechanics, by the way: he never risked to promote capable men too close to the top, because they were the major threats for himself; he lacked historically funded, stable legitimacy to back him up and let more room for capable subordinate generals.
Yet, actually, the same mechanics saves us - Putin's clique is on the same spot, their own generals are their primary threat, so they never let any capable general to be promoted at the top.
Yes, all this is true of every military in the world. Russia is in a far worse position.
Good start!
I kind of thought that with so many Soviet-built ABs, PSU had lots of concrete hangars for their planes, so was always surprised to see them losing planes in plain sight from above.
Soviet and Warsaw Pact air bases near the Iron curtain had many hardened shelters. Seems like they invested their limited resources into areas where they thought they'll need them in case of a major war against the NATO. Air bases in Ukraine and Russia, having been so far away from the expected battlegrounds received none of the funding, so they just decided to park their aircraft in simple revetments.
There are definitely some hangars, at least at those few ABs I've been to or around. Moreover, they don't look like a white concrete box - usually, it looks like a hill or a mound, covered with grass, with a large iron-concrete gate on one side. So they are not that easy to spot from above.
Not sure if they are used though.
Tom.
A Mobutu to FiFi-FoFo approach. Your fact finder and filter is great input. What needs to be done: format and focus discussion - like to learn your recommendations.
To make things worse - Chuhuyv AB was such a mess that: “…on February 24, 2022, after missile strikes on military unit A4104, which is deployed in the Aviator microdistrict in the city of Chuguev, Kharkiv region, an unmanned aerial vehicle control group from the city of Starokonstantinov, Khmelnytsky region (25 military personnel in total) under the command of the senior group of the captain of the Air During the period from 06:25 to 08:25, the Armed Forces of Ukraine left the place of duty, as well as military equipment, in particular, two UAV ground control stations, four Bayraktar TB2 UAVs, along with ammunition and other property of the specified military unit. On the same day, the indicated ground control stations, UAVs, ammunition and other property were destroyed by servicemen of military unit A4104 in order to prevent their capture by the RF Armed Forces..” https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/107759506
Dear Tom, as always great analysis! But I owe you a few thoughts on that topic as well. This was so since you mentioned Sodol and related events.
This matter seems to me to be much more complicated then "Sodol", "Oleschuk", "Syrskiy" or "Zelenskiy".
The way you described before system Putin, and there is a certain feeling connected to this, as I have observed those "minions" of that system in the hotels afters few vodkas blabbering about oil, gas, and so, and how they would have someone or something or everyone and everything.
But also I had shorts glimpses into system ZSU, and system Ukraine. It is distinctly different from system Putin, but also for example distinctly different from system Sweden. So "Sodol" is simply a face to that system. And the system is such, those "reforms", means something quite radical. For example two reforms to mention, NBU and UA national police, one involved firing 5000 people and that about 50% of the system, the other required starting new units along with old ones, effectively firing all of "old staff". Still, both systems as observed now after many years after "reform" are bearing some features of old systems.
So it is chicken and an egg problem. Is that leader of that system that exerts his or her influence or the other way around? Unfortunately.
Just for example have you heard of huge problems with online gambling with frontline and otherwise soldiers? Who is the "culprit" in that one? No so easy to resolve.
So there are very smart and motivated people, but they avoid such systems as "wildfires". All in all it looks extremely "blessed", as far as it gets. But, without serious internal change, it will not get much further.
Anything that can be improved should be improved, whether you are fighting or not.
It depends on the situation for specifics but it;s a process. For infantry operations, the better units always conduct after action reviews and finding out what did and did not work. They also communicate with other like minded units to share lessons learned. Drone units do that a lot, as well. In this conflict, the availability of videos really help at the tactical level.
The only solution that is visible to me now is aggressively growing those units, which are effective and attract people. This is what is happening already. Just further cooperation from the state should be ensured. The bigger those units are, even if they become an equivalent of army or corpse, the better.
Analysing a situation and identifying problems is possible from a distance. Fixing them requires a certainly level of indepth knowledge of the situation that cannot be seen from outside. But I guess an honest and frank description of the actual situation would be a good start, then those participating could come up with ideal for improvement. And the higher ups could listen to all that, Ask questins and look for local solutions because they dont know everything.
It similar to a big company, it's about good leadership: accept bad news and critique, learn from it and try to improve himself and your team from mistakes. Everybody makes mistakes. Provide support for those who want to learn from own mistakes, fire those who are reluctant to learn and improve.
It is not easy, and of course the problems are larger than the individuals. But one, mind you only one, of the reforms you have to do is to get rid of the most incompetent/corrupt etc leaders. As a minimum to show what values you are trying to avoid/ punish. Then you have to try to build on the good parts as much aspossivle. And it is time consuming and frustrating.
Here is an example of what I mean by more then a "face" problem: https://x.com/donikroman/status/1811682215002067205
Thank you, Tom.
You can take people out of the USSR, but you can never get the USSR out of people.
So, Colonel-General Mykola Oleshchuk lied when he said that all warplanes were in the air on 24 February 2022.
https://tsn.ua/ato/scho-vidbuvalosya-v-nebi-nad-ukrayinoyu-u-pershi-hvilini-vtorgnennya-komanduvach-ps-rozpoviv-pro-dvi-golovni-komandi-2393980.html
And Colonel-General Valerii Zaluzhnyi lied too. He said that he contacted with each commander in the AFU. Zaluzhniy didn't say about the period of time, but he mentioned when everything started.
https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3708530-zaluznij-rozpoviv-pro-persi-hvilini-sirokomasstabnogo-vtorgnenna-rf-v-ukrainu.html
The second of your conclusions is false - you've confused "informed properly" with "acted properly".
Please read the third paragraph from the bottom more closely. Electronic warfare cut off GenStab-U from communication at all. General Sokolov proved these words. Radio communication didn't work. He lost communication right away after the first shot. https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2023/09/18/7420200/
Here you've confused "lost radio-comms" with "lost all comms". Read more about the UA communications of the first days, looks like you may see a lot of surprising things.
It's Sokolov who's lying (to hide his obvious incompetence in the best case|).
Please show me your source. Perhaps Sokolov lied in this interview, but I don't see proof. It's elementary to say in general: read more about the first days or he's lying.
It's not a source, it's elementary knowledge of warfare. His arguments show his incompetence or lack of proper motivation at best.
Oh, I see. It's useless to proceed this conversation.
Well contacted can also be: Hi there, we are at war. Please hold the line(phone).
Please read the third paragraph from the bottom more closely.
Thank you for this. Its aptly named as well. Adds up that Ukrainian military was not as fully prepared as initial impressions led us to believe. And yes the fish rots from the head. But I trust in the end Ukraine will prevail
Good start Tom. Militaries that can’t do self criticism/reflection are bound to make more mistakes that gets people killed… too bad ego/ putting a positive face is more important to some higher ups than to face the issues and deal with it.
It's a kind of a talent to be able to show joy to public while crying privately
Nobody is shot down for bringing bad news. But they (even brigade commanders) are sent to frontlines - to bring better news and lead by example.
The Mobutu Syndrom… almost 30 years since his fall and death, But I am sure the description is apt. One reflection on this as a project manager. It is foten an important part of the managerial work to project confidence and success Even when realityserien are different. Hence the President will be optimistisk and skewed towards good News, the Chief of the Army likewise etc. because to some degree they need to fake it til they make it. Having said that I also strongly believe these figurens need to know about this, need to try to learn etc. and it is Zalushnys duty to be too optimistic towards foreingers he also need to learn about what is going on. And his officers who doesnt have the same duty towards externals should do it even more. But it is very easy to see how such practices (malpractices really) are created. And will sustain for a long period unless external shocks make it necessary to change. Lets hope these shocks have arrived.
Ouch. Just ouch. Someone should have been shot for that. The fact that any UAF units survived at all seems to be more out of luck and Russian failure than anything smart on their part.
You are in for a rumble in the jungle...
Underrated callback; nicely done. The number of times I’ve heard some new development and hoped Ukraine was playing rope-a-dope is substantial.