Ukraine War, 11 July 2024: Mobutu Syndrome, Part 1

Hello everybody!

Must admit… I’m really ‘fighting myself’… or was fighting myself - while putting the following together. In the light of all the tragedies that befell Ukraine, it’s not easy to draw certain conclusions, nor is it easy to make certain statements.

…not even easy to click on ‘continue’ and post the following…

However, my standpoint is that I do owe - myself and to you - discussing unpleasant topics in the same fashion I discuss ‘pleasant’ ones. Because avoiding unpleasantries is equal to lying. Foremost to oneself. Therefore, and just like in the case when I’ve ‘expressed doubts’ into the ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ myth, from early days of the Russian all-out invasion (only to face ‘lots of flak’), cannot but express my ‘doubts’, and critique in regards of numerous even more important issues related to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and its air defence branch, in particular.

What am I talking about?

We’re now into the third year of the Russian all-out invasion of Ukraine (and the 11^th year since the original invasion of the Crimea and Donbas). Lots of things have happened over this time, and yet…. Well, at least gauging by what was going on in the air over Ukraine on 8 July this year, meanwhile it’s only certain that many things are still the same.

Unsurprisingly, I’m deeply frustrated by latest developments and it’s that, ‘pure frustration’ that drove me into writing this one. I do not intend to offend anybody, and certainly lack lots of details and insights (indeed: these would be welcome, as far as constructive and well-substantiated); and yes, a lot of that frustration is caused by corrupt, incompetent, and hesitant Western politicians and oligarchy alike.

However, it’s also a frustration over a topic about which I find there was too much silence for too long.

The topic in question is: incompetence at top command levels of the Ukrainian armed forces.

Please mind: I’ve got it easy to rant and complain. I’m not involved; I’m living and working in (perceived) safety, at least 900km away from the frontlines, and, actually, for me, nothing is at stake. Foremost, if I write something specific people do not like: nothing’s going to happen to me. Thus, contrary to hundreds…even thousands of others, I have it easy to babble.

As next, I could have titled this one differently. For example, I could’ve continued it under the title ‘Fish rots from the Head, Part 3’, or ‘Failures of the PSU’s command System’, or anything else coming to your mind. Have decided to title it the ‘Mobutu Syndrome’ for reasons I’m going to explain below – and also because my (professional- and private) experience is that there are situations where only ‘shock therapy’ can help: because I’m sure some are going to be ‘shocked’ by the following, and thus I hope this might prompt a reform.  

Finally, one might wonder why am I writing this just now? The reason is the obvious failure of the PSU to defend not only Kyiv, but ‘quite a few other places too’, on 8 July 2024, which in turn enabled the Russians to demolish three hospitals and kill over 50 people (all over Ukraine, not ‘just’ 41 in Kyiv and Kryvyi Rih, as insisted – and ignored - both by official Kyiv and the Ukrainian and international media).

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So, what am I going to explain today? What’s the topic?

As those following my work for longer know, in my professional career, I did a lots of research about ‘little-known’, ‘obscure’ air forces and air wars. Especially so in the Middle East – but also in Africa. Indeed, for decades, this was something like ‘primary focus’ of most of my work (should there be any doubts, or if you’re new on this blog, see here).

Point is: between others, one of topics I went through over the times was that of the late dictator of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mobutu (his full official name was much longer, but lets keep it at that for reasons of simplicity).

While a ‘close’ US- and French ally, Mobutu was notorious for plenty of things, but especially for disliking bad news. Word is he personally shot several people bringing him bad news. In other cases, he had the ‘messengers’ tortured and murdered by his security services…

Now, sure, one might say my association is absurd: Mobutu was a dictator, while Ukraine has a president and a parliament that were elected, and a functioning judiciary etc., etc., etc. Moreover (and this is just my own experience whenever I draw parallels of this kind), both Europeans and Americans love to react with complaint in style of, ‘but, the Ukrainian armed forces (ZSU) are a professional military service, not some African bimbos’…

Finally, hand on heart: AFAIK, nobody in Ukraine has shot anybody for delivering bad news… (yet?)

However: matter of fact is that, regardless if somebody is shot or not, the effects are exactly the same.

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What am I talking about?

Gauging by what do I get to hear out of the service, and the Ukrainian public and the media:

-          President Volodymyr Zelensky dislikes bad news;

-          Commander-in-Chief of the ZSU, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrsky, dislikes bad news;

-          Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force and Air Defence Force (PSZSU; I’m simplifying it to ‘PSU’ for my blog), Colonel-General Mykola Oleshchuk, dislikes bad news…

….and, to keep it simple: when one has this kind of constellation at the top of the state and the armed forces (and their branches), people stop letting them know about bad news. Nobody is keen to ‘get shot’, i.e. fired, dismissed, ‘sent to peel potatoes and wash toilettes in some corner’… On the contrary: their subordinates have an incentive to lie to them: to provide them with ‘good news’.

That’s why, ‘Mobutu Syndrome’.

This even more so considering:

-          Syrsky not only dislikes bad news, but tends to consider people bringing bad news for incompetent and then starts micromanaging their units; and

-          Oleshchuk is doing exactly the same.

Unsurprising results:

-          brigade commanders in need of help are not requesting help when they need it;

-          micromanagement by Syrsky and Oleshchuk is not only distracting commanders from their actual duties, but causing them to fall silent about problems (indeed: ‘to hope for the best’), to fail to act at their own initiative; to fail to prepare their units; to fail to train them properly; to fail to position them correctly (i.e. to fail to teach them to position themselves correctly); even to fail to fortify their positions; while,

-          both tend to surround themselves with favourites: ‘people never bringing bad news’, but, so they think, ‘solving problems, instead’…

With other words: exactly like in the Russian armed forces, where it’s Putin that has, back in February-June 2022, successfully destroyed the pre-war Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) through micromanagement and orders not connected to reality, the micromanagement of the ZSU by Syrsky and the PSU by Oleshchuk is paralysing the entire chain of command. Except for a handful of their favourites, nobody dares taking actions on his own.

As a consequence, too many units are caught ill-prepared for action; troops are still sent to the battle without sufficient training; once in battle, units are deployed in wrong positions and lacking field-fortifications… indeed, some are even not properly camouflaging their positions, and – especially in the PSU – not moving for days. As we’ve witnessed this over the last weeks and months, in air- and missile warfare, alone the later is equal to ‘certain death’.

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How do I dare saying things of this kind?

Because there are more than enough examples.

I think the best is to start with the start.

While researching for two books, one of which is short of being published, and the other is about to follow (call this ‘shameless self-advertising’, even ‘war profiteering’, I do not mind for decades already), co-authors and me have not only asked lots of people (in Ukraine, and in Russia) lots of questions, but also scrounged the Ukrainian mainstream- and social media for reports about events at the start of Pudding’s all-out invasion, on 24 February 2022.

Namely, the usual story about the PSU on that day – the ‘version’ one can read in the mass of reports by numerous top Western Experten, too – is that the PSU was ‘dispersed’ already before the Russian attack, thus avoided suffering losses, and then (quickly?) ‘sealed the airspace’ for the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS), and similar blah-blah…

To characterise this as ‘only partially truth’, would be an understatement. As is easy to find out, provided one just tries, much of the PSU was not even put on alert on 24 February 2022, not to talk about being ‘dispersed’.

Ozerne AB, early morning of 24 February 2022…

Consequently, the force received a number of heavy blows and suffered lots of unnecessary losses. Here just a few examples coming to my mind right away – and all easy to find in the Ukrainian mainstream- and the social media (mind: ‘AB’ stands for ‘air base’, a facility with permanent presence of specific units; and ‘FOB’ for ‘forward operating base’, a facility with temporary presence of elements of specific units):

-          Ivano-Frankivsk AB, 40^th Brigade: MiG-29-pilots were put on alert at 03.10hrs in the morning, but then left to sit in their cockpits for hours. The first two were scrambled only once the Russian missile began detonating around and/or behind them. Exact number of resulting casualties remains unknown…

-          Ozerne AB, 831^st Brigade: neither scrambled nor alerted on time, two Su-27s destroyed by Russian missiles on the ground; third jet was lost (and its pilot killed) during attempt to scramble from a damaged runway, one pilot and six ground personnel killed..

-          Vinnytsia, 1^st Radio-Technical Brigade: the unit – which was at the very heart of the Ukrainian integrated air defence system – wasn’t even put on alert that morning. It was hit by several ballistic missiles while still inside its base, and that at 05.20hrs, i.e. 20 minutes after the start of the Russian invasion. Unsurprisingly, it suffered heavy losses in both equipment and personnel: exact numbers unknown…

-          Uman, 210^th Anti-Aircraft Regiment (S-300V1s): the unit was hit while still in its base, losing most of its equipment, even if ‘relatively few’ of its personnel.

-          138^th Radio-Technical Brigade: neither alerted nor dispersed. A direct hit by a Russian missile demolished a building in which 50 troops were sleeping: (‘reportedly’), by sheer luck nobody was killed….

-          Kharkiv, 164^th Radio-Technical Brigade and the 302^nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment: by NATO-standards, both units were de-facto destroyed by the Russian missiles in the first minutes of the all-out invasion, and that while still in their bases. Sure, majority of the personnel survived, but then: certainly not thanks to their super-generals. Consequence: Kharkiv was left without air defences right from the start of the war, and until today the PSU is struggling whenever trying to re-build the local system…

-          Chuhuiv FOB: the base was put on alert, but only four MiG-29s scrambled on time. One veered off during take-off and crashed into a recently-constructed fence (aircraft written off). Five L-39s and four Bayraktars were destroyed by Russian missiles. Exact number of casualties remains unknown…

-          Mariupol: the PSU used to have a radar station at the local airport. Amid subsequent developments it simply ‘went down in all the ambient noises’ that this was savaged by the Russian missiles right at the start of the invasion. As usually, the number of PSU personnel killed there is unknown..

-          Melitopol AB: only a detachment of six Su-25s from the 299^th Brigade was put on alert before the Russian onslaught, but they were ordered to get airborne only as the Russian missiles began to detonate around them. And in the middle of their attempts to roll for the runway, an Il-76 conveniently parked in their way – to start unloading. Su-25-pilots had to roll around the transport in order to reach the runway…. Want to make things really bad? More than 20 aircraft and helicopters parked there were subsequently captured by the Russians… and if you think the end of the ordeal of those six Su-25-pilots was over once they were airborne: wrong. Their own ground crews that expected them at different of dispersal forward air bases have (repeatedly) opened fire at them…

-          Melitopol, 208^th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (S-300PS/PTs): a complete battalion of this brigade was captured by the Russians – and that together with all of its equipment – while on field exercises outside the city. Only a handful of its officers and other ranks managed to escape…

….and so forth: there are many, many more similar examples… (I’ll not even try to go into all the tragedies form the Kherson and Mykolaiv, not to talk about Mariupol)…

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Of course, there is never ‘just one reason’ for such cases. And so, there is no doubt that much of above-mentioned failures and resulting losses were caused by the break-down in ZSU’s and PSU’s strategic military communications, resulting from the Russian cyberattack on the same, from the evening of 23 February 2022. As a consequence, the GenStab-U in Kyiv, and the High Command PSU in Vinnitsya couldn’t contact their geographically-organised commands, nor brigade commanders for days (at least not until the StarLink system was rushed to service, starting with 28 February).

And, yes, sure: we’ve all heard about the SBU’s ‘investigation into circumstances of losing Kherson and Zaporizhzhya’ (ho-hum), and latest allegations for incompetence of Lieutenant-General Sodol. However, SBU’s investigation is conveniently heading nowhere for two years, already, while Sodol could only be responsible for failing to defend Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, and Mariuipol. He can’t be blamed for the failure of the PSU to prepare itself, to put its units on alert and disperse them on time – because he was not responsible for the PSU.

….BUT, all of this is only bringing me to the next related issue…

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(…to be continued…)