I remember an old Clancy novel where a Russian general had learnt to divide by three the claims from his AA people... Seems reality is not too different, in fact.
The articles mean nothing in Soviet and post-Soviet military, it's just an imitation - you'd better to have some publications to be promoted (with a partial exception of specialized mil-tech magazines, articles there are sometimes meaningfull) and it's a matter of personal connections and mutual favors to make a publication. 'Thinking outside the box' and 'competitive force-on-force exercises' are of those concepts that exactly everyone acknowledges, often loundly, and still no one implements (in armies of this kind). Because articles and speaches are imitation, and the consequences are exactly the same as you've mentioned.
Zusko commanded 58th from 2020 to mid 2023, being it's head of staff 2017-2018 and 49th's deputy commander before it (2014-2015). Dvornikov was appointed as a commander of Southern Military District in 2016, where Zusko served, yet Zusko was never his deputy but a head of staff and then commander of one of it's armies.
Sigh.... Sorry that I'm even trying: have actually decided not to answer any of comments to the 'Mobutu Syndrome'-series. So, I'll leave it at that: who understands, understands; who doesn't, doesn't, and that's it. It's not my 'job' to go 'convincing' everybody.
Tom states that it's an exception. The only argument is an article, wich actually means absolutely nothing (wich is absolutyely obvious for anyone who served in or was trained for a post-Soviet armed force). The second Tom's auxiliary statement was just wrong, as far is I know - Dvornikov just never commanded 58th and never had Zusko as his deputy commander, wich supposes Tom's mistaken about Dvornikov. I don't think there would be any conclusions overall - I just have no disagreements with Tom in this topic, aside of this narrow point.
I read somewhere that during the Battle of Britain both sides claimed enemy losses at double , and their own at half, the true rate. Natural, I suppose.
So are we facing a deep misunderstanding of the cost of this war, in terms of men and material, to Russia. If so, we need a serious rethink about the adequacy of what we are doing
I suppose the only possible silver lining to this is that neither side is demonstrating competence, or, rather, both sides are approximately equally incompetent.
I have to wonder that when the Ukrainian pilots currently being trained in the West return to their units, along with their squadron commanders, whether or not the Western lessons learned methodology might start to work its way up from the bottom? Certainly, crap commanders can stifle it, but conscientious pilots and low level commanders will see the benefits and hopefully it might trickle upwards.
Correct me if I am wrong but I was under the feeling we hardly saw this kind of grassroot dynamic at play with army forces trained in the West.
It used to be a trope to praise SOFs before the war as a mean to praise Western SOF so I have my own reservations about theses specific type of forces.
A pilot cannot move an aircraft to another AB of his own accord, can he? And the commanders don't seem to be able to protect the existing (Soviet) planes.
No, I believe it is exactly like what Tom described -- "I shot a missile, saw an explosion and the thing went off radar". Besides that in the first weeks of war probably there was a bit of each unit that saw an explosion or fall was reporting a kill.
In the ground losses for example there is a few things hidden, firstly artillery pieces include mortars. Secondly losses include those destroyed and damaged. Though destroyed vs damaged is like 50/50. And damaged are often being evacuated, repaired and used again. So that is why we may see the numbers as something not matching properly.
Tom thanks for this sobering read. I remember reading Zaluzhnyi's writing about adapting technology and increasing mobilization last year and it made a lot of sense to me. I was then surprised to hear Zelensky say he wants to get rid of people who are always "negative" and that they needed "positive" people around(of course this was targeted at Zaluzhnyi). In hindsight, there wasnt anything in Zaluzhnyi's writing which hasnt been vindicated. Today the mobilization he struggled to call for early which led to his dismissal is somewhat being implemented.
I dont think it helps in finding out the truth of whats on the ground if instead of seeking the truth, one is seeking positivity. In all this I trust Ukraine will prevail but possibly Zelensky needs to also reflect along with others in the Genstab-U on what they can do better. I have been one of those that thoroughly believed their figures wrt Russian aircraft shot down, but now starting to doubt them. But in all this aluta continua to the people of Ukraine and thank you for the post
Zaluzhnyi was not negative, instead he was overly positive. Just read some of pre-counteroffensive articles, where he described what he needs for it and outlined how it should go. And then see actual results.
Instead, he could have been a proponent of attritional flexible defence, means continuing to be on the defensive as long as enemy is actively attacking and allowing to cause significant losses, and situationally counter-attacking also in order to cause more losses. Which what happens now.
And another aspect is "being in the fields". One of the most important management practices. Visiting frontlines, staying with the soldiers, communicating, seeing things with own eyes. This was not happening with Zaluzhnyi.
Hmmmm, wasnt my words about negativity, was Zelensky's. I agree Zaluzhnyi made mistakes, but after the failed 2023 counter offensive his write ups came off as quite pragmatic. Maybe before the failed offensive he had to toe the line to provide positive news to Zelensky. But I think its a fact he was fired in part because he wasnt saying things Zelensky wanted to hear(after the failed 2023 summer offensive). Remember how he challenged Zelensky's narrative that the war wasnt at a stalemate? After every public figure in the admin came out to say the war wasnt at a stalemate and then boom there's an article from Gen Zaluzhny saying its at a stalemate.
I agree though in hindsight he could have done a lot of things better including possibly visiting the frontline more often. But my point was, his write ups after the failed offensive seemed quite pragmatic and challenged the overly positive narrtives fronted by Zelensky.
Otherwise aluta continua to the people of Ukraine.
Don't you consider it's a bit unusual we are discussing write-ups of the warring general, and not his campaigns? Basically from the turn out of events it seems he was very much willing to help Zelenskiy on the foreign policy front. So logically he got the respective position. Though maybe a bit lower then expected.
Look, besides I am not a proponent of popular vote in making choices. Means there is an elected official, and he must bear the responsibility for those, for there is no other way to carry out his duties. Unfortunately this is not how it works in UA politics as of now. Everyone is bent on forcing choices of their preference.
Yes if we stick within context(which is he got fired for saying negative but pragmatic things after the failed 2023 offensive)his write ups were pertinent to explaining how he wanted to prosecute the war. Which was in direct contrast to his boss Zelensky. He mentioned the need to adapt technology wise as well increase mobilization, and that the transparency of the battlefield due to the proliferation of drones had made it difficult to carry out large scale maneuvers or mass large forces.
Also he was fired out of the position(he clarified that he would not resign but also move to any position his given as long as it was serving Ukraine) and replaced with Syrsky who was considered more of a yes man to Zelensky. In all this I trust Zelensky, Zaluzhny and Syrsky are doing their best and we dont have all the details.
why do you assume that PSU doesn't have the real kill statistics for internal purposes? the numbers released are for PR (or "propaganda" if you wish) purposes, which is totally understandable.
Because a more realistic set of data would result in changes to how Ukrainians do things (eg don't just park Su-27s in the open where they can be splatteredby Iskanders).
The realistic data set could even exist but is ignored by higher ups who have political and career objectives (certainly happens in my workplace which is an Australian government department).
Yes, that would be the point. Learning and improving.then you need to assess the situation critically and realisticly. And acted upon. The classic Deming cycle of management is Plan, Do, Check, Act. And since it is a circle, repeat. To improve the quality of performance of any organisation. Yoy can certainly find other modell, But the point is that you need to act differently. If you havent changed how you act you are not learning.
Certainly none of that happening here in Australian public service anymore. It's all becoming very...."Russian" in how things are handled (growth of corruption, nepotism, de-professionalisation etc etc).
And by the looks of it not much happening in the Ukrainian War on either side.
Because... that would effectively double the amount of paperwork (keeping both real and PR statistics), and the amount of it is already (or still?) staggering in ZSU.
So the old commander was well liked and dealt with bad news, but had issues controlling his subordinates. The new commander (I'm talking the Commander of all the UA Forces) has control over his subordinates but can't deal with bad news. Crap, can't we get someone in between? Micromanagers KILL organizations, and I was really hoping Ukraine had that beat. I am guessing some more high profile unit commanders are going to have to make a stink in order to get things sorted. You have to be able to deal with bad news, you have to. You can swear, you can curse, and you can maybe throw something, but in the end you have to go "Okay, got it. Understand, now let's fix it." and not fire the guy who told you in the hopes of getting some help.
Problem with Ukraine and beating the personnel issues is something most people don't even want to admit - Ukraine's military culture is a Russian one but even more importantly its society's culture is very close to Russian one. That means everything from corruption and nepotism to that typical Russian style arrogance of not allowing one to recognise their own mistakes.
Which makes sense given 100s of years of Russian occupation/colonisation and the fact that any Ukrainian officer trained up to at least 2014 is a product of a Soviet style system if not the Soviet system when that was still a country.
True to an extent. Some of them have jumped entirely into the Western Style. The guy I worked with did. He had issues, it really was hard for him to understand. But he knew enough to know this was how it needed to be and worked to try and figure it out. But a lot were the old school and yeah, getting them to see the light was damn hard.
Absolutely negative concerning the training. Indeed, Ukraine has officers trained in Western military schools, but the number is not big. And the number will not be any bigger at war. If you take example of Poland, they joint the NATO with more poor state of interoperability, and still not the all forces interoperable. So it is not something that could be changed in a second
Liar, liar, liar. It is not just incompetence; this is a direct lie. Yes, you'd better be silent cause every word you say you're right will be false. If that was so bad, how it survived?
Ukrainian Air Force are facing the challenge noone had in the modern history, you have never met General Oleshchuck and you made judjement of him personnally.
You know nothing, what is happennig on the ground, so, you're right, you'd better not comment this lie-series.
The interesting fact is that the attack on the Commander of the Air Forces of Ukraine was launched simultaneously in Ukraine and outside. Who is orchestrating you all? I believe I know. Как погодка в Мааскве?
But alright as you wish then, ukraine is totally winning, F-16 will be the 167th game changer of this war and you'll take back everything including Crimea tomorrow and bring Putin to the Hague the day after.
Well, Tom after reading it all, I can admit that's a lot of information. Wrong, unacurate, close to reality and fair. Altogether. But the point is, if you put one fact of false information took from russianpropaganda, it spoils it all.
You're saying PS lost C2 for several days due to cyber attack, and you are wrong. I was watching the face of General Oleshchuk in the monitor very first days, and I saw air picture clear. So the information you posted is ridiculous.
Hope you will not piss of Ukrainian military that hard, and they coud separate the sheep from the goats. You better be more cautious in sources.
Even if he had wanted to, could Oleshchuk have made the dispersal decision without political approval? Surely we can all recall how the national leadership were in denial even as the Russians crossed the border.
I remember an old Clancy novel where a Russian general had learnt to divide by three the claims from his AA people... Seems reality is not too different, in fact.
"except within the 58th Army, while this was still commanded by Dvornikov"
- Zusko?
(Dvornikov never commanded 58th and he's a notorious blockhead.)
The articles mean nothing in Soviet and post-Soviet military, it's just an imitation - you'd better to have some publications to be promoted (with a partial exception of specialized mil-tech magazines, articles there are sometimes meaningfull) and it's a matter of personal connections and mutual favors to make a publication. 'Thinking outside the box' and 'competitive force-on-force exercises' are of those concepts that exactly everyone acknowledges, often loundly, and still no one implements (in armies of this kind). Because articles and speaches are imitation, and the consequences are exactly the same as you've mentioned.
Zusko commanded 58th from 2020 to mid 2023, being it's head of staff 2017-2018 and 49th's deputy commander before it (2014-2015). Dvornikov was appointed as a commander of Southern Military District in 2016, where Zusko served, yet Zusko was never his deputy but a head of staff and then commander of one of it's armies.
Sigh.... Sorry that I'm even trying: have actually decided not to answer any of comments to the 'Mobutu Syndrome'-series. So, I'll leave it at that: who understands, understands; who doesn't, doesn't, and that's it. It's not my 'job' to go 'convincing' everybody.
Dude, he mentioned an exception to the rule. If you claim that it was not that big of an exception, it doesn't contradict his argument.
Tom states that it's an exception. The only argument is an article, wich actually means absolutely nothing (wich is absolutyely obvious for anyone who served in or was trained for a post-Soviet armed force). The second Tom's auxiliary statement was just wrong, as far is I know - Dvornikov just never commanded 58th and never had Zusko as his deputy commander, wich supposes Tom's mistaken about Dvornikov. I don't think there would be any conclusions overall - I just have no disagreements with Tom in this topic, aside of this narrow point.
I read somewhere that during the Battle of Britain both sides claimed enemy losses at double , and their own at half, the true rate. Natural, I suppose.
So are we facing a deep misunderstanding of the cost of this war, in terms of men and material, to Russia. If so, we need a serious rethink about the adequacy of what we are doing
Well Ukrainians are lying, Russians just way more.
That was clear from the start. Question is who is willing to change and from my professional carrer I can tell you, very few
I suppose the only possible silver lining to this is that neither side is demonstrating competence, or, rather, both sides are approximately equally incompetent.
I have to wonder that when the Ukrainian pilots currently being trained in the West return to their units, along with their squadron commanders, whether or not the Western lessons learned methodology might start to work its way up from the bottom? Certainly, crap commanders can stifle it, but conscientious pilots and low level commanders will see the benefits and hopefully it might trickle upwards.
One can hope, can't one?
Correct me if I am wrong but I was under the feeling we hardly saw this kind of grassroot dynamic at play with army forces trained in the West.
It used to be a trope to praise SOFs before the war as a mean to praise Western SOF so I have my own reservations about theses specific type of forces.
A pilot cannot move an aircraft to another AB of his own accord, can he? And the commanders don't seem to be able to protect the existing (Soviet) planes.
There will be more pressure to protect the Holy cows awaited for so long.
Maybe there is a difference between the numbers released for the public and the ones they are working with, as it should be ?
No, I believe it is exactly like what Tom described -- "I shot a missile, saw an explosion and the thing went off radar". Besides that in the first weeks of war probably there was a bit of each unit that saw an explosion or fall was reporting a kill.
In the ground losses for example there is a few things hidden, firstly artillery pieces include mortars. Secondly losses include those destroyed and damaged. Though destroyed vs damaged is like 50/50. And damaged are often being evacuated, repaired and used again. So that is why we may see the numbers as something not matching properly.
Ah, mortars! That explains crazy numbers like 50-60 artillery pieces a day.
Tom thanks for this sobering read. I remember reading Zaluzhnyi's writing about adapting technology and increasing mobilization last year and it made a lot of sense to me. I was then surprised to hear Zelensky say he wants to get rid of people who are always "negative" and that they needed "positive" people around(of course this was targeted at Zaluzhnyi). In hindsight, there wasnt anything in Zaluzhnyi's writing which hasnt been vindicated. Today the mobilization he struggled to call for early which led to his dismissal is somewhat being implemented.
I dont think it helps in finding out the truth of whats on the ground if instead of seeking the truth, one is seeking positivity. In all this I trust Ukraine will prevail but possibly Zelensky needs to also reflect along with others in the Genstab-U on what they can do better. I have been one of those that thoroughly believed their figures wrt Russian aircraft shot down, but now starting to doubt them. But in all this aluta continua to the people of Ukraine and thank you for the post
Zaluzhnyi was not negative, instead he was overly positive. Just read some of pre-counteroffensive articles, where he described what he needs for it and outlined how it should go. And then see actual results.
Instead, he could have been a proponent of attritional flexible defence, means continuing to be on the defensive as long as enemy is actively attacking and allowing to cause significant losses, and situationally counter-attacking also in order to cause more losses. Which what happens now.
And another aspect is "being in the fields". One of the most important management practices. Visiting frontlines, staying with the soldiers, communicating, seeing things with own eyes. This was not happening with Zaluzhnyi.
Hmmmm, wasnt my words about negativity, was Zelensky's. I agree Zaluzhnyi made mistakes, but after the failed 2023 counter offensive his write ups came off as quite pragmatic. Maybe before the failed offensive he had to toe the line to provide positive news to Zelensky. But I think its a fact he was fired in part because he wasnt saying things Zelensky wanted to hear(after the failed 2023 summer offensive). Remember how he challenged Zelensky's narrative that the war wasnt at a stalemate? After every public figure in the admin came out to say the war wasnt at a stalemate and then boom there's an article from Gen Zaluzhny saying its at a stalemate.
I agree though in hindsight he could have done a lot of things better including possibly visiting the frontline more often. But my point was, his write ups after the failed offensive seemed quite pragmatic and challenged the overly positive narrtives fronted by Zelensky.
Otherwise aluta continua to the people of Ukraine.
Don't you consider it's a bit unusual we are discussing write-ups of the warring general, and not his campaigns? Basically from the turn out of events it seems he was very much willing to help Zelenskiy on the foreign policy front. So logically he got the respective position. Though maybe a bit lower then expected.
Look, besides I am not a proponent of popular vote in making choices. Means there is an elected official, and he must bear the responsibility for those, for there is no other way to carry out his duties. Unfortunately this is not how it works in UA politics as of now. Everyone is bent on forcing choices of their preference.
Yes if we stick within context(which is he got fired for saying negative but pragmatic things after the failed 2023 offensive)his write ups were pertinent to explaining how he wanted to prosecute the war. Which was in direct contrast to his boss Zelensky. He mentioned the need to adapt technology wise as well increase mobilization, and that the transparency of the battlefield due to the proliferation of drones had made it difficult to carry out large scale maneuvers or mass large forces.
Also he was fired out of the position(he clarified that he would not resign but also move to any position his given as long as it was serving Ukraine) and replaced with Syrsky who was considered more of a yes man to Zelensky. In all this I trust Zelensky, Zaluzhny and Syrsky are doing their best and we dont have all the details.
why do you assume that PSU doesn't have the real kill statistics for internal purposes? the numbers released are for PR (or "propaganda" if you wish) purposes, which is totally understandable.
Because a more realistic set of data would result in changes to how Ukrainians do things (eg don't just park Su-27s in the open where they can be splatteredby Iskanders).
The realistic data set could even exist but is ignored by higher ups who have political and career objectives (certainly happens in my workplace which is an Australian government department).
Which is what Tom is getting at.
Yes, that would be the point. Learning and improving.then you need to assess the situation critically and realisticly. And acted upon. The classic Deming cycle of management is Plan, Do, Check, Act. And since it is a circle, repeat. To improve the quality of performance of any organisation. Yoy can certainly find other modell, But the point is that you need to act differently. If you havent changed how you act you are not learning.
Certainly none of that happening here in Australian public service anymore. It's all becoming very...."Russian" in how things are handled (growth of corruption, nepotism, de-professionalisation etc etc).
And by the looks of it not much happening in the Ukrainian War on either side.
Because... that would effectively double the amount of paperwork (keeping both real and PR statistics), and the amount of it is already (or still?) staggering in ZSU.
So the old commander was well liked and dealt with bad news, but had issues controlling his subordinates. The new commander (I'm talking the Commander of all the UA Forces) has control over his subordinates but can't deal with bad news. Crap, can't we get someone in between? Micromanagers KILL organizations, and I was really hoping Ukraine had that beat. I am guessing some more high profile unit commanders are going to have to make a stink in order to get things sorted. You have to be able to deal with bad news, you have to. You can swear, you can curse, and you can maybe throw something, but in the end you have to go "Okay, got it. Understand, now let's fix it." and not fire the guy who told you in the hopes of getting some help.
Problem with Ukraine and beating the personnel issues is something most people don't even want to admit - Ukraine's military culture is a Russian one but even more importantly its society's culture is very close to Russian one. That means everything from corruption and nepotism to that typical Russian style arrogance of not allowing one to recognise their own mistakes.
Which makes sense given 100s of years of Russian occupation/colonisation and the fact that any Ukrainian officer trained up to at least 2014 is a product of a Soviet style system if not the Soviet system when that was still a country.
True to an extent. Some of them have jumped entirely into the Western Style. The guy I worked with did. He had issues, it really was hard for him to understand. But he knew enough to know this was how it needed to be and worked to try and figure it out. But a lot were the old school and yeah, getting them to see the light was damn hard.
Absolutely negative concerning the training. Indeed, Ukraine has officers trained in Western military schools, but the number is not big. And the number will not be any bigger at war. If you take example of Poland, they joint the NATO with more poor state of interoperability, and still not the all forces interoperable. So it is not something that could be changed in a second
It's taken Poland 40+ years so far, and, as you say, it's not complete.
Liar, liar, liar. It is not just incompetence; this is a direct lie. Yes, you'd better be silent cause every word you say you're right will be false. If that was so bad, how it survived?
Ukrainian Air Force are facing the challenge noone had in the modern history, you have never met General Oleshchuck and you made judjement of him personnally.
You know nothing, what is happennig on the ground, so, you're right, you'd better not comment this lie-series.
The interesting fact is that the attack on the Commander of the Air Forces of Ukraine was launched simultaneously in Ukraine and outside. Who is orchestrating you all? I believe I know. Как погодка в Мааскве?
Ah Ukrainian trolls are not happy about some truth being told...
Oh dear, what a beautiful language) Maybe you prefer continue our conversation in your russian?
I thought I will never see such people at this resource, ment for SMEs thought sharing. Total upset.
See you're just proving my point even further...
But alright as you wish then, ukraine is totally winning, F-16 will be the 167th game changer of this war and you'll take back everything including Crimea tomorrow and bring Putin to the Hague the day after.
Happy now ?
Thanks for this report Tom, while I didn't really like it I have to agree
Well, Tom after reading it all, I can admit that's a lot of information. Wrong, unacurate, close to reality and fair. Altogether. But the point is, if you put one fact of false information took from russianpropaganda, it spoils it all.
You're saying PS lost C2 for several days due to cyber attack, and you are wrong. I was watching the face of General Oleshchuk in the monitor very first days, and I saw air picture clear. So the information you posted is ridiculous.
Hope you will not piss of Ukrainian military that hard, and they coud separate the sheep from the goats. You better be more cautious in sources.
Even if he had wanted to, could Oleshchuk have made the dispersal decision without political approval? Surely we can all recall how the national leadership were in denial even as the Russians crossed the border.