Ukraine War, 11 July 2024: Mobutu Syndrome, Part 2

(…continued from Part 1…)

Roughly speaking, within NATO, there are two ‘pillars’ of tactical training – from training of single pilots/crews, via training at company-, battalion-/squadron-, up to brigade level (at least two times a year: even higher):

-          post-action de-brief: frank, objective discussion between all the participants about ‘lessons learned’, i.e. what was done right and what wrong during an exercise; at war, of course, this is a discussion of what was done right and what went wrong during a combat operation (for example: ‘why did we lose this or that vehicle, or gun, or aircraft, or helicopter…’); and

-          competitive force-on-force exercises (for example: towards the end of its tactical training, a company of troops is sent to exercise simulated combat against another company from the same unit).

Nearly unheard of in the VSRF (except within the 58^th Army, while this was still commanded by Dvornikov), these training methods remain scarce within the ZSU (AFAIK, only the 3^rd Assault, 4^th Rapid-Reaction-, and two or three other brigades are exercising and operating this way) – and are de-facto unheard of within the PSU. Sure, Ukrainian pilots and SAM-operators are ‘discussing things’ between themselves; apparently, Su-25-pilots of the 299^th Brigade are doing some post-mission de-briefs. But, in the rest of the force… ‘crickets’.

….and, of course, when top commanders dislike bad news, while favourising their favourites that have only good news to report, this kind of training is even entirely impossible. ‘That would expose commander’s failures’, even incompetence, ‘ashame people’…. and this is entirely unlikely to change any time soon.

Unsurprisingly, and except for ‘SBU’s investigations’ about the loss of Kherson and Zaporizhzhya(caugh… caugh… sorry, this is from smoking too little, yesterday…), until today, I have not heard about a single investigation into the circumstances and reasons, or any of consequences of Oleshchuk’s failure to put so many of PSU units on alert, to disperse them out of their bases, on time, before the opening Russian strikes. On the contrary: it seems that ‘everybody’ in the PSU (just like in the ZSU) ‘simply knows’ what happened, and it’s ‘sure’ this is not going to happen again, and thus there is no need to learn any lessons….

….which is bringing me to the next related issue…

***

Because there is no practice of serious, nor widespread post-operation de-brief within the force, it’s unsurprising that the PSU’s methods of ‘confirming kills’ are ‘questionable’, to put it diplomatically. Indeed, I would characterise them with, ‘at the level of Iraqis and Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s’.

What do I mean?

I mean that a pilot or SAM-operator is free to report things like, ‘I fired a missile and there was an explosion’ or ‘target disappeared from my radar scope’… ‘fire and smoke’ – and, voila!

In the PSU; this is considered a ‘confirmed kill’ (of a Russian aircraft or helicopter). Even ‘evidence enough’ for people to get awarded the title ‘Hero of Ukraine’. Definitely to paint ‘kill markings’ on their SAM-launchers or aircraft.

Ironically, this is exactly the same way the Russians are crediting their pilots and SAM-operators with kills. See, ‘he released a bomb’, or ‘fired a missile’, ‘fire and smoke’ = and the target is considered for destroyed, the enemy for ‘shot down’.

Indeed, this is going so far that for the Russian GenStab a pilot that fired two or three air-to-air missiles = ‘automatically killed two or three Ukrainian aircraft/helicopters’. (What a surprise then, the ‘leading ace’ of this war is a certain Colonel of the VKS with ’12 confirmed kills’…)

But: did anybody go there to check if there is resulting wreckage? ….or any other kind of evidence?

Nope.

NOBODY there (neither in the Russian nor) in the Ukrainian armed forces is responsible for investigating claims, and an objective analysis of evidence. Because commanders dislike bad news: because bad news might reveal them, or their friends, or their favourites… as incompetent.

Sure, the wreckage of the Russian aircraft and helicopters is regularly inspected – but by the SBU, and for intel-gathering purposes: for the purpose of extracting sensitive pieces of avionics. But, nobody in the PSU is coming to the idea to go and crosscheck claims. Instead, generals are happy to distribute ‘Hero of Ukraine’ (and ‘Hero of the Russian Federation’) awards to their left and right.

That’s good news, you know. ‘Confirmation of competence’. That’s always good.

Unsurprisingly, the PSU is wildly exaggerating the Russian losses.

….and along such practices, certain brigade-commander received ‘Hero of Ukraine’ for claiming an Il-76 and two Mi-24s. For ‘good news’ and ‘competence’. And who cares if until this very day there is no trace of evidence for his ‘three kills’?

Now think about where is this leading. This diagram is summarising officially issued Ukrainian claims for downed Russian aircraft and helicopters:

So, 360 Russian aircraft and 326 helicopters shot down?

Isn’t that great?

Of course it’s great, becasue it’s ‘lots of good news’ - and good news are good to cover-up own incompetence. Nobody gets ashamed that way.

Reality?

There’s simply no evidence for this.

Ironically, Ukrainians (and lots of their supporters outside Ukraine), love to disparage similar Russian claims. However, actually, these Ukrainian claims are as ‘solid’ as Russian claims for similar numbers of Ukrainian aircraft and helicopters shot down, and to call this ‘daydreaming’ would be an understatement.

As of today, independently verified as written off for all reasons (i.e. including those shot down, but also those destroyed on the ground or written-off in accidents related to operations in Ukraine) are exactly 102 Russian aircraft and 118 helicopters.

You think this is unimportant?

Fine. Really, no problem with me.

….just… if you think that way, please keep in mind: conclusion is on hand that, just like the GenStab in Moscow, so also the GenStab-U in Kyiv, and the High Command PSU in Vinnytsia, have no serious idea about what’s really ‘working’ for their air forces and ground-based air defences, and what not. What officers are really successful? What weapons? What aircraft and/or helicopters?

In most of cases they’re actually guessing based on hear-say and overclaiming (not to say: wishful thinking).

Is it then surprising when the PSU fails as hard as it did on 8 July?

….which is bringing me to the next related issue: the events of that day…

(….to be continued…)