Well, well, well :)) Can't wait for your own breakdown:
"Defense officials and congressional staffers told CNN that Ukrainian troops have in recent weeks used the US-made Patriot air defense system to shoot down at least one faraway Russian fighter jet. The Russian jets have largely been staying behind Russian defensive lines, making them difficult for Ukraine to target with shorter-range systems like NASAMs.
The Russian planes the Patriot targeted were on a bombing run to fire missiles against Ukrainian targets, US officials said, which Russia has been doing throughout the past year to maximize civilian casualties."
Pack up a Patriot battery, move is up close to the border during a pattern of Russian attacks from inside their previously safe territory, let the West's recce assets tell you that a strike is inbound, fire up your radars at the last minute, shoot the shit out of the strike and start to scoot while your missiles are outbound.
Russian aircraft blow up deep inside Russia. Much mystery abounds.
Thanks (not only for the work, as usual) but for the quick pace publishing. Deeply interested because as an ole’foot logger volunteer (Landser do may say?), all the air combat weapons and procedure seems as wizardry. Need to look for more “Air” books in Helion.
Can you pls explain if these HAWKs are the same SAMs supplied to Ukraine, that proved to be non-operational as you briefly mentioned earlier? Do you know the particular reason why they do not work?
Also, in your articles you focus mostly on cases of anti-aircraft defense, is it very similar to the anti-missile?
Mobility is the key to all aspects of defence, whether defence as defence or the defensive aspects of the assault (i.e. not getting hit while attacking). The war in Ukraine has both proved this, again, and shown that the amount of mobility needed has increased substantially. One needs to stay inside the decision cycle of one's opponent. You must find your enemy, attack and displace faster than your enemy can find you, decide to hit you and employ their weapons. Luckily for Ukraine, their decision cycle has proven to be far shorter than the Russian's, but the Russian cycle is not infinite and not uniformly really long.
Thanks for an interesting #2 Tom will be looking for #3, I knew the Hawk system was fairly old but knew nothing of it effectiveness. Sounds like it was a good system in its time and as I understand Ukraine has gotten a few of them so maybe useful to some extent now
MIM-23....IMHO, the best SAM-system in wider service of the 1970s and 1980s.
Ukraine appears to have got one or two systems from Spain. The last I've heard of them, they were in poor condition and never worked, though: apparently returned in April. No news on them ever since.
BTW, mind that the USA have supplied additional MIM-23 rounds and spares. It is perfectly possible that the system/s in question are already in service.
Thank you so much! It’s fascinating to read those little-known SAM stories…from the other side. Many years ago I’ve heard them from my Father, who was among the first Soviet officers specifically trained on SAMs, graduating in 1959.
Specifically, concerning Mole Cricket: how certain it is “that 14 of Syrian SAM-sites in question were fully operational on the next morning”? The Syrian personnel, and their Soviet advisers were under tremendous pressure to report them as operational, but were they really?
At least, IAF continued to operate over Lebanon with impunity.
How certain it was...? Two different SyAADF officers - each was a CO of one of 19 SAM-sites attacked on 9 June - recalled the same number (including their own SAM-sites), and that independently from each other, at two entirely different ocassions, spread 'over years'.
There was lots of damage to launchers - especially to 'non-mobile/fixed' launchers of SA-2- and SA-3-SAM-sites - but in 14 cases fire-control radars were repairable and repaired by the next morning. Which is why the Israelis continued shelling them.
(BTW, did I mention that most of the '19 destroyed Syrian SAM-sites' were actually hit by the Israeli artillery and artillery rockets, not by the IDF/AF....?)
One story I remember hearing was about a Cub acquisition radar missing a good chunk of its antenna, which made its beam into some funny shape with unusual side lobes, and badly misaligned with the illuminator. The illuminator could still be aimed via the optical channel, making it technically “operational”, but hardly able to shoot at anything beyond 10 km or so.
And yes, that Cub was hit by artillery, probably corrected by UAVs, although none was seen. Syrians/Soviets had no idea about UAV back then, and were wondering how the long range artillery can be so accurate.
Hehe, yes: have heard the same story. The world is getting really small...
But, that's the point about UAVs: before having them, the Israelis depended on ELINT to find out if some SAM-site is operational or not. Since having them, they can find out at least if it's damaged.
Thank you, as a Tanker the air war or defence in an air war is a bit of a mystery to me.
Cool article again, thank you Tom! I have a hunch it might be connected to this event somehow: https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/14/europe/russia-aircraft-downed-ukraine-bryansk-intl/index.html
.....now really: how do you come to such nasty ideas.... ;-)
Ahsooooo... :-)
Well, well, well :)) Can't wait for your own breakdown:
"Defense officials and congressional staffers told CNN that Ukrainian troops have in recent weeks used the US-made Patriot air defense system to shoot down at least one faraway Russian fighter jet. The Russian jets have largely been staying behind Russian defensive lines, making them difficult for Ukraine to target with shorter-range systems like NASAMs.
The Russian planes the Patriot targeted were on a bombing run to fire missiles against Ukrainian targets, US officials said, which Russia has been doing throughout the past year to maximize civilian casualties."
Pack up a Patriot battery, move is up close to the border during a pattern of Russian attacks from inside their previously safe territory, let the West's recce assets tell you that a strike is inbound, fire up your radars at the last minute, shoot the shit out of the strike and start to scoot while your missiles are outbound.
Russian aircraft blow up deep inside Russia. Much mystery abounds.
Rinse and repeat.
Thanks (not only for the work, as usual) but for the quick pace publishing. Deeply interested because as an ole’foot logger volunteer (Landser do may say?), all the air combat weapons and procedure seems as wizardry. Need to look for more “Air” books in Helion.
Thanks Tom, this column is just about the most valuable thing on the internet these days.
Just small ADDENDA: there is no Kh-9 but a Kh-28 or Тактическая противорадиолокационная ракета X-28 http://xn--80aafy5bs.xn--p1ai/aviamuseum/dvigateli-i-vooruzhenie/aviatsionnoe-vooruzhenie/sssr/aviatsionnye-rakety/upravlyaemye-rakety/ur-vozduh-poverhnost/takticheskaya-protivoradiolokatsionnaya-raketa-x-28/ there are even photos of Su-20 and Su-17M3 with them
Yup: mixed up 'Kh-28' and 'AS-9'. I'll correct this, thx.
Thank you Tom.
I am all anticipation!
Wow! Really nice parte! Thanks Tom!
Hi Tom, thanks a lot for your articles.
Can you pls explain if these HAWKs are the same SAMs supplied to Ukraine, that proved to be non-operational as you briefly mentioned earlier? Do you know the particular reason why they do not work?
Also, in your articles you focus mostly on cases of anti-aircraft defense, is it very similar to the anti-missile?
AFAIK, nope. Spaniards have had much upgraded MIM-23s....though that was 20 or so years ago...
Re. 'anti-missile'.... do you mean ballistic missile defence?
That's a relatively new discipline, seriously pursued only since the early 1990s, and mostly by NATO-people. Sorry, haven't researched it as much.
Mobility is the key to all aspects of defence, whether defence as defence or the defensive aspects of the assault (i.e. not getting hit while attacking). The war in Ukraine has both proved this, again, and shown that the amount of mobility needed has increased substantially. One needs to stay inside the decision cycle of one's opponent. You must find your enemy, attack and displace faster than your enemy can find you, decide to hit you and employ their weapons. Luckily for Ukraine, their decision cycle has proven to be far shorter than the Russian's, but the Russian cycle is not infinite and not uniformly really long.
Mobility is life.
Great article, Tom! Love reading your writings, super exciting. And love your sarcasm 😉
Thanks for an interesting #2 Tom will be looking for #3, I knew the Hawk system was fairly old but knew nothing of it effectiveness. Sounds like it was a good system in its time and as I understand Ukraine has gotten a few of them so maybe useful to some extent now
MIM-23....IMHO, the best SAM-system in wider service of the 1970s and 1980s.
Ukraine appears to have got one or two systems from Spain. The last I've heard of them, they were in poor condition and never worked, though: apparently returned in April. No news on them ever since.
Thanks for this information I find it interesting as I know nothing about air defense systems, its a nice education
My pleasure.
BTW, mind that the USA have supplied additional MIM-23 rounds and spares. It is perfectly possible that the system/s in question are already in service.
Thank you so much! It’s fascinating to read those little-known SAM stories…from the other side. Many years ago I’ve heard them from my Father, who was among the first Soviet officers specifically trained on SAMs, graduating in 1959.
Specifically, concerning Mole Cricket: how certain it is “that 14 of Syrian SAM-sites in question were fully operational on the next morning”? The Syrian personnel, and their Soviet advisers were under tremendous pressure to report them as operational, but were they really?
At least, IAF continued to operate over Lebanon with impunity.
How certain it was...? Two different SyAADF officers - each was a CO of one of 19 SAM-sites attacked on 9 June - recalled the same number (including their own SAM-sites), and that independently from each other, at two entirely different ocassions, spread 'over years'.
There was lots of damage to launchers - especially to 'non-mobile/fixed' launchers of SA-2- and SA-3-SAM-sites - but in 14 cases fire-control radars were repairable and repaired by the next morning. Which is why the Israelis continued shelling them.
(BTW, did I mention that most of the '19 destroyed Syrian SAM-sites' were actually hit by the Israeli artillery and artillery rockets, not by the IDF/AF....?)
One story I remember hearing was about a Cub acquisition radar missing a good chunk of its antenna, which made its beam into some funny shape with unusual side lobes, and badly misaligned with the illuminator. The illuminator could still be aimed via the optical channel, making it technically “operational”, but hardly able to shoot at anything beyond 10 km or so.
And yes, that Cub was hit by artillery, probably corrected by UAVs, although none was seen. Syrians/Soviets had no idea about UAV back then, and were wondering how the long range artillery can be so accurate.
Hehe, yes: have heard the same story. The world is getting really small...
But, that's the point about UAVs: before having them, the Israelis depended on ELINT to find out if some SAM-site is operational or not. Since having them, they can find out at least if it's damaged.
I don't know what the result is, but I think it has to do with 4 Russian planes and helicopters being shot down in Russian territory. ;)
Great post. There is a lot of military history we dont know about
All incredibly enlighten8ng, thanks.