You are indeed busy here. But informative as always. Seems like the comment you ended your update with yesterday, cannot see how Assad regime survives this holds true. But if the Russians are fleeing the country where will they go? I assume troops can be airlifted out. But their ships? Or will they make some stand at their bases, negotiate for something or? Understand you don’t like predicting, but reflections on the situation for Russians there?
Ships can go anywhere, I am not sure what your question means.
I guess that it would be to the Baltic ports.
The usually well-informed Russian blogger Fighterbomber wrote yesterday the Russians
only have the logistics to evacuate a fraction of their equipment
He also wrote yesterday they might as well evacuate their naval base Tartus because they will no longer be able to operate normally.
It is definitely well-defended, but without land links, supplies will be difficult, and sooner or later, the rebels will find time to shell the base, which will be uncomfortable.
Thank you for the update about logistics issues. Yes, ships can go anywhere there is water. But do they have the needed supplies? There is a long way from Eastern Mediterranean to the Baltics. (Passing through two rather narrow straits at that, but let’s ignore that. If you had passed Gibraltar I would send them to Murmansk and not risk interdiction from the Swedes and Danes.) So I really wonder. I am not saying they cannot, but they will have some challenges. But I guess «Figtherbomber» is correct and they will loose a lot of equipment. Can’t say I am dismayed about that.
There is no blocade of baltic, and no reason and also no posibility to block ship arrival there. These skips will not change anything in power there. Russia power is nuclear weapons then far far away planes rocket and maybe submarines and the rest is so far that cannot be seen
It is certainly possible to black naval ships moving into the Baltic Sea. It is after all quite a narrow strait between two NATO countries. Whether there is political will to do it is another question. On that I tend to agree with you, they won’t.
Yes but it is also a free internationnal waterway. It needs certain reasons to block single ships. In no way (except war) all ships from certain states can be blocked.
The docks in Tartus are only 100m long so not suitable for merchant ships.
Russia stopped supplying Tartus by sea in February.
The only supply ships capable of docking are landing ships and they only have two of these, plus it is 4,500 nauticsl miles each way so they are range limited to 18mph so more than ten days
Edit: I don't know where the landing ships are moored today but if in Kaliningrad it is ten days before they can even start evacuating.
If they do leave Tartus then Kaliningrad is its only warm water port and it is an enclave just over 200 sq km plus small Black Sea ports which are blocked for war ships by the Montreux Convention
As usual, another excellent update. with more promised to come. This will be a very interesting weekend and the picture is getting a little bit clearer, step by step.
1) Assad has lost, as his allies are leaving him in droves. Of course he could and maybe will try a desperate last stand at Damascus, but that wouldn't change the outcome, just more dead people and additional destruction.
2) The CMO gets more and more influence, which could be very good for the future of Syria.
3) The PKK/YPG/SDF conglomerate will also lose, which leads me to next point.
4) It is obvious that Erdogan and the USA have opposing goals and the future will tell how long the US are going to support the conglomerate (just thinking about Vietnam and Afghanistan as examples). That also depends on how far is Erdogan willing to go to reach his own goals, as I think he isn't too happy with a strong CMO?
5) What is Israel going to do in it's obsession of being the overlord for the complete Near East?
That all together will decide the near future of Syria, peace or a prolongation of war?
Addition to my point 3)
Seems as if the conglomerate will be sold in the near future, according to Donald Trump.
Just a short quote from the end of Trump on Syria "This is not our war":
"..the United States should have nothing to do with it. This is not our fight. Let it play out. Do not get involved."
Re. 3, I doubt the the PKK/YPG/SDF conglomerate will lose that badly because an independent Kurdistan was part of the 1982 Israeli Yinon Plan, the sort of real Ur-text of neoconservatism, back when all this divide et impera/"reshaping the Middle East" stuff originally started. (Speculating : but the Kurds may have some imagined role in a future Iranian regime change op.)
Re. 4 The US has for decades only had a wisp of an idea when it comes to its own foreign policy, in practice being totally reactive, and with a great preponderance of political weight in Washington behind following Israel. Which is (my) answer to point 5 - Israel will do nothing new themselves and operate by proxy through their "relationship" with Trump. What, if any, kind of modus vivendi the Israelis and the Turks can work out re. Kurdistan seems to be the interesting question. Especially now that the Turks could have immense leverage over Russia re. the Tartus base. A key bargaining chip in Ukraine.
Okay you mentioned that obscure 1982 plan. Obscure because Turkey, no matter if Erdogan or someone else is ruling in Ankara, will never accept an indepedent Kurdistan. That is just wishful thinking.
Yes the USA are also clueless regarding the Near East. There were also some, as I think, stupid rumors on other channels, that if the CMO wins, Israel would move in and create a buffer zone in Syria.
As the Turks have no control over the CMO, they also have no leverage at all regarding Tartus.
Addition:
IMHO Erdogan already tries to play a game, which is too big in relation to the economical size and structure of Turkey.
Re. the viability of Kurdistan, it depends how geographically maximalist a Kurdistan we're talking about. You could make one out of Syrian and Iraqi Kurdistan technically without the consent of the Turks, and still use this as a bridgehead against Iran. But I agree, a world where the Israeli-US "conglomerate" carves Kurdistan out of Turkey is a world without Turkey in NATO. Extremely far fetched.
Re. the "buffer zone"; or Golan Heights, I think it would be naive to think the current Isreali cabinet, which is comprised of lunatics, aren't seeing the end of Assad and the advent of Trump as a golden opportunity to secure their control.
One could argue Israel doesn't need it, because of it's technological possibilities via desalination plants, but denying others access to it, gives Israel power.
It is both surprising and unsurprising at the same time how fickle support/power for authoritarian regimes is. Ultimately the power of authoritarian regimes is all about fear. It always seems to end this way. Government forces vaporising into thin air and the leadership jumping on a plane. I would guess the woman and children of the top brass etc are already in Lebanon or have flown out of the country.
One thing I'm still trying to understand is: what exactly are all these dozens of "factions" working together as CMO (and others)? Sounds like a whole lot, so what are they - local village prophets and their listeners? Charismatic activists and their closest neighbours? Local feudal barons recruiting people from "their" villages? Or are they somehow all "serious" (by whichever standards) organizations with ideological / religious differences to each other? How much of their efforts are they willing to invest into whatever may come after "Assad first", as opposed to just going back home and dealing with their own communities' transition into a "new order"?
Yea I'm not doubting that the us rebranded the PKK to the YPG, that's okay.
What I'm asking is where you took the info that the leadership of the sdf is Turkish. Because it seems to me that they are all syrian born. I also looked at some of the politicians of sdf and they are all born in Syria.
And then, I don't know how to ask a "syrian kurd" if they consider sdf and him as kurds. I'd love if you gave some sources so I can understand better the dynamic inside the Kurdish movement.
Finally, but this is just my consideration, I still don't understand why the "syrian kurds" would care. I mean they recognize as kurds, so they are (were actually) a stateless nation. So why would it matter if they are born in Syria, turkey or iraq? Maybe this is an ignorant question and if so, tell me where I can get better info
Sorry, I do not understand something. What kind of 'links' shall I offer you?
While researching about the Syrian Arab Air Force, have been to Syria a number of times. Have traveled the country from al-Bab in the north to Bosra ash-Sham in the south. Have meet and interviewed hundreds of people (Sunnis, Alawi, Kurds, Druze, Christians...all veteran officers of the SyAAF and the SyAADF) and interviewed enough to write books like:
(...which, between others, are containing more info about Hafez al-Assad's career with the SyAAF than you're going to find in all the other related books - combined...)
...then the first military history of the Syrian War of 2011-2013,
While running that research (foremost back in 1998-2018), have met and interviewed hundreds of Syrians. Between others, have had not just one or two, but seven field commanders of the 'Syrian Democratic Forces' telling me, without any reservations, 'yes, I was born in Cizre (or other towns in south/south-eastern Türkye), and we're the PKK'.
And they, and few other Kurds from Syria, have also told me how in 2011-2012, the PKK took over northern Syria when the Assadist regime was withdrawing (and that in agreement with Assadists), and assassinated or forced into exile all the 13-14 leaders of local Kurdish parties (the mass of which was pro-KDP), to impose themselves.
Finally, have learned to distinguish 'Syrian Kurds' from 'PKK-Kurds' (and I know those of Syrian Kurds I happen to know do not see themselves as a 'Kurdish nation', but 'Syria'), just like the Jews taught me to distinguish between 'Zionist Jews' and 'other Jews'. All first hand.
So, by best will, but I simply do not understand: what kind of 'links' shall I offer you? To first-hand experiences like sitting in the famous coffeeshop vis-a-vis the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, chatting with the highest-distinguished MiG-21-pilot of the SyAAF, accompanied by his friend who was a Kurd, while 50 metres down the road a gang of Hezbullat was selling CDs titled 'Battle for Baghdad Airport', and showing scenes of Chechens chopping heads of captured Russian troops?
Okay, thanks for clearifying. I asked you those questions not because i thought you were lying or as a critical, but just because simply a lot of things you say about the kurds can't be found basically nowhere on the internet, so I wondered where you took that information.
Well, most of things I've published about can't be found anywhere on the internet (nor, actually, in other books to the same topics). Which is why I'm damned as 'spy' in about a dozen of countries (and officially sought for by IRGC's Judge Salvatti, too).
It wasn't as evident as now in late november or early december, that Asaad was going to lose so quickly! It seems Russians are even worse than US when it comes to building a foreign puppet's army.
I didn’t know that most of the SDF’s ranks are conscripted Arabs. Are the depictions of 'female Kurdish soldiers without headscarves,' often plastered across social media and internet articles about the SDF, somewhat far-fetched from the reality on the ground? I guess this isn’t surprising after all. It also explains the revolts across SDF-controlled territories.
You are indeed busy here. But informative as always. Seems like the comment you ended your update with yesterday, cannot see how Assad regime survives this holds true. But if the Russians are fleeing the country where will they go? I assume troops can be airlifted out. But their ships? Or will they make some stand at their bases, negotiate for something or? Understand you don’t like predicting, but reflections on the situation for Russians there?
Firgot to say thank you, poor manners here.
Ships can go anywhere, I am not sure what your question means.
I guess that it would be to the Baltic ports.
The usually well-informed Russian blogger Fighterbomber wrote yesterday the Russians
only have the logistics to evacuate a fraction of their equipment
He also wrote yesterday they might as well evacuate their naval base Tartus because they will no longer be able to operate normally.
It is definitely well-defended, but without land links, supplies will be difficult, and sooner or later, the rebels will find time to shell the base, which will be uncomfortable.
Thank you for the update about logistics issues. Yes, ships can go anywhere there is water. But do they have the needed supplies? There is a long way from Eastern Mediterranean to the Baltics. (Passing through two rather narrow straits at that, but let’s ignore that. If you had passed Gibraltar I would send them to Murmansk and not risk interdiction from the Swedes and Danes.) So I really wonder. I am not saying they cannot, but they will have some challenges. But I guess «Figtherbomber» is correct and they will loose a lot of equipment. Can’t say I am dismayed about that.
There is no blocade of baltic, and no reason and also no posibility to block ship arrival there. These skips will not change anything in power there. Russia power is nuclear weapons then far far away planes rocket and maybe submarines and the rest is so far that cannot be seen
It is certainly possible to black naval ships moving into the Baltic Sea. It is after all quite a narrow strait between two NATO countries. Whether there is political will to do it is another question. On that I tend to agree with you, they won’t.
Yes but it is also a free internationnal waterway. It needs certain reasons to block single ships. In no way (except war) all ships from certain states can be blocked.
The docks in Tartus are only 100m long so not suitable for merchant ships.
Russia stopped supplying Tartus by sea in February.
The only supply ships capable of docking are landing ships and they only have two of these, plus it is 4,500 nauticsl miles each way so they are range limited to 18mph so more than ten days
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivan_Gren-class_landing_ship
Edit: I don't know where the landing ships are moored today but if in Kaliningrad it is ten days before they can even start evacuating.
If they do leave Tartus then Kaliningrad is its only warm water port and it is an enclave just over 200 sq km plus small Black Sea ports which are blocked for war ships by the Montreux Convention
They're evacuating by their ships. Just like Iranians.
Thanks!
As usual, another excellent update. with more promised to come. This will be a very interesting weekend and the picture is getting a little bit clearer, step by step.
1) Assad has lost, as his allies are leaving him in droves. Of course he could and maybe will try a desperate last stand at Damascus, but that wouldn't change the outcome, just more dead people and additional destruction.
2) The CMO gets more and more influence, which could be very good for the future of Syria.
3) The PKK/YPG/SDF conglomerate will also lose, which leads me to next point.
4) It is obvious that Erdogan and the USA have opposing goals and the future will tell how long the US are going to support the conglomerate (just thinking about Vietnam and Afghanistan as examples). That also depends on how far is Erdogan willing to go to reach his own goals, as I think he isn't too happy with a strong CMO?
5) What is Israel going to do in it's obsession of being the overlord for the complete Near East?
That all together will decide the near future of Syria, peace or a prolongation of war?
Addition to my point 3)
Seems as if the conglomerate will be sold in the near future, according to Donald Trump.
Just a short quote from the end of Trump on Syria "This is not our war":
"..the United States should have nothing to do with it. This is not our fight. Let it play out. Do not get involved."
Re. 3, I doubt the the PKK/YPG/SDF conglomerate will lose that badly because an independent Kurdistan was part of the 1982 Israeli Yinon Plan, the sort of real Ur-text of neoconservatism, back when all this divide et impera/"reshaping the Middle East" stuff originally started. (Speculating : but the Kurds may have some imagined role in a future Iranian regime change op.)
Re. 4 The US has for decades only had a wisp of an idea when it comes to its own foreign policy, in practice being totally reactive, and with a great preponderance of political weight in Washington behind following Israel. Which is (my) answer to point 5 - Israel will do nothing new themselves and operate by proxy through their "relationship" with Trump. What, if any, kind of modus vivendi the Israelis and the Turks can work out re. Kurdistan seems to be the interesting question. Especially now that the Turks could have immense leverage over Russia re. the Tartus base. A key bargaining chip in Ukraine.
Okay you mentioned that obscure 1982 plan. Obscure because Turkey, no matter if Erdogan or someone else is ruling in Ankara, will never accept an indepedent Kurdistan. That is just wishful thinking.
Yes the USA are also clueless regarding the Near East. There were also some, as I think, stupid rumors on other channels, that if the CMO wins, Israel would move in and create a buffer zone in Syria.
As the Turks have no control over the CMO, they also have no leverage at all regarding Tartus.
Addition:
IMHO Erdogan already tries to play a game, which is too big in relation to the economical size and structure of Turkey.
Re. the viability of Kurdistan, it depends how geographically maximalist a Kurdistan we're talking about. You could make one out of Syrian and Iraqi Kurdistan technically without the consent of the Turks, and still use this as a bridgehead against Iran. But I agree, a world where the Israeli-US "conglomerate" carves Kurdistan out of Turkey is a world without Turkey in NATO. Extremely far fetched.
Re. the "buffer zone"; or Golan Heights, I think it would be naive to think the current Isreali cabinet, which is comprised of lunatics, aren't seeing the end of Assad and the advent of Trump as a golden opportunity to secure their control.
Those stupid rumors are about an additional buffer zone and not the Golan Heights.
The real reason for the still ongoing occupation of the Golan Heights is rather simple. It is the water.
https://water.fanack.com/israel/water-resources-in-israel/
&
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/what-are-golan-heights-israel-syria
One could argue Israel doesn't need it, because of it's technological possibilities via desalination plants, but denying others access to it, gives Israel power.
Can you imagine trump getting a briefing on Syria? Five seconds in his eyes lose focus and he says, “what the hell are we doing there”?
It is both surprising and unsurprising at the same time how fickle support/power for authoritarian regimes is. Ultimately the power of authoritarian regimes is all about fear. It always seems to end this way. Government forces vaporising into thin air and the leadership jumping on a plane. I would guess the woman and children of the top brass etc are already in Lebanon or have flown out of the country.
The regime is falling rapidly. It was many times in our history. It's too early to congratulate the Syrian people, but they deserve it.
One thing I'm still trying to understand is: what exactly are all these dozens of "factions" working together as CMO (and others)? Sounds like a whole lot, so what are they - local village prophets and their listeners? Charismatic activists and their closest neighbours? Local feudal barons recruiting people from "their" villages? Or are they somehow all "serious" (by whichever standards) organizations with ideological / religious differences to each other? How much of their efforts are they willing to invest into whatever may come after "Assad first", as opposed to just going back home and dealing with their own communities' transition into a "new order"?
Please can you do new posts rather than updating existing ones.
Thinking of that as well. Guess, I'll do exactly that.
New ones will be better. Or you may add the updates with an "Update" or "Addendum" type heading.
Thanks for all your work!
I am wondering what a CMO controlled Syria will mean for Qatar.
I don't understand where you get the info that the leadership of sdf is all turkish born.
And i don't understand what it really matters, given that they seen themselves af Kurdish.
So, because Mazloum Abdi claims to be from Ayn al-Arab/Kobani, he's a 'Syrian'?
Ask Syrian Kurds if they consider him and the SDF as such (and be cautious to do so privately, please).
For the rest, see here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHpaIO-Pj10
Yea I'm not doubting that the us rebranded the PKK to the YPG, that's okay.
What I'm asking is where you took the info that the leadership of the sdf is Turkish. Because it seems to me that they are all syrian born. I also looked at some of the politicians of sdf and they are all born in Syria.
And then, I don't know how to ask a "syrian kurd" if they consider sdf and him as kurds. I'd love if you gave some sources so I can understand better the dynamic inside the Kurdish movement.
Finally, but this is just my consideration, I still don't understand why the "syrian kurds" would care. I mean they recognize as kurds, so they are (were actually) a stateless nation. So why would it matter if they are born in Syria, turkey or iraq? Maybe this is an ignorant question and if so, tell me where I can get better info
Sorry, I do not understand something. What kind of 'links' shall I offer you?
While researching about the Syrian Arab Air Force, have been to Syria a number of times. Have traveled the country from al-Bab in the north to Bosra ash-Sham in the south. Have meet and interviewed hundreds of people (Sunnis, Alawi, Kurds, Druze, Christians...all veteran officers of the SyAAF and the SyAADF) and interviewed enough to write books like:
https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/migs-in-the-middle-east-volume-1-soviet-designed-combat-aircraft-in-egypt-iraq-and-syria-1955-1963.php
https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/migs-in-the-middle-east-volume-2-soviet-designed-combat-aircraft-in-egypt-and-syria-1963-1967.php
(...which, between others, are containing more info about Hafez al-Assad's career with the SyAAF than you're going to find in all the other related books - combined...)
...then the first military history of the Syrian War of 2011-2013,
https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/syrian-conflagration-revised-edition-the-syrian-civil-war-2011-2013.php
...and the first military history of the Russian military intervention in Syria, too:
https://www.helion.co.uk/military-history-books/moscows-game-of-poker-revised-edition-russian-military-intervention-in-syria-2015-2017.php
While running that research (foremost back in 1998-2018), have met and interviewed hundreds of Syrians. Between others, have had not just one or two, but seven field commanders of the 'Syrian Democratic Forces' telling me, without any reservations, 'yes, I was born in Cizre (or other towns in south/south-eastern Türkye), and we're the PKK'.
And they, and few other Kurds from Syria, have also told me how in 2011-2012, the PKK took over northern Syria when the Assadist regime was withdrawing (and that in agreement with Assadists), and assassinated or forced into exile all the 13-14 leaders of local Kurdish parties (the mass of which was pro-KDP), to impose themselves.
Finally, have learned to distinguish 'Syrian Kurds' from 'PKK-Kurds' (and I know those of Syrian Kurds I happen to know do not see themselves as a 'Kurdish nation', but 'Syria'), just like the Jews taught me to distinguish between 'Zionist Jews' and 'other Jews'. All first hand.
So, by best will, but I simply do not understand: what kind of 'links' shall I offer you? To first-hand experiences like sitting in the famous coffeeshop vis-a-vis the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, chatting with the highest-distinguished MiG-21-pilot of the SyAAF, accompanied by his friend who was a Kurd, while 50 metres down the road a gang of Hezbullat was selling CDs titled 'Battle for Baghdad Airport', and showing scenes of Chechens chopping heads of captured Russian troops?
Okay, thanks for clearifying. I asked you those questions not because i thought you were lying or as a critical, but just because simply a lot of things you say about the kurds can't be found basically nowhere on the internet, so I wondered where you took that information.
I see.
Well, most of things I've published about can't be found anywhere on the internet (nor, actually, in other books to the same topics). Which is why I'm damned as 'spy' in about a dozen of countries (and officially sought for by IRGC's Judge Salvatti, too).
Here's the (partial) list:
https://www.helion.co.uk/people/tom-cooper.php
Wow, I didn't know that! That's both cool and sad. Thanks!
Thanks a lot! Very useful information.
Btw, why the Assadists aren't fighting? They should have been well equipped and well fed, right?
Maybe they don’t want to die in a meaningless battle in a lost war defending someone they don’t care about.
It wasn't as evident as now in late november or early december, that Asaad was going to lose so quickly! It seems Russians are even worse than US when it comes to building a foreign puppet's army.
You’re the best.
I didn’t know that most of the SDF’s ranks are conscripted Arabs. Are the depictions of 'female Kurdish soldiers without headscarves,' often plastered across social media and internet articles about the SDF, somewhat far-fetched from the reality on the ground? I guess this isn’t surprising after all. It also explains the revolts across SDF-controlled territories.
Collapsing house of cards , with the side support (Russia and Iran) falling off already.