I'm glad that my yesterday concerns about the Rastan bridge chokepoint came to be unfounded.
OTOH - do you have any additional info about the clashes and forces south of Damascus? Yesterday morning there was only one local rebel ambush, now there are at least three or four separate, but larger area of actions.
Are these groups independent forces, affiliate with the CMO, or part of another, yet not counted party?
Don't have any contacts there, so hard to say. Gauging by reporting in the social media there is protesting, and there are sorts of mini-uprisings in Namar and Jasim, for example (50km south of Damascus), in al-Jizah and several places around it.
These are areas that used to be liberated form Assadism back in 2012-2016, until Jordan banned all support for insurgents and these were forced into 'reconcilliation' (indeed: thousands of 'reconcilled' insurgents - entire units - ended serving Assadists, and were 'integrated' into the Syrian Army by the Russians).
How much are the locals really controlling any pieces of real estate: no idea. I do consider it likely that they've meanwhile been in touch with the CMO (at least wouldn't be surprised if this is the case).
Seems smart of CMO to make deals and allow local militias to switch sides. Make it possible for the other to avoid fighting. A lot of people probably doesn’t have much loyalty to Assad. But of course they can switch back later.
There's no love for Assad in Dera'a. There never was. The protesting erupted there as first, and the armed uprising began precisely because Assadists began arresting, torturing, and mutilating even little kids in Dera'a, back in March 2011.
Of course, we laymen will have a lot of questions that you will surely have to answer several times in the coming days. ^^
Did you expect the defense of Aleppo and even more of Hama to collapse so quickly?
And just speculatively. Assuming the CMO insurgents manage to wrest power from Assad, will the situation for the people there improve or is it just "one devil being replaced by another"? I would simply be interested in your personal opinion, since you know the country and the people.
And with regard to IS. In the Syrian desert, an enormous power vacuum is emerging in many places after Assad's withdrawal. IS has already announced that it will take advantage of the situation. Will this whole situation unintentionally strengthen IS again or will PKK/YPG/SDF be able to prevent IS from doing so?
And last but not least, what is the CMO insurgents' attitude to Russia and Iran beyond the propaganda? Would they continue to tolerate a Russian and Iranian military presence in Syria after possible negotiations with the two countries or are the rebels hardliners when it comes to these two countries?
I hope I have asked some interesting questions and thank you for your reports.
Sorry, simply no way: there will be no cooperation between the CMO and the Daesh.
Should there be doubts, check the HTS' behaviour towards opposition over the last 6-7 years. Sure, it was suppressing revolutionary activists and their critique: 'but' and 'only' arresting and detaining them.
However, whatever Daesh (and/or al-Qaeda) sympathisers and/or 'activists' it's found in western Idlib... they were exterminated. To the last. In this regards, the HTS is absolutely merciless.
That would require so called SDF/YPG/PKK to not call CMO "Turko-facist jihadi daeshi mercenaries from space" the minute they think they can get US support to occupy a larger piece of Syria just like they call everybody when they believe they can invade an additional part of the country.
They were literally starting again this refrain at the beginning of the current rebel offensive until they realize like everybody else that this is not just a regular flare up but the collapse of the Assad regime
Right now they seem willing to push not just further in Deir Ezzor where they faced an Arab uprising last year, one they managed to repress only with direct US intervention & bombing, but well into the Syrian Badiah. Not doubt to seize the natural ressource just like Russia did in 2016. This would actually be the best way to sustain a forever IS led insurgency against their occupation.
The best way to get rid of IS remnants is a free and just Syria where all including the Sunni Arab majority can live in peace away from any occupation.
Yes, some very interesting questions. Sorry if I do not go into guessing about some of their possible future aspects: I can't predict future, and thus I'm not even trying.
1.) Nope. No way. AFAIK, even the CMO only aimed to liberate northern Idlib. It 'just' proved so highly effective that the IRGC deployed there collapsed and ran away, in turn opening the way into Aleppo... and then well beyond.
2. & 3.) I am not going to guess what might happen if the CMO topples Assad. They first have to manage that. And to manage that, they first must secure Homs, and then drive all the way to Damascus. (And, while I can say something like, 'that would have not only 'strategic implications for Syria, but would send tectonic shocks through all of the Middle East and beyond', it didn't happen [yet] and is thus pointless to discuss.)
That said, yes, you're right: amid the collapse of the Assadist/IRGC-control of the Badya (central-eastern Syria) the Daesh is spreading rapidly. I wouldn't be surprised to hear them seizing Palmyra (for third time), in the coming days. Thus, yes, the CMO's clash with the Daesh is meanwhile unavoidable.
I do hope the CMO can find a way to postpone this, though, simply because their focus is what really matters: Assadism. Is this defeated, it's going to be far easier to counter the Daesh, too.
That said, no idea what exactly is going to happen in Badya, and I'm not going to guess. Let me 'just' observe in this regards that back in 2014-2017, when Anadan (a town in northern Idlib) was under the insurgent control, its civic authorities have had the (by far) most effective programe for de-extremisation of Daesh idiots. No idea where are the people in question now, but if they can re-launch their efforts, that's certainly going to be far more effective than all the Assadist, IRGC, Russian, US and PKK's 'offensives' and whatever else against the Daesh of the last 7-8 years - combined.
4.) IRGC was the target No. 1 during the 'initial phase' of the offensive into north-eastern Idlib. It held the frontline hit the hardest in the first few hours. Therefore, one can deduce that the IRGC is going to remain a target in the future, too. Regarding Russia: it's still around, and its air strikes are hitting the civilians in Idlib, Aleppo, and now in Hama, very hard. But, because the VKS has next to no clue about what exactly is going on where on the battlefield, and is next of incapable of hitting manoeuvring targets, it has next to no effects upon the ground battle. Thus, the CMO 'can afford' something like 'ignoring the Russians' and focusing on the Assadists and the IRGC. At least for the time being.
I read an article probably at least six years ago about how the Syrian army had disintegrated to the point where most areas marked as under government rule are in fact controlled by an array of regime-friendly militias - they were just better supported and coordinated than rebel groups with a lot less infighting.
I presume it's cheaper to handle a country this way. Just don't get in a situation when your supposed forces may be inclined to switch sides, because they will.
AFAIK, the Russian Med Flotilla left the port because it's on a live-firing exercise. I'm (still) not sure if that's anything like an 'evacuation' - especially considering the ships are still nearby.
That said, the port is not defended by the Russians. Actually, they're controlling just a part of it. It's defended by Assadists (and they've bussed lots of reinforcements to the town, the last few days).
It looks like the rebels have captured enough artillery to bombard Tartus from a distance for a long time
I do not know if that would be a good strategy or if they would be better off concentrating on clearing any pockets of Assadists in their captured areas.
Maybe it would be enough for now to bottle the Russians up by blocking the land routes.
The Russian blogger Fighterbomber seems very depressed.
He is talking about Russia abandoning their bases in Syria and abandoning a lot of equipment simply because they will have very limited functionality and no longer be fully operational, not because they are defeated in battle.
He said they now only have two backup airfields which is the critical minimum and they do not have a good answer to drones due to supply issues of air defence missiles and systems due to the distance from Russia.
Yup. There are reports (and videos) purportedly showing the Russians hauling their S-300 SAM-systems from Hmeymim AB via Banyas to the port of Tatrous. Some say, that's an evacuation etc...
I'm 'cautiously optimistic', but, after all the experiences with 'Syria', taking nothing for granted.
Yesterday Salih Muslim sugar talked about his amical wish toward CMO, today its Mazloum Abdi turn. How cute of them. One would almost forget they repeatedly proposed to join Assad's (or should we say Russia's) Idlib 2019/2020 offensive.
Thanks Tom. Can you clarify what kind of air support the rebels have? Is it just their various drones? Is it possible that the Turkish, Israeli and US air forces are assisting them to some extent?
1.) Just UAVs. A small number of jet-propelled, relatively fast and long-ranging (150-200km) UAVs, and then only enough FPVs to fly some 40+ strikes a day. All made locally (even with help of some of solutions provided by the Ukrainian GUR).
2.) Sorry, really, that's simply not the case. The Primitives in the Pentagon (i.e. the US DoD & DIA) are insistent that the CMO are 'terrorists' and 'jihadists' (indeed: they are those who have 'leaked' that idiotic DIA report according to which 'the entire uprising in Syria was instigated by al-Qaeda').
Israel is not the least interested in losing Assad, or seeing him being replaced by some sort of 'normal' (and especially no 'pluralist') Syrian government: it needs a 'mortal threat' in Syria so it can continue crying for help and cashing US aid.
And Erdogan can't stand any kind of independent Syrian insurgents (he was the first to start conditioning provision of help to them, with them subjecting themselves to the political control of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and that publicly, already back in November 2011).
For Israel and the US, the political situation in Syria is a balancing act and a weak Assad is the preferred option. So I would guess that both parties will be letting Iran fly as many IRGC in as they can.
That's a hypothesis that will be easy to check in practice. In effect does Israel want the so-called "Axis of Resistance" to thrive while at the same time fighting it? Seems a bit 3D chess-ish to me.
I would suspect that Israel (thus also the US) want neither the Assadists nor the "Axis of Resistance" to thrive because any organized Syrian Govt. is likely to be anti Israel. Syrian turmoil is not 3D chess but a maintenence of the status quo that has allowed Israel to focus on more capable adversaries.
In theory yes, but I think the distant dream of a stable state run by Jowlani and people like that would be aligned with Turkey and other Sunni states, basically all of whom are Israel appeasers. I don't think Jowlani is a new Nasser. At best he's just not-a-Salafist-terrorist.
The failure to organise the destruction of the bridge north of Hama is an indication that the Assad army is in a bit of a mess. Also looks like the CMO are taking territory Taliban style i.e. discussions via mobile/walkie talkie
With that amount of actors it is hardly callable an army. Compared to that the armies of the Holy Roman Empire were more centralised with a unified picture of what the end goal is.
Noise I’m reading now is Assad forces are already abandoning Homs. Further south in Daraa, it appears more than local protests, "Opposition factions in Daraa gain control of the Al-Ray checkpoint, scientific research area, universities, and cow farm after SAA forces retreat toward Daraa city. Defections were secured near Al-Ray, while the "Southern Operations Room" now holds the "Old Customs" checkpoint in Daraa Al-Balad.”
How this all plays out, given the quick turn-over of events in Syria, I expect we’ll know tomorrow.
Nothing yet. Just something like a collapse of Assadist security and military services in the Dera'a Province (southern Syria, along the border to Jordan), and hurried withdrawal of the 4th Division (Maher al-Assad) from there.
Thanks for the update. I also would like updates on Ukraine of course, but Don is doing a fine job. And I must say that the collapse of the Assad regime seems like a very good thing. Which would end up with Russia getting kicked out. Nice as well.
Looks to me like the CBA/FED/IHG is pushing hard with support of LKJ/ONM on the south side of the city. If RQP/UTS/XWV is joining in they may defete ZY.
So far this is how i understand the complicity of this.
Eh? Tan poco? Queremos mas información! Principalmente como afecta a nuestro simpático dictador democrático elegido por el 105% de la población rusa!
Sorry, not much left to say. And no idea how's that influencing el-Presidente: the times I used to have connections 'up there', are long since over.
Thank you for the update!
I'm glad that my yesterday concerns about the Rastan bridge chokepoint came to be unfounded.
OTOH - do you have any additional info about the clashes and forces south of Damascus? Yesterday morning there was only one local rebel ambush, now there are at least three or four separate, but larger area of actions.
Are these groups independent forces, affiliate with the CMO, or part of another, yet not counted party?
Don't have any contacts there, so hard to say. Gauging by reporting in the social media there is protesting, and there are sorts of mini-uprisings in Namar and Jasim, for example (50km south of Damascus), in al-Jizah and several places around it.
These are areas that used to be liberated form Assadism back in 2012-2016, until Jordan banned all support for insurgents and these were forced into 'reconcilliation' (indeed: thousands of 'reconcilled' insurgents - entire units - ended serving Assadists, and were 'integrated' into the Syrian Army by the Russians).
How much are the locals really controlling any pieces of real estate: no idea. I do consider it likely that they've meanwhile been in touch with the CMO (at least wouldn't be surprised if this is the case).
Seems smart of CMO to make deals and allow local militias to switch sides. Make it possible for the other to avoid fighting. A lot of people probably doesn’t have much loyalty to Assad. But of course they can switch back later.
There's no love for Assad in Dera'a. There never was. The protesting erupted there as first, and the armed uprising began precisely because Assadists began arresting, torturing, and mutilating even little kids in Dera'a, back in March 2011.
Of course, we laymen will have a lot of questions that you will surely have to answer several times in the coming days. ^^
Did you expect the defense of Aleppo and even more of Hama to collapse so quickly?
And just speculatively. Assuming the CMO insurgents manage to wrest power from Assad, will the situation for the people there improve or is it just "one devil being replaced by another"? I would simply be interested in your personal opinion, since you know the country and the people.
And with regard to IS. In the Syrian desert, an enormous power vacuum is emerging in many places after Assad's withdrawal. IS has already announced that it will take advantage of the situation. Will this whole situation unintentionally strengthen IS again or will PKK/YPG/SDF be able to prevent IS from doing so?
And last but not least, what is the CMO insurgents' attitude to Russia and Iran beyond the propaganda? Would they continue to tolerate a Russian and Iranian military presence in Syria after possible negotiations with the two countries or are the rebels hardliners when it comes to these two countries?
I hope I have asked some interesting questions and thank you for your reports.
SDF and CMO are able to defeat ISIS if they would be able to make a deal and cooperate.
Sorry, simply no way: there will be no cooperation between the CMO and the Daesh.
Should there be doubts, check the HTS' behaviour towards opposition over the last 6-7 years. Sure, it was suppressing revolutionary activists and their critique: 'but' and 'only' arresting and detaining them.
However, whatever Daesh (and/or al-Qaeda) sympathisers and/or 'activists' it's found in western Idlib... they were exterminated. To the last. In this regards, the HTS is absolutely merciless.
I mean deal between SDF and CMO, then they can defeat Daesh.
That would require so called SDF/YPG/PKK to not call CMO "Turko-facist jihadi daeshi mercenaries from space" the minute they think they can get US support to occupy a larger piece of Syria just like they call everybody when they believe they can invade an additional part of the country.
They were literally starting again this refrain at the beginning of the current rebel offensive until they realize like everybody else that this is not just a regular flare up but the collapse of the Assad regime
Right now they seem willing to push not just further in Deir Ezzor where they faced an Arab uprising last year, one they managed to repress only with direct US intervention & bombing, but well into the Syrian Badiah. Not doubt to seize the natural ressource just like Russia did in 2016. This would actually be the best way to sustain a forever IS led insurgency against their occupation.
The best way to get rid of IS remnants is a free and just Syria where all including the Sunni Arab majority can live in peace away from any occupation.
Yes, some very interesting questions. Sorry if I do not go into guessing about some of their possible future aspects: I can't predict future, and thus I'm not even trying.
1.) Nope. No way. AFAIK, even the CMO only aimed to liberate northern Idlib. It 'just' proved so highly effective that the IRGC deployed there collapsed and ran away, in turn opening the way into Aleppo... and then well beyond.
2. & 3.) I am not going to guess what might happen if the CMO topples Assad. They first have to manage that. And to manage that, they first must secure Homs, and then drive all the way to Damascus. (And, while I can say something like, 'that would have not only 'strategic implications for Syria, but would send tectonic shocks through all of the Middle East and beyond', it didn't happen [yet] and is thus pointless to discuss.)
That said, yes, you're right: amid the collapse of the Assadist/IRGC-control of the Badya (central-eastern Syria) the Daesh is spreading rapidly. I wouldn't be surprised to hear them seizing Palmyra (for third time), in the coming days. Thus, yes, the CMO's clash with the Daesh is meanwhile unavoidable.
I do hope the CMO can find a way to postpone this, though, simply because their focus is what really matters: Assadism. Is this defeated, it's going to be far easier to counter the Daesh, too.
That said, no idea what exactly is going to happen in Badya, and I'm not going to guess. Let me 'just' observe in this regards that back in 2014-2017, when Anadan (a town in northern Idlib) was under the insurgent control, its civic authorities have had the (by far) most effective programe for de-extremisation of Daesh idiots. No idea where are the people in question now, but if they can re-launch their efforts, that's certainly going to be far more effective than all the Assadist, IRGC, Russian, US and PKK's 'offensives' and whatever else against the Daesh of the last 7-8 years - combined.
4.) IRGC was the target No. 1 during the 'initial phase' of the offensive into north-eastern Idlib. It held the frontline hit the hardest in the first few hours. Therefore, one can deduce that the IRGC is going to remain a target in the future, too. Regarding Russia: it's still around, and its air strikes are hitting the civilians in Idlib, Aleppo, and now in Hama, very hard. But, because the VKS has next to no clue about what exactly is going on where on the battlefield, and is next of incapable of hitting manoeuvring targets, it has next to no effects upon the ground battle. Thus, the CMO 'can afford' something like 'ignoring the Russians' and focusing on the Assadists and the IRGC. At least for the time being.
Is it possible for the insurgents to cut off the coast without entering Homs itself?
Yes, it is. They can advance into the hills west of Homs and then to the Lebanese border.
Salamiyah's Ismailis (shia sect) made a deal with CMO https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1864953873443495957
I read an article probably at least six years ago about how the Syrian army had disintegrated to the point where most areas marked as under government rule are in fact controlled by an array of regime-friendly militias - they were just better supported and coordinated than rebel groups with a lot less infighting.
I presume it's cheaper to handle a country this way. Just don't get in a situation when your supposed forces may be inclined to switch sides, because they will.
There's also Shia vs Suni line. But the history and relations are very complicated ...
Thank you, Tom. Is Tartus defended by the ruzzians ? Or already given up ? The vessels have left. It was the port via which ruzzians received material from Iran, it seems. Best wishes. P.S. It will be interesting to see how all this will connect with Lebanon. I don't know whether you read L'Orient Le jour. here is a sample. https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1438441/le-liban-a-la-veille-dune-periode-de-stabilite-malgre-les-nombreuses-bombes-a-retardement.html
AFAIK, the Russian Med Flotilla left the port because it's on a live-firing exercise. I'm (still) not sure if that's anything like an 'evacuation' - especially considering the ships are still nearby.
That said, the port is not defended by the Russians. Actually, they're controlling just a part of it. It's defended by Assadists (and they've bussed lots of reinforcements to the town, the last few days).
It looks like the rebels have captured enough artillery to bombard Tartus from a distance for a long time
I do not know if that would be a good strategy or if they would be better off concentrating on clearing any pockets of Assadists in their captured areas.
Maybe it would be enough for now to bottle the Russians up by blocking the land routes.
As explained yesterday, CMO's current priority is: Assadists first.
The Russian blogger Fighterbomber seems very depressed.
He is talking about Russia abandoning their bases in Syria and abandoning a lot of equipment simply because they will have very limited functionality and no longer be fully operational, not because they are defeated in battle.
He said they now only have two backup airfields which is the critical minimum and they do not have a good answer to drones due to supply issues of air defence missiles and systems due to the distance from Russia.
Yup. There are reports (and videos) purportedly showing the Russians hauling their S-300 SAM-systems from Hmeymim AB via Banyas to the port of Tatrous. Some say, that's an evacuation etc...
I'm 'cautiously optimistic', but, after all the experiences with 'Syria', taking nothing for granted.
Yesterday Salih Muslim sugar talked about his amical wish toward CMO, today its Mazloum Abdi turn. How cute of them. One would almost forget they repeatedly proposed to join Assad's (or should we say Russia's) Idlib 2019/2020 offensive.
It seems Daraa countryside is rising again.
Hopefully it is already too late for Assad.
Thanks Tom. Can you clarify what kind of air support the rebels have? Is it just their various drones? Is it possible that the Turkish, Israeli and US air forces are assisting them to some extent?
1.) Just UAVs. A small number of jet-propelled, relatively fast and long-ranging (150-200km) UAVs, and then only enough FPVs to fly some 40+ strikes a day. All made locally (even with help of some of solutions provided by the Ukrainian GUR).
2.) Sorry, really, that's simply not the case. The Primitives in the Pentagon (i.e. the US DoD & DIA) are insistent that the CMO are 'terrorists' and 'jihadists' (indeed: they are those who have 'leaked' that idiotic DIA report according to which 'the entire uprising in Syria was instigated by al-Qaeda').
Israel is not the least interested in losing Assad, or seeing him being replaced by some sort of 'normal' (and especially no 'pluralist') Syrian government: it needs a 'mortal threat' in Syria so it can continue crying for help and cashing US aid.
And Erdogan can't stand any kind of independent Syrian insurgents (he was the first to start conditioning provision of help to them, with them subjecting themselves to the political control of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and that publicly, already back in November 2011).
As for 'how comes all of this', cannot but recommend reading my 'write up' on the Syrian War, posted about a year ago: https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/syria-5-6-october-2023-adventures
For Israel and the US, the political situation in Syria is a balancing act and a weak Assad is the preferred option. So I would guess that both parties will be letting Iran fly as many IRGC in as they can.
That's a hypothesis that will be easy to check in practice. In effect does Israel want the so-called "Axis of Resistance" to thrive while at the same time fighting it? Seems a bit 3D chess-ish to me.
I would suspect that Israel (thus also the US) want neither the Assadists nor the "Axis of Resistance" to thrive because any organized Syrian Govt. is likely to be anti Israel. Syrian turmoil is not 3D chess but a maintenence of the status quo that has allowed Israel to focus on more capable adversaries.
In theory yes, but I think the distant dream of a stable state run by Jowlani and people like that would be aligned with Turkey and other Sunni states, basically all of whom are Israel appeasers. I don't think Jowlani is a new Nasser. At best he's just not-a-Salafist-terrorist.
The failure to organise the destruction of the bridge north of Hama is an indication that the Assad army is in a bit of a mess. Also looks like the CMO are taking territory Taliban style i.e. discussions via mobile/walkie talkie
With that amount of actors it is hardly callable an army. Compared to that the armies of the Holy Roman Empire were more centralised with a unified picture of what the end goal is.
Is it only a matter of time before the Russians destroy the bridge, and how much would its destruction impact the rebels' advancement?
It's too late for that. Besides, check Google Maps: the bridge is easy to bypass along a road nearby.
Noise I’m reading now is Assad forces are already abandoning Homs. Further south in Daraa, it appears more than local protests, "Opposition factions in Daraa gain control of the Al-Ray checkpoint, scientific research area, universities, and cow farm after SAA forces retreat toward Daraa city. Defections were secured near Al-Ray, while the "Southern Operations Room" now holds the "Old Customs" checkpoint in Daraa Al-Balad.”
How this all plays out, given the quick turn-over of events in Syria, I expect we’ll know tomorrow.
Tom,any evening updates? Has the SAA left Homs?
Nothing yet. Just something like a collapse of Assadist security and military services in the Dera'a Province (southern Syria, along the border to Jordan), and hurried withdrawal of the 4th Division (Maher al-Assad) from there.
Thanks for the update. I also would like updates on Ukraine of course, but Don is doing a fine job. And I must say that the collapse of the Assad regime seems like a very good thing. Which would end up with Russia getting kicked out. Nice as well.
Things are starting to get crazy. Video of civilians (?) of Daraa wandering around “captured” heavy armaments with AK47s and sandals.
Bashar al-Assad looks good to go. His pleads to Putin are shot as his regime.
He will probably leave in a plane to Moscow at the end....
Looks to me like the CBA/FED/IHG is pushing hard with support of LKJ/ONM on the south side of the city. If RQP/UTS/XWV is joining in they may defete ZY.
So far this is how i understand the complicity of this.