Syria War, 6 December 2024

Hello everybody!

By now it’s plain obvious: every time I start working on my next update on the War in Ukraine, and our collection for the ZSU, the CMO insurgents in Syria make another major advance. So much so, meanwhile I had to draw a new map, and nobody can say how long this might remain valid… I think it cannot be denied that there is a major conspiracy…

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Seriously now: yesterday, 5 December 2024, was such a remarkable day for Syria (and such nobodies like me, ‘monitoring’ the country for decades already), that it’s next to impossible to put it into words.

Hama, a city acting as the centre and symbol of resistance against Assadism already since around 1976, the site of a major uprising in February 1982, the city as terribly terrorised by the Assadist regime as hardly any other in Syria - was liberated.

What’s more, immediately after, the CMO insurgents rushed south, and - for the first time since the start of anti-Assad uprising in March-May 2011 - linked up with two additional insurgent strongholds: Rastan and Talbiseh.

Back in 2011-2018, Rastan and Talbiseh used to be free: the local insurgents liberated the area, and repelled several major Assadist, IRGC-, and Russian offensives. Under the Russian mediation, they ‘reconcilled’ when major offensives by the regime drove the insurgents into western Aleppo: when all hope for a possible establishment of a land link to Idlib was lost.

What’s more: during their flight from Hama, what is left of the ‘best’ troops of the Assadist regime have failed to demolish the Rastan Bridge: a crucial highway link. Therefore, the VKS bombed it the whole night, and damaged it: whether it’s still passable for heavy vehicles is presently unclear.

While the VKS (and, possibly, Assadists) dropped some 20-30 bombs at the Rastan Bridge, the last night, only one is known to have actually scored a hit.

One way or another, as of this morning, the CMO insurgents have reached the northern outskirts of Homs.

Around the same time, the CMO insurgents also liberated Ithriyah (about 100km east of Hama), and then Uqayribat. I recall Ithriyah as a small, dusty town of low family homes in the semi-desert of the central Syrian plain. At the first look, ‘nothing important’. However, it’s a major crossroad, and important because over the last two days, the US-supported PKK/YPG/SDF also launched an advance: from al-Mansurah to Resafa and then in western direction. Ithriyah is now going to act as something like ‘stronghold in the eastern flank’ of the CMO.

Note: many of these insurgent advances are no result of ‘combat’ as such: by now, it’s definitely certain that the CMO is in regular contact with all the other parties. With dozens of Assadist commanders, with the PKK/YPG/SDF, perhaps even with the IRGC (where it’s funny that the PKK/YPG/SDF-leadership is all the time trying to talk to Türkye, but without much success, simply because Erdogan is not in control of the CMO). Cases are known like that of the Military Academy of Aleppo: the CMO agreed with Assadists to evacuate hundreds of troops and cadets from there. They were evacuated, but only to Khanasir. There, the Assadist commanders simply left them on their own and run away. All were captured, of course (and now are offered the opportunity to switch sides and fight for the insurgents). In case of places like Ithriyah and Uqayribat, it’s near-certain that there were similar agreements.

The liberation of Uqayribat is as important because from there, the insurgents are pushing in southern direction, de-facto flanking Homs.

***

….which is bringing me to the topic of Homs.

Sure, about three quarters of the city of Homs was completely demolished during the fighting of 2011-2015.

Nevertheless, Homs remains a major traffic hub: indeed, it is the link between Damascus and coastal cities like Tartous, Banyas and Lattakiya. If the regime loses Homs, it is going lose land connection to its strongholds in Jabal an-Nusayria (so-called ‘Alawite Mountains’) and along the coastal plain.

Unsurprisingly, over the last 3-4 days, there was a growing number of reports about the Assadists and the IRGC rushing all possible reinforcements to Homs. In turn: there’s a major traffic jam along the highway from Damascus to Homs and then from Homs to Tartous, as thousands of Assadist dependants are fleeing towards the coast.

Moreover, and reportedly, the IRGC’s Liwa al-Qods arrived in Homs, together with the Republican Guards Division (owned by Bashar al-Assad): over the last year, these three units were deployed along the Israel-occupied Golan Heights. In similar fashion, in the Dayr az-Zawr area (eastsern Syria, outside my map), the 4th Armoured Division (owned by Maher al-Assad) and the 17th Division have handed over al-Quriyah and several other towns to the PKK/YPG/SDF and then drove in big columns in the direction of Homs. The idea seems to be to ‘defeat’ or at least ‘block’ the CMO advance, then see what happens next: the PKK, allied with the Assadist regime almost since it came into being, back in 1986, doesn’t mind, of course.

Mechanised units of one of Assadist formations underway through Homs, early this morning.

Assadist formations rushing towards Homs were followed by first significant reinforcements sent to Syria by Hezbollah Lebanon. Arguably, Israel bombed them repeatedly as they were crossing the border between Lebanon and Syria in the al-Qusayr area (50km south-west of Homs), but I doubt that’s going to stop them.

Overall: depending on the speed with which both the CMO and Assadists/IRGC can bring their forces into position, one can expect the 2nd Battle of Homs to erupt in the coming days.