1) Irpin river that covers Kyiv from north was turned into a wide swamp (which is was a century ago) by flooding it with the waters from Kyiv reservoir. There was no way forward for them.
2) The fields around the road were fields of deep mud - rasputitsa. Thus the armor had to stay on the road in a column - no way to go left or right.
Theory 3, Modification: This is all the preliminary media teasing to get all the speculation and everyone's favorite public figure out in the open. Then a reorganization essentially promotes Zaluzhnyi and puts him in charge of the stuff he's been talking about in public articles - unifying the war effort from top to bottom in a new way.
But then again, that's just how I'd approach matters. Ukraine has two different armies:
- Small one that can mount effective offensive operations, attracts volunteers, and is run by younger leaders who get how to use drones to minimize casualties.
- The mobilized army, which is responsible for holding most of the front with Soviet gear and too often officers with a Soviet mentality.
The length of the front and difficulty sustaining operations with the pittance of support offered by Ukraine's partners means limited attacks in areas that can be isolated. These two armies are going to have different mentalities and capabilities, much like German (and Romanian, Hungarian, et al) infantry divisions and their armored battle groups playing fire brigade did in 1943/1944.
To run the war and maintain two different logistics and training streams probably means new organization at the war staff level. Zaluzhnyi essentially needs to run a combo of the US Training and Doctrine Command and the services' War Colleges. Directly connect industry to units in the field and bypass the established bureaucracy.
Or the media could be totally right like always and this comes down to pure ego.
But fantastic analysis overall. Excellent takedown of the "great man" bias in military history. And hey, some of us do remember Nehring, and not just from Hearts of Iron. Though I've a soft spot for Balck and Mellenthin, myself. Even wrote them into my fiction. The German staff and field officer dynamic duo exemplified.
People tend to forget history or never even read about it. For example everybody knows about the Prussian military might. However, few know that the first encounter with Napoleon was a disaster and lots of Prussian generals ended being shot for that. It took a while until people like Blücher got to the top.
While I agree that the south stinks like betrayal, I disagree the north defense of the invasion was. It was the tactical approach to let the Russians in, attack the supply lines further back and then destroy the overstretched BTGs with minimum support or self defense capabilities in the front.
There is a reason Russia scrapped the whole BTG concept afterwards.
I don't know if you follow Col. Reisner, but just a few days ago a lecture from back in November at the Bundeswehr academy in Munich was released on youtube. Worth a watch since he adresses military instead of the public in this one.
It wasn't the failure of the ukranian intelligence. Budanov said openly in an interview that he knew about a russian offensive and he sent his wife abroad. The chief CIA Mr. Burns has visited Kyiv many times before 24/02/22 and during the last visit he shared with ukrainians the full-scale invasion plan.
Nope, do not follow Reisner (though then, I do not follow the mass of commentators about this war: want to have my mind free of any kind of influences).
I'm in disagreement with that conclusion, and also - AFAIK - the BTG-concept was scrapped only months later.
Indeed, Reisner's 'explanation' sounds to me like 'driven by need to explain it in military fashion', rather than based on facts. There are few examples from the past for similar behaviour. For example, on 4 June 1942, US Navy and Imperial Japanese Navy fought the battle of Midway. The US operation in question was based on breaking the IJN's code. Thus the USN couldn't really brag about a major victory and sinking of four Japanese aircraft carriers.
Therefore, the US Army Air Force (predecessor of the US Air Force) was 'free' to claim the victory for itself. Indeed, it went as far as to claim that its B-17 bombers have sunk four Japanese carriers (and lots of other ships).
....it was only years later, well after the Second World War, that the truth - the story of the Battle of Midway as we know it - was revealed in the public.
Me thinks, Reisner is making the same mistake: he's 'free' to claim the 'poor little Russians drove into a giant trap'.
Aren't you a bit bigheaded to tell me what to do and what not?
Any source you access influences you, if you want it (or keep a "free mind") or not. And this is also true for yourself, keep that in mind.
I pointed this one out, because I think it is different from his usual analysis adressing military and worthwhile watching.
The tactic I described in the North is pretty well documented and happened on more than one of the russian approach vectors, hence it's hard to believe it was an "accident".
And to the other user pointing out Butcha, sure if they had some crystal ball foreseeing the future they might have done it differently, but it's always easy to judge the past instead of the future.
Can't see anything where S's post told you what not to do. If you are thinking of the comment "Don't follow Reisner), he was just omitting the "I", just like my previous sentence in this post.
You're offering no 'critique', but launching one, unprovoked and entirely pointless personal attack after the other.
Primary issue here is that you seem entirely unable to understand what you read - just like when you blamed me for copying 'word by word' a Forbes article that was quoting my article.
This is certainly an after the fact approach. There was no grand strategy or general tactical approach in my view (formed also by impressions from media interviews with ZSU officers and other many commentators) . That Bucha was very badly defended mostly with TRO is well-known. The ad-hoc decisions at Irpin… it was certainly not a plan to let the Russians as deep as to E-40 highway out of Kyiv. But as a consequence of their deep drive, the Russians became overstretched and were defeated. Maybe only near Kharkiv and Sumy there was such a deliberate plan but probably only for the first 10-20km.
If it was a trap, why wouldn't you let the Il-76 try to land and blow them out of the air during landing? They are good and easy targets as they can't fly evasive manoeuvres.
Why were no larger formations waiting on the flanks of the Russians to not only make them retreat but entirely crush those formations because they ran out of fuel? For example the attack from Sumy direction.
They didn't trap them. That was the only option with the troops at hand there. My wife's cousin was sitting on packed suitcases North of Fastiv at that time. The Russian encirclement there was stopped by the Zhitomirski brigade as he told and they were giving the Russians hell. Guess why - Zhitomir is the next city to the west of Kyiv so they were the first to be there and also their families would be next.
it was very tiresome reading both 'Zelensky hates Zaluzhny' and 'it's all just ruSSian propaganda' takes these couple of weeks
re Kyiv offensive, i can offer some insight as a Belarusian - the thing is Ukrainians (both gov and people) are very naive about lukashenko regime - to the point they got offended when Belarus MoD didn't keep its promise not to allow ruSSians into Ukraine - and that after repeated failures of Minsk "agreements", the fascist suppression of civil liberties in Belarus, and years of ruSSian military build-up on its territory
Definitely. For example my mother in laws colleagues sent her mother to Bucha as it is outside the city of Kyiv and the government said it is save there. Well, she is no more...
Very good explanation what's a real job of Commander-in-Chief and I agree there's a space to improvements in organization from what I've read in public sources. E.g. last summer some units complained about lack of training in UXO by the western instructors. But hey, who knows better UXO at Ukraine front lines than ZSU soldiers?
"and then Churchill fired Auchinleck… before ‘finding’ Montgomery, who, in the end, did nothing the way Auchinleck wouldn’t do it, anyway"
Initially it was "Strafer" Gott who was appointed to replace Auchinleck - but he was killed in a plane crash. Churchill opposed the appointment of Montgomery, but was finally "persuaded" by Alanbrooke.
And Montgomery did do things rather differently from his predecessors.
Most notably, he made it very clear that "orders are orders, not a starting point for discussion" - fixing one of the long-standing problems with command within 8th Army.
He also dramatically increased the amount and intensity of training (something he was always hot on - his division trained and rehearsed withdrawal in the face of the enemy (the most difficult of military manoeuvres) during the "phoney war" period of 1940. As a result, they were able to mount a successful rearguard action enabling the Dunkirk evacuations.
His other significant change was communicating plans for battle, and their individual parts in it, to relatively junior officers, not just to generals and staff officers.
Of course, I know all of this, but can't go into every minute detail: not even into how much of a self-promoter was Montgomery, just like Rommel, Patton and all the other famous generals.
As long as one can walk the talk, then as distasteful self-promotion may be, it is acceptable. Unfortunately, Montgomery failed to walk the full distance of his talk. He did the job initially though, further proving what you wrote. Performs, keep; fails, replace. Rinse and repeat until victory.
Montgomery was indeed selfpromoting, also after the war, to the point of writing a large book on the history of warfare. I still remember the drawings of the battle, especially the one for Canne. I now assume he didnt write it himself, but it made an impression in seventies. And as other has pointed out, some of us do remember Wawel, Auchinleck etc. But we easily succumb to the big man theory in war.
My Russian contacts are telling me (as fact) that Zaluzhny has already been sacked and is on his way to be Ukraine's ambassador to the UK. Their BS is astounding.
Oh sure, there is loads of evidence that he is thinking about it and maybe intends to do it. The Russians don't seem to distinguish between thinking about it and having already done it.
Thinking aloud in public here is very close to having done.
Look at that another way: if Zelensky wanted to keep Zaluzhny he would have never said anything like that (as such talks lower the morale), but would have stuck to the "unity" narrative. As he was doing for 2 years of the war.
Biden, Sullivan and Co wanted to manipulate this war but failed completely mostly because they underestimated Putler's regime and partly because they did not take into consideration Trump's popularity and the duplicity of the American politicians. All the mess with the dismissal of Zaluzhny is a mere consequence of the lack of ammunition and other military equipment that had to be supplied in time and in adequate quantity. We in Ukraine are simply tired of the Western cowardice and shortsightedness. As to Zelensky he is more like the personage of "The comedians" by Graham Green than Churchill or Truman.
No, he is not. He is not in Churchill's position because Ukraine has no colonies and no dominions to get resources and Ukraine is not an island. He is not in Truman's position because Ukraine is attacked by the enemy many times richer and Ukraine has no nukes while the enemy has. Moreover his partners probably will be never attacked by this enemy . At least they hope so and this is the problem.
The US is fighting its own battle for survival as a democracy. Unlike Ukraine, only a few people have died so far but it is the sole reason why aid to Ukraine is interrupted. I am sorry for the impact it is having on your survival. There is still reason for hope, even as the cost rises.
Can you elaborate on this please. I have never thought about it like that. What makes you think the help (its decrease) is somehow related to few US volunteers died in ukraine?
Don - on that note, I just listened to an interview of George Terry who has worked in Ukraine for 26 years and runs a NGO there. He passed on a comment about Russian disinfo in the USA from his visit to Washington DC that, if true, is astounding. From 15:04 to 17:36.
That doesn't surprise me at all, and yet I'm still surprised by how many people believe something just because a political leader they follow, a political leader of the "team" they've chose, has said it.
Certainly, there is ignorance among political leaders but many support propaganda because it aligns with their long term goals.
Your post shows the infantility of Ukrainians as a nation. What do you mean we are tired? How can you get tired of smbd who is helping you? Its like The beggar is tired of people not giving him money. It makes no sense, right?
It is incredible baseness to call the country struggling for its existence " a beggar". Ukraine is no more a beggar than Great Britain during WWII. No more discussion with you.
And, if you mean the Arab-Israeli conflict: are you only interested in figures since 7 October 2023, or - which is what actually counts - those since 1918?
I think that truth about the South will not come in real time during the war … Do you have a historical precedent - of a political leader who has successfully established the reasons for an early failure and made them public ? maybe years after the war as a leading history theory, we will learn more. It was a failure of Zelenskyy to prepare better for the war but who could have done better? Would Porpshenko have been able to secure hundreds more of tanks, millions of artillery shells, etc before the war? Was the Ukrainian society ready for such an effort? I think the answers are “no” and that is why they elected Ze and he actually managed to grow into the job. No, Elena - he is not Chrchill or Truman (which were no saints nor geniuses) but he is a leader at war who managed to grow into the job.
Tom, another very important observation about the current state of the war - hey, things are not at all as bad as in August 2022! Yes, Avdiivka is on the brink of being lost but … who still remembers how quickly the Russian took Kremina and advanced all the way to Lyman? Now the event can’t make it to Terny. How TOS-1 was unstoppable weapon similar to today’s KABs? In a matter of two-three months - Popasna, Rubizhne and Severidonetsk were gone. Now it takes same time to take Avdiivka.
Now ZSU is inflicting much more damage to the Russians, it keeps Southern Kherson and Crimea under threat, and actually it finally has started damaging the Russian war infrastructure/machine within - albeit at a very slow pace.
He didn’t run away. Not so many years ago, no one was sure whether any Ukrainian political or military leader wouldn’t just run away under Russian pressure. He managed to organize international support around Ukraine’s war effort. While military aid is quite insufficient, I don’t think that anyone thought even current levels were achievable
at the start of the war. He hasn’t made any big mistakes since the war started - all that is needed.
Well, yes it was his star hour so to say in the spring-summer of 2022.
Where his psychological inner qualities and his actor background fit the picture nicely.
But neither before the was no after the 2022 he did anything meaningful and useful for the nation. In my personal rating zelensky is the worst president in the history of Ukraine.
zelensky was in power from 2019 with absolute majority im parliament.
the war started in 2022 (3 years later). Country lost ~30% of territory and hundred thousands in killed and injured. (not to mention destroyed economy and 6-8 million migrant). President lied directly into eyes of his citizens.
Then Stalin is the weakest among the USSR heads of state as in 1942 the enemy got close to the capital, the most populated territories were captured and millions of men died.
The same by the way is true about Zaluzhny. One mistake of Ze was to limit early Zaluzhny’s media appearances which actually added even more to the myth about Zaluzhny. Look, I do think he should stay at the army top. Between Zaluzhny and Ze, I also choose Zaluzhny. But the myth about Zaluzhny is also unhealthy. Actually, anyone willing to share how Ze chose Zaluzhny in the first place? When the war was about to (re)start in 2022, I was surprised to find that Khomchak was replaced. Having in mind how long Poroshenko kept Muzhenko….
I'm afraid that if Zaluzhny gets to the top of the state, he will add impunity to the existing corruption. He fixed neither issue in the army, meaning he is either unwilling or unable to. Why should that change if he rules the country?
At the very least Zelensky has always been sensitive to the public turning against him.
Many best fighters died or are disabled, whoever remains in the army is tired. There are no men willing to replace them. This is in part the result of sticking to Bakhmut, in part - of lack of the ammo, in part - of losing the trained volunteer units in the offensive. The Ukrainian army is losing its quality which they are trying to compensate by the quantity of forcibly mobilized men.
It is very sad what you say. But then, what is the solution? It is not possible to turn the balance without more army men. The Russian human resource is far from over. They seem to have still enough army men.
There is a need for a strong multiplier: either new technologies (i.e. mass production of drones or a *massive* Western help) or a well-planned defense. If that lowers the Ukrainian losses by an order of magnitude, the army may survive with its current strength. Paying in lives for the Russian prevalence in artillery is not going to work anymore.
This could be true if the Russian army didn't get new men as well. But it does unfortunately, and they compensate the losses do far. You can resist but I see it difficult to win without a rise.
With mass-produced self-targeting Lancets or unlimited artillery/MLRS/AD ammo to outrange the enemy. The Ukrainian army is still staffed above 50%, and if it starts to fight back with negligible losses there'll be some new recruits.
Yes, and it is all about money. It is frightening to see that you (and us all in Europe) depend on Mr. Trump. He has a chance to make AGA: by defeating Russia. I don't even want to think about conspiracy theories. Let's see.
There is one thing I don't understand very well, and please forgive me for bothering you with that. The family of general Syrskyi lives in Russia. This sounds like a liability. Do they have ties or not any more? I don't say he is not trustworthy, but it is quite odd to me.
Didn't think about that, who knows :) But are the people ready to surrender or they will find a different Zelensky? Syrsky did a good job so far, but all that I know is from outside.
Thank you for this great write up, one of my favourites so far, as you touch a lot of important angles. So much gold in here that I have heard other experts echo as well. I think it was Ben Hodges who recently said if the army commander loses the confidence of the Commander in Chief(Zelensky), then he should resign since no one is irreplaceable. I like Zaluzhnyi and enjoyed his recent write ups, they show he appreciates the rapidly evolving nature of technology, but he's not the only smart person in Ukraine nor the only capable one nor the one with the best ideas.
As I was reading your write up I had questions that you later brought up, like for example how did the Russians get past to Kherson and take the whole of Zaporizhzhia yet this was obviously the most at risk location?(Was it Zelensky who forced Zaluzhnyi to move the troops?)
As well for me, the question has always been why they didnt attack through Zaporizhzhia to cut the land bridge instead of trying to retake Kherson city in late 2022? I understand as you stated Zaluzhnyi wanted to attack through Zaporizhzhia after the successful counter offensive but was not granted permission, this is also a bad sign. Those responsible should reflect on this as in hindsight it sounds like Zaluzhnyi's idea would have made a lot of sense.
Another thing is I have heard some analysts such as Michael Kofman, who I respect, talk negatively about when Ukraine tried to hold Bakhmut, because purportedly Zelensky wanted to attack there while Zaluzhnyi wanted to attack somewhere else(Which is one of the things that brought contention between Zaluzhnyi and Zelensky!). But the Bakhmut battle was partly what led to Prighozin's Wagner mutiny so it wasnt entirely useless. I hope you could touch on this incident.
So I am trying to reconcile the fact that Zaluzhnyi is not irreplaceable with the possibility Zelensky may have been behind some of the mistakes during the course of the war. Whatever it is, empirical data shows changing military commanders has more benefit than not changing them. But how does this data stand up if possibly, a political head is interfering with the work of a decent Army commander?
There was a recent article about Kherson and Zaporizhya offensive. it was not zelensky but US who did not like the plan to attack zaporizhya as it was much more risky and it makes sense at least to me. It could change the war greatly in both ways.
Thanks for the info, in hindsight the Zaporizhzhia front was not anywhere as fortified as it is today and neither did Russia have the manpower in September 2022. But again I dont have the full details. It just seemed odd to me considering the Russians in Kherson city were in a precarious position regardless even if they mined the whole area they couldnt transport supplies easily past the Dnieper river. For me, attacking through Zaporizhzhia would have been a much smarter thing than trying to retake Kherson city, but again I'm not a General but a lay man.
They were afraid of the Russian counterattacks at the flanks: from Kherson region in the West by troops coming through Crimea and from Donetsk in the East. That could have encircled the Ukrainian troops that would have been attacking towards the sea.
They were stuck there because:
1) Irpin river that covers Kyiv from north was turned into a wide swamp (which is was a century ago) by flooding it with the waters from Kyiv reservoir. There was no way forward for them.
2) The fields around the road were fields of deep mud - rasputitsa. Thus the armor had to stay on the road in a column - no way to go left or right.
Thank you.
Theory 3, Modification: This is all the preliminary media teasing to get all the speculation and everyone's favorite public figure out in the open. Then a reorganization essentially promotes Zaluzhnyi and puts him in charge of the stuff he's been talking about in public articles - unifying the war effort from top to bottom in a new way.
But then again, that's just how I'd approach matters. Ukraine has two different armies:
- Small one that can mount effective offensive operations, attracts volunteers, and is run by younger leaders who get how to use drones to minimize casualties.
- The mobilized army, which is responsible for holding most of the front with Soviet gear and too often officers with a Soviet mentality.
The length of the front and difficulty sustaining operations with the pittance of support offered by Ukraine's partners means limited attacks in areas that can be isolated. These two armies are going to have different mentalities and capabilities, much like German (and Romanian, Hungarian, et al) infantry divisions and their armored battle groups playing fire brigade did in 1943/1944.
To run the war and maintain two different logistics and training streams probably means new organization at the war staff level. Zaluzhnyi essentially needs to run a combo of the US Training and Doctrine Command and the services' War Colleges. Directly connect industry to units in the field and bypass the established bureaucracy.
Or the media could be totally right like always and this comes down to pure ego.
But fantastic analysis overall. Excellent takedown of the "great man" bias in military history. And hey, some of us do remember Nehring, and not just from Hearts of Iron. Though I've a soft spot for Balck and Mellenthin, myself. Even wrote them into my fiction. The German staff and field officer dynamic duo exemplified.
Thx, Andrew.
And yes... there are now 'two ZSUs', and thus two doctrinal concepts within the force. Not an easy task...
Ah, and thanks for reminding me of von Mellenthin: couldn't recall his name any more.
Can you explain please. What 2 zsu are you talking about?
The only 2 zsu ive heard of is zsu of zaluzhny and zsu fo syrsky which are the same small russian armies but different commanders.
Volunteer units and mobilized units
You mean like the Marcus' unit?
Who is Marcus?
this guy - https://forbes.ua/ru/profile/valeriy-markus-ananev-696
Thank you very much. Very, very interesting.
Great read, thanks Tom.
People tend to forget history or never even read about it. For example everybody knows about the Prussian military might. However, few know that the first encounter with Napoleon was a disaster and lots of Prussian generals ended being shot for that. It took a while until people like Blücher got to the top.
While I agree that the south stinks like betrayal, I disagree the north defense of the invasion was. It was the tactical approach to let the Russians in, attack the supply lines further back and then destroy the overstretched BTGs with minimum support or self defense capabilities in the front.
There is a reason Russia scrapped the whole BTG concept afterwards.
I don't know if you follow Col. Reisner, but just a few days ago a lecture from back in November at the Bundeswehr academy in Munich was released on youtube. Worth a watch since he adresses military instead of the public in this one.
dude you don't let the ruSSians in
Bucha is the reason lots of Ukrainians don't trust Zelensky anymore
it was an intelligence failure grounded in misunderstanding of the fascist lukashenko regime and years of willing collaboration with it
What does it have to do with Bucha?
It wasn't the failure of the ukranian intelligence. Budanov said openly in an interview that he knew about a russian offensive and he sent his wife abroad. The chief CIA Mr. Burns has visited Kyiv many times before 24/02/22 and during the last visit he shared with ukrainians the full-scale invasion plan.
Nope, do not follow Reisner (though then, I do not follow the mass of commentators about this war: want to have my mind free of any kind of influences).
I'm in disagreement with that conclusion, and also - AFAIK - the BTG-concept was scrapped only months later.
Indeed, Reisner's 'explanation' sounds to me like 'driven by need to explain it in military fashion', rather than based on facts. There are few examples from the past for similar behaviour. For example, on 4 June 1942, US Navy and Imperial Japanese Navy fought the battle of Midway. The US operation in question was based on breaking the IJN's code. Thus the USN couldn't really brag about a major victory and sinking of four Japanese aircraft carriers.
Therefore, the US Army Air Force (predecessor of the US Air Force) was 'free' to claim the victory for itself. Indeed, it went as far as to claim that its B-17 bombers have sunk four Japanese carriers (and lots of other ships).
....it was only years later, well after the Second World War, that the truth - the story of the Battle of Midway as we know it - was revealed in the public.
Me thinks, Reisner is making the same mistake: he's 'free' to claim the 'poor little Russians drove into a giant trap'.
Aren't you a bit bigheaded to tell me what to do and what not?
Any source you access influences you, if you want it (or keep a "free mind") or not. And this is also true for yourself, keep that in mind.
I pointed this one out, because I think it is different from his usual analysis adressing military and worthwhile watching.
The tactic I described in the North is pretty well documented and happened on more than one of the russian approach vectors, hence it's hard to believe it was an "accident".
And to the other user pointing out Butcha, sure if they had some crystal ball foreseeing the future they might have done it differently, but it's always easy to judge the past instead of the future.
'Bigheaded'? That's an understatement. I'm nothing less than a megalomaniac, searching for ways to control the World, every evening... 🙄
Can't see anything where S's post told you what not to do. If you are thinking of the comment "Don't follow Reisner), he was just omitting the "I", just like my previous sentence in this post.
You're offering no 'critique', but launching one, unprovoked and entirely pointless personal attack after the other.
Primary issue here is that you seem entirely unable to understand what you read - just like when you blamed me for copying 'word by word' a Forbes article that was quoting my article.
Sorry, no time for that.
This is certainly an after the fact approach. There was no grand strategy or general tactical approach in my view (formed also by impressions from media interviews with ZSU officers and other many commentators) . That Bucha was very badly defended mostly with TRO is well-known. The ad-hoc decisions at Irpin… it was certainly not a plan to let the Russians as deep as to E-40 highway out of Kyiv. But as a consequence of their deep drive, the Russians became overstretched and were defeated. Maybe only near Kharkiv and Sumy there was such a deliberate plan but probably only for the first 10-20km.
https://youtu.be/bniPj92YVhU?si=yJ7rMNqEyCkLYddg
(Sry only german)
If it was a trap, why wouldn't you let the Il-76 try to land and blow them out of the air during landing? They are good and easy targets as they can't fly evasive manoeuvres.
Why were no larger formations waiting on the flanks of the Russians to not only make them retreat but entirely crush those formations because they ran out of fuel? For example the attack from Sumy direction.
They didn't trap them. That was the only option with the troops at hand there. My wife's cousin was sitting on packed suitcases North of Fastiv at that time. The Russian encirclement there was stopped by the Zhitomirski brigade as he told and they were giving the Russians hell. Guess why - Zhitomir is the next city to the west of Kyiv so they were the first to be there and also their families would be next.
Absolutely brilliant contribution to the "debate of the day". Your commentary is something that I value as much or more than almost any other. Thanks.
cheers Tom, very insightful
it was very tiresome reading both 'Zelensky hates Zaluzhny' and 'it's all just ruSSian propaganda' takes these couple of weeks
re Kyiv offensive, i can offer some insight as a Belarusian - the thing is Ukrainians (both gov and people) are very naive about lukashenko regime - to the point they got offended when Belarus MoD didn't keep its promise not to allow ruSSians into Ukraine - and that after repeated failures of Minsk "agreements", the fascist suppression of civil liberties in Belarus, and years of ruSSian military build-up on its territory
Indeed, a lot of what the Ukrainian government - and, sometimes: the ZSU, too - is doing, appears as 'driven by wishful thinking' to me.
Definitely. For example my mother in laws colleagues sent her mother to Bucha as it is outside the city of Kyiv and the government said it is save there. Well, she is no more...
Very good explanation what's a real job of Commander-in-Chief and I agree there's a space to improvements in organization from what I've read in public sources. E.g. last summer some units complained about lack of training in UXO by the western instructors. But hey, who knows better UXO at Ukraine front lines than ZSU soldiers?
"and then Churchill fired Auchinleck… before ‘finding’ Montgomery, who, in the end, did nothing the way Auchinleck wouldn’t do it, anyway"
Initially it was "Strafer" Gott who was appointed to replace Auchinleck - but he was killed in a plane crash. Churchill opposed the appointment of Montgomery, but was finally "persuaded" by Alanbrooke.
And Montgomery did do things rather differently from his predecessors.
Most notably, he made it very clear that "orders are orders, not a starting point for discussion" - fixing one of the long-standing problems with command within 8th Army.
He also dramatically increased the amount and intensity of training (something he was always hot on - his division trained and rehearsed withdrawal in the face of the enemy (the most difficult of military manoeuvres) during the "phoney war" period of 1940. As a result, they were able to mount a successful rearguard action enabling the Dunkirk evacuations.
His other significant change was communicating plans for battle, and their individual parts in it, to relatively junior officers, not just to generals and staff officers.
Of course, I know all of this, but can't go into every minute detail: not even into how much of a self-promoter was Montgomery, just like Rommel, Patton and all the other famous generals.
As long as one can walk the talk, then as distasteful self-promotion may be, it is acceptable. Unfortunately, Montgomery failed to walk the full distance of his talk. He did the job initially though, further proving what you wrote. Performs, keep; fails, replace. Rinse and repeat until victory.
Montgomery was indeed selfpromoting, also after the war, to the point of writing a large book on the history of warfare. I still remember the drawings of the battle, especially the one for Canne. I now assume he didnt write it himself, but it made an impression in seventies. And as other has pointed out, some of us do remember Wawel, Auchinleck etc. But we easily succumb to the big man theory in war.
My Russian contacts are telling me (as fact) that Zaluzhny has already been sacked and is on his way to be Ukraine's ambassador to the UK. Their BS is astounding.
Thats what people say in Ukraine (among other things)
Office wants him to resign (and thus offering different alternative positions).
Zaluzhny refuses to resign so president has to dismiss him at his will.
Thats the only problem for now. And it is 100% political issue.
resigning is bad for zaluzhny rating and good for office.
dismissing zaluzhny is bad for office rating and good for zaluzhny.
Zelensky's office told that Zaluzhny is just a manager under the president and thus there is nothing extraordinary in the case of the president's exchanging him for yet another manager. I don't know how you call such statements other than the preparation of public opinion https://www.unian.ua/politics/zvilnennya-zaluzhnogo-podolyak-zdivuvavsya-reakciji-na-chutki-12529830.html
Oh sure, there is loads of evidence that he is thinking about it and maybe intends to do it. The Russians don't seem to distinguish between thinking about it and having already done it.
Thinking aloud in public here is very close to having done.
Look at that another way: if Zelensky wanted to keep Zaluzhny he would have never said anything like that (as such talks lower the morale), but would have stuck to the "unity" narrative. As he was doing for 2 years of the war.
Looks like the Russians were right . Not heard anything about him becoming Ambassador to the UK though.
They found out that he cannot leave ZSU before the mobilization is over. No civilian jobs are possible.
It could be possible (any law could have exemptions), but perhaps he doesn't want to.
Thank you so very much. It explains lots of things to me.
Biden, Sullivan and Co wanted to manipulate this war but failed completely mostly because they underestimated Putler's regime and partly because they did not take into consideration Trump's popularity and the duplicity of the American politicians. All the mess with the dismissal of Zaluzhny is a mere consequence of the lack of ammunition and other military equipment that had to be supplied in time and in adequate quantity. We in Ukraine are simply tired of the Western cowardice and shortsightedness. As to Zelensky he is more like the personage of "The comedians" by Graham Green than Churchill or Truman.
....but: he's now in Churchill or Truman's position - and we must hope he's up to the task.
No, he is not. He is not in Churchill's position because Ukraine has no colonies and no dominions to get resources and Ukraine is not an island. He is not in Truman's position because Ukraine is attacked by the enemy many times richer and Ukraine has no nukes while the enemy has. Moreover his partners probably will be never attacked by this enemy . At least they hope so and this is the problem.
The US is fighting its own battle for survival as a democracy. Unlike Ukraine, only a few people have died so far but it is the sole reason why aid to Ukraine is interrupted. I am sorry for the impact it is having on your survival. There is still reason for hope, even as the cost rises.
Most people don´t understand that
Can you elaborate on this please. I have never thought about it like that. What makes you think the help (its decrease) is somehow related to few US volunteers died in ukraine?
I think he was referring to the US "fighting its own battle for survival as a democracy," which I took to mean its internal struggles.
yeah thanks for clarification. I completely misunderstood it.
Don - on that note, I just listened to an interview of George Terry who has worked in Ukraine for 26 years and runs a NGO there. He passed on a comment about Russian disinfo in the USA from his visit to Washington DC that, if true, is astounding. From 15:04 to 17:36.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8E_ogYXj0A0&t=904s
That doesn't surprise me at all, and yet I'm still surprised by how many people believe something just because a political leader they follow, a political leader of the "team" they've chose, has said it.
Certainly, there is ignorance among political leaders but many support propaganda because it aligns with their long term goals.
Well, if the majority of the US population voted for a dictator that would still be a free democratic vote.
Yes. Democracy does provide the tools for a path to autocracy.
Your post shows the infantility of Ukrainians as a nation. What do you mean we are tired? How can you get tired of smbd who is helping you? Its like The beggar is tired of people not giving him money. It makes no sense, right?
It is incredible baseness to call the country struggling for its existence " a beggar". Ukraine is no more a beggar than Great Britain during WWII. No more discussion with you.
"The graveyards are full of indispensable men” - Charles De Gaulle
Do you know how many civilians died in Israel conflict and how many in Ukraine war?
What is 'Israel conflict'?
And, if you mean the Arab-Israeli conflict: are you only interested in figures since 7 October 2023, or - which is what actually counts - those since 1918?
And Ukraine war is since ... 17. century? Millions died in Holodomor in 1932-3.
Did I say something else?
Thanks Tom!
I think that truth about the South will not come in real time during the war … Do you have a historical precedent - of a political leader who has successfully established the reasons for an early failure and made them public ? maybe years after the war as a leading history theory, we will learn more. It was a failure of Zelenskyy to prepare better for the war but who could have done better? Would Porpshenko have been able to secure hundreds more of tanks, millions of artillery shells, etc before the war? Was the Ukrainian society ready for such an effort? I think the answers are “no” and that is why they elected Ze and he actually managed to grow into the job. No, Elena - he is not Chrchill or Truman (which were no saints nor geniuses) but he is a leader at war who managed to grow into the job.
Tom, another very important observation about the current state of the war - hey, things are not at all as bad as in August 2022! Yes, Avdiivka is on the brink of being lost but … who still remembers how quickly the Russian took Kremina and advanced all the way to Lyman? Now the event can’t make it to Terny. How TOS-1 was unstoppable weapon similar to today’s KABs? In a matter of two-three months - Popasna, Rubizhne and Severidonetsk were gone. Now it takes same time to take Avdiivka.
Now ZSU is inflicting much more damage to the Russians, it keeps Southern Kherson and Crimea under threat, and actually it finally has started damaging the Russian war infrastructure/machine within - albeit at a very slow pace.
He didn’t run away. Not so many years ago, no one was sure whether any Ukrainian political or military leader wouldn’t just run away under Russian pressure. He managed to organize international support around Ukraine’s war effort. While military aid is quite insufficient, I don’t think that anyone thought even current levels were achievable
at the start of the war. He hasn’t made any big mistakes since the war started - all that is needed.
Well, yes it was his star hour so to say in the spring-summer of 2022.
Where his psychological inner qualities and his actor background fit the picture nicely.
But neither before the was no after the 2022 he did anything meaningful and useful for the nation. In my personal rating zelensky is the worst president in the history of Ukraine.
If you value Yanukovich , more…
Its not that i value yanukovych more.
My reasoning is as follows.
zelensky was in power from 2019 with absolute majority im parliament.
the war started in 2022 (3 years later). Country lost ~30% of territory and hundred thousands in killed and injured. (not to mention destroyed economy and 6-8 million migrant). President lied directly into eyes of his citizens.
Who is responsible for all of the above?
How can one evaluate the ruler by such results?
Then Stalin is the weakest among the USSR heads of state as in 1942 the enemy got close to the capital, the most populated territories were captured and millions of men died.
The same by the way is true about Zaluzhny. One mistake of Ze was to limit early Zaluzhny’s media appearances which actually added even more to the myth about Zaluzhny. Look, I do think he should stay at the army top. Between Zaluzhny and Ze, I also choose Zaluzhny. But the myth about Zaluzhny is also unhealthy. Actually, anyone willing to share how Ze chose Zaluzhny in the first place? When the war was about to (re)start in 2022, I was surprised to find that Khomchak was replaced. Having in mind how long Poroshenko kept Muzhenko….
I'm afraid that if Zaluzhny gets to the top of the state, he will add impunity to the existing corruption. He fixed neither issue in the army, meaning he is either unwilling or unable to. Why should that change if he rules the country?
At the very least Zelensky has always been sensitive to the public turning against him.
Many best fighters died or are disabled, whoever remains in the army is tired. There are no men willing to replace them. This is in part the result of sticking to Bakhmut, in part - of lack of the ammo, in part - of losing the trained volunteer units in the offensive. The Ukrainian army is losing its quality which they are trying to compensate by the quantity of forcibly mobilized men.
you forgot to add lack of rotation.
It is very sad what you say. But then, what is the solution? It is not possible to turn the balance without more army men. The Russian human resource is far from over. They seem to have still enough army men.
There is a need for a strong multiplier: either new technologies (i.e. mass production of drones or a *massive* Western help) or a well-planned defense. If that lowers the Ukrainian losses by an order of magnitude, the army may survive with its current strength. Paying in lives for the Russian prevalence in artillery is not going to work anymore.
This could be true if the Russian army didn't get new men as well. But it does unfortunately, and they compensate the losses do far. You can resist but I see it difficult to win without a rise.
With mass-produced self-targeting Lancets or unlimited artillery/MLRS/AD ammo to outrange the enemy. The Ukrainian army is still staffed above 50%, and if it starts to fight back with negligible losses there'll be some new recruits.
Yes, and it is all about money. It is frightening to see that you (and us all in Europe) depend on Mr. Trump. He has a chance to make AGA: by defeating Russia. I don't even want to think about conspiracy theories. Let's see.
There is one thing I don't understand very well, and please forgive me for bothering you with that. The family of general Syrskyi lives in Russia. This sounds like a liability. Do they have ties or not any more? I don't say he is not trustworthy, but it is quite odd to me.
Probably no ties by now since he is in the Ukrainian army at least since 2014 https://meduza.io/feature/2024/02/09/novyy-glavkom-vsu-aleksandr-syrskiy-rodilsya-v-rossii-ego-roditeli-seychas-zhivut-vo-vladimire
I've got a new conspiracy theory: Zelensky may have removed nationalistic commanders from power as a preparation to surrender.
Didn't think about that, who knows :) But are the people ready to surrender or they will find a different Zelensky? Syrsky did a good job so far, but all that I know is from outside.
Thank you for this great write up, one of my favourites so far, as you touch a lot of important angles. So much gold in here that I have heard other experts echo as well. I think it was Ben Hodges who recently said if the army commander loses the confidence of the Commander in Chief(Zelensky), then he should resign since no one is irreplaceable. I like Zaluzhnyi and enjoyed his recent write ups, they show he appreciates the rapidly evolving nature of technology, but he's not the only smart person in Ukraine nor the only capable one nor the one with the best ideas.
As I was reading your write up I had questions that you later brought up, like for example how did the Russians get past to Kherson and take the whole of Zaporizhzhia yet this was obviously the most at risk location?(Was it Zelensky who forced Zaluzhnyi to move the troops?)
As well for me, the question has always been why they didnt attack through Zaporizhzhia to cut the land bridge instead of trying to retake Kherson city in late 2022? I understand as you stated Zaluzhnyi wanted to attack through Zaporizhzhia after the successful counter offensive but was not granted permission, this is also a bad sign. Those responsible should reflect on this as in hindsight it sounds like Zaluzhnyi's idea would have made a lot of sense.
Another thing is I have heard some analysts such as Michael Kofman, who I respect, talk negatively about when Ukraine tried to hold Bakhmut, because purportedly Zelensky wanted to attack there while Zaluzhnyi wanted to attack somewhere else(Which is one of the things that brought contention between Zaluzhnyi and Zelensky!). But the Bakhmut battle was partly what led to Prighozin's Wagner mutiny so it wasnt entirely useless. I hope you could touch on this incident.
So I am trying to reconcile the fact that Zaluzhnyi is not irreplaceable with the possibility Zelensky may have been behind some of the mistakes during the course of the war. Whatever it is, empirical data shows changing military commanders has more benefit than not changing them. But how does this data stand up if possibly, a political head is interfering with the work of a decent Army commander?
There was a recent article about Kherson and Zaporizhya offensive. it was not zelensky but US who did not like the plan to attack zaporizhya as it was much more risky and it makes sense at least to me. It could change the war greatly in both ways.
Thanks for the info, in hindsight the Zaporizhzhia front was not anywhere as fortified as it is today and neither did Russia have the manpower in September 2022. But again I dont have the full details. It just seemed odd to me considering the Russians in Kherson city were in a precarious position regardless even if they mined the whole area they couldnt transport supplies easily past the Dnieper river. For me, attacking through Zaporizhzhia would have been a much smarter thing than trying to retake Kherson city, but again I'm not a General but a lay man.
They were afraid of the Russian counterattacks at the flanks: from Kherson region in the West by troops coming through Crimea and from Donetsk in the East. That could have encircled the Ukrainian troops that would have been attacking towards the sea.