No Bucks, No Buck Rogers

Hello everybody!

Before I get back to finish the work on diverse features waiting for their turns for some 3, 4, 7, 10 weeks etc., permit me to address one issue about which I’m meanwhile receiving really a lots of questions - from readers here, and from the media. Indeed, so many question, I find it easier to answer all of them in this, one feature.

The question is that about whether (President) Zelensky is going to replace (General) Zaluzhny, or not; and, if he does so, what’s going to happen?

Before I do so, let me explain the title: back in the late 1940s, there was a highly popular science-fiction comic published in the USA, titled Buck Rogers. It was so popular they made a movie or two along it, and it was still quite influential when I was a little kid, back in the 1970s… Now, Buck Rogers was a hero flying all over the space to fight all sorts of villains. One way or the other, when somebody concluded that Buck couldn’t do anything of that without proper financing (i.e. ‘funding’ in modern jargon), the conclusion was born that, ‘No bucks (no money), no Buck Rogers’…

With other words: ‘modern weapons come at a price’, but also, ‘one can’t fight a war without financing the war, first’…

That is, at least from my point of view, the very essence of this, ‘Zelensky vs Zaluzhny’ affair, too. As for why: see below.

Now, on to your questions…

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Question 1: What could be the reason for a dismissal of Zaluzhny and/or the leadership/other top commanders of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU), and/or what would it mean?

Up front: I can’t know, nor would I ever claim to know, exactly, what is on Mr. Zelensky’s mind, nor what is on Mr. Zaluzhny’s mind. And, as far as I know, a final decision in this regards was not even taken (at least not at the time I’m writing this). Indeed: I have a major problem just finding out what’s on my own mind, not to talk about my wife’s mind (and, trust me, that’s not just about, ‘that issue with women’). So, how am I supposed to know what’s on somebody else’s mind?

At best, I can analyse what they say.

Theory No. 1

Essence of what Zelensky says, time and again, is that he’s determined to liberate every inch of Ukrainian territory along borders from 1992. This is what the majority of the Ukrainian public seems to want, and, apparently, what’s on Zaluzhny’s mind, too.

Right now this objective seems to be hopelessly out of reach. There are two reasons for this:

A.) The politicians, the media, and large parts of the public have expected too much from the Ukrainian summer offensive of 2023. Plus, on the military plan, this offensive miscalculated in several regards: it encountered much better prepared resistance than expected. As such, it was overoptimistic: even if destroying a large number of Russian units, it failed to reach as far as it aimed to reach…

B.) Since October, the West is preoccupied with ‘saving Israel’ - which is in no need of being saved at all, but excelling in doing to Palestinians exactly what the Russians are doing to Ukrainians. But, hey: ‘Israel is ah-so-super-turbo-important’. Which is just as good, at least for Western purposes, because otherwise it would become crystal clear just how endemically and hopelessly incompetent, corrupt and greedy is the entire system of administration here (whether in the USA, EU or anywhere else in the ‘West’): so much so that, just one example, in two years it still failed to significantly increase at least the production of artillery shells…

….and the combined result of this is that now everybody is deeply depressed. The war was not finished with another, elegant and quick Ukrainian victory, and thus things are black, sinister, and whatever… And when everybody is depressed, and things are ‘that bad’, then ‘somebody must pay’…

While, actually, the condition of the ZSU right now is ‘far from good, but at least nowhere near as bad as it was as of August 2022’. However, that’s ‘unpopular’ right now, and thus nobody is paying attention….and I’m digressing.

The point is: it’s no big secret (and that already since August-September 2022) that some of top ZSU commanders (see: ‘colonels’ and ‘generals’) are not convinced they can or that they should. At least some think there is no reason to try this; or that this should not even be attempted. For example, statements I’ve heard were in style of: why lose precious troops to ‘liberate Donbas’, where only people who seem not curious to get liberated are still around in Donbas?

Considering there was such thinking already (almost) two years ago; and considering the West’s proven, systemic incompetence and the resulting inability to reinforce the ZSU sufficiently to enable a successful, large-scale offensive (not to talk about securing a durable supply of enough artillery ammunition for the ZSU just to hold its current positions), it’s very likely (but anything else than sure: mind, this is really just my ‘best guess’), that some of top ZSU officers are argumenting in the same style. See: ‘we could, but why shall we?’ Or, ‘we’re not given the means, thus we can’t’.

…which is something people in positions like that of Zelensky’s simply do not like to hear.

Even more so considering that it is at least as possible (if not even ‘likely’) that some of them are blaming the government (and the head of that government is Zelensky) for the failure to secure what they need (or let them reform and rearm the ZSU on time, i.e. before 2022, or similar….).

Theory No. 2

Alternatively, it is possible that the reasons for this entire affair are a ‘mix’ of all of above-listed issues, or just few of them. Or it could be the ‘chemistry’ between Zelensky and Zaluzhny is ‘poor’… we can’t really know, right now. Point is, one way or the other, this is resulting in what I call ‘lasting disagreements’. Lasting disagreements between ‘political masters’ (politicians) and ‘generals’ are nothing new. Actually, they’re ‘news’ only for those trying to comment a ‘war’ while having no clue about war. In reality, the history is full of such disagreements.

Just for example: ever heard of Winston Churchill’s ‘series dismissal’ of commanders of the British Army’s Desert Force/VIII Army of 1941-1942? I’m sure you didn’t - foremost because the mass of English-language histories of that campaign is doing like if ‘nothing happened there in north Africa’ before Montgomery took over, in August 1942, and then ‘Allies became victorious and everything was simply great’…

Actually, Churchill first fired General Wavell, replacing him with Auchinleck; then Auchinleck appointed Ritchie, and then fired him, and then Churchill fired Auchinleck… before ‘finding’ Montgomery, who, in the end, did nothing the way Auchinleck wouldn’t do it, anyway… Nah. Instead, and if at all, you’ve heard that General- and then Field Marshal Rommel was such a military genius, eh? While, actually, he was messing around all the time, and it was on such of his staff like Westphal, or Nehring - people you’ve certainly never heard about - to clean up after him… Other, similar affairs, would include President Truman’s famous dismissal of (a 5-star) General (praised as the greatest US military genius ever) Douglas MacArthur, in 1951…. and then, shall I then go into ‘Hitler and his generals’? ‘Stalin and his generals’? ‘Saddam and his generals’? The ‘Mullahs’ in Tehran and their… Colonels?

….or, do you seriously think there are no disagreements between ‘blood-thirsty dictators’ and generals?

Ow, how cute… and naive… almost as cute and as naive as to think that Churchill was jealous or hated people like Wavell and Auchinleck and whatever else, and thus fired them and that was the end of their military careers. Quite on the contrary: knowing to appreciate their experiences and skills, he appointed them to other positions instead (whether they then messed up in India is a different story, of course…).

Important is to mind:

A) I’m repeating myself, but let me mention it again, for emphasis: ‘lasting disagreements’ between ‘political masters’ (politicians) and ‘generals’ are nothing new, and the mass of them is based on facts that politicians in positions like that of Zelensky’s, need ‘results’, while generals in position like that of Zaluzhny’s do not feel they have received the troops, equipment and supplies they need to accomplish their task (or, in MacArthur’s case: the authorisation to do what they consider for necessary to win a war).

B) Sometimes, such dismissals are ‘good’. Sometimes they’re… not really ‘bad’: right now, no negative example is coming to my mind. I’m only sure that no dismissals are not good at all. Mind the successive US presidents failing to fire even one of top US commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq of 2001-2020 period - and see where did that lead the USA (and allies). Add Syria to that - because this one is still going on.. Essentially, everybody was (and still is) lying (and cashing) - to themselves, to each other, and to the public; wasting trillions of taxpayer’s money; the armed forces won every battle…. and everybody lost two wars… and is on the best way to lose the third, and then the fourth and fifth one, too…

Theory No. 3

Based on Zelensky’s own statements (see here for a good example), it seems that he is looking for something like ‘fresh start’: a new group of top officers, not ‘spent’ by two years of bitter war (and lots of losses).

Why that/how comes?

Matter of fact is that commanding an armed force is an exhausting job. It’s nothing you can do ‘from nine to five’: it’s a 24/7 job, 365 days a year - with an important ‘sideline’. When trying to do this at war, you can very easily get killed, too. Foremost, you are carrying incredible amounts of responsibilities: if you screw up just one time, your entire nation can get literally eradicated, in the worst case. In best case, lots of people are going to die, and equipment worth billions is going to be lost. Thus, at least in theory, every single of your decisions must be ‘right’. And, hand on heart: that’s simply impossible. We’e all doing mistakes, all the time.

….and even if you survive all of this, you still have so much blood on your hands, the awareness of the fact you have sent so many people to die, or are responsible for so many deaths… that’s not the least ‘funny’. On the contrary, this all is leaving its mark on everybody (it would do so even to an iceberg, not only to a human being with the intellect necessary to run this kind of a job, so much is sure).

That’s why ‘fresh blood’ in sense of ‘appointing somebody not wasted by all he/she went through’ is - usually - a good idea.

(And if it is not: OK, then fire the next guy/gal, and find a replacement… repeat this exercise until the result is satisfactory, and mind: nobody is irreplaceable!)

As next, mind that military sciences are continuously advancing: they never stop. There are constant advances in technologies, tactics, even at operational and strategic levels. A ‘fresh mind’ is also much more likely to come up with new ideas: ideas taking the enemy by surprise. Thus, a ‘rotation’ of commanders (even if in form of a dismissal) is supposed to make sure that only those with best/latest qualifications are in charge. Of course: best/latest academic qualifications in military sciences do not always matter at war: combat experience and merits matter much more. However, mind that somebody doing an excellent job as a company-, or even a battalion commander, is anything else than ‘1000% sure’ to do as good a job as a brigade-, divisional-, theatre-, or a commander of an entire armed force… just like there is no ‘law’ that a successful Commander-in-Chief ‘must’ be a good president. Reason is that each of these positions requires a different style of acting (not to say: ‘different style of command’).

On the negative side: General Zaluzhny is enjoying such popularity in the ZSU and the population, that he’s an ‘indisputable authority’. Indisputable authorities are good to have, no doubt, but: they can become a huge liability, too. For example, any possible replacement for General Zaluzhny is likely to experience significant problems while trying to impose his/her authority upon the ZSU, and start re-forming it along own ideas. See, ‘but, under General Zaluzhny, we were doing that this way…’ - and then the guy (less likely a gal) has to yell, ‘….and under my command you’re going to do this my way’, all the time. Trust me, is no good ‘starter’, and even if: after a few days of that, you get fed up of it…

Bottom line, this ‘Theory No. 3’ is that Zelensky might be looking for officers with new ideas, or officers who might have it easier to continue reforming the ZSU, have it easier to adapt to new technologies and tactics, or to exercise their personal influence upon developments on the battlefield in different fashion.

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Question 2: What would General Zaluzhny’s dismissal mean for the Ukrainian prospects in this war?

This is where I’m now coming to the title of this feature. I.e. what they used to say already back in the 1950s or 1960s, about the essence of modern warfare: ‘no bucks, no Buck Rogers’.

Means: no money, no war.

Essentially: for the Ukrainian prospects in this war, replacement of Zaluzhny and other top ZSU officers means, ‘somewhere between very little and nothing’.

The reason is that Zaluzhny couldn’t do much more with the means (read: money) at his disposal, than he did. And that any kind of replacement for him is unlikely to be able to do much more.

If, for example, the USA are ‘saving Israel’ by shipping all the artillery shells calibre 155mm to the IDF, so this can go on killing another Palestinian mother every 10 minutes, but not to Ukraine… then no five Zaluzhnys could prevent a situation like in Avidiivika a few days ago, when troops called for artillery support, and M777s were ready and available - but had not a single shell on hand.

This is not going to change, regardless what group of officers might be in command of the ZSU. Nor if Zelensky organises a new team to command the ZSU. Because miligtary officers can only do what the political masters enable them to do. ‘Enabling’ is foremost done in form of providing funding, or securing foreign aid. Thanks to the EU, the funding for Ukraine’s survival as a state over the next few years is now secured. However, this does not mean that the funding for what the ZSU would need and/or like to have is secured, too: on the contrary, this is heavily dependent on whether the ZSU gets much more than what it’s getting since October.

And that is, actually, Zelensky’s responsibility.

Therefore, and because there is nobody who can create miracles, and unless the Zelensky administration finds a way to significantly increase the funding for the ZSU -and kicks a few smelly backsides in the West powerfully enough for this to start delivering serious amounts of artillery ammunition, pronto - any new group of officers at the top of the ZSU could change relatively little (just how little, or how much, see further below).

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Question 3: If the situation gets better, can Zelensky take credit for it?

Yes, of course he can. He’s the president and has the powers to dismiss Zaluzhny. Indeed, it’s actually his very job to, if the situation is not satisfactory (regardless for what reason), find an alternative.

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Question 4: What if the situation gets worse, who would be the main person to blame?

Guess who?

Zelensky. Because, ultimately, it’s his job, and he has to sign any such order, and thus - officially, and ultimately - it would be his decision.

Though, in such case, it’s on Ukrainian voters to ‘dismiss’ Zelensky - on the next elections, too.

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Question 5: What can you say about the general state of the Ukrainian Armed Forces under Valery Zaluzhny?

At this point in time, the answer is unclear. The state of research about this war is that only statements by different persons are available, and next to no official documentation. Thus, we have the ‘he said, she said’ situation: lots of different people are making lots of different statements, but there is no absolute certainty about who is right and who is wrong (or, even worse: who might be lying).

What is sure is that the ZSU under Zaluzhny has survived the initial Russian onslaught. Alone that was a major achievement – because almost everybody (and thus Putin, too), expected the ZSU to fold and run away. Even to surrender en masse. As next, the ZSU’s resistance and the quality of that resistance (and the resulting, massive Russian losses) have forced Putin to drastically reduce his original aims for this invasion: to withdraw his troops from Kyiv, Czerhnihiv, and Sumy, and to abandon plans for seizure of Odesa. Finally, the fighting will of the ZSU has enabled the recovery of eastern Kharkiv Oblast, and northern Kherson Oblast.

However, I’m of the kind not assigning such achievements to ‘generals’, but to lower-ranking officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and to ‘troops’. It doesn’t matter if generals are popular or not; military geniuses, or not; lucky, or not; skilled or not. Indeed, Generals can command as much as they like: if the officers, NCOs, and troops these generals are commanding are running away, surrendering or similar - then nobody is left to fight. And it took lots of officers, NCOs, and especially ‘troops’, lots of courage to stand and fight the massive Russian airborne- and mechanised onslaughts on Kyiv, Czernihiv, Mykolaiv, Voznessensk, Zaporizhzhya, on Izyum, on Lyman, on Popasna, on Severodonetsk, on Lysychansk, on Bakhmut, on Vuhledar, on Avidiivka etc. Indeed, the ZSU wouldn’t even reach Robotyne without its troops being ready to pay the ultimate price and cross those extensive and dense Russian minefields in order to get there.

Where ‘generals’ are really important is ‘organisation’. See: enabling lower-ranking officers, NCOs, and troops willing to fight – to fight. This enabling goes through the provision of organisation, command style, training, logistics, and then equipment and weaponry etc. By all respect, and with or without General Zaluzhny: these are all also the major problem zones of the ZSU.

Certain is only that it must have been Zaluzhny who has instilled, or at least authorised the instillation of the ‘fighting spirit’ and ‘can do’ mentality within lower ranks of the ZSU: without him at least granting permission to do so to somebody else, this would be impossible. Thus, a ‘plus point’ for him.

However, it is still so that after two years since the all-out invasion, none of other affairs important for the ZSU’s effectiveness is anything like ‘working well’. Indeed, improvements observed so far remain relatively minimal. The ZSU grew immensely in numbers, but lacks well-trained officers, skilled in commanding bigger formations (from battalion to brigade and bigger). The lack of skilled commanders is such that brigades are still grouped into ‘territories of operations’, instead into divisions - because Generals do not feel ‘safe’ to let their lower-ranking officers command more than a battalion. Foremost: much too often it happens that when there is a crisis, battalions from 5, 10, 15 and more different brigades are rushed to the zone in question, piecemeal, instead of entire brigades…

These are other big issues, too. There are major issues in the way the ZSU is deploying its newly-established units (see: rushing them into offensives, instead of assigning them quieter sectors of the frontline, to enable them to work-up). There are major issues with the logistics (which often appears to be run by ‘Soviet-style’ officers, who are rather ‘hoarding’ than ‘pushing forward’ what they get, etc., etc., etc.). And, there are major issues with the rotation of existing units: multiple examples are known for units that were kept in the line for up to 18 months, instead of being rotated to the rear, to enable them at last some time for rest, reorganisation and retraining. Problem: the longer a unit is in the field, the more exhausted its troops get, and thus the higher the losses and lower its efficiency…

Unsurprising result is: some units (those given the time to train, work-up and then get their stuff together before launching an offensive) are highly efficient, and thus attracting lots of volunteers. Others are ‘merely vegetating’: they’re existent (on paper and in the field), but of very low combat effectiveness…and thus attracting next to no volunteers, and in need of reinforcements whenever there’s a serious Russian attack. However, and as the ZSU knows very well (which is why it’s not insistent on general mobilisation of all the able-bodies men in Ukraine): combat effectiveness of volunteers is several magnitudes higher than that of draftees…

Finally, there’s the issue of accountability: while lots of medals are distributed to officers and troops successful in combat, investigations of major failures of the ZSU are progressing at snail’s pace – if at all. For example, two years since the Russians made their ‘Sunday afternoon drive’ to Kherson, Melitopol and Berdyansk, it is still unclear who was responsible for letting them do that? Similarly, it’s still unclear who has left the Russians drive all the way from the border to downtown Kyiv, on the first 2-3 days of the war? At least since November 2021, it was clear the Russians would invade, but nobody in the SBU and the ZSU came to the idea that they would go ‘all-out’ and not only try seizing Kyiv, but also Odesa, and all of north-eastern and southern Ukraine? Who is responsible for making such, massive failures in assessing Russian intentions?

Really: nobody?

There’s still no answer to this question. Sorry, but: this is where nobody else than the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces is responsible.

Question 6: is Zaluzhny a great military commander and why?

On one side, the situation in regards of this question is similar to the above-mentioned: ‘too little data to compute’.

For example, while Zaluzhny is not responsible for many of operational-level decisions, it was still on him to grant permission for any of major operations. For example: the one that led to the liberation of eastern Kharkiv Oblast. That took both ‘brain and guts’… But, was it on him to decide? Or did that decision come from higher up? Or lower down? Considering that the word is meanwhile, Zaluzhny wanted to attack in southern Zaporizhzhya shortly after (i.e. in late 2022), but was not granted permission to do so… I’m not sure about the answers: they are to become available only years later, once this all becomes ‘history’.

On the other, and strictly speaking, one must keep in mind that generals in Zaluzhny’s position are no ‘field commanders’: they’re administrators, even ‘politicians’, but no ‘field commanders’. They are rarely (if ever) even issuing direct orders to commanders in the field. It’s simply not their job: their job is to obtain (through explaining their requirements to their political masters), to administer/manage/organise, to motivate and thus to enable. It’s the job of their subordinates to plan, to organise, to train, to report - and yes: to receive Zaluzhny’s approval - and then to realise their plans.

Should there be any doubts about this, take one of historic commanders in similar position as example. Say: General George S Patton of the US Army, still widely lauded as the genius of US Army’s manoeuvre warfare. In his case, there are many pointing out what a skilled general he was for, for example, advancing for 80km a day through northern France, or turning his army for something like 180 degrees in a matter of 24 hours during the Battle of Bulge, both in 1944…

However, the way I see it, very little of this was really Patton’s achievement. The army he commanded was organised, equipped, and trained by the Roosevelt administration, which consisted of skilled technocrats, who understood they have to organise, equip, and train 60 divisions capable of fighting in such different circumstances and such distant battlefields, ‘half a world away’, like Burma, or different islands in the Pacific, or France. Without them finding a way to convince the industry to jump-start the necessary production facilities, while enabling the armed forces to train enough officers and troops, and keeping these sufficiently well-supplied, Patton would have nothing to command around. Not even his commander’s car.

(Should there be any doubts about this achievement, see what the Ukrainian administrations have failed to do over the last 20 years, and then what Biden’s and other glorious Western administrations are NOT managing, the last two years.)

Where Patton played an important role was in finding, promoting, appointing and motivating subordinated officers with the ‘can do’ mentality, enabling them to train their troops and lead them so these can move a ‘small town of 12,000, with 4000 vehicles’ - like an armoured division - over 80km a day, or turning multiple such formations 180 degrees around the battlefield in 24 hours.

Similar is valid for Zaluzhny, too.

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Bottom line: while I have no doubts that Zaluzhny is highly popular – in the ZSU and in the Ukrainian population – I’m not (yet) sure if he’s a great military commander, or not. He’s certainly somebody keeping the spirits of troops high, though. And then so much so, many seem to want him as a candidate for the next presidential elections; which in turn is why many say that Zelensky is jealous about Zaluzhny’s popularity and this is the reason he wants to dismiss him.

And even if: I’m not sure if Zelensky even comprehends all these issues, nor if they matter to him. However, if he does – which is perfectly possible, though not very likely (because he’s busy with many other issues) – then all of this might be an additional reason for him to consider a replacement of the ‘entire ZSU top’.

That’s about all coming to my mind in this regards, and I hope it’s of some help.