Know thy Enemy

Hello everybody!

Early this morning, while drinking cappuccino, having a smoke, and reading your reactions and different messages, few - apparently - unrelated things came to my mind. So, I’ve told to myself: ‘lets put that on the paper and see if there is any kind of connection’…. This took a little bit longer to do than expected, and so this one is released late at night, once again…

Lets welcome Ukraine to the United States of Absurdistan

The first is… well, I do not remember the exact date of the following anecdote. Think, it was around 2007, perhaps 2008… I’m only sure that the US-involvement in the ‘war in Iraq’ was still in full swing, and there was no talk about withdrawal from the country (yet). And there was that conference about the situation in Iraq, held somewhere in the UAE: think it was Dubai. The usual story: lots of celebrities from different think-tanks, all highly-praised Experten, and lots of their customers and sponsors from the politics, economy, and different armed forces. All in nice suits and gala uniforms, and wearing those prominent IDs, identifying them as authorised (and ‘privileged’) to be present and whatever else….

At some point in time, during a speech by an important US representative (somebody quite high up the Bush Jr. Administration), a high officer of the UAE police flipped out: unable to tolerate all the nonsense he’s got to hear, he stood up and started yelling that the USA were the Enemy No. 1 of not only the UAE, but all the (Sunni) Arabs…

The speech of the US representative was interrupted for some 1-2 minutes: as long as it took for the (probably: Pakistani) security personnel to – politely, but with determination – escort the ‘protesting’ gentleman out of the hall. Then the conference was resumed like if nothing happened….

I wasn’t personally present at that conference, and thus I’m no eyewitness. Have heard about this ‘incident’ from a contemporary contact. So, perhaps things did happen that way, and perhaps they didn’t: we can’t know, because the incident in question was never reported by any kind of the media.

Just… by accident, around the same time, I was underway in Syria and, between others, visiting a friend who owned a small computer shop in downtown Damascus. While there, I was stunned to run into a stock of latest PCs, motherboards, chips, and different Microsoft software products. All were still tidily packed in their original boxes. So much so, at the bottom of the rear cover of every of boxes in question there stood a (‘small’) note (though printed in fat letters) that the export of the content of that box is strictly prohibited to countries like Iran, North Korea, or Syria…

Early morning, anno domini ‘sometimes around 2007’… look from the Fardos Tower Hotel towards north-western Damascus, in direction of the Presidential Palace (background centre). Western side of Mount Kasyoun (moutain overlooking Damascus) is visible in the background on the right side.

While having a look at a box containing CDs with the latest version of the Windows (can’t help it: I’m curious by nature), I couldn’t but loudly wonder: how comes my friend has already got originally packed Microsoft products but in Farsi language (Farsi = Persian language), and that where the Windows version in question was only announced, but not yet released in the EU...

As true Arab gentleman as always, my friend was patient with me. Politely, he has offered a perfectly logical answer: ‘Oh, “they” are air-freighting this stuff from the People’s Republic of China to the UAE’, where he’s picking it up. And he had the Farsi-language version in store because between his customers were Iranian pilgrims travelling to Syria to visit the shrine of Sayyida Zaynab, in southern Damascus…

Fast forward: 16-17 years later people can’t stop wondering how comes,

-          Russia has no problem to continue purchasing US-made high-tech which is then installed into its guided missiles, aircraft and tanks;

-          even more so considering Taiwan imposed no sanctions on export of such goods to the Russian Federation at all;

-          the UAE is still considered one of ‘most important non-NATO-allies’ of the USA (and NATO);

-          although the UAE helped cause the civil war that destroyed Libya since 2016, plus a civil war that savaged much of Ethiopia more recently, began sponsoring IRGC’s military intervention in Syria against the local insurgents, and, lately, is selling StarLink terminals to the Russians, so they can deploy them in support of their war of extermination of Ukraine;

-          while operatives of the Ukrainian SBU and SSO are fighting on the same side like the (‘Iranian’) Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), on behalf of the military junta in charge of the Sudan;

-          and that against Russia- and UAE-supported Janjaweed genocidaries of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)…

Now, this might appear entirely incomprehensible – to you and to me.

And, indeed: few years ago, when I’ve asked somebody from the Austrian diplomatic corps, how comes the EU and the West are tolerating not only what the UAE is doing in Libya and Syria, but also what Qatar is doing in the same countries, plus the Qatari support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the fact that Qatar is the biggest supporter of Islamic extremism in the EU… well, I’ve been told by the gentleman in question that I do not know how the international diplomacy works.

With other words: I’m the ultimate stupid in international relations, entirely unable to understand machinations of this kind. Even despite such honourable attempts to explain them, like the article Ukraine’s Sudan Gambit, here…

Alternatively, all that’s left for me is to say:

‘welcome to the United States of Absurdistan (EU & USA & NATO), dear Ukrainians’.

***

Outsmarting thy Enemy

But, wait, wait… not everything is that bad, and there are few things I might be able to explain. Or at least I can try explaining some…

Several readers - and my dear colleague, friend, and co-author of several books, Milos - are warning me from taking Ukrainian claims for Russian Su-34s (and Su-35s) shoot-down over the last two weeks for granted. And, yes, you all have lots of good reasons for such warnings. For example (and between others) they say:

-          1.) Yes, so far, and except for four downed Russian fighter-bombers, plus that A-50, there’s no visual evidence for the other of claimed kills.

-          2.) Even if Ukrainians and their… hkhm… (sorry, smoking is really not doing me well)….their  ‘allies’, the US-Americans (followed, probably, by the British, French, even Germans) have certainly evaluated the captured ECM-containers from different of Russian Su-30s, Su-34s, and Su-35s shot down over Ukraine of the last two years, there is no absolute guarantee they have developed effective countermeasures. And if at all, we’re unlikely to know anything until sometimes in 1, 5, 10, or more years…

-          3.) The Russians might not have published evidence they do have such stuff, but it is perfectly possible they have developed their own counterparts to the US-made ADM-160 MALD: an air-launched decoy, meanwhile deployed by Ukraine to (regularly and totally) confuse the Russian air defences, thus opening the way for Su-24-launched Storm Shadow and Scalp-EG guided missiles to strike selected targets. On the Russian-occuppied Crimea, just for example. If nothing else, and because their MPK/UMPK glide bombs are crude and easily detectable by radars, they could use these as decoys against Ukrainian air defences….

-          4.) Contrary to what are different Experten in the West explaining, the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) does regularly fly what is called ‘SEAD’ in the West. See: suppression of enemy air defences. With other words: they are actively searching for, and attacking Ukrainian air defence systems, especially Ukrainian surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Thus, the latter are not free to ‘plink’ Russian Su-34s as easily as this might appear considering the (high) number of recent claims.

-          5.) The Russian aircraft industry has already reacted to the (‘possible’) compromise of its electronic warfare systems to the Ukrainian and Western intelligence services: all Su-34s returned to the factory for overhauls, are not only refurbished, but upgraded to the Su-34M standard. In Russia, this is also known as the Su-34SVO, because it is including upgrades based on experiences from the ‘SVO’ – which is the Russian abbreviation for ‘Special Military Operation’ (see: Pudding’s three days/two weeks war of extermination of Ukraine, going on for two years now….and that precisely along the plan)….

And so, here my 5 cents in this regards.

Yesterday, I’ve mentioned what is currently the National Air And Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), of the USA: an agency specialised in obtaining and inspecting foreign military technologies. I’ve mentioned its predecessor, too: the Foreign Technologies Division (FTD, of the US Air Force). Now, think about the following: two minutes of googling is going to reveal that the predecessor of the FTD was established already back in 1916, during the First World War – and then even before the USA became directly involved in the First World War.

Crest of the NASIC

Crest of the (former) FTD, which was re-organised as NASIC in 1991.

Moreover, from dozens of interviews with US officers over the time (to make sure: all run for military-history-related research purposes) it is perfectly clear that even if they do not know how, why, or by whom was that intelligence collected, they all have received extensive lectures in the intelligence collected by the FTD (not so much of that collected by ‘well-known/famous’ agencies like the CIA, NSA etc.).

How can I say?

Well, and just for example, talk to F-14 Tomcat- and/or F/A-18 Hornet and/or A-6 Intruder and/or A-7 Corsair pilots/crewmembers that fought Libyans in 1986-1989… or similar gentlemen with experiences from the war with Iraq in 1991: if you ask the ‘right’ questions, it’s easy to conclude that they knew, precisely, the characteristics of (for example) MiG-23s fighters flown by the Libyans and Iraqis, or SA-5 SAMs operated by the Libyans. They knew, exactly, how to avoid them, or where or how these could become dangerous for them. And when they did not know everything because some of stuff their opponents were operating was of Western origin, then they’ve checked with the French, to organise them training sessions against Mirage F.1 fighter-bombers made for Iraq…

Thus, this kind of intelligence-gathering processes in the USA do not ‘happen by accident’: they are one of core elements of the US military doctrine. So much so that while the NASIC is collecting technical intelligence, other agencies are collecting intelligence about every military officer of ‘interesting’ armed services. Which in turn means it’s not ‘perhaps possible’ the MiBs of the NASIC (and few other, similar agencies from the UK, France etc.) have inspected wreckage of every single Russian aircraft shot down over Ukraine: it is ‘1000% certain, period’, they’ve inspected the ECM-pods from every downed Su-34 and Su-35 so far and that fell into Ukrainian hands.

And this is as important for a ‘very technical reason’. This is the point where most of people stop reading stuff of the following kind: thus, I’ll try to keep it as simple as possible.

To fully understand this ‘technical’ issue, let me start with an example from back in the 1970s and 1980s: the times when large numbers of combat aircraft were equipped with so-called ‘Radar Warning Receivers’ (RWRs). Early RWRs were quite simple, analogue assemblies, essentially warning a pilot that his aircraft was ‘painted’ by a radar (or several radars) working in specific modes, and then from what direction. The modes usually detected by contemporary RWRs were those used by radars to guide radar homing missiles. While ‘top notch machinery’, back then, from the point of view of the modern times, an average RWR from those times was nothing but ‘dumb’. It could only say if the aircraft was ‘painted’ by radar threat from left or right, or front or the rear, and little else.

Sure, by the 1980s, there were ‘slightly more sophisticated’ RWRs, which could even differentiate between radars used by SAMs and those used by most likely flying opponents, and lots of people were convinced that such RWRs were perfectly fine and even too expensive…

RWR-’display’ as installed on many Soviet types of the mid-1980s (for example: MiG-29, Su-17/22M-4, Su-24M and similar). Essentially, this was no cathode ray tube, even less so a LCR or whatever ‘screen’ - but a set of lamps. And lamps would turn on depending on what kind of ‘threat’ was ‘painting’ the jet in quesiton.

‘However’… Back in the early 1970s, the US Navy pressed into service its brand-new interceptor, the above-mentioned F-14A Tomcat (perhaps better known as ‘the sexy jet from the Top Gun movie’… the original one, from 1986). This was equipped with the most-powerful radar installed into an aircraft until that time (and long after): the AWG-9. The AWG-9 not only had an extremely high power output, but also some 24+ working modes. One of these – the Track-While-Scan mode (TWS) – was special in so far that when the AWG-9 working in the TWS painted one of ‘dumb’ RWRs as installed on the mass of Soviet (and French) aircraft of the times, one of the following two things were happening:

-          either the RWR didn’t react at all, or

-          it showed the threat from diametrically opposite direction (i.e. from left instead from right, or from front instead the rear).

On its own, you might now say, ‘so what?’

Well, imagine yourself flying a Soviet-made MiG or Sukhoi equipped with one of ‘dumb’ RWRs. The weather is nice, and you’re underway with buddies from your squadron to bomb some place. Everything’s fine, your RWR is fully operational – and showing no threats at all. Things are so fine, pilots would often start singing… Thus, you have no clue that some 60-70km ahead of you there’s an F-14 around. Even less so this F-14 has fired one of its AIM-54 Phoenix long-range air-to-air missiles: you do not know anything at all until that AIM-54 either blows you up, or one of your buddies, or misses. Because your RWR didn’t recognise the AWG-9 working in TWS mode.

Radar display of the AWG-9, as installed in the rear cockpit of an F-14A, in the early 1980s.

Alternatively, you can end like an Iraqi Super Etendard pilot underway in southern direction over the Persian Gulf. His (French-made) RWR actually did ‘warn’ him – and his wingman – but: of a threat from his right, from the direction of Saudi Arabia. And then he got shot down from the left, from the direction of Iran. By an (Iranian) F-14A using an AIM-54, with help of AWG-9 deployed in TWS mode. Sufficient to say: until today the Iraqis are convinced their Super Etendard was shot down by the Saudis…

The reason I’m mentioning this example is that this is one of effects one can expect a PAC-2 or PAC-3 to have, if modified on basis of inspection of the wreckage of some Russian Su-34 or Su-35 (plus their electronic warfare gear, of course). Sure, their ‘RWRs’ are nowadays digitalised, and advanced enough to actually be considered ‘Radar Warning and Homing System’ (RHAW): these are showing not only a very precise direction of the threat, or its type, but also its approximate distance. Something like this:

Display of an RHAW-system, showing the type and direction of the threat in question.

….all provided the RHAW gear has detected the radar emissions from the radar in question. If not – for example because the radar in question is working in frequency range not detectable by the RHAW-gear – the RHAW gear is ‘not working’: not warning the crew.

One more factor that’s little known in this air war over Ukraine, is that the mass of kills are neither some sort of ‘long range’ kills, and even less so scored over the maximum range. I.e. examples like when a Russian S-400 shot down an Ukrainian jet over (depending on source) 110-140km range, in the first few days of the war, or the two shoot-downs of A-50s, are an exception from the rule. The mass of kills scored by ‘heavy’, radar-homing SAMs – by weapons with range of 40, 50, 100-150km – are scored over ranges of 20, 30, 40, rarely 50km.

Which is only further reducing the reaction time of targeted crews.

And then mind: this is not the year 1967 and we’re not talking here about pilots of US F-105 Thunderchiefs ‘dodging’ relatively slow (and clearly visible, because of their smoke trails) S-75 Dvina/Neva and similar stuff (i.e. what the West used to call the ‘SA-2 Guideline’). We’re in the year 2024, and talking about pilots of Russian Su-34 facing stuff like Patriot. Missiles of the MIM-104 (i.e. PAC-2 and PAC-3) system are accelerating so fast, that they are flying at supersonic speed (Mach 1) already at the time they are leaving their launch container. Max speed of missiles like MIM-104D/E and MIM-104F (as delivered to Ukraine) is actually unknown, but estimated at ‘more than Mach 3.5’. Some of missiles are releasing no smoke trails at all. Which means: they’re next to impossible to detect visually.

Bottom line: even if it happens the crew detects – whether with help of a ‘working’ RHAW-gear, or visually - the incoming missile, it’s got extremely little time to evade. Actually, it can’t evade in classic fashion: by ‘flying a hard turn’ (like F-105-pilots used to do). Their best option is to ‘unload’: dive and accelerate away at highest speed, trying to escape the missile’s ‘no escape zone’…and hope and pray it did so on time…

…and then, please mind: we have no trace of clue what other ‘aces up the sleeve’ the Ukrainians might have. This might include ‘weirdest’ combination of Russian/Ukrainian/US-made radars with launchers from systems like PAC-2 or PAC-3, but also IRIS-T, NASAMS, Sea Sparrow/Aspide missiles on Buks etc. The mass of this was never deployed in combat before but is nowadays possible thanks to special software made to ‘mate’ very diverse weapons systems, regardless of their origin. Thus, most of this is actually ‘uncommon’ even to its manufacturers and users, not only unknown to the Russians.

As next: yes, the Russians do run SEAD operations. Have mentioned this time and again. Some are including up to 20 Su-30s, Su-34s, and Su-35s, some of these equipped with powerful electronic warfare gear, others with anti-radar missiles. Moreover, such operations are combined by activity of the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence), which still has numerous informers in Ukraine (like the group caught by the Ukrainian SBU, about a week ago). It’s more than obvious that the Russians are trying to hunt down Ukrainian Patriots, too: remember their claims to have ‘destroyed’ one or two by their Kinzhals, the last year? The last week they’ve claimed to have destroyed ‘two Patriot (systems)’, too. However, a careful analysis of their ‘video evidence’ has shown that they have targeted some Ukrainian military facility about 20km north-west of Kherson: hardly a place the PSU would deploy any of its Patriots – whether by day or night. What a surprise then, all the evidence for ‘Russian success’ in SEAD operations of the last week, were videos confirming the destruction of two Ukrainian P-18 radars, and one NASAMS launcher.

Still from one of Russia-released videos purportedly showing a truck used to move the LS - the launcher of a Patriot battery. This was supposed to provide ‘evidence’ that they have hit a Patriot system, last week near Kherson. Actually, the truck visible on that video (not on the insert in the lower left corner), is of German-, not of US- origin, and used to haul other heavy stuff, though no Patriots.

Just like P-15s which I’ve used as examples in my analysis of early Ukrainian Patriot-operations (see the article ‘Assault Mode’, linked above), P-18s are some 50+ years old, and while still useful (especially if supported by a modern-day processor/software), more likely to be deployed as decoys. And launchers are the easiest part of any SAM-site to replace.

P-18 radar (centre, background).

Actually, this is rather indicative of the Russians having no clue where to search for Ukrainian Patriots. Not because they would be stupid, but because they lack the means to do so in real time – which is what is making what I call ‘138^th’s roaming’ as important: as long as its firing units are frequently on the move (i.e. moving ever 1-2 hours), the Russians have very little chance of even avoiding their ambushes, not to talk about finding and destroying them.

Bottom line: there are lots of ‘arguments speaking in favour of many of Ukrainian ‘claims’.

However, fact is that there is no visual evidence for more than 4 kills over the last two weeks. Fact is also that, for example: a ‘jet that disappeared from radar while targeted by a SAM’ is absolutely no ‘confirmation’ for a kill: it’s at least ‘likely’ the targeted jet actually recognised the threat (i.e. the RHAW-gear ‘worked’), and dove to evade – as that the jet was shot down.

Thus, we have to wait and see what information might eventually emerge out of Russia. In the case of shoot-downs with fatalities, that’s usually ‘easy’, because – whether hours, days, weeks, or months later – there are related reports in the social media. Where the crew survived: not at all.

Hope, you’ve survived reading this, and might feel a notch better informed now.