To continue your observation, I added link with Taras Chmut (fund Came back alive). Where He told, what You desсribe during some time (except directly critic of All politic heads of Ukraine).
From this interview, I have hope that situation will be changed (the main question, How many time it will be take)
Dear Tom, thank you! But this is a bit overstretched don't you think: "even if equipped with 2000 M1 main battle tanks, 2000 M2/M3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and 5000 M109 self-propelled artillery pieces, and supported by 300 F-16s".
Yes, you are right, things are seriously "going south". But I highly doubt there is a magic bullet in terms of some field commander coming and changing things.
But mostly I am starting to suspect, that "Dreamland" starts in Ze office.
For example I heard many times of 30K long ranged drones for 2025. To do what? Is it a best use for them? Maybe instead of being one time drones they can be frontline bombers or something?
So I am starting to doubt that besides someone's ambitions, a serious thought to alternatives is given.
But then political opponents are as bad, if not worse. So all in all, it does seem as a critical point and there is no signs of favourable solution.
There may be an aspect of narciss, difficult to tell without actually seeing person in daily life. Not sure about team though, they seem to work quite effectively in their foundation. But, if you simply look at several key aspects of the person like motivation, character, management experience, political experience, resilience, intelligence in the end of the day, knowing own limitations, then the choice is rather narrow. Looking at personal and family life and relationships may be as important. So if you speak of "junta", then maybe Biletskiy, but I am suspicious of his conflicts with parts of his former team.
Lack of competence has plagued Ukraine ever since I've started to actively observe internal Ukrainian politics - around 2010. I see absolutely noone in Ukrainian public or media field that is in any way better than Zelensky, realistically.
There is no 'magic bullet': every war is a system of systems.
Problem with the ZSU is that the head of the system is not changing anything at all: not learning any lessons, not reforming anything, not re-organising anything, not even buying the equipment the troops need. There's absolutely 0 'lessons learned' in Kyiv.
The topic you've asked about: the MoD is so corrupt and incompetent, that the only things that 'work' there are 'private contacts. If a designer/manufacturer of item XY has the necessary connections and the 'pocket money' to bribe, then his products are acquired. And if not - then not. And the MoD nor the GenStab-U can't care less about consequences, while Zele is just babbling and bragging with other people's achievements around, instead of firing people who do not care.
With other words: there is no trace of interest in any kind of alternatives.
Situation is serious, Zelensky & his circus must go!
And from Trump´s POV - he is who he is, I dont like him, but I must agree that this war must end because its unvinable - exactly because general dumbnes and greed of Ukraine elites, right from the top.
If (big IF) Ukraine society would be able to generate better and more competent manager able to organize the resitance in next years is open question - I hope so.
It will not be able. There is neither demand nor understanding in society for what competence is.
The first two things any competent leader would do would be, first, end of democratic pretense and establishment of wartime dictatorship not just defacto, but openly; and second, taking many steps hurting people in the name of winning the war. There is no demand for that in society, at least.
I think all of us are looking forward for a future time when you do a retrospective on how 2022-2024 military developments look from the lens of more recent and objective knowledge.
As for change I think we need to be real. Elections right now aren't practical so Zelenski is there to stay until a future ceasefire. And there is no obvios better candidate anyway. As for Sirsky&Co, anyone Zelenski replaces them with is likely to be even more of a yes-man for future political interference. The best that can be realistically hoped for is for Sirsky&Co to promote adequate "middle management" of competent officers who are capable of fixing their mess and mitigating the stupidity of politicians and top generals. This is how all large organizations work - the idiots at the top appoint capable people to cover their asses. Not that I have great expectations of that happening either, it's just the only moderately likely option.
What I do expect as much more likely is that Russia's economy will implode this year, as many analysts are predicting, taking away Russia's ability to supply its army and pay competitive salaries. So Sirsky&Co don't need to win, they just need to lose slower than Russia.
"What I do expect as much more likely is that Russia's economy will implode this year, as many analysts are predicting, taking away Russia's ability to supply its army and pay competitive salaries."
Keep on dreaming, it gives positive emotions.))) Despite inefficiency of state-owned companies and RU Central Bank doubtful policies, RU economy potential is still colossal. Wishful thinking analysts are happy to share their dellusions. It's a matter of taste whether trust them or not.)
Tradeover with China gained records heights. Chinese buy raw materials and sell any machinery asked. Discount for RU goods is offset by money that are not kept/invested in the West anymore
Slovakian vice-speaker of parliament saw himself the "lack" of products in Moscow shops:
Sure food is "cheaper" than at Slovakia, keep dreaming⁷
I saw his report and many slovaks are laughing of him 🤣
With average salaries and pensions you can buy max. 1/3 of goods (optimistic estimate).
Government reserves are keeping to melt down, European customers are finishing diversification of energy supplies (sure you probably will continue deliveries of NG and oil but compeating by price) so reserves are going to disappear sooner or later so keep dreaming (please dont take SK/HU as typical EU country, what they say is different to what's happening).
Really like it when people start talking about the "potential" of an economy. Every person has potential, every economy has potential. The potential of the Russian economy is roughly the same it was 10 years ago, the potential of the civilian economy is lower due to military needs.
At the end of the day though, I concede there is no way to objectively (by that I mean, not realying on potentially cooked government figures) measure how the value of Russian oil and raw resources measure against value of Chinese civilian and industrial goods, so there is still enough justification for you to hope things are not too bad and are still manageable.
Since I know more about Russian economy than most of the members here (Tom knows my background) I can speak with a certain degree of assertion.
China replaced West machinery wise, with mediators its possible to buy any Western product (of course, at higher price). Discount for RU export goods is unpleasant but since oligarkhs money is not going to West at previous volumes, it's bearable.
I don’t think the population will go to the streets. But Caucasus or Belorussian could create problems. If some persons die or something other to change the current equations.
The implosion, if it comes, will not come from those who can afford to buy things at «higher prices». At least not before those »higher prices» are much higher. I accept that you know more about the Russian economy than me, but we should accept that the situation now is relatively unique. And unstable. It is a situation with a lack of manpower for everything but the army (ok, that too), whose production system now is totally geared towards war, with a serious inflation and excluded from a lot of markets. It isn’t good. But I don’t think it will implode this year.
Thanks, this is indeed interesting and confirming what could be expected.
I never actually meant that part of the comment to get so much attention so some misunderstandings arose. When I say "implosion of the economy" I mean someting very specific.
Of course stage 1 of Russia militarizing would have been making it impossible for oligarchs and western multinationals to export their assets.
Stage 2 would have been squeezing the profit out of state-owned Russian oil companies by forcing them to buy rubbles. This also happened in 2022.
Stage 3 would be forcing Russian banks to give favorable loans to military industry companies and local governments, to ensure military equipment can be manufactured at a loss and local governments can pay enlistment bonuses. A lot of people say this has started but no idea how far it has gone.
Now, banks have deep pockets so Stage 3 can last for a while. Also, whenever a worker at a factory or a recruit puts their salary at the bank, the bank can use these money to give a new loan, which can be used to pay another worker/recruit, and so on. What this means is that everyone keeping money on deposit in Russian banks is likely to be an investor in the Russian defence-industrial complex, which in turn is producing a lot of stuff, but doing it at a loss.
Now, stage 3 is heading into only one direction - making banks less stable, then insolvent, then pusning deeper into insolvency. What's not clear is how far they've gotten already. They could still be very healthy, they could already be in very deep trouble.
Eventually at the end of that road, banks become too insolvent to function normally and process money withdrawals. (as all their money is tied up in insolvent military companies) At that point there will be two very clear "solutions" that need to taken:
- central bank gives them as much rubbles as they need. This will cause hyperinflation but that's the lesser of two evils, if the alternative is deposits just disappearing
- that however won't solve banks not having yuans/euros/ect. So all foreign currency deposits will be converted into rubbles using some artificial exchange rate
The above two actions, and the following consequences, are what I call implosion. At the most basic level it's just a matter of the government shifting the costs of the war into the future until they can no longer be shifted further and then suffering the consequences.
I have spent last month in Russia, in 3 small cities, talking with my relatives and people, seeing for myself the mood and the life, how it goes. I absolutely do not believe Russian economy may collapse in 2025 or 2026. Any such developments should be noticeable to critical eye and they aren't.
Of course. You just can't overturn cultural upbringing, common wisdom and societal pressure, not an easy way. The woman you spoke with is a lucky one; it's just her mother. The past. For me, it's my children and grandchildren. :) I really want to get my granddaughter out of Russia, for her to not grow up a Russian, but it's not an option until the situation in Russia will significantly change to worse.
I agree that resilance of general population of Russia is similar or more than it is in Slovakia. And in case of populations of Russian/Slovak small-towns (villages) the ressilance can be expected as those people (pensioners) are acustomised to harsh life and small income/pensions.
Oh I absolutely don't believe these kinds of signs would be visible without everyone talking about it. The problem is currency reserves and availability of credit. Basically China needs an export market and I imagine would be quite happy to supply Russia whatever it needs, first in exchange for oil and then on credit. The civilian economy implosion will only happen when that credit line runs out.
Of course official statistics currently still show Russia running a surplus, but those official statistics are just hard to believe considering the war. Russia's workforce is a fixed number and you cannot have more people manufacturing weapons and more people manufacturing civilian goods at the same time.
But, to be clear, as long as China is willing to ship stuff to Russia on credit, all will appear fine. There will be close to zero hardship for the civilian Russian population to endure. Problem is, even China's pockets aren't endless and it cannot bankroll Russia for too long. And even if the war ends today, those debts will need to be repaid afterwards.
I do not believe China is shipping anything on credit. Yuan and euro are freely available inside Russia, even if prices are high. Chinese imports are expensive in roubles, but it isn't exactly a problem. There would be no credit, there would be just inflation, and it's bearable; trade balance, apparently, is not as bad as you think.
Banks in Russia cannot actually own euro since 2022 with the exception of cash notes. Central bank sanctions mean that Russian foreign currency reserves are exclusively held in yuan. All the euro and dollars in Russian bank accounts are actually backed by yuan reserves. This practically means that while internally Russians can transfer "euros" between accounts, when those euros are used to buy something from abroad the bank is instead selling or borrowing yuans to do it.
So the real Russian position is the difference between the remaining Central bank yuan reserves and the sum of all euro, dollar and yuan deposits held by persons and businesses in Russia. And even if those deposits are large that's still not a problem until people actually start withdrawing them or using them to buy things.
That's what I mean by implosion - everything will be 100% fine until one day it becomes hard for the banks to handle withrawals in foreign currency as the reserves backing these deposits have been exausted long ago.
Yes, as long as oil revenues stay above the expenditures of ordinary Russians spending their salaries on foreign goods, all will be fine. Things will only start going downhill once that balance changes (if it already hasn't), and we'll only see indicators much later than that, when the avalanche is about to hit.
Russian economy would not collapse, it's false impression created by some journos back in 2022 and 2023. It would just gradually decline and decline ... To the point when it would fail to supply the army in Ukraine satisfactorily. And again, it would not bring collapse of VSFR, just gradual decline of capabilities. (And we can see it's eroding already when civilian cars are used for attacks.)
Yes, people can live in poverty like in in Soviet Union or North Korea when brainwashed.
Not good solution: waiting for Russia to implode/have a crisis which renders the VSRF incapable of fighting. The best ZSU Bdes/units will still lose competent and experienced personnel and resources which is still wasteful NOT a smart and fight hard/efficient way of winning a war.
I'd be quite happy for Ukraine generals to get their collective shit together. But at this point it seems Russia will first run out of foreign currency and military stockpiles, then we'll see the heat death of the universe, and only then the ZSU organization will improve.
That is not an improvement of the ZSU(if the same commanders at U-GenStab, etc plus Zelenskyi, et al) actually, the implosion of the Russian economy/means to support the war effort just stops/incapacitate the Russian means to wage war, the Russians were not defeated by a more efficient, less wasteful Ukrainian means of war.
Which is still a long way to go, we are still in Jan 2025 NOT Jan 2026 or May 2027.
So let us just be on fact based information/evident truth.
Possible solution: two generals. Syrskyi in charge of half of the army and one front. And another new General in charge of the other half of the army & another front, with a new non-soviet based system, with more independent, meritocracy based modern NATO type forces. Just like we had competition between Gen Montgomery & Gen Patton, Eisenhower in WW2. This way there is healthy competition between the two systems of military organization, the old and new systems. We have Gen Syrskyi and new Gen B then both reporting to Zelensky. The old system also is not allowed to interfere with the new Generals forces by making sure that both new and old systems have equal priorities on logistics, material and men. There will be fights who gets what, but that can be fixed. Summary example, Gen Syrskyi, northern front, Kursk to Donetsk. General "new", southern front, Crimea to Donetsk. This was disruption is minimized and leadership, military methods, organization & strategy/tactics are tested to see which works best.
Possible, see above reply. "Each Senior General can spend time on his "section". So we have a main Field Marshal, who understands the issues & cannot micro-manage the other two, "north/south theatre" generals. Also, to change an organization in the middle of a war is problematic. Nevertheless, not to adapt or do nothing is just as bad. However, the idea of a senior Eisenhower, with two Generals such as Paton and Montgomery still stands and has proven to work. So for example, in Ukraine we could have one Field Marshal Zaluzny, then a General Syrskyi for the northern theatre and another General for the southern theatre. With the new General adopting a less micro-managing, hierarchical approach such as in UK, US, German, Swedish armies. Two theatres of war, north and south, so each General has less to manage and can concentrate on the smaller scope."
I share your point of view in general, but must also observe that the Allied organization in WW2 in Europe has been characterized by historians as coalition warfare, the coalition comprising sovereign nation-states in a mutual alliance. There are no national coalitions on the Ukraine side of this current tragic war. I perceive that if Ukrainian politico-military authorities cannot successfully re-organize the command structure of the Ukrainian armed forces along more Western European & American models [army(..ies), corps, divisions & bridades ....] then I fear that Ukraine may go down ultimately in defeat.
I also perceive that Ukraine has managed to turn, for example, Kursk into a distraction. Whatever limited military power is available to the Ukrained armed forces, should be applied as directly as possible to degrading Russian military operations. I am not against disrupting certain long-term military-related logistics such as disrupting oil supplies and facilities (e.g., refineries, fuel tanks, etc.), but even these activities must always relate as directly as possible to the Russian-Ukraine field of battle.
I admit that I am not a land warfare expert, but I still know at least from my U.S. Navy experience and from my studies at the U.S. Naval War College that an effective strategy is important. Probably even during the beginning of this war (early 2022) and especially today, Ukraine should have focused its strategy on the Strategic Defense and apply all military actions to satisfy the demands of such a defense. IOW, NO DISTRACTIONS! I do not see any hope in the near to intermediate future that Ukraine can inflict a decisive defeat of Russian military forces on Ukrainian soil.
I have already written several times that they need a proper structure of their land forces. That proper structure has been used by all nations for a long time.
It is only Ukraine with it's current structure, which is the insane exception.
And yes again this war will decide the future of Ukraine, either in good or in bad.
With the end of the year 2025 most of the stocks from soviet times will be used up, afterwards it will be a completely different situation and Ukraine is also gearing up the attacks on the oil infrastructure.
Agree, that is why I put Eisenhower after the stroke "/". Pros and cons here. Each Senior General can spend time on his "section". So we have a main Field Marshal, who understands the issues & cannot micro-manage the other two, "north/south theatre" generals. Also, to change an organization in the middle of a war is problematic. Nevertheless, not to adapt or do nothing is just as bad. However, the idea of a senior Eisenhower, with two Generals such as Paton and Montgomery still stands and has proven to work. So for example, in Ukraine we could have one Field Marshal Zaluzny, then a General Syrskyi for the northern theatre and another General for the southern theatre. With the new General adopting a less micro-managing, hierarchical approach such as in UK, US, German, Swedish armies. Two theatres of war, north and south, so each General has less to manage and can concentrate on the smaller scope.
Okay so... most russians assault are failing (and yet they're making ground every day) so they're suffering insane casualties and are labeled as "meat waves attack"
But when ukraine fail all of their counter attack except for maybe a few exceptions a week, everything is fine?
If an attack fails or not has nothing to do with meat wave attacks.
An attack can fail without being a meat wave attack and attack can also being be successful and being a meat wave attack.
Most of Ukrainian counter attacks fail, because many don't know how to properly conduct them, which doesn't automatically mean they were meat wave attacks.
When Ukrainians are at their worst, they start to somewhat resemble Russians. And when that happens Russian patriots start parading it as if they scored a point. And I just have to shake my head in disbelief.
Honored to be mentioned!: "you think it’s OK if Syrsky is appointing his incompetent buddies into crucial positions – not because ‘he has it easier to work with people he knows’, but, principally, because (and as explained at least 2-3 times over the last 12 months) he owes them personal favours?"
I assumed the person comparing you to the "Austrian" was young and full of TOO much vinegar, so I just made an example argument he could have used. I'm still here, so I know you know that ;)
I've watched "12 O'Clock High" at least a dozen times. It argue that even if everyone loves the leader, if the leader is beyond reproach in courage and integrity, wars cannot be won on that. You talk about meritocracy, that's in the film. A young navigator, of German ancestry, screws up. Savage thinks he should be replaced. Gately doesn't. In the end, the young man commits suicide from shame. There are no easy answers in the film and at the end it questions its own argument. Even if one follows a structure can they remain sane?
Which further supports your argument about the difference between 2022 and 2025. Even for those surviving Ukrainian soldiers, how can the work effectively after 3 years of this? I don't see that most of them could. I don't see how I could.
I actually agree with you 110% that the leadership needs to change. I disagree with the argument that Ukraine can't vote in another leader. I think the world of what Zelensky has done. But as you argue, you can't change people, no matter how good they are.
In 12 O'Clock they talk about the great thing Gately had done. They couldn't have been more respectful. But replacing him was the right move.
I found your reference to "12 O'Clock High" quite interesting. When I was a drilling Naval Reservist, we senior officers attended a Navy-sponsored course on leadership, accountability, & competence over a two-days drill weekend. The curriculum was oriented around this movie. We were briefed in the beginning with certain principles to be adduced from the move. Then we watched a segment of "12 O'Clock High" followed by a discussion of what we observed regarding those principles, then watched another segment, etc., to the end of the movie. Finally, a summary of everything "learned" in our discussion (based upon the Socratic method) concluded the course.
This was one of the best leadership courses that I attened in my experience, and was very much unlike most military/naval training that I have undergone (the Naval War College being an exception which was great!).
I have followed your commentary about everything warfare for many years now (dating back since pre-Ukraine conflict), something I cannot say the same for anyone else within the global 'conflict analysis' space. The reason why I follow your commentary is to challenge my own thoughts regarding same subjects to avoid being trapped by believing that only my own conclusions are the 'correct' version of assumptions. The reason for that is simply because us [intellectually limited] modified primates do not know everything (especially referring to all the retired NATO military Generals turned 'war analysts' who love stating their opinions as concrete facts 'since January 17, 1991'). Do I agree with everything you say? No. In fact, there are many things you say I don't agree with, but that's where cognitive maturity comes into play. Basically, just because I don't agree with you doesn't mean I don't respect your opinion. In fact, when I don't agree with something you said, I am motivated more to understand the fundamental reasons why I don't agree with your opinion(s). Simply put, my disagreement with you is more about me for me than its about you. So, who am I? I am nobody, a random guy who the majority people will never remember (nor notice) being present in the same room as them, even though I am a veteran of the past 5 major wars fought during the past 3 decades embedded in multiple nationality (predominantly NATO/NATO allied) militaries. Does that make me an expert? F*ck no! In fact, my current conclusion now, entering 2025, is that the current global 'competition' dynamics (which is ALL interconnected), is one major rabbit hole resembling a Viet Cong tunnel complex riddled with traps and dead ends. The deeper you go, the more f*cked up it becomes. My point is: It is absolutely IMPOSSIBLE for a layman to make any sense of what's going on in Ukraine (nevertheless the world), when people who are appointed to analyze the conflict as a living are struggling to understand the situation thoroughly and accurately. Fact is, warfare is a science, and science is an ongoing evolution of understanding.
So, taking a look at the current situation in Ukraine, I've been spending a lot of time with Ukrainians at the ground level to understand much of the present-day cultural dynamics which constitutes present-day Ukrainian society. Without going into this too deep, I'll only summarize my conclusions extremely briefly without going into detailed explanation. In summary, we as non-Ukrainians need to understand the characteristics shaping the Ukrainian situation as follows:
1. Ukraine is not a single unified nation with a singular cultural identity. Current Ukrainian society is still very much divided along various lines ranging from opposing political beliefs, religion, and ethnic identity.
2. Simplified, the current Ukraine 'territories-controllled' are still divided into two prominent groups, namely, a minority eastern Ukraine which primarily identifies as ethnic Russian, and a majority central- and western Ukraine which do not identify as ethnic Russian.
3. Even though the Ukrainian minorities in the east predominantly identifies as ethnic Russian, it does not mean they support Russia in its current aggression in eastern Ukraine. This, however, is where most of the problems in the current Ukrainian war efforts start because what most (foreign audience) do not realize is that proportionately the ethnic Russian Ukrainians are contributing a large component of frontline forces facing the Russian (and proxies) forces in eastern Ukraine compared to the Ukrainians who choose to identify as 'not of ethnic Russian ancestry' (a very sensitive debatable concept by its own also not to be discussed).
4. The eastern Ukrainian ethnic Russians still feel disadvantaged by Kyiv on the basis of their ethnic Russian identity which is reflected in the quality of support provided to them through the imbalanced military structures on the frontlines since they are always last in line to receive the newest military hardware, although first in line when resisting Russian offensives. When Western military aid reaches Ukraine, the ethnic Russian frontline units usually receive the older Soviet equipment being replaced by the more modern Western hardware destined for units manned by non-ethnic Russian Ukrainians from the center and the west. The result is that the eastern Ukrainians who identify as ethnic Russians, even though patriotic Ukrainians, do not experience equal inclusiveness within the current Ukrainian war effort, still being on the receiving end of much distrust and neglect by Kyiv which is primarily focussed on pleasing the majority non-Russian identifying Ukrainians to maintain political favor.
So, what is my point? Simple answer, this is the primary weakness that Russia is exploiting in the east, and as long as Kyiv neglects the ethnic Russian minority Ukrainians in the east, this will always remain a vulnerability (achilles heel) in this war. One of the problems with the Western reinforcement of 'cultural diversity' so commonly practiced in our 'democracies' is that the consequences thereof is in fact reinforcement of cultural divisions. Government diversity programs do not unify societies, and that is the problem that a more Western leaning Ukraine is unknowingly facing now. Bottomline: Kyiv needs to move away from diversity based politics, especially the toxic Western DEI doctrine simply because its outcomes are counter-productive. Unfortunately, in defense of Kyiv, it has no other choice to enforce Western imposed 'democratic' [and flawed] doctrines as part of the military aid terms and conditions it depends on. Looking at military culture, we will also notice much of society's problems filtering into the manner the military effort is organized which eventually erodes morale and motivation for engagement in war. As morale and motivation declines (partly caused by degraded trust in the cause and military leadership), we start noticing a major decline in discipline within the military ranks, something we are noticing in the ZSU now. The challenge with a decline in military discipline is that when it spirals out of control, the political leaders start fearing military revolt. So, one of the major problems I have noticed during my career is that military leadership is always focussed on developing the new best methods of analyzing the battlefield and the effectiveness and efficiency of military efforts while neglecting the most important component of warfare, namely, the human resources responsible for executing the military plans. One of the most overlooked components of military planning is motivation within the ranks of the military organization. The biggest mistake the best military commanders still make is to assume that their subordinates are properly motivated (which in most cases are severely overestimated). So, how do you motivate your troops effectively? The simple (Soviet era) way is by force (exercised through the threat of death to you or harm to your family in the event of resistance), whereas in the West money is the primary form of motivation. Are these methods effecrive? No. In my experience I have learnt that effective motivation of the most efficient combat forces I have ever observed usually practised the following simple rules:
1. It is 'the enemy', not 'your enemy'.
2. Never hate the enemy. Hate only clouds judgement and limits innovative thinking. Hate also toxifies own organizational culture which negatively affects morale.
3. Always respect the enemy equally (as a peer) as you expect to be respected as equal professionals in opposition supporting different opposing causes irrespective of any perceived affiliations in terms of culture, ethnicity, or religion.
4. Therefore, motivation to engage in direct conflict should rather be cause based instead of hate based.
5. To be cause motivated, the cause should be clearly defined and concise, attainable (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound), believable (not flawed by falsehoods), resilient to enemy information operations, and achievable. Entering 2025, the ZSU 'cause' is becoming more blurred through the lack of effective leadership and guidance.
6. Never underestimate the enemy, and never overestimate own forces capabilities.
Bottomline: These characteristics are usually found in professional military forces developed on the idea of volunteerism and not forced conscription, why consciption dependent militaries always struggle with motivation amongst its members usually leading to poor military effectiveness against a superior motivated adversary. We observed this first hand during the initial phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 where a poorly equipped but superior motivated ZSU effectively resisted a superior equipped but poorly motivated VSRF. Now, 3 years later the ZSU leadership has lost the advantage it had in terms of motivation simply due to repeated mistakes and poor leadership decisions. Unfortunately no weapon systems, irrespective of how good it is, can make up for poor motivation amongst the people that need to deploy it. This is also the primary reason why Ukraine needs to reform its military culture from the top down. Forcing people to serve in the military against their will is counterproductive and only expends valuable resources inefficiently. A smaller well motivated military can achieve much more than a poorly motivated [and consequently poorly trained and disciplined] force.
Its time for Kyiv to take a step back and realize that hard decisions need to be made now. Now is not the time for political game playing.
My main comment is a little frivolous, but can you use more paragraphs and subheadings. Makes long-form replies easier to read.
Regarding Ukrainian culture, I would add that there is a culture of deference in a lot of old Soviet Bloc countries that stops people from challenging the hierarchy about things they disagree with.
Take it with a grain of salt. The whole "Ukrainians who identify as ethnically Russian" part is hogwash. There are ethnically Russian Ukrainians of course, but there are no people who would call themselves that. People will tell you that their language is Russian or their cultural milestones are Soviet or Russia-adjacent, but this ethnicity thing is some kind of projection from the poster, it's not a thing, *at all*. I guess I need to type a few more kilobytes to give weight to my claim, but trusting people just because they typed a novel is ridiculous.
I host Ukrainians. Without detailing their family histories, I'd agree that the "ethnic identity" question is extremely complicated. From some time spent in Latvia it seems to me that matter is, to a high degree, a matter of choice. I believe that the poster is correct in suggesting that the focus on "diversity" is frequently divisive and visibly counterproductive. I have no idea what novel you're referring to but I've read, among other relevant books, both "The Grey Bees" and "The Orphanage" so for many reasons I'm attempting to understand the issues in this appalling conflict. But I'm just a civilian punter here...
By "the novel" I meant the original comment. The identity among post-soviets is not ethnicity based even when couched in ethnic terms, people claim to be Russian or Ukrainian or could decide they are a different thing at some point in their life, but that's the thing it's one-dimensional. People who identify as "ethnically Russian Ukrainians" is a fabrication. It's just projection from someone from a country where people do have a separate ethnic identity. In Ukraine people who would say something like that are 1/10000.
Same thing about "focus on diversity" in Ukraine. What the hell are we even talking about? If there's a divisive issue in Ukraine right now that would be lack of acceptance of diversity, not some "democratic focus on diversity" imaginary horseshit.
Ukrainians talking about US culture wars sound sophomore, people sharing insights on Ukrainian cultural issues sound even worse as they have even less of a chance to get all the necessary background knowledge.
This nonsense with people diagnosing cultures they started tangentially interacting with a couple years ago needs to stop.
From what I can tell as an American this war seems more like civil war. The US civil war seems a very direct comparison. There were no separate ethnic groups but there were strong regional differences in cultural thinking ie agrarian vs manufacturing society, slave owning vs abolitionist and most importantly how each side saw the role of the federal government. These differences are sometimes framed as “ethnic” but it is the wrong word. Would this be a more accurate way of framing how you see the war in Ukraine?
У вас неверная информация. Мы с востока никогда не говорили, что мы русские. Конечно есть индивиды, которые считают себя до сих пор гражданами СССР, но большинство считают себя просто русскоязычными украинцами, довольно хорошо владеющими украинским языком, но между собой говорят на русском - вот и вся связь с Россией.
Второе ваше заблуждение - что нам дают старую технику. Вы совсем не понимаете, как здесь распределяются резервисты. Человека с востока чаще пошлют воевать за бригаду, созданную на юге или западе страны, и наоборот. Состав любой бригады будет содержать множество людей со всех регионов. У нас нет чисто харьковской бригады, состоящей из жителей Харькова и так про любой город и регион.
Так что ваше умозаключение построено на неверных данных и привело просто к фантастическому роману о гражданской войне из российской пропаганды. Вы просто стали очередной её жертвой...
Dear Tom.
To continue your observation, I added link with Taras Chmut (fund Came back alive). Where He told, what You desсribe during some time (except directly critic of All politic heads of Ukraine).
From this interview, I have hope that situation will be changed (the main question, How many time it will be take)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ia7aud2_lJA
Dear Tom, thank you! But this is a bit overstretched don't you think: "even if equipped with 2000 M1 main battle tanks, 2000 M2/M3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and 5000 M109 self-propelled artillery pieces, and supported by 300 F-16s".
Yes, you are right, things are seriously "going south". But I highly doubt there is a magic bullet in terms of some field commander coming and changing things.
But mostly I am starting to suspect, that "Dreamland" starts in Ze office.
For example I heard many times of 30K long ranged drones for 2025. To do what? Is it a best use for them? Maybe instead of being one time drones they can be frontline bombers or something?
So I am starting to doubt that besides someone's ambitions, a serious thought to alternatives is given.
But then political opponents are as bad, if not worse. So all in all, it does seem as a critical point and there is no signs of favourable solution.
what about Klitchko, mayor of Kyiv???
Oh, no. Maybe Prytula, but he is in a way removed himself recently. Have no idea what's happening there.
he is a narciss. and has no team
currently i see no one able to manage UA state effectively as anti crises manager. some kind of a junta needed maybe
There may be an aspect of narciss, difficult to tell without actually seeing person in daily life. Not sure about team though, they seem to work quite effectively in their foundation. But, if you simply look at several key aspects of the person like motivation, character, management experience, political experience, resilience, intelligence in the end of the day, knowing own limitations, then the choice is rather narrow. Looking at personal and family life and relationships may be as important. So if you speak of "junta", then maybe Biletskiy, but I am suspicious of his conflicts with parts of his former team.
god damned, NO! he has ruined Kyiv during 15 years of his management.
Klitchko - incompetent and corrupt.
Prytula - another "KVN" (comedy competition) graduate are you kidding me? Undisciplined and likely corrupt.
Lack of competence has plagued Ukraine ever since I've started to actively observe internal Ukrainian politics - around 2010. I see absolutely noone in Ukrainian public or media field that is in any way better than Zelensky, realistically.
There is no 'magic bullet': every war is a system of systems.
Problem with the ZSU is that the head of the system is not changing anything at all: not learning any lessons, not reforming anything, not re-organising anything, not even buying the equipment the troops need. There's absolutely 0 'lessons learned' in Kyiv.
The topic you've asked about: the MoD is so corrupt and incompetent, that the only things that 'work' there are 'private contacts. If a designer/manufacturer of item XY has the necessary connections and the 'pocket money' to bribe, then his products are acquired. And if not - then not. And the MoD nor the GenStab-U can't care less about consequences, while Zele is just babbling and bragging with other people's achievements around, instead of firing people who do not care.
With other words: there is no trace of interest in any kind of alternatives.
Thanks Tom! Agree - facts changed, so the opinion too.
Good write up Tom. Unfiltered truth stings a lot but it’s still the truth.
Situation is serious, Zelensky & his circus must go!
And from Trump´s POV - he is who he is, I dont like him, but I must agree that this war must end because its unvinable - exactly because general dumbnes and greed of Ukraine elites, right from the top.
If (big IF) Ukraine society would be able to generate better and more competent manager able to organize the resitance in next years is open question - I hope so.
It will not be able. There is neither demand nor understanding in society for what competence is.
The first two things any competent leader would do would be, first, end of democratic pretense and establishment of wartime dictatorship not just defacto, but openly; and second, taking many steps hurting people in the name of winning the war. There is no demand for that in society, at least.
The resistance would have to go as it goes now.
de-facto same as here in Slovakia.
Extemly limited pool of decent managers and predominant mood - not to take steps that could hurt my everyday life.
Thank you very much.
Finally a good piece of analytics!
If the circus doesn’t realise it’s got clowns and the show isn’t working then how do they effect change ?
Thanks Tom,
I think all of us are looking forward for a future time when you do a retrospective on how 2022-2024 military developments look from the lens of more recent and objective knowledge.
As for change I think we need to be real. Elections right now aren't practical so Zelenski is there to stay until a future ceasefire. And there is no obvios better candidate anyway. As for Sirsky&Co, anyone Zelenski replaces them with is likely to be even more of a yes-man for future political interference. The best that can be realistically hoped for is for Sirsky&Co to promote adequate "middle management" of competent officers who are capable of fixing their mess and mitigating the stupidity of politicians and top generals. This is how all large organizations work - the idiots at the top appoint capable people to cover their asses. Not that I have great expectations of that happening either, it's just the only moderately likely option.
What I do expect as much more likely is that Russia's economy will implode this year, as many analysts are predicting, taking away Russia's ability to supply its army and pay competitive salaries. So Sirsky&Co don't need to win, they just need to lose slower than Russia.
"What I do expect as much more likely is that Russia's economy will implode this year, as many analysts are predicting, taking away Russia's ability to supply its army and pay competitive salaries."
Keep on dreaming, it gives positive emotions.))) Despite inefficiency of state-owned companies and RU Central Bank doubtful policies, RU economy potential is still colossal. Wishful thinking analysts are happy to share their dellusions. It's a matter of taste whether trust them or not.)
Tradeover with China gained records heights. Chinese buy raw materials and sell any machinery asked. Discount for RU goods is offset by money that are not kept/invested in the West anymore
Slovakian vice-speaker of parliament saw himself the "lack" of products in Moscow shops:
https://t.me/ASupersharij/35776
Sure food is "cheaper" than at Slovakia, keep dreaming⁷
I saw his report and many slovaks are laughing of him 🤣
With average salaries and pensions you can buy max. 1/3 of goods (optimistic estimate).
Government reserves are keeping to melt down, European customers are finishing diversification of energy supplies (sure you probably will continue deliveries of NG and oil but compeating by price) so reserves are going to disappear sooner or later so keep dreaming (please dont take SK/HU as typical EU country, what they say is different to what's happening).
Yesno. Troubles are increasing, no argues...but...implode?))))
Andrej Danko has is onw - wery specific - perception of reality. He is wery good in creating of straw mans.
Really like it when people start talking about the "potential" of an economy. Every person has potential, every economy has potential. The potential of the Russian economy is roughly the same it was 10 years ago, the potential of the civilian economy is lower due to military needs.
At the end of the day though, I concede there is no way to objectively (by that I mean, not realying on potentially cooked government figures) measure how the value of Russian oil and raw resources measure against value of Chinese civilian and industrial goods, so there is still enough justification for you to hope things are not too bad and are still manageable.
Since I know more about Russian economy than most of the members here (Tom knows my background) I can speak with a certain degree of assertion.
China replaced West machinery wise, with mediators its possible to buy any Western product (of course, at higher price). Discount for RU export goods is unpleasant but since oligarkhs money is not going to West at previous volumes, it's bearable.
So, "implode" sounds very funny.
For the oligarchs of course it is no real problem, but that is not where revolutions start.
Revolutions start when big parts of the population really suffer.
Does the Russian popultion in big parts suffer enough?
I don't know.
No, it does not. Many suffer enough to keep silence, not to go to the streets.
I don’t think the population will go to the streets. But Caucasus or Belorussian could create problems. If some persons die or something other to change the current equations.
The implosion, if it comes, will not come from those who can afford to buy things at «higher prices». At least not before those »higher prices» are much higher. I accept that you know more about the Russian economy than me, but we should accept that the situation now is relatively unique. And unstable. It is a situation with a lack of manpower for everything but the army (ok, that too), whose production system now is totally geared towards war, with a serious inflation and excluded from a lot of markets. It isn’t good. But I don’t think it will implode this year.
Thanks, this is indeed interesting and confirming what could be expected.
I never actually meant that part of the comment to get so much attention so some misunderstandings arose. When I say "implosion of the economy" I mean someting very specific.
Of course stage 1 of Russia militarizing would have been making it impossible for oligarchs and western multinationals to export their assets.
Stage 2 would have been squeezing the profit out of state-owned Russian oil companies by forcing them to buy rubbles. This also happened in 2022.
Stage 3 would be forcing Russian banks to give favorable loans to military industry companies and local governments, to ensure military equipment can be manufactured at a loss and local governments can pay enlistment bonuses. A lot of people say this has started but no idea how far it has gone.
Now, banks have deep pockets so Stage 3 can last for a while. Also, whenever a worker at a factory or a recruit puts their salary at the bank, the bank can use these money to give a new loan, which can be used to pay another worker/recruit, and so on. What this means is that everyone keeping money on deposit in Russian banks is likely to be an investor in the Russian defence-industrial complex, which in turn is producing a lot of stuff, but doing it at a loss.
Now, stage 3 is heading into only one direction - making banks less stable, then insolvent, then pusning deeper into insolvency. What's not clear is how far they've gotten already. They could still be very healthy, they could already be in very deep trouble.
Eventually at the end of that road, banks become too insolvent to function normally and process money withdrawals. (as all their money is tied up in insolvent military companies) At that point there will be two very clear "solutions" that need to taken:
- central bank gives them as much rubbles as they need. This will cause hyperinflation but that's the lesser of two evils, if the alternative is deposits just disappearing
- that however won't solve banks not having yuans/euros/ect. So all foreign currency deposits will be converted into rubbles using some artificial exchange rate
The above two actions, and the following consequences, are what I call implosion. At the most basic level it's just a matter of the government shifting the costs of the war into the future until they can no longer be shifted further and then suffering the consequences.
I have spent last month in Russia, in 3 small cities, talking with my relatives and people, seeing for myself the mood and the life, how it goes. I absolutely do not believe Russian economy may collapse in 2025 or 2026. Any such developments should be noticeable to critical eye and they aren't.
I've seen some observation of one ru living in UK, based on her conversations with her mother and rest of family living somewhere at russia.
She said "its like a whole nation is living in a cult".
To save someone from the cult you need to take him/her away from it but it's impossible with whole nations
Of course. You just can't overturn cultural upbringing, common wisdom and societal pressure, not an easy way. The woman you spoke with is a lucky one; it's just her mother. The past. For me, it's my children and grandchildren. :) I really want to get my granddaughter out of Russia, for her to not grow up a Russian, but it's not an option until the situation in Russia will significantly change to worse.
🤞
I agree that resilance of general population of Russia is similar or more than it is in Slovakia. And in case of populations of Russian/Slovak small-towns (villages) the ressilance can be expected as those people (pensioners) are acustomised to harsh life and small income/pensions.
Oh I absolutely don't believe these kinds of signs would be visible without everyone talking about it. The problem is currency reserves and availability of credit. Basically China needs an export market and I imagine would be quite happy to supply Russia whatever it needs, first in exchange for oil and then on credit. The civilian economy implosion will only happen when that credit line runs out.
Of course official statistics currently still show Russia running a surplus, but those official statistics are just hard to believe considering the war. Russia's workforce is a fixed number and you cannot have more people manufacturing weapons and more people manufacturing civilian goods at the same time.
But, to be clear, as long as China is willing to ship stuff to Russia on credit, all will appear fine. There will be close to zero hardship for the civilian Russian population to endure. Problem is, even China's pockets aren't endless and it cannot bankroll Russia for too long. And even if the war ends today, those debts will need to be repaid afterwards.
I do not believe China is shipping anything on credit. Yuan and euro are freely available inside Russia, even if prices are high. Chinese imports are expensive in roubles, but it isn't exactly a problem. There would be no credit, there would be just inflation, and it's bearable; trade balance, apparently, is not as bad as you think.
Banks in Russia cannot actually own euro since 2022 with the exception of cash notes. Central bank sanctions mean that Russian foreign currency reserves are exclusively held in yuan. All the euro and dollars in Russian bank accounts are actually backed by yuan reserves. This practically means that while internally Russians can transfer "euros" between accounts, when those euros are used to buy something from abroad the bank is instead selling or borrowing yuans to do it.
So the real Russian position is the difference between the remaining Central bank yuan reserves and the sum of all euro, dollar and yuan deposits held by persons and businesses in Russia. And even if those deposits are large that's still not a problem until people actually start withdrawing them or using them to buy things.
That's what I mean by implosion - everything will be 100% fine until one day it becomes hard for the banks to handle withrawals in foreign currency as the reserves backing these deposits have been exausted long ago.
You are forgetting oil revenues. There would be no exhaustion as long as oil is sold for yuan. Only exchange rate rouble-yuan will change.
Yes, as long as oil revenues stay above the expenditures of ordinary Russians spending their salaries on foreign goods, all will be fine. Things will only start going downhill once that balance changes (if it already hasn't), and we'll only see indicators much later than that, when the avalanche is about to hit.
Russian economy would not collapse, it's false impression created by some journos back in 2022 and 2023. It would just gradually decline and decline ... To the point when it would fail to supply the army in Ukraine satisfactorily. And again, it would not bring collapse of VSFR, just gradual decline of capabilities. (And we can see it's eroding already when civilian cars are used for attacks.)
Yes, people can live in poverty like in in Soviet Union or North Korea when brainwashed.
Not good solution: waiting for Russia to implode/have a crisis which renders the VSRF incapable of fighting. The best ZSU Bdes/units will still lose competent and experienced personnel and resources which is still wasteful NOT a smart and fight hard/efficient way of winning a war.
I'd be quite happy for Ukraine generals to get their collective shit together. But at this point it seems Russia will first run out of foreign currency and military stockpiles, then we'll see the heat death of the universe, and only then the ZSU organization will improve.
That is not an improvement of the ZSU(if the same commanders at U-GenStab, etc plus Zelenskyi, et al) actually, the implosion of the Russian economy/means to support the war effort just stops/incapacitate the Russian means to wage war, the Russians were not defeated by a more efficient, less wasteful Ukrainian means of war.
Which is still a long way to go, we are still in Jan 2025 NOT Jan 2026 or May 2027.
So let us just be on fact based information/evident truth.
Anyone who tries to associate Tom with Hitler is either a fool or a scoundrel.
Thank you. A harsh truth is no less a truth!
Possible solution: two generals. Syrskyi in charge of half of the army and one front. And another new General in charge of the other half of the army & another front, with a new non-soviet based system, with more independent, meritocracy based modern NATO type forces. Just like we had competition between Gen Montgomery & Gen Patton, Eisenhower in WW2. This way there is healthy competition between the two systems of military organization, the old and new systems. We have Gen Syrskyi and new Gen B then both reporting to Zelensky. The old system also is not allowed to interfere with the new Generals forces by making sure that both new and old systems have equal priorities on logistics, material and men. There will be fights who gets what, but that can be fixed. Summary example, Gen Syrskyi, northern front, Kursk to Donetsk. General "new", southern front, Crimea to Donetsk. This was disruption is minimized and leadership, military methods, organization & strategy/tactics are tested to see which works best.
Wouldn't this create twice the overhead and twice the confusion?
Possible, see above reply. "Each Senior General can spend time on his "section". So we have a main Field Marshal, who understands the issues & cannot micro-manage the other two, "north/south theatre" generals. Also, to change an organization in the middle of a war is problematic. Nevertheless, not to adapt or do nothing is just as bad. However, the idea of a senior Eisenhower, with two Generals such as Paton and Montgomery still stands and has proven to work. So for example, in Ukraine we could have one Field Marshal Zaluzny, then a General Syrskyi for the northern theatre and another General for the southern theatre. With the new General adopting a less micro-managing, hierarchical approach such as in UK, US, German, Swedish armies. Two theatres of war, north and south, so each General has less to manage and can concentrate on the smaller scope."
Sorry but that is a pipe dream regarding the past and the present. Eisenhower was the commander-in-chief. If you don't want to believe, take a look for example here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Headquarters_Allied_Expeditionary_Force
War isn't an experiment, which can be repeated in a lab. That simply doesn't work.
I share your point of view in general, but must also observe that the Allied organization in WW2 in Europe has been characterized by historians as coalition warfare, the coalition comprising sovereign nation-states in a mutual alliance. There are no national coalitions on the Ukraine side of this current tragic war. I perceive that if Ukrainian politico-military authorities cannot successfully re-organize the command structure of the Ukrainian armed forces along more Western European & American models [army(..ies), corps, divisions & bridades ....] then I fear that Ukraine may go down ultimately in defeat.
I also perceive that Ukraine has managed to turn, for example, Kursk into a distraction. Whatever limited military power is available to the Ukrained armed forces, should be applied as directly as possible to degrading Russian military operations. I am not against disrupting certain long-term military-related logistics such as disrupting oil supplies and facilities (e.g., refineries, fuel tanks, etc.), but even these activities must always relate as directly as possible to the Russian-Ukraine field of battle.
I admit that I am not a land warfare expert, but I still know at least from my U.S. Navy experience and from my studies at the U.S. Naval War College that an effective strategy is important. Probably even during the beginning of this war (early 2022) and especially today, Ukraine should have focused its strategy on the Strategic Defense and apply all military actions to satisfy the demands of such a defense. IOW, NO DISTRACTIONS! I do not see any hope in the near to intermediate future that Ukraine can inflict a decisive defeat of Russian military forces on Ukrainian soil.
I have already written several times that they need a proper structure of their land forces. That proper structure has been used by all nations for a long time.
It is only Ukraine with it's current structure, which is the insane exception.
And yes again this war will decide the future of Ukraine, either in good or in bad.
With the end of the year 2025 most of the stocks from soviet times will be used up, afterwards it will be a completely different situation and Ukraine is also gearing up the attacks on the oil infrastructure.
Agree, that is why I put Eisenhower after the stroke "/". Pros and cons here. Each Senior General can spend time on his "section". So we have a main Field Marshal, who understands the issues & cannot micro-manage the other two, "north/south theatre" generals. Also, to change an organization in the middle of a war is problematic. Nevertheless, not to adapt or do nothing is just as bad. However, the idea of a senior Eisenhower, with two Generals such as Paton and Montgomery still stands and has proven to work. So for example, in Ukraine we could have one Field Marshal Zaluzny, then a General Syrskyi for the northern theatre and another General for the southern theatre. With the new General adopting a less micro-managing, hierarchical approach such as in UK, US, German, Swedish armies. Two theatres of war, north and south, so each General has less to manage and can concentrate on the smaller scope.
Even if you split it into 10 sections, without a proper structure it would still be too much micromanagement.
Wow quite illuminating. The only question now is how soon will the top Brass in the ZSU finally be replaced?
By whom? Who would decide which of the brass is competent and which isn't?
"the ZSU is, actually, running lots of local counterattacks. However, the mass of these are failing so miserably, we never hear about them."
So basically... ukraine use human waves attack ? lol. Oh wait no we all know they're so different than the Russians....
No that is a gross twisting of what was written.
Okay so... most russians assault are failing (and yet they're making ground every day) so they're suffering insane casualties and are labeled as "meat waves attack"
But when ukraine fail all of their counter attack except for maybe a few exceptions a week, everything is fine?
Alright lol.
When Ukraine fails it is ok? I thought the whole argument here was that it wasn’t fine.
You seem to have a problem with basic logic.
If an attack fails or not has nothing to do with meat wave attacks.
An attack can fail without being a meat wave attack and attack can also being be successful and being a meat wave attack.
Most of Ukrainian counter attacks fail, because many don't know how to properly conduct them, which doesn't automatically mean they were meat wave attacks.
There are similarities, of course. Centuries of cultural domination and contamination aren't going to dissipate overnight or over a generation.
When Ukrainians are at their worst, they start to somewhat resemble Russians. And when that happens Russian patriots start parading it as if they scored a point. And I just have to shake my head in disbelief.
Honored to be mentioned!: "you think it’s OK if Syrsky is appointing his incompetent buddies into crucial positions – not because ‘he has it easier to work with people he knows’, but, principally, because (and as explained at least 2-3 times over the last 12 months) he owes them personal favours?"
I assumed the person comparing you to the "Austrian" was young and full of TOO much vinegar, so I just made an example argument he could have used. I'm still here, so I know you know that ;)
I've watched "12 O'Clock High" at least a dozen times. It argue that even if everyone loves the leader, if the leader is beyond reproach in courage and integrity, wars cannot be won on that. You talk about meritocracy, that's in the film. A young navigator, of German ancestry, screws up. Savage thinks he should be replaced. Gately doesn't. In the end, the young man commits suicide from shame. There are no easy answers in the film and at the end it questions its own argument. Even if one follows a structure can they remain sane?
Which further supports your argument about the difference between 2022 and 2025. Even for those surviving Ukrainian soldiers, how can the work effectively after 3 years of this? I don't see that most of them could. I don't see how I could.
I actually agree with you 110% that the leadership needs to change. I disagree with the argument that Ukraine can't vote in another leader. I think the world of what Zelensky has done. But as you argue, you can't change people, no matter how good they are.
In 12 O'Clock they talk about the great thing Gately had done. They couldn't have been more respectful. But replacing him was the right move.
I found your reference to "12 O'Clock High" quite interesting. When I was a drilling Naval Reservist, we senior officers attended a Navy-sponsored course on leadership, accountability, & competence over a two-days drill weekend. The curriculum was oriented around this movie. We were briefed in the beginning with certain principles to be adduced from the move. Then we watched a segment of "12 O'Clock High" followed by a discussion of what we observed regarding those principles, then watched another segment, etc., to the end of the movie. Finally, a summary of everything "learned" in our discussion (based upon the Socratic method) concluded the course.
This was one of the best leadership courses that I attened in my experience, and was very much unlike most military/naval training that I have undergone (the Naval War College being an exception which was great!).
I have followed your commentary about everything warfare for many years now (dating back since pre-Ukraine conflict), something I cannot say the same for anyone else within the global 'conflict analysis' space. The reason why I follow your commentary is to challenge my own thoughts regarding same subjects to avoid being trapped by believing that only my own conclusions are the 'correct' version of assumptions. The reason for that is simply because us [intellectually limited] modified primates do not know everything (especially referring to all the retired NATO military Generals turned 'war analysts' who love stating their opinions as concrete facts 'since January 17, 1991'). Do I agree with everything you say? No. In fact, there are many things you say I don't agree with, but that's where cognitive maturity comes into play. Basically, just because I don't agree with you doesn't mean I don't respect your opinion. In fact, when I don't agree with something you said, I am motivated more to understand the fundamental reasons why I don't agree with your opinion(s). Simply put, my disagreement with you is more about me for me than its about you. So, who am I? I am nobody, a random guy who the majority people will never remember (nor notice) being present in the same room as them, even though I am a veteran of the past 5 major wars fought during the past 3 decades embedded in multiple nationality (predominantly NATO/NATO allied) militaries. Does that make me an expert? F*ck no! In fact, my current conclusion now, entering 2025, is that the current global 'competition' dynamics (which is ALL interconnected), is one major rabbit hole resembling a Viet Cong tunnel complex riddled with traps and dead ends. The deeper you go, the more f*cked up it becomes. My point is: It is absolutely IMPOSSIBLE for a layman to make any sense of what's going on in Ukraine (nevertheless the world), when people who are appointed to analyze the conflict as a living are struggling to understand the situation thoroughly and accurately. Fact is, warfare is a science, and science is an ongoing evolution of understanding.
So, taking a look at the current situation in Ukraine, I've been spending a lot of time with Ukrainians at the ground level to understand much of the present-day cultural dynamics which constitutes present-day Ukrainian society. Without going into this too deep, I'll only summarize my conclusions extremely briefly without going into detailed explanation. In summary, we as non-Ukrainians need to understand the characteristics shaping the Ukrainian situation as follows:
1. Ukraine is not a single unified nation with a singular cultural identity. Current Ukrainian society is still very much divided along various lines ranging from opposing political beliefs, religion, and ethnic identity.
2. Simplified, the current Ukraine 'territories-controllled' are still divided into two prominent groups, namely, a minority eastern Ukraine which primarily identifies as ethnic Russian, and a majority central- and western Ukraine which do not identify as ethnic Russian.
3. Even though the Ukrainian minorities in the east predominantly identifies as ethnic Russian, it does not mean they support Russia in its current aggression in eastern Ukraine. This, however, is where most of the problems in the current Ukrainian war efforts start because what most (foreign audience) do not realize is that proportionately the ethnic Russian Ukrainians are contributing a large component of frontline forces facing the Russian (and proxies) forces in eastern Ukraine compared to the Ukrainians who choose to identify as 'not of ethnic Russian ancestry' (a very sensitive debatable concept by its own also not to be discussed).
4. The eastern Ukrainian ethnic Russians still feel disadvantaged by Kyiv on the basis of their ethnic Russian identity which is reflected in the quality of support provided to them through the imbalanced military structures on the frontlines since they are always last in line to receive the newest military hardware, although first in line when resisting Russian offensives. When Western military aid reaches Ukraine, the ethnic Russian frontline units usually receive the older Soviet equipment being replaced by the more modern Western hardware destined for units manned by non-ethnic Russian Ukrainians from the center and the west. The result is that the eastern Ukrainians who identify as ethnic Russians, even though patriotic Ukrainians, do not experience equal inclusiveness within the current Ukrainian war effort, still being on the receiving end of much distrust and neglect by Kyiv which is primarily focussed on pleasing the majority non-Russian identifying Ukrainians to maintain political favor.
So, what is my point? Simple answer, this is the primary weakness that Russia is exploiting in the east, and as long as Kyiv neglects the ethnic Russian minority Ukrainians in the east, this will always remain a vulnerability (achilles heel) in this war. One of the problems with the Western reinforcement of 'cultural diversity' so commonly practiced in our 'democracies' is that the consequences thereof is in fact reinforcement of cultural divisions. Government diversity programs do not unify societies, and that is the problem that a more Western leaning Ukraine is unknowingly facing now. Bottomline: Kyiv needs to move away from diversity based politics, especially the toxic Western DEI doctrine simply because its outcomes are counter-productive. Unfortunately, in defense of Kyiv, it has no other choice to enforce Western imposed 'democratic' [and flawed] doctrines as part of the military aid terms and conditions it depends on. Looking at military culture, we will also notice much of society's problems filtering into the manner the military effort is organized which eventually erodes morale and motivation for engagement in war. As morale and motivation declines (partly caused by degraded trust in the cause and military leadership), we start noticing a major decline in discipline within the military ranks, something we are noticing in the ZSU now. The challenge with a decline in military discipline is that when it spirals out of control, the political leaders start fearing military revolt. So, one of the major problems I have noticed during my career is that military leadership is always focussed on developing the new best methods of analyzing the battlefield and the effectiveness and efficiency of military efforts while neglecting the most important component of warfare, namely, the human resources responsible for executing the military plans. One of the most overlooked components of military planning is motivation within the ranks of the military organization. The biggest mistake the best military commanders still make is to assume that their subordinates are properly motivated (which in most cases are severely overestimated). So, how do you motivate your troops effectively? The simple (Soviet era) way is by force (exercised through the threat of death to you or harm to your family in the event of resistance), whereas in the West money is the primary form of motivation. Are these methods effecrive? No. In my experience I have learnt that effective motivation of the most efficient combat forces I have ever observed usually practised the following simple rules:
1. It is 'the enemy', not 'your enemy'.
2. Never hate the enemy. Hate only clouds judgement and limits innovative thinking. Hate also toxifies own organizational culture which negatively affects morale.
3. Always respect the enemy equally (as a peer) as you expect to be respected as equal professionals in opposition supporting different opposing causes irrespective of any perceived affiliations in terms of culture, ethnicity, or religion.
4. Therefore, motivation to engage in direct conflict should rather be cause based instead of hate based.
5. To be cause motivated, the cause should be clearly defined and concise, attainable (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound), believable (not flawed by falsehoods), resilient to enemy information operations, and achievable. Entering 2025, the ZSU 'cause' is becoming more blurred through the lack of effective leadership and guidance.
6. Never underestimate the enemy, and never overestimate own forces capabilities.
Bottomline: These characteristics are usually found in professional military forces developed on the idea of volunteerism and not forced conscription, why consciption dependent militaries always struggle with motivation amongst its members usually leading to poor military effectiveness against a superior motivated adversary. We observed this first hand during the initial phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 where a poorly equipped but superior motivated ZSU effectively resisted a superior equipped but poorly motivated VSRF. Now, 3 years later the ZSU leadership has lost the advantage it had in terms of motivation simply due to repeated mistakes and poor leadership decisions. Unfortunately no weapon systems, irrespective of how good it is, can make up for poor motivation amongst the people that need to deploy it. This is also the primary reason why Ukraine needs to reform its military culture from the top down. Forcing people to serve in the military against their will is counterproductive and only expends valuable resources inefficiently. A smaller well motivated military can achieve much more than a poorly motivated [and consequently poorly trained and disciplined] force.
Its time for Kyiv to take a step back and realize that hard decisions need to be made now. Now is not the time for political game playing.
That took a while to read, but thanks.
My main comment is a little frivolous, but can you use more paragraphs and subheadings. Makes long-form replies easier to read.
Regarding Ukrainian culture, I would add that there is a culture of deference in a lot of old Soviet Bloc countries that stops people from challenging the hierarchy about things they disagree with.
Thank you. There's a great deal to think about in this brilliant commentary. I will try to get it to a few people who might benefit from it.
Take it with a grain of salt. The whole "Ukrainians who identify as ethnically Russian" part is hogwash. There are ethnically Russian Ukrainians of course, but there are no people who would call themselves that. People will tell you that their language is Russian or their cultural milestones are Soviet or Russia-adjacent, but this ethnicity thing is some kind of projection from the poster, it's not a thing, *at all*. I guess I need to type a few more kilobytes to give weight to my claim, but trusting people just because they typed a novel is ridiculous.
I host Ukrainians. Without detailing their family histories, I'd agree that the "ethnic identity" question is extremely complicated. From some time spent in Latvia it seems to me that matter is, to a high degree, a matter of choice. I believe that the poster is correct in suggesting that the focus on "diversity" is frequently divisive and visibly counterproductive. I have no idea what novel you're referring to but I've read, among other relevant books, both "The Grey Bees" and "The Orphanage" so for many reasons I'm attempting to understand the issues in this appalling conflict. But I'm just a civilian punter here...
By "the novel" I meant the original comment. The identity among post-soviets is not ethnicity based even when couched in ethnic terms, people claim to be Russian or Ukrainian or could decide they are a different thing at some point in their life, but that's the thing it's one-dimensional. People who identify as "ethnically Russian Ukrainians" is a fabrication. It's just projection from someone from a country where people do have a separate ethnic identity. In Ukraine people who would say something like that are 1/10000.
Same thing about "focus on diversity" in Ukraine. What the hell are we even talking about? If there's a divisive issue in Ukraine right now that would be lack of acceptance of diversity, not some "democratic focus on diversity" imaginary horseshit.
Ukrainians talking about US culture wars sound sophomore, people sharing insights on Ukrainian cultural issues sound even worse as they have even less of a chance to get all the necessary background knowledge.
This nonsense with people diagnosing cultures they started tangentially interacting with a couple years ago needs to stop.
From what I can tell as an American this war seems more like civil war. The US civil war seems a very direct comparison. There were no separate ethnic groups but there were strong regional differences in cultural thinking ie agrarian vs manufacturing society, slave owning vs abolitionist and most importantly how each side saw the role of the federal government. These differences are sometimes framed as “ethnic” but it is the wrong word. Would this be a more accurate way of framing how you see the war in Ukraine?
Well, only if you believe the Soviet Union to still exist. Otherwise this is an outright invasion.
У вас неверная информация. Мы с востока никогда не говорили, что мы русские. Конечно есть индивиды, которые считают себя до сих пор гражданами СССР, но большинство считают себя просто русскоязычными украинцами, довольно хорошо владеющими украинским языком, но между собой говорят на русском - вот и вся связь с Россией.
Второе ваше заблуждение - что нам дают старую технику. Вы совсем не понимаете, как здесь распределяются резервисты. Человека с востока чаще пошлют воевать за бригаду, созданную на юге или западе страны, и наоборот. Состав любой бригады будет содержать множество людей со всех регионов. У нас нет чисто харьковской бригады, состоящей из жителей Харькова и так про любой город и регион.
Так что ваше умозаключение построено на неверных данных и привело просто к фантастическому роману о гражданской войне из российской пропаганды. Вы просто стали очередной её жертвой...
Typical :-(
That was just what i intended to write, but you where quicker than me.