Evanescence

by Tom Cooper

Hello everybody!

Today, I would like to address a handful of issues that emerged, mostly, over the last two days.

For example, the recurring ‘automatic association’ of me as an Austrian (see there: I’m really not Australian… nor British, for that matter) – with Adolf Hitler.

‘Beg your pardon, but’: coming from a family that fiercely (and with deadly consequences) opposed that stinking Brown Rubbish already 70+ years back, and continues resisting it ever since, I’m allergic to such stereotypes. Thus, not only that I’m ‘sensitive’ about this issue because nobody from whom I’m descending was a ‘member of Einsatztruppen’ (as few idiots – both from Russia and Ukraine - are explaining around the social media), but: for those who might have missed it, here it is, one last time. Whoever comes here to compare or associate me with Hitler in ‘Comments’, has exactly one opportunity to withdraw such a statement. Afterwards, the presence in question is banned. Without any further warnings, without any explanations, and irreversibly.

Why?

Because for me, that’s equal to racism. And I’ve got exactly 0 tolerance for racists and racism. Because I’m non-tolerant vis-à-vis racists and racism: from my point of view, racists are the most primitive- and the most despicable form of human life I can imagine.

That’s my standpoint in this regards, and as long as I breathe and crawl around this planet I’ll not move half an inch in this regards.

***

Another issue mentioned – especially the last two days – came in reaction to the Part 5 of the latest Don’s Weekly (originally, this was written by Don: I’m responsible for expanding it, and for ‘sharpening’ the critique it contains).

In this regards, I cannot but remind everybody reading this about Don’s Review of the Battle of Avdiivka, plus few other features published back in February 2024, and/or about my article Dreamland, published back in mid-October 2024. At least as important would be the feature Procedures, from July 2024.

There you have it: already months ago, we have laid out, one by one, all the facts known to us, all the reasons why are we as critical of Zelensky, Syrsky, the GenStab-U etc. as we are. We’ve explained what is done in wrong fashion, and how to solve it. For example: because ‘procedures’ (read: doctrine) – is the fundaments of the problem in Ukraine, because they are determining how are the troops trained, and units commanded.

Theoretically, these three features alone would have been ideal for orientation of especially those complaining we’re ‘only criticising’ but ‘never offering solutions’, too - all provided characters in question have at least a trace of interest in serious conversation about this topic, and no different other agendas, of course.

Bottom line: in this regards, the situation couldn’t be any simpler. It is neither Don’s, nor my fault if you’ve missed all we’ve posted here, and are complaining because you didn’t read what is posted.

***

Directly related to the last point discussed above, (and, PLEASE, pay attention): almost a year since Don’s review of the Battle of Avdiivka, at least seven months since my feature on Procedures, and nearly four months since Dreamland, we all on this blog, are, essentially, still discussing exactly the same set of topics.

Don’t you ever ask yourself ‘how comes’?

Because, in Kyiv – in the Zelensky Administration, and between Syrsky/Glavcom & Buddies/GenStab-u - NOTHING has happened. They didn’t change an ounce in their behaviour. The President might be announcing and claiming something else, but: he is still issuing ‘no step back’ orders, still establishing new brigades (at least until a few days ago), and still ordering ‘counteroffensives’ for purely political reasons (see: ‘oh, the next Rammstein-meeting is due; quickly, go and attack something in Kursk’). The Glavcom is still micromanaging the battle (indeed, he’s in personal command of the Battle for Pokrovsk!), and the GenStab-U is still, and systematically not doing its job (didn’t write a new set of procedures, didn’t reform the way it thinks, nor did it reform the way it works: i.e. there is still no new doctrine, and thus no standardised, ZSU-wide quality of training, or procedures for commanding units, regardless at what level).

At most, the only thing that happened…indeed, the ‘biggest achievement by the top Ukrainian political- and military commanders’ of the Year 2024, was for Syrsky & Buddies to abandon even their own, Soviet-times doctrine and systemically destroy not only the cohesion of about a dozen of different ZSU brigades that are already neck-deep into fighting the Russians, but even the 155^th Mechanised Brigade - an that before the later ever came into being.

…what a surprise the results were such ‘fantastic news’ like the losses of Avdiivka, Ochetertyne, Novomykahilvka, Vuhledar, Blahodatne, Kurakhove, Toretsk….

The pair that can’t even fight this war, not to talk about winning it.

…and still, some are wondering why are we as critical of Zelensky, Syrsky/Glavcom & Buddies/GenStab-U?

…and if not, then you think it’s OK if Syrsky is appointing his incompetent buddies into crucial positions – not because ‘he has it easier to work with people he knows’, but, principally, because (and as explained at least 2-3 times over the last 12 months) he owes them personal favours?

***

I could go on like this, literally, ‘forever’. From my point, meanwhile it’s obvious: this would be pointless. Therefore, let me end with a question that emerged not only in reaction to the Part 5 of the latest Don’s Weekly, but also in an interview for the Ukrainian mainstream media, yesterday.

While the issue in question is, actually, very specific, I beg for understanding that I know no better way to describe/summarise it, but: how comes back in early 2023 I was critical of ill-disciplined ZSU-troops, of NATO’s hesitant deliveries of ammo- and arms to Ukraine, but now I’m so critical of the top political- and military commanders of Ukraine?

The answer is also explaining why have I titled this feature with ‘Evanescence’.

Evanescence stands for condition that’s lasting only a short time, then is disappearing, even forgotten.

Principal reason is that the research into ‘military history’ (contemporary or not) never ends: whoever is taking this job seriously, must constantly run additional research, must constantly cross-check and examine, and constantly update own knowledge, first and foremost.

Back in early 2022, I knew next to nothing about the ZSU. Then I learned some, then more, then yet more etc.: the more I busy myself with this topic, the more contacts I find, the more I know – and the better I can analyse. Usually, the situation is such that what I know ‘right now’ is ‘nothing’ in comparison to what I’m going to know in a day, week, month or a year. Unsurprisingly: what I happen to know about the ZSU nowadays, is ‘light years ahead’ in comparison to what I used to know about the ZSU - and the war in Ukraine, in general - back in 2022.

Another, even more important reason is that wars are affairs that are in the state of permanent flux, constant change, and that are ephemeral, too. As a result, what was valid for the war in Ukraine of February 2022, was not valid for the first half of 2023, not in the second half of 2023, and especially not through 2024, or in early 2025.

For example (and as explained in the Dreamland), back in February 2022, the ZSU went into this war in a state that, with hindsight, can be assessed with ‘good’. Say: ‘about 6 on the scale from 1 to 10, where 1 would stand for miserable and 10 would stand for excellent’. It comprised about 20 brigades, most of these were staffed by combat-experienced troops, and commanded by ‘good’ to ‘excellent’ commanders. Moreover, it was confronted by about 160 ‘battalion tactical groups’ (BTGs) of Spetsnaz and private military companies (PMCs), VDV and VSRF, the average quality of which was anywhere between ‘OK’ and ‘piss-poor’ (say: ‘about 2 to 4 on the scale from 1 to 10’).

The war of February-May 2022, was largely characterised by ‘manoeuvre’ warfare: except along the former LOC, it was run by large mechanised formations, over hundreds of kilometres, and not stalemated in form of trench warfare.

‘Unsurprisingly’, the ZSU of February 2022, ‘was capable’ of – for example – having units like the 14^th Mechanised Brigade (ZSU), operating (on order from its own commander, not of any ‘generals in Kyiv’) in small, mobile combat groups (approx. half a company each) to cover a frontline of nearly 300 kilometres west of Kyiv. And not only that: they were constantly running counterattacks into the Russian rear, wreaking havoc with logistics of the Russian 35^th Combined Arms Army… and the 14th Mech was (highly) successful at that, too.

Another example: in February-March 2022, the 58^th Motorised Brigade (ZSU) didn’t manage to create a coherent frontline to defend Sumy or Konotop, ‘but’, and ‘although’ constantly withdrawing in western direction, it wreaked havoc in the flanks and the rear of the 1^st Guards Tank Army and the 2^nd Guards Combined Arms Army, destroyed the 90^th Tank Division’s attempt to cross the Desna River, etc., etc., etc. - thus delaying the Russian advance on (eastern) Kyiv by ‘weeks’…. It was (highly) successful.

…and these are ‘just two out of dozens’ of ‘positive’ examples for the ZSU in 2022 (there were negative examples, too, but that’s ‘a different pair of shoes’).

On 9 March 2022, a small team armed with Javelins, supported by few UAVs, and an artillery battery were ‘enough’ to turn around a reinforced tank regiment of the VSRF and send it fleeing in panic for kilometres. In January 2025, the ZSU has the mid-ranking commanders with such experiences, but no ‘generals’ to train the entire force correspondingly, and even less so ‘generals’ capable of commanding the force in effective fashion.

The point is this: meanwhile, it’s the Year 2025. As surprising as it might sound, things are fundamentally different.

Not only was up to 50% of the ‘peace-time ZSU’ – the ZSU that entered this war in February 2022 – literally, ‘shot away’ (killed, wounded, missing/captured, or else), but general circumstances and the enemy force are fundamentally different.

The ZSU commanders of 2022 knew why they didn’t follow specific of NATO-advices: I strongly doubt that in early 2025 top ZSU commanders could reasonably explain why are they commanding (or not at all), the way they do.

The ZSU of 2025 (here I’m ‘bunching together’ not only the ZSU, but also the National Guard and the Territorial Defence), has over 1 million troops under arms. They are organised into more than 100 ‘independent’ brigades and battalions. In terms of quality of their training and combat effectiveness, the mass of these are nowhere near those 20+ brigades of 2022. While there’s no doubt that about a dozen of brigades are highly effective (say: ‘7-8 on the scale from 1 to 10’), the mass couldn’t outmatch the VSRF of 2022 (see: they’re at ‘3-4 on the scale from 1 to 10’).

This results in a situation where the ZSU of 2025 needs far more quality in training and command than ever before.

Best example: Don and me have wondered about the lack of ZSU’s tactical counterattacks, time and again in 2024. Eventually, it turned out that the ZSU is, actually, running lots of local counterattacks. However, the mass of these are failing so miserably, we never hear about them. Both because the quality of training and command are that miserable that the mass is failing and because troops get killed as result of the lack of training and miserable commanders.

‘Lovely’, isn’t it?

On the battlefields of February-April 2022, it ‘didn’t matter’ if a brigade had no flank protection, or a company or battalion ‘did a mistake’ and ‘ambushed in the wrong place’: the consequences were never dire. On the battlefields of January 2025, average ZSU battalion is tasked with defending 10-20 kilometres of frontline (sometimes up to 50km), while a failure of the superior command node to coordinate between it and neighbouring battalions is – regularly – resulting in catastrophic losses.

It’s not that the Spetsnaz, the VDV or the VSRF of 2025 are ‘significantly better’ in comparison to 2022, but in reaction to such experiences like from February-May 2022, but especially the Ukrainian counteroffensive in eastern Kharkiv (September-October 2022), even the Keystone Cops in Moscow have learned their lessons. Recognising they can’t fight the ZSU effectively in any other fashion than through confronting it with ‘masses’ (back in February-May 2022, that was ‘masses of armoured fighting vehicles’; in May-July 2022, that was ‘masses of artillery’… nowadays, that’s ‘masses of own infantry’, constantly rolling into ever additional assaults), they’ve constructed extensive frontlines, containing massive volumes of mines and field fortifications. The quality of average VSRF officer of 2025 might be ‘below all acceptable levels’, however, at least his superiors know the ways to find weak spots in ZSU’s positions - and that far better than they knew (or didn’t) in 2022…

Means: since 2022, the Russians have learned (at least some of) their lessons. They have reformed and adapted to new circumstances.

Only Zelensky, Syrsky and the GenStab-U didn’t.

The Russian Armed Forces of 2022 were operating in fashion that was easy to predict, along routes that were easy to predict. They were easy to ambush and they were easy to cut off from their supplies. Their reaction to resulting experiences - foremost in form of heavily mined- and fortified frontlines, but also in form of deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops - are what are massively troubling the ZSU: over the last two years, the top command of the ZSU has proven as unable to find solutions for this problem. Indeed: by people proven as unable to unite and organise both the nation and its armed forces, and fully exploit its potentials. Therefore, this top command must be replaced by people who can find solutions.

...where I’m not even going into the fundamental difference between the technology dominating this war in 2022, and nowadays. Like UAVs, just for example: the battlefield nowadays is dominated by them so much, neither side can manoeuvre a unit larger than a platoon anywhere close to the frontline without this being promptly detected by the enemy.

Finally, in the Year 2025, the ZSU’s fame of 2022 doesn’t matter: it has no direct impact upon what is happening on the battlefield, every single day.

***

Bottom line: the war as fought right now, is fundamentally different to the war as fought back in 2022, or in 2023, or in 2024. And the state of the ZSU is such that it doesn’t matter any more if NATO is supplying arms and ammunition: foremost the quality of command (which in turn results in no quality of training) is so poor, the quality of its top command is so miserable, that even if equipped with 2000 M1 main battle tanks, 2000 M2/M3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and 5000 M109 self-propelled artillery pieces, and supported by 300 F-16s, the ZSU wouldn’t be more effective than it currently is. Precisely because the top leadership of Ukraine is proving reform-resistant beyond belief.

This is why I feel I cannot stop emphasising that it’s meanwhile not only urgent, but a matter of national survival of Ukraine – for ‘at least’ Syrsky & Buddies to be dismissed and replaced. Replaced by people who can organise, who can manage, who can command, who are not corrupt but insistent on quality standards and -control, who care – about their troops, about supplies and support for these troops - and who can motivate their subordinates, not use them as scapegoats for own failures, and force them into desperation and silence at every opportunity.

As long as these issues are not solved – and, presently: there is absolutely no trace of any kind of solution in sight; there are mere ‘statements for the press’ and lots of ‘promises’ – the ZSU can’t improve.

If the ZSU can’t improve, Ukraine can’t win this war either.

Whether you like my critique, or not, is entirely irrelevant, but: these are the reasons for my critique.