Don's Weekly, 4 March 2024: Part 5

(…continued from Part 4)

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Equipment

France supplied Ukraine with about 50 air to ground HAMMER missiles that have a 70 km range and a 250 kg warhead with inertial/GPS guidance, accurate to 10 meters if unjammed. They have now been used…

https://twitter.com/UKikaski/status/1764267899550679429

A Ukrainian SU-27M launches a HARM missile at some target that is broadcasting an electronic signal. At 0:08 you hear the sonic boom of the MACH 2.9 (987 m/s) missile…

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1764313022263136621

Russia says they will resume production of the A-50. If it actually happens, it will take a while to build one…https://en.defence-ua.com/industries/rostec_wants_to_resume_production_of_a_50u_aewc_systems_but_new_aircraft_wont_be_ready_any_soon_history_shows-9703.html

Most tanks and APC/IFVs are destroyed near the front lines and are relatively easy to track with visual confirmation. Artillery can be scattered 10-20 km behind the front lines where it is more difficult to determine if it has been destroyed. Some analysts decided to track all of the artillery in storage and see how much has been removed over time. It could be removed to be used, or be refurbished before use, or be available as replacement parts, including the replacements of worn out barrels, but it is a consistent observation that can provide a sense of Russia’s artillery loss without visually confirming the loss itself. As a rough indicator, there were 4450 self-propelled guns in storage before February, 2022 and there are now 2961 in storage now. There were 14631 towed artillery pieces in storage in 2022 and there is 6786 in storage now. That’s a reduction of 1489 self-propelled guns and 7845 towed guns…

https://twitter.com/bentanmy/status/1762117582935687218

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Baba Yaga Drones as Bombers and Motherships

In the absence of sufficient artillery ammo, Ukraine is trying to fill the void with drones. One advantage artillery had over the FPV drones is range. While firing from 6-10 km behind friendly lines, Ukrainian artillery could still hit targets 15 km behind Russian lines with conventional rounds and up to 30 km behind Russian lines using rocket-assisted rounds. FPV drones were limited to targets about 10 km from Russian lines due to battery limitations and the cheaper communication gear that makes the $500 drone an affordable one-time use munition.

The larger six- and eight-rotor drones cost anywhere from $13-50,000 dollars and perform as bombers, carrying loads of up to 20 kg, and can carry lighter loads up to 30 km away. They are slow, making them vulnerable to small arms fire, but they have thermal sights and operate mostly at night. The sound of their engines while they hunt at night led Russians to name the drone after Baba Yaga, a witch that inhabits the forest in Slavic folklore. Some of the heavier payloads used are mortar shells or anti-tank mines…

https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1763779021890846913

The Ukrainians reconfigured some of these drones as motherships resistant to electronic warfare attacks and reportedly able to communicate via Starlink. Instead of carrying munitions, they would carry other FPV drones, up to ten according to a Russian report. This brief footage shows an FPV being launched from a mothership during an experimental flight…

One operator flies the EW-resistant Baba Yaga mothership across the front lines, where enemy EW activity is strongest, and uses its thermal optics to detect Russian targets as far as 30 km from the front lines. When a target is found, an FPV is launched and another operator flies it, sending his signal first to the mothership, which then repeats it so the operator can control the FPV itself. If the Baba Yaga drone is shot down then Ukraine would lose not only an expensive drone, but any FPV drone that was not yet expended. But the use of motherships provide Ukraine another way of eliminating targets far behind Russia’s front line and will remain a useful option even when Ukraine receives higher quantities of artillery ammunition in the future…https://www.kyivpost.com/post/28771

Integrated Air Defense Systems

Given the multiple air defense systems Ukraine received, it made sense to integrate the various western systems with each other and with Ukraine’s existing systems. Part of that integration involved the ability of different missiles being used in different launchers. The Norwegian NASAMS system was designed with that capability in mind but other systems have also been modified. The other part of the integration is the software that links various radar data with different command centers to different launchers. The integration has been called the FrankenSAM system after Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein monster that was created from various body parts.

The US had been working on that issue for several years when they ran a 2019 test at White Sands, New Mexico. They were testing the capability to detect, track and engage multiple threats at the same time. The components used in the integrated air defense test were air and ground components from the Air Force, Marine Corps and Army. These components were an F-35 jet, a USMC TPS-59 radar, Patriot and Sentinel radars, the Link 16 tactical data network used by NATO and other countries, and two Patriot launchers using PAC-2 missiles.

Two low flying cruise missiles were used as targets and they flew in different directions to attack different targets. The multiple air defense sensors tracked the targets at different times based on the location of the cruise missiles, the terrain around the cruise missiles (which could block a sensor) and the capabilities of the sensors. No single sensor could track both targets throughout their entire flight, yet the data from all the sensors created a single composite track of both targets throughout their entire flight. After the integrated system calculated engagement solutions, the soldiers executed them and both targets were destroyed nearly simultaneously. Simultaneous launches decrease the reaction time any target might have, as well as increase the chances of a launching component surviving any enemy SEAD activity.

It is likely that a modified version of this system has been used to integrate Ukraine’s multiple air defense assets. Tom Cooper has explained many times in the past how destroying one component of an air defense system rarely renders the rest of the components useless: If you knock out one launcher, there might be three or five other launchers that are still operating. If you knock out one target tracking radar that controls three launchers, there might be another target tracking radar that controls three other launchers. That was true for one isolated system with multiple components.

If multiple Ukrainian air defense systems were integrated into an air defense network, these capabilities would be multiplied. Every active radar system in the network, which could include aircraft, would provide data to every command center in the network. They, in turn, could determine which missiles in which launchers would be the best choice to attack a particular target.

In ground warfare, reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance is vital. The same is true in aerial warfare. Radars are needed to detect an aerial threat, but simply looking for targets exposes detection radars to attack, so older or cheaper radars can be used in this role. If one of these is knocked out, then a dormant detection radar nearby can be activated. Their placement depends on the expected direction of attacks, the terrain that could block their views, and the expected enemy capabilities to engage and destroy the detection radars. If all the detection radars in a sector were destroyed, it could create a gap through which other enemy aerial attacks could pass without timely notice.

To track and engage the targets, better radars are needed to determine the precise location and speed of the target. These radars can remain dormant until the target is within the engagement range of the missile. Then the tracking radars can be turned on and pass the data to the missile. Once the missile is launched and is tracking the target on its own, the tracking radar can be turned off and moved. This limits the time in which the tracking radar can be detected and engaged, increasing its chances of survival.

The various enemy targets could be assessed and engaged by the cheapest missile(s) in range that would be judged effective, and there could be different missiles with different capabilities loaded in the same launcher. If the enemy targets were drones and cruise missiles, the method of engagement could also include machine guns and Gepard or Slinger cannon, if they are within range, or even electronic warfare spoofing to gain functional control over the drone or cruise missile.

An integrated network of system components is significantly more effective than isolated air defense systems. This is the probable reason why Ukrainian air defenses are claiming more aerial shootdowns, many of which have been verified. It is also likely to impact future air defense development and production where advanced components can be created and plugged into an integrated network of existing components rather than needing to create new advanced isolated air defense systems.

Here is the Northrop Grumman advertisement of that successful 2019 test complete with uplifting music: