(Continued from Part 3….) Yes, this week’s Don’s Weekly is slightly longer than usual - simply because there is a lot to let you know about, and to discuss. Thus, here the conclusive-, Part 4. Equipment South Korean arms sales rose from US$7 billion in 2021 to US$17 billion in 2022, and was at US$14 billion in 2023, ranging from fighters to ground vehicles and air defense systems to countries like Poland, Egypt, Australia and Malaysia. The UK is considering buying and producing the K9 self-propelled gun on its own, replacing the AS-90 that is scheduled to leave service at the end of the decade. The range of the K9 is 40 km with conventional shells. Poland’s Krab is based on a K9 chassis, an AS-90 turret and a Rheinmetall gun. Poland bought 152 K9’s and will receive them all by 2027…
Thanks for this article, and for sharing your writings more generally.
This is what I am struggling to get my head around: If this is an artillery war, and 80% of casualties are inflicted by shellfire, and Ukraine is fast running out of ammunition, and its allies are unable to replenish inventory at anything like the rate at which it’s being expended, how can this end well?
Similarly, if Ukraine is expending its air defense missiles much more rapidly than its friends in the west are producing them, how can this end well?
And if Ukraine is running out of people willing voluntarily to serve in its armed forces, and will serve only if they’re compelled to do so, what does that tell us?
We all tend to emphasise with the ‘underdog’, as is human nature, but surely, at some point in the not-too-distant future, all the chickens are going to come home to roost, and where will be be then.
Where we will be then is a good question. In an ideal world, some Nato members will simply declare the loss of Ukraine as unacceptable and do something about it. If a coalition of the willing were to stand up the whole political landscape would tilt.
Nonetheless - what you seem to suggest is simply surrender. But that is not an option. Putin has openly said this is a war with all of NATO, so all that would do is move the battlefield elsewhere. And now Putin would have more resources, since Ukraine is a pretty rich price.
Thanks - yes I agree with what you say, but I absolutely don’t advocate surrender, or anything else for that matter.
I’m not a military person at all, nor am I a Ukrainian or a Russian, so I don’t really have a personal dog in the fight.
I just think that there seems to be a collective cognitive dissonance apparent throughout the west, especially within the media, where the generally acknowledged facts lead us towards an appreciation of a certain likely outcome, but which our previously fixed emotional mindset finds unacceptable, and hence rejects.
As I said, if someone could point me towards a path that leads to a good outcome for Ukraine I would be greatly appreciative.
A lot of my recent blog posts focus on this. But I'm no official *expert* so if you're looking for an authoritative take, try Mick Ryan or Phillips Obrien's blogs on Substack.
My take: Crimea is now vulnerable, and it's key. Seize even a toehold, and the logic of Putin's broader war crumbles. It's always been all about Crimea.
By the same logic, France was doomed to lose WW1. Population numbers were similar to today's Ukraine, all soldiers were conscripts, casualties ran over a million, economy was in tatters due to early German advances and every ally was fending for themselves, not offering relief to others. And the war was the ultimate stalemate, against which all later stalemates are being compared.
Also nowhere in this article is it said that Ukraine is running out of ammo. It says that Ukraine is not using as much ammo as it would like to. Which has been the case since day 1 of the war. And was also the case for Russia before they got a temporary boost from North Korea. But let's see how long this boost last them at current consumption.
You're leaving one thing out. Ukraine is facing an existential war, there's no surrendering for them. On the other hand Russia losing a war wouldnt be the first time, they lost in Afghanistan to a similarly sized country with much less population and technical equipment over close to a decade. We're in the second year of the invasion and Russia is on the defencive. Ukraine just needs enough support and Russia will be on the backfoot. But its not like Russia can capture large swaths of territory or that it has infinite resources. Its situation is precarious but its more determined than the West. So eventually the Ukrainians will prevail its just a matter of how much the West is willing to let them get slaughtered before providing whats enough/pivoting to manufacture towards supporting Ukraine.
Russia believes the best defense is to constantly be on the offensive. Even in winter. Despite all military sense. The only result is increased casualties and burned out survivors.
Wars are a battle of wills. If you look at Afghanistan (pick a version), Vietnam (against France, US or the Mongols) or any number of other wars there have been severe differences in combat power and the persistance and will to win prevaled in the end for the underdog. Ukraine is fortunate in that it is much more evenly matched than those instances. It still remains a battle of wills. It ends when enough people on one side determines it's not worth it anymore. I don't see either side saying that anytime soon.
World War I had stalemates in some sectors and quite a bit of maneuver in others. Of great importance, though, was production, including food production. Because of the blockade, the Axis forces suffered. When Austria-Hungary took a supply of food that was travelling up the Danube and meant for Germany, the Germans were understandably angry. By 1918, 763k German civilians died from starvation. This starvation and the lack of progress or outright failures on the battlefield were driving forces in the Axis decision to capitulate.
There are a lot of production issues beyond artillery. Russian civilian medical care is suffering because there's insufficient supplies for the military. Russian infrastructure is having problems in the cold of winter. Ukrainian drones are starting to attack Russian production of oil and military equipment. Ukraine has its own issues of a limited manpower base and insufficient supplies from the West, plus the widespread attacks on infrastructure, factories/warehouses and civilians. All these actions create pressure. Surviving this pressure goes back to the battle of wills.
How this ends depends on a lot of things. More western equipment will relieve some pressure on Ukraine and increase the pressure on Russia. Will there ever be significant internal resistance in Russia? Maybe, maybe not. There is none now. Will Ukraine tire of the fight and decide it's better to live under Russian occupation and the inevitable suppression? There's no sign of that now. The West has a lot of influence in the outcome based on what they do and do not do.
> Will Ukraine tire of the fight and decide it's better to live under Russian occupation and the inevitable suppression?
I don't think that's a likely scenario at all, although the West is telling themselves that. ~ 7 million Ukranians are displaced all other the world and another ~ 7 million Ukranians are displaced in Ukraine itself.
That is already more than 1/3 of Ukraines population.
And after Butcha, Irpin, Kherson and Mariupol I find it more likely that we will see a 2nd Bergkarabach in twentyfold magnitude, where pretty much the whole population packed their bags and just fled instead of rolling over and awaiting the inevitable...
I haven't seen any indication that Ukraine is no longer willing to fight, either in polls or any comments I've read. I'm sure the history of the past century is also a motivating factor. Of course, Ukrainians would know more on this subject than I would. That's why my choice is to support them until they say otherwise.
Yes, and if the incompetent and corrupt commanders (probably half of the personnel) are replaced by leaders that are respected by their soldiers. Currently there is too much talking of:
* "If you are killed tomorrow I will be assigned another recruit"
* Squads are well understaffed (as much as 50%) because some soldiers gave their salary cards to their commanders and were allowed to leave forever.
* If a soldier does not agree with his commander he may disappear.
* Soldiers killed in action are missing in the documents.
Of course, all of that can be dismissed as a Russian propaganda, though extremely widespread and never refuted it is. I wonder why we don't hear of fragging (yet?).
It's the economy, stupid ... and lack of courage (will) of politicians.
1. Contrary to many beliefs, war does not improve economy - war is destruction, and economy needs construction. So, even if defense sector is boosting in the West, it means other parts of economy get less government money and their growth is slower.
2. To increase production cost lot of money and if the war would be over soon, the new factories would have no customers - wasted money. That's the lack of political courage to say: "we have to do it even when there is a chance these money would be wasted." (Now, it easy to say "that war would for log and and I knew it always". But even Putin was afraid with mobilisation and remember Prigozin uprising. So, nobody knew how Russian society would react.)
An industrial mobilization (people working 3 shifts or 12 hours a shift) may actually improve an economy by improving the productivity and lowering unemployment. If their production is being sold.
There is another factor - the delayed demand which helps the economy to keep at higher level after a war.
There are multiple forces in many directions, as it always happens in economics - their sum is often negative for a war, but we cannot say for sure. The Russian economy benefited from the war and sanctions in the short term - maybe because they steal less now - but we don't see long-term results yet.
Russian economy has not benefited from the war, that's also wrong.
1. Russia had a large Russian National Wealth Fund. Putin was stuffing that with a lot of money since 2014 - BTW. a sign of war preparation. The amount of money seems not smaller now, but it's kind of fake - they are adding real estates etc. into it to make it look better. So liquid actives are much smaller.
2. Inflation is high, probably higher that Russia confess. They try to hold it by high interest rates and government subventions. (These will force inflation higher, too.)
3. Internal investments are low - see recent problems with heating. There are reports about much lower investments in health care which will bring problem in the future.
... etc.
So, Russia economy is much worse than before the war. They can hold it just because they sell oil (gas and other raw materials to sell.) They future depend on the oil price very much - if oil drops just $10 lower, they are doomed.
Take into account that Poland did not buy K9 because they are better than Krabs (crabs are better in many respects). (Poland bought K9s only because they were available in large quantities.
Some corrections and additional details on French shells production.
French Ministre des Armées Sebastien Lecornu recently gave an interview in which he talked about support for Ukraine and French "Economie de Guerre" aka a grandiloquant formulation to advertise the still anaemic french production.
Lecornu said French production of 155 mm shells went from 1 000 per month to 2 000 per month for a grand total of ... 24 per year. Now the goal is to raise this production onward to reach ... 3 000 shells per months by 2024 end. I emphasize this is the goal by 2024 end. For most of the year, the production will be below 3k/month. Just like for most of 2023, the French production was below 2k/month and only reached this level by the end of the year.
Meaning French 2024 production will be *somewhere between 24 000 and 36 000 shells. And closer to the former than the latter.
Now there have been some confusion because earlier, the German MoD announced it had contracted a French company to produce 68 000 155mm shells for 278 million euros.
The thing is, there is only one French company producing 155mm shells : Nexter. And as French Minister Lecornu said, it will produce less than 36 000 shells in 2024.
Now, the most attentive would have notice the German MoD does not specify when the 68k shells from "an unnamed French company" are supposed to be delivered to Ukraine. For all we know it could be in 2050.
An other explanation could be how our wonderful oligarchy operates. In France we used to talk about Nexter as an unified, French company. But technically, during the mid 2010s, Nexter became a joint-ventur with German company Krauss-Maffei Wegmann under the new name KNDS. And as KNDS website explains, KNDS do have shells productions capacities in Belgium and Italy. respectively trhough its subsidiaries Mecar (Belgium) and Simmel Difesa (Italy). On top of Nexter Munitions.
It is most certains that Lecornu talked about Nexter Munitions alone since it is the only KNDS subsidiary responsible for ammunition production based in France. Maybe Germany contracted the other subsidiaries for the 68k shells. So technically it would have contracted an "unammed French company" but still deliver the shells relatively quickly. Unfortunately I have absolutely no clue on Belgian and Italian productions.
Last but not least, in that same interview, Lerconu boasted Nexter aims to produce 78 CAESAR howitzers in 2024. 6 of them bought by Ukraine. He called on "partners" to finance the rest jointly. Later, the French press announced France is to finance 12 of theses howitzers. Thus leaving 60 howitzers to be financed by *someone.
So maybe, Germany will in fact subside all of KNDS shell production including Nexter Munitions' production which French authorities hyped as France noble and benevolent effort to support Ukraine. Given the level of cynicism in Paris theses days, it would not be surprising.
This is not a one off event. Often French authorities have advocated our partners ought to buy our wonderful equipment, so we make money and deliver them at a snail speed. Afaik, earlier during the war, French authorities contemplate to deliver our old Mirage and hopefully make some money out of it too. The Ukrainians said nope while they expected to receive F-16. Though it seems they may change their mind given Mykola Oleshchuk's recent words.
In fact, during the past year, French have gone absolutely crazy about defence contract. There is hardly a week that goes by without some politicians, "journalists", "experts" or businessmen rallying voraciously against "stupid Europeans buying Americans gears rather than French gears" and how it sabotages the "European Defence". Of course, "European Defence" ought to mean everybody buy overpriced French products which may be delivered sometimes. Hopefully before 2100.
For the record Nexter raised the price of the CAESAR by over 25% ... Side note but it is so typical of France and France economy evolution during the past decades. Voracious rentiers who never aim to sell more or better but merely raise prices on every occasion while producing as little as possible. It is literally destroying the country.
Lecornu also said proudly it now takes only 15 months to produce a CAESAR. So even if the 78 canons are all financed, it is unlikely all will be delivered by 2024 end.
Thanks for the details about the French defense industry.
If the French were going to donate the old Mirages, I would be happy, but if they're trying to exact a high price from these, why Ukraine should agree while working with donated F-16s?
Better would be to buy brand new Rafales instead, IMHO
I wrote 36k per year until I saw: "The Nexter group, for example, opened a second artillery shell manufacturing line in Bourges allowing it to double its production with now more than 100,000 155 mm shells produced each year."
It does not matter at all from which UE country the shells are produced indeed.
It is just it can be confusing and provoke mistakes since Nexter is so much identified as "French production". There is a risk to double count the various productions as "French" because of Nexter and then from their actual place of production if outside of France.
Typically, the article you just posted presented it as the French industrial effort when technically, it is not. As well as grossly over-estimating current production in France.
I saw a lot of people confused because of the German MoD statement. I was confused myself when I saw it. Ence the comment.
I hope I did not sound disagreeable. I did not mean so. I actually value your work quite a lot.
I am going to edit the "Some corrections and additional details on French shells production." sentence in my previous comment into "Some additional details on French shells production." as I made it sounded like you did a mistake while you did not.
The article focuses on artillery shells and that is alright. What about artillery itself?
There are open source reports out there saying that Russia may run out of Soviet artillery stores through 2024 that it has been using to equip some of its troops. (Similarly to the more widely circulated analysis of leftover tanks.) It is also claimed that Russia has a much more limited ability to produce more artillery.
How do you evaluate these claims and their impact if true? Could Russia effectively start 'running out of artillery' while having, comparatively, enough shells? Will the impact, if any, be only visible by 2025; and will Russia have to start aggressively shopping for more to be able to sustain its operations?
Well, there are some "signs" about artillery itself.
Recently, RF started to use 130-mm М-46 towed gun designed in 1946. According to different sources, there were 350-650 total of them in storage of RF. While it has a remarkably long range (27 to 37 km), it is considered somewhat obsolete today, and 130-mm calibre is not as common as 122 or 152 mm.
On the other hand, Ukraine has been using about a dozen of M-46 donated by Croatia. But Ukraine has little choice as it does not have vast "stores of Rodina" like RF does.
That is certainly a point - but still an indication that there isn't an unlimited pool of artillery available for Russia to dip into. What happens when it runs out (and when) is at question here...
To determine the numbers of a particular category of weapons you need to know initial numbers, warehouse numbers, how much has been destroyed and how much is being produced. It's a little easier to determine those numbers for tanks since they are destroyed on the front lines and are easier to count. With wonderful sites like Oryx, they can provide a minimal number of visually verified kills. They can't tally the ones that are destroyed without a visual record, so it's a good baseline for minimum kills. Estimates by the Ukrainian army tend to be on the high end of reports by a significant amount. UK and US estimates are much closer to the Oryx counts. Then you look at the production amounts and the satellite images of the shrinking pool of tanks in storage because of refurbishment and you can get an estimate with a decent amount of confidence.
Artillery is a little more difficult because they aren't on the front line and it's harder to record their destruction. So that number is going to have a lower level of confidence, but the satellite images are being used for refurbishment rates as they disappear form storage. At some point before 2022, Russia shut down the forges that produce steel strong enough for artillery barrels. I haven't heard if they've restarted those steel mills or, if they have, what their rate of production is. But if it has been restarted somewhere, and it probably has, the rate of production is likely to be low, as it is for the tanks.
But that's not the only factor. Artillery barrels wear out and eventually burst if they aren't replaced. Until then, the barrel wear means gases escape up the sides of the shells instead of propelling them. As a result, the gun can't fire as far and its accuracy drops off a lot. When the range is shorter, artillery has to fire closer to the front lines, which puts them in greater danger of being destroyed. So whatever number of barrels that might be produced for a new gun is going to be reduced because of the need for replacement barrels...or not. Some barrels have already been removed from artillery pieces in storage. Maybe the rest of the gun wasn't worth refurbishing, but either way, it's either one less replacement barrel or one less complete artillery system.
Russia is certainly losing more artillery than is being replaced by production or refurbishment, but it's much harder to establish a number with a high level of confidence.
Ukraine, on the other hand, seems to have enough replacement barrels and France, alone, will send 78 artillery pieces this year.
Visually confirmed losses have Ukraine around 500 guns destroyed and Russia around 1000 guns destroyed. Ukraine says about 4600 artillery systems have been destroyed. The reality is somewhere in between. So Russian artillery is on a downward trend, but we don't have a rate with a high degree of confidence. I think Ukraine will be better off. Sure, they have 105mm guns, but because of range, which aids survivability, and accuracy, the 78 Caesar systems could be the equivalent of maybe 300 152mm guns.
any rough guess about the factoring of actual losses compared to Oryx visually confirmed losses? A rough estimate would be around 1.5x to 2x of the visually verified losses, but that's a gut feeling
Well, 1,000 is the low end, 4,600 is the high end. That would be 6 artillery pieces lost per day. UK says 1300 back in November. That would be 2 artillery pieces lost per day. 2-3 lost Russian guns per day sounds likely to me.
Thank you for the interesting update on artillery shells.
I have read about drones being used instead of artillery and increased drone production for Ukraine. Is this really a viable alternative to artillery or just wishful thinking.
What would be the ratio?
I mean could 10 drones be equivalent to one artillery piece or a 100 or a 1,000?
Artillery and drones are two very different systems. The value of both changes with the circumstances. 30 Russian soldiers crossing an open field? An artillery shell, or better yet, a DPICM shell, is more valuable than a few drones. 2-3 infantry hiding in a small bunker? Drones are pretty good for that.
That said, looking at Andrew Perpetua's maps, the ratio of Ukrainian shelling instances to drone attacks seems increasing in favor of drone attacks, no doubt because of Ukraine's desire to conserve artillery ammo and save them for those times when they are significantly more effective than drones.
The original timeline was December, then it was pushed back to spring of 2024. I'm glad that was moved up. More than 20k have been produced at "only" $40k each.
I guess that antitank drones might be a good substitute for artillery rounds, because you need fewer drones to destroy a T-72 (I would guess 4-5 or so), compared to a dozen or more artillery rounds (and mines - never forget mines!)
Mines have damaged/destroyed a lot of vehicles. Drones are always useful. With a shortage of artillery ammo they will have to carry more of the burden.
Interesting article here on drones versus other weapons quotes the (latest) Battle of Novomykhailivka as an example.
Of course artillery and rockets like the GLSDB are much better for longer range especially against static targets like ammo dumps and command posts.
I doubt Russia will contemplate moving their ammo dumps out of occupied territories so they will have to get a hell of a lot better at disguising them.
Drones are a transformative technology that have established their place on the battlefield. They are a combat multiplier when working with other technologies. Different situations call for different solutions. While artillery was also used at Novomykhailivka, the shortage of artillery ammo is a situation and the versatile drone has been key to stopping Russian assaults lately.
Worth keeping in mind that there's a difference between raw shell use and the proportion of shots that score an effective hit. NATO doctrine shoots for a total kill, but in practice drone videos reveal 2-6 shots from 1-2 guns hitting targets that NATO would use a battery of six guns and 18 shots to achieve.
Raw shells * Miss fraction = Effective fire rate (obviously over-simplified model, but gets the point across).
Cold War doctrine was written by general types who can't imagine fighting with anything less than several brigades, if not divisions. Military institutions remain too rigid to adapt to the reality of density = death. Operations are returning to classic roots: degrade enemy logistics in a vulnerable zone, apply pressure on an under-defended point, generate a crisis too big for the enemy to cope with in the time available.
Why I think southwestern Kherson is the key to 2024. Where else can Ukraine even theoretically isolate a chunk of the front? Spending a decade battling over Donbas isn't going to be decisive because there is no natural boundary in Ukraine's east. Get to Crimea, though, and Moscow effectively loses the war in a political sense.
The Russian society (its aggressive part) has already been mobilized to an extent close to that of the Germans in WW2. As you remember they did not surrender till the Allies were closing on Berlin. The Russians take Crimea for their land (Крым - наш!) and a threat of losing is very likely to frenzy the society and increase the flow of men volunteering to fight.
A frenzied society? Putin's entire game has been about keeping the fatter orcs back home pretending that their turn to die at the front won't come. That's what a pyramid scheme society does - alienates. Thing goes into a frenzy, parts turn on eachother. Ukraine wins by default in that scenario. Nobody leaped to defend Putin from Wagner's revolt, and if the next one is big enough - so long ruscist empire.
I suppose that USA unloading their artillery cluster munitions should be quite helpful against infantry, and relieve the lack of unitary artillery rounds. I saw somewhere that Leopard 1s in Ukraine are also carrying canister rounds, which are very effective against infantry and soft targets in close range.
I am quite glad that Greece is proceeding with sending weapons and ammunition to Ukraine.
I remember a year ago a nasty outcry from many Greeks complaining loudly about the possibility to send ancient BMP-1s to Ukraine in exchange for an amount of Marder IFVs. It was quite nasty (there are too many fans of Russia and Putin in Greece, unfortunately, even within armed forces)
As a retired Artilleryman and proud Redleg, I have to say I loved reading this post. I also served in Ukraine in 2017 and worked with the Ukrainian Fires Center of Excellence and knew the Commandant, and I can say the UA has been working on being GREAT artillerymen for a long time. They try to use the Western weapons to their strengths (range and accuracy being the big ones), and it helps that they know all the stuff the RU is using and how they use it. Well, to start with, even Russians learn. But the UA works hard to keep ahead in this game. If we can just give them the tools they can pull it off. I do have one question though, what about Ukrainian Artillery ammuntion production? I know they started at ZERO, but are now making RU caliber and also western 155mm (I have heard rumors they are doing 105mm as well). Ukraine used to make tons of this stuff, I am hoping they can keep ramping up and become a major part of this math.
Ukraine will start producing 155mm shells but not for two to three years. They signed agreements with two US companies. There was no mention of how many they were planning to produce. It's part of their long term plan to build up their internal capacity and reduce dependence on allies. Many allied countries are helping them. For instance, Sweden will help them set up a CV-90 produciton line. Germany is setting up a factory to supposedly produce 400 KF-51 tanks a year (Leopard 2A4 hull, 130mm gun). BAE is working with Ukraine to produce 105mm guns, but I haven't seen anything on Ukraine producing the ammo, only receivng it.
Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria were supposed to produce 122mm and 152mm shells. I don't have any production numbers on those.
Well, so far I can't find the article I read, I did find plenty about 152mm production though and mortars/mortar Ammo. I"m going to keep looking though. I'll let you know when/if I find it.
Sounds good. I found a mention that Ukraine started small amounts of 155mm production in September, 2023. It didn't mention the ammounts and its source was the WSJ, which is behind a paywall.
That sounds like the one. The amounts were small lots, from what I remember they were proof of concept/ability builds. Basically Ukraine showing that they COULD make western standard ammo.
This is the very moment when you begin to hate the West for its weakness and corruption... for its false guarantees to Ukraine in response to the renunciation of nuclear weapons, and its incompetence on the international stage on serious issues. It's a shame...they will regret it too late.
I kmow I'm late. Dear mr. Tom, please notice this fact. The person who'se name Serhiy Krivonos, the former chef of the SOF of AFU. He was the the chief of the defence of the Zhulyany airport in early 2022. He reveald the aims of the Decembers strickes, unfortunatelly. :(
So you are really in deep trouble if “Putin” decide to attack you.
Thanks for this article, and for sharing your writings more generally.
This is what I am struggling to get my head around: If this is an artillery war, and 80% of casualties are inflicted by shellfire, and Ukraine is fast running out of ammunition, and its allies are unable to replenish inventory at anything like the rate at which it’s being expended, how can this end well?
Similarly, if Ukraine is expending its air defense missiles much more rapidly than its friends in the west are producing them, how can this end well?
And if Ukraine is running out of people willing voluntarily to serve in its armed forces, and will serve only if they’re compelled to do so, what does that tell us?
We all tend to emphasise with the ‘underdog’, as is human nature, but surely, at some point in the not-too-distant future, all the chickens are going to come home to roost, and where will be be then.
Thanks again for your work.
Where we will be then is a good question. In an ideal world, some Nato members will simply declare the loss of Ukraine as unacceptable and do something about it. If a coalition of the willing were to stand up the whole political landscape would tilt.
Nonetheless - what you seem to suggest is simply surrender. But that is not an option. Putin has openly said this is a war with all of NATO, so all that would do is move the battlefield elsewhere. And now Putin would have more resources, since Ukraine is a pretty rich price.
Thanks - yes I agree with what you say, but I absolutely don’t advocate surrender, or anything else for that matter.
I’m not a military person at all, nor am I a Ukrainian or a Russian, so I don’t really have a personal dog in the fight.
I just think that there seems to be a collective cognitive dissonance apparent throughout the west, especially within the media, where the generally acknowledged facts lead us towards an appreciation of a certain likely outcome, but which our previously fixed emotional mindset finds unacceptable, and hence rejects.
As I said, if someone could point me towards a path that leads to a good outcome for Ukraine I would be greatly appreciative.
A lot of my recent blog posts focus on this. But I'm no official *expert* so if you're looking for an authoritative take, try Mick Ryan or Phillips Obrien's blogs on Substack.
My take: Crimea is now vulnerable, and it's key. Seize even a toehold, and the logic of Putin's broader war crumbles. It's always been all about Crimea.
By the same logic, France was doomed to lose WW1. Population numbers were similar to today's Ukraine, all soldiers were conscripts, casualties ran over a million, economy was in tatters due to early German advances and every ally was fending for themselves, not offering relief to others. And the war was the ultimate stalemate, against which all later stalemates are being compared.
Also nowhere in this article is it said that Ukraine is running out of ammo. It says that Ukraine is not using as much ammo as it would like to. Which has been the case since day 1 of the war. And was also the case for Russia before they got a temporary boost from North Korea. But let's see how long this boost last them at current consumption.
You're leaving one thing out. Ukraine is facing an existential war, there's no surrendering for them. On the other hand Russia losing a war wouldnt be the first time, they lost in Afghanistan to a similarly sized country with much less population and technical equipment over close to a decade. We're in the second year of the invasion and Russia is on the defencive. Ukraine just needs enough support and Russia will be on the backfoot. But its not like Russia can capture large swaths of territory or that it has infinite resources. Its situation is precarious but its more determined than the West. So eventually the Ukrainians will prevail its just a matter of how much the West is willing to let them get slaughtered before providing whats enough/pivoting to manufacture towards supporting Ukraine.
"Russia is on the defencive". Incorrect.
Russia believes the best defense is to constantly be on the offensive. Even in winter. Despite all military sense. The only result is increased casualties and burned out survivors.
Wars are a battle of wills. If you look at Afghanistan (pick a version), Vietnam (against France, US or the Mongols) or any number of other wars there have been severe differences in combat power and the persistance and will to win prevaled in the end for the underdog. Ukraine is fortunate in that it is much more evenly matched than those instances. It still remains a battle of wills. It ends when enough people on one side determines it's not worth it anymore. I don't see either side saying that anytime soon.
World War I had stalemates in some sectors and quite a bit of maneuver in others. Of great importance, though, was production, including food production. Because of the blockade, the Axis forces suffered. When Austria-Hungary took a supply of food that was travelling up the Danube and meant for Germany, the Germans were understandably angry. By 1918, 763k German civilians died from starvation. This starvation and the lack of progress or outright failures on the battlefield were driving forces in the Axis decision to capitulate.
There are a lot of production issues beyond artillery. Russian civilian medical care is suffering because there's insufficient supplies for the military. Russian infrastructure is having problems in the cold of winter. Ukrainian drones are starting to attack Russian production of oil and military equipment. Ukraine has its own issues of a limited manpower base and insufficient supplies from the West, plus the widespread attacks on infrastructure, factories/warehouses and civilians. All these actions create pressure. Surviving this pressure goes back to the battle of wills.
How this ends depends on a lot of things. More western equipment will relieve some pressure on Ukraine and increase the pressure on Russia. Will there ever be significant internal resistance in Russia? Maybe, maybe not. There is none now. Will Ukraine tire of the fight and decide it's better to live under Russian occupation and the inevitable suppression? There's no sign of that now. The West has a lot of influence in the outcome based on what they do and do not do.
> Will Ukraine tire of the fight and decide it's better to live under Russian occupation and the inevitable suppression?
I don't think that's a likely scenario at all, although the West is telling themselves that. ~ 7 million Ukranians are displaced all other the world and another ~ 7 million Ukranians are displaced in Ukraine itself.
That is already more than 1/3 of Ukraines population.
And after Butcha, Irpin, Kherson and Mariupol I find it more likely that we will see a 2nd Bergkarabach in twentyfold magnitude, where pretty much the whole population packed their bags and just fled instead of rolling over and awaiting the inevitable...
I haven't seen any indication that Ukraine is no longer willing to fight, either in polls or any comments I've read. I'm sure the history of the past century is also a motivating factor. Of course, Ukrainians would know more on this subject than I would. That's why my choice is to support them until they say otherwise.
Ukrainians are willing to fight, but whoever is still not in the army is unwilling to die. Which is synonymous to going to the army which lacks ammo.
Do you think attitudes would be different if Ukraine had all the equipment and ammo it needed?
Yes, and if the incompetent and corrupt commanders (probably half of the personnel) are replaced by leaders that are respected by their soldiers. Currently there is too much talking of:
* "If you are killed tomorrow I will be assigned another recruit"
* Squads are well understaffed (as much as 50%) because some soldiers gave their salary cards to their commanders and were allowed to leave forever.
* If a soldier does not agree with his commander he may disappear.
* Soldiers killed in action are missing in the documents.
* This is less heard of - because few women return to tell of it https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/04/fighting-two-enemies-ukraine-female-soldiers-decry-harassment
Of course, all of that can be dismissed as a Russian propaganda, though extremely widespread and never refuted it is. I wonder why we don't hear of fragging (yet?).
Military recruiters routinely beat men, with few cases getting to major Ukrainian news sites https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/vikradennya-tck-muzikanta-gurtu-intermezzo-u-chernivcyah-u-spravi-z-yavilis-novi-podrobici-2503021.html
Thank you for this information, wasnt aware of these details (not really details) on WW1
It's the economy, stupid ... and lack of courage (will) of politicians.
1. Contrary to many beliefs, war does not improve economy - war is destruction, and economy needs construction. So, even if defense sector is boosting in the West, it means other parts of economy get less government money and their growth is slower.
2. To increase production cost lot of money and if the war would be over soon, the new factories would have no customers - wasted money. That's the lack of political courage to say: "we have to do it even when there is a chance these money would be wasted." (Now, it easy to say "that war would for log and and I knew it always". But even Putin was afraid with mobilisation and remember Prigozin uprising. So, nobody knew how Russian society would react.)
An industrial mobilization (people working 3 shifts or 12 hours a shift) may actually improve an economy by improving the productivity and lowering unemployment. If their production is being sold.
There is another factor - the delayed demand which helps the economy to keep at higher level after a war.
There are multiple forces in many directions, as it always happens in economics - their sum is often negative for a war, but we cannot say for sure. The Russian economy benefited from the war and sanctions in the short term - maybe because they steal less now - but we don't see long-term results yet.
Russian economy has not benefited from the war, that's also wrong.
1. Russia had a large Russian National Wealth Fund. Putin was stuffing that with a lot of money since 2014 - BTW. a sign of war preparation. The amount of money seems not smaller now, but it's kind of fake - they are adding real estates etc. into it to make it look better. So liquid actives are much smaller.
2. Inflation is high, probably higher that Russia confess. They try to hold it by high interest rates and government subventions. (These will force inflation higher, too.)
3. Internal investments are low - see recent problems with heating. There are reports about much lower investments in health care which will bring problem in the future.
... etc.
So, Russia economy is much worse than before the war. They can hold it just because they sell oil (gas and other raw materials to sell.) They future depend on the oil price very much - if oil drops just $10 lower, they are doomed.
They always depended on the oil exports - nothing new there at all.
Yes, but they have no "benefit from the war and sanctions in the short term", definitely.
They invested a lot of money that were previously stored. GDP increased.
Thank you so very much. It is heartbreaking. Best wishes.
Take into account that Poland did not buy K9 because they are better than Krabs (crabs are better in many respects). (Poland bought K9s only because they were available in large quantities.
Also, virtually whole Krab production goes to Ukraine, while K9 stays in Poland
This is a necessity
The Krabs also use a (heavily modified) K9 chassis.
Some corrections and additional details on French shells production.
French Ministre des Armées Sebastien Lecornu recently gave an interview in which he talked about support for Ukraine and French "Economie de Guerre" aka a grandiloquant formulation to advertise the still anaemic french production.
https://www.leparisien.fr/international/sebastien-lecornu-il-faut-etre-endurant-dans-notre-soutien-militaire-a-lukraine-17-01-2024-CSY6LQXL2NCCXBKY7AMKKQTF7A.php
Lecornu said French production of 155 mm shells went from 1 000 per month to 2 000 per month for a grand total of ... 24 per year. Now the goal is to raise this production onward to reach ... 3 000 shells per months by 2024 end. I emphasize this is the goal by 2024 end. For most of the year, the production will be below 3k/month. Just like for most of 2023, the French production was below 2k/month and only reached this level by the end of the year.
Meaning French 2024 production will be *somewhere between 24 000 and 36 000 shells. And closer to the former than the latter.
Now there have been some confusion because earlier, the German MoD announced it had contracted a French company to produce 68 000 155mm shells for 278 million euros.
https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/ukraine-unterstuetzung-deutschland-beschafft-artilleriemunition-5717012
https://www.uawire.org/germany-to-provide-350-000-additional-155mm-artillery-shells-to-ukraine
The thing is, there is only one French company producing 155mm shells : Nexter. And as French Minister Lecornu said, it will produce less than 36 000 shells in 2024.
Now, the most attentive would have notice the German MoD does not specify when the 68k shells from "an unnamed French company" are supposed to be delivered to Ukraine. For all we know it could be in 2050.
An other explanation could be how our wonderful oligarchy operates. In France we used to talk about Nexter as an unified, French company. But technically, during the mid 2010s, Nexter became a joint-ventur with German company Krauss-Maffei Wegmann under the new name KNDS. And as KNDS website explains, KNDS do have shells productions capacities in Belgium and Italy. respectively trhough its subsidiaries Mecar (Belgium) and Simmel Difesa (Italy). On top of Nexter Munitions.
https://www.knds.fr/en/our-brand/mecar
It is most certains that Lecornu talked about Nexter Munitions alone since it is the only KNDS subsidiary responsible for ammunition production based in France. Maybe Germany contracted the other subsidiaries for the 68k shells. So technically it would have contracted an "unammed French company" but still deliver the shells relatively quickly. Unfortunately I have absolutely no clue on Belgian and Italian productions.
Last but not least, in that same interview, Lerconu boasted Nexter aims to produce 78 CAESAR howitzers in 2024. 6 of them bought by Ukraine. He called on "partners" to finance the rest jointly. Later, the French press announced France is to finance 12 of theses howitzers. Thus leaving 60 howitzers to be financed by *someone.
https://www.liberation.fr/international/europe/la-france-appelle-ses-allies-a-cofinancer-la-fourniture-de-78-canons-caesar-a-lukraine-20240118_LFFJZEGSSZFCPGZM5PU53PARWI/?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter&xtor=CS7-51-#Echobox=1705603622-1
So maybe, Germany will in fact subside all of KNDS shell production including Nexter Munitions' production which French authorities hyped as France noble and benevolent effort to support Ukraine. Given the level of cynicism in Paris theses days, it would not be surprising.
This is not a one off event. Often French authorities have advocated our partners ought to buy our wonderful equipment, so we make money and deliver them at a snail speed. Afaik, earlier during the war, French authorities contemplate to deliver our old Mirage and hopefully make some money out of it too. The Ukrainians said nope while they expected to receive F-16. Though it seems they may change their mind given Mykola Oleshchuk's recent words.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-mirage-aircraft-may-reinforce-ukrainian-air-force-commander-2024-01-14/
In fact, during the past year, French have gone absolutely crazy about defence contract. There is hardly a week that goes by without some politicians, "journalists", "experts" or businessmen rallying voraciously against "stupid Europeans buying Americans gears rather than French gears" and how it sabotages the "European Defence". Of course, "European Defence" ought to mean everybody buy overpriced French products which may be delivered sometimes. Hopefully before 2100.
For the record Nexter raised the price of the CAESAR by over 25% ... Side note but it is so typical of France and France economy evolution during the past decades. Voracious rentiers who never aim to sell more or better but merely raise prices on every occasion while producing as little as possible. It is literally destroying the country.
https://www.opex360.com/2023/01/27/artillerie-le-danemark-veut-remplacer-les-caesar-promis-a-lukraine-par-des-obusiers-israeliens-atmos/
Lecornu also said proudly it now takes only 15 months to produce a CAESAR. So even if the 78 canons are all financed, it is unlikely all will be delivered by 2024 end.
Thanks for the details about the French defense industry.
If the French were going to donate the old Mirages, I would be happy, but if they're trying to exact a high price from these, why Ukraine should agree while working with donated F-16s?
Better would be to buy brand new Rafales instead, IMHO
I wrote 36k per year until I saw: "The Nexter group, for example, opened a second artillery shell manufacturing line in Bourges allowing it to double its production with now more than 100,000 155 mm shells produced each year."
https://www.rfi.fr/fr/%C3%A9conomie/20240124-l-industrie-fran%C3%A7aise-au-d%C3%A9fi-de-l-%C3%A9conomie-de-guerre
I don't suppose it matters too much if the shells go directly from France to Ukraine or pass through Germany first.
It does not matter at all from which UE country the shells are produced indeed.
It is just it can be confusing and provoke mistakes since Nexter is so much identified as "French production". There is a risk to double count the various productions as "French" because of Nexter and then from their actual place of production if outside of France.
Typically, the article you just posted presented it as the French industrial effort when technically, it is not. As well as grossly over-estimating current production in France.
I saw a lot of people confused because of the German MoD statement. I was confused myself when I saw it. Ence the comment.
I hope I did not sound disagreeable. I did not mean so. I actually value your work quite a lot.
I am going to edit the "Some corrections and additional details on French shells production." sentence in my previous comment into "Some additional details on French shells production." as I made it sounded like you did a mistake while you did not.
I took your comment as it was meant. I appreciate any corrections or news of any kind. I appreciate you offering it.
Great update thank you!!
The article focuses on artillery shells and that is alright. What about artillery itself?
There are open source reports out there saying that Russia may run out of Soviet artillery stores through 2024 that it has been using to equip some of its troops. (Similarly to the more widely circulated analysis of leftover tanks.) It is also claimed that Russia has a much more limited ability to produce more artillery.
How do you evaluate these claims and their impact if true? Could Russia effectively start 'running out of artillery' while having, comparatively, enough shells? Will the impact, if any, be only visible by 2025; and will Russia have to start aggressively shopping for more to be able to sustain its operations?
Well, there are some "signs" about artillery itself.
Recently, RF started to use 130-mm М-46 towed gun designed in 1946. According to different sources, there were 350-650 total of them in storage of RF. While it has a remarkably long range (27 to 37 km), it is considered somewhat obsolete today, and 130-mm calibre is not as common as 122 or 152 mm.
On the other hand, Ukraine has been using about a dozen of M-46 donated by Croatia. But Ukraine has little choice as it does not have vast "stores of Rodina" like RF does.
If it uses an unusual caliber, it just lets the Russian use up those 130mm shells they have in their (or NK's) storage. It would be foolish not to.
That is certainly a point - but still an indication that there isn't an unlimited pool of artillery available for Russia to dip into. What happens when it runs out (and when) is at question here...
To determine the numbers of a particular category of weapons you need to know initial numbers, warehouse numbers, how much has been destroyed and how much is being produced. It's a little easier to determine those numbers for tanks since they are destroyed on the front lines and are easier to count. With wonderful sites like Oryx, they can provide a minimal number of visually verified kills. They can't tally the ones that are destroyed without a visual record, so it's a good baseline for minimum kills. Estimates by the Ukrainian army tend to be on the high end of reports by a significant amount. UK and US estimates are much closer to the Oryx counts. Then you look at the production amounts and the satellite images of the shrinking pool of tanks in storage because of refurbishment and you can get an estimate with a decent amount of confidence.
Artillery is a little more difficult because they aren't on the front line and it's harder to record their destruction. So that number is going to have a lower level of confidence, but the satellite images are being used for refurbishment rates as they disappear form storage. At some point before 2022, Russia shut down the forges that produce steel strong enough for artillery barrels. I haven't heard if they've restarted those steel mills or, if they have, what their rate of production is. But if it has been restarted somewhere, and it probably has, the rate of production is likely to be low, as it is for the tanks.
But that's not the only factor. Artillery barrels wear out and eventually burst if they aren't replaced. Until then, the barrel wear means gases escape up the sides of the shells instead of propelling them. As a result, the gun can't fire as far and its accuracy drops off a lot. When the range is shorter, artillery has to fire closer to the front lines, which puts them in greater danger of being destroyed. So whatever number of barrels that might be produced for a new gun is going to be reduced because of the need for replacement barrels...or not. Some barrels have already been removed from artillery pieces in storage. Maybe the rest of the gun wasn't worth refurbishing, but either way, it's either one less replacement barrel or one less complete artillery system.
Russia is certainly losing more artillery than is being replaced by production or refurbishment, but it's much harder to establish a number with a high level of confidence.
Ukraine, on the other hand, seems to have enough replacement barrels and France, alone, will send 78 artillery pieces this year.
Visually confirmed losses have Ukraine around 500 guns destroyed and Russia around 1000 guns destroyed. Ukraine says about 4600 artillery systems have been destroyed. The reality is somewhere in between. So Russian artillery is on a downward trend, but we don't have a rate with a high degree of confidence. I think Ukraine will be better off. Sure, they have 105mm guns, but because of range, which aids survivability, and accuracy, the 78 Caesar systems could be the equivalent of maybe 300 152mm guns.
any rough guess about the factoring of actual losses compared to Oryx visually confirmed losses? A rough estimate would be around 1.5x to 2x of the visually verified losses, but that's a gut feeling
Well, 1,000 is the low end, 4,600 is the high end. That would be 6 artillery pieces lost per day. UK says 1300 back in November. That would be 2 artillery pieces lost per day. 2-3 lost Russian guns per day sounds likely to me.
Thank you for the interesting update on artillery shells.
I have read about drones being used instead of artillery and increased drone production for Ukraine. Is this really a viable alternative to artillery or just wishful thinking.
What would be the ratio?
I mean could 10 drones be equivalent to one artillery piece or a 100 or a 1,000?
Thanks for any comments
Artillery and drones are two very different systems. The value of both changes with the circumstances. 30 Russian soldiers crossing an open field? An artillery shell, or better yet, a DPICM shell, is more valuable than a few drones. 2-3 infantry hiding in a small bunker? Drones are pretty good for that.
That said, looking at Andrew Perpetua's maps, the ratio of Ukrainian shelling instances to drone attacks seems increasing in favor of drone attacks, no doubt because of Ukraine's desire to conserve artillery ammo and save them for those times when they are significantly more effective than drones.
At last!
The Pentagon confirms the transfer of GLSDB precision guided bombs to Ukraine , department spokesman Patrick Ryder said .
The original timeline was December, then it was pushed back to spring of 2024. I'm glad that was moved up. More than 20k have been produced at "only" $40k each.
I guess that antitank drones might be a good substitute for artillery rounds, because you need fewer drones to destroy a T-72 (I would guess 4-5 or so), compared to a dozen or more artillery rounds (and mines - never forget mines!)
Mines have damaged/destroyed a lot of vehicles. Drones are always useful. With a shortage of artillery ammo they will have to carry more of the burden.
Interesting article here on drones versus other weapons quotes the (latest) Battle of Novomykhailivka as an example.
Of course artillery and rockets like the GLSDB are much better for longer range especially against static targets like ammo dumps and command posts.
I doubt Russia will contemplate moving their ammo dumps out of occupied territories so they will have to get a hell of a lot better at disguising them.
https://www.facebook.com/stefan.korshak
I believe you already mentioned the Russians do not send large assault groups any more
I believe the link is empty (it points to your favorites)
Thanks, link is fixed - I hope
Drones are a transformative technology that have established their place on the battlefield. They are a combat multiplier when working with other technologies. Different situations call for different solutions. While artillery was also used at Novomykhailivka, the shortage of artillery ammo is a situation and the versatile drone has been key to stopping Russian assaults lately.
Worth keeping in mind that there's a difference between raw shell use and the proportion of shots that score an effective hit. NATO doctrine shoots for a total kill, but in practice drone videos reveal 2-6 shots from 1-2 guns hitting targets that NATO would use a battery of six guns and 18 shots to achieve.
Raw shells * Miss fraction = Effective fire rate (obviously over-simplified model, but gets the point across).
Cold War doctrine was written by general types who can't imagine fighting with anything less than several brigades, if not divisions. Military institutions remain too rigid to adapt to the reality of density = death. Operations are returning to classic roots: degrade enemy logistics in a vulnerable zone, apply pressure on an under-defended point, generate a crisis too big for the enemy to cope with in the time available.
Why I think southwestern Kherson is the key to 2024. Where else can Ukraine even theoretically isolate a chunk of the front? Spending a decade battling over Donbas isn't going to be decisive because there is no natural boundary in Ukraine's east. Get to Crimea, though, and Moscow effectively loses the war in a political sense.
The Russian society (its aggressive part) has already been mobilized to an extent close to that of the Germans in WW2. As you remember they did not surrender till the Allies were closing on Berlin. The Russians take Crimea for their land (Крым - наш!) and a threat of losing is very likely to frenzy the society and increase the flow of men volunteering to fight.
A frenzied society? Putin's entire game has been about keeping the fatter orcs back home pretending that their turn to die at the front won't come. That's what a pyramid scheme society does - alienates. Thing goes into a frenzy, parts turn on eachother. Ukraine wins by default in that scenario. Nobody leaped to defend Putin from Wagner's revolt, and if the next one is big enough - so long ruscist empire.
I suppose that USA unloading their artillery cluster munitions should be quite helpful against infantry, and relieve the lack of unitary artillery rounds. I saw somewhere that Leopard 1s in Ukraine are also carrying canister rounds, which are very effective against infantry and soft targets in close range.
And there's the matter of 120mm mortars...
The Russians learned not to group their infantry.
Hmm, so that reduces quite a lot the effectiveness of the cluster munitions...
Yes, Russia is using smaller assault groups and deeper trenches. On the plus side, Ukraine is facing smaller assault groups.
I am quite glad that Greece is proceeding with sending weapons and ammunition to Ukraine.
I remember a year ago a nasty outcry from many Greeks complaining loudly about the possibility to send ancient BMP-1s to Ukraine in exchange for an amount of Marder IFVs. It was quite nasty (there are too many fans of Russia and Putin in Greece, unfortunately, even within armed forces)
As a retired Artilleryman and proud Redleg, I have to say I loved reading this post. I also served in Ukraine in 2017 and worked with the Ukrainian Fires Center of Excellence and knew the Commandant, and I can say the UA has been working on being GREAT artillerymen for a long time. They try to use the Western weapons to their strengths (range and accuracy being the big ones), and it helps that they know all the stuff the RU is using and how they use it. Well, to start with, even Russians learn. But the UA works hard to keep ahead in this game. If we can just give them the tools they can pull it off. I do have one question though, what about Ukrainian Artillery ammuntion production? I know they started at ZERO, but are now making RU caliber and also western 155mm (I have heard rumors they are doing 105mm as well). Ukraine used to make tons of this stuff, I am hoping they can keep ramping up and become a major part of this math.
Ukraine will start producing 155mm shells but not for two to three years. They signed agreements with two US companies. There was no mention of how many they were planning to produce. It's part of their long term plan to build up their internal capacity and reduce dependence on allies. Many allied countries are helping them. For instance, Sweden will help them set up a CV-90 produciton line. Germany is setting up a factory to supposedly produce 400 KF-51 tanks a year (Leopard 2A4 hull, 130mm gun). BAE is working with Ukraine to produce 105mm guns, but I haven't seen anything on Ukraine producing the ammo, only receivng it.
Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria were supposed to produce 122mm and 152mm shells. I don't have any production numbers on those.
I will have to do some digging, but I remember reading that Ukraine was producing some 155mm. Not much, but it was to test their production ability.
I'd be glad to see what you find.
Well, so far I can't find the article I read, I did find plenty about 152mm production though and mortars/mortar Ammo. I"m going to keep looking though. I'll let you know when/if I find it.
Sounds good. I found a mention that Ukraine started small amounts of 155mm production in September, 2023. It didn't mention the ammounts and its source was the WSJ, which is behind a paywall.
That sounds like the one. The amounts were small lots, from what I remember they were proof of concept/ability builds. Basically Ukraine showing that they COULD make western standard ammo.
This is the very moment when you begin to hate the West for its weakness and corruption... for its false guarantees to Ukraine in response to the renunciation of nuclear weapons, and its incompetence on the international stage on serious issues. It's a shame...they will regret it too late.
I kmow I'm late. Dear mr. Tom, please notice this fact. The person who'se name Serhiy Krivonos, the former chef of the SOF of AFU. He was the the chief of the defence of the Zhulyany airport in early 2022. He reveald the aims of the Decembers strickes, unfortunatelly. :(
Oh, I appologise, this is the link https://frontnews.eu/ua/news/details/73624
https://youtu.be/9BcjnI8-hXQ?si=IYsllmUo66XxPgRp&t=302
I beg you pardon, my duty often times like a wall. If you have any knowledge in the ukrainian language you could get it or even have more.
Are there any proven Russian jets loses due to air to air hit by Ukrainian jets?
Thanks for the update. Sobering, but important.