Don's Weekly, 29 January 2024: Part 4
(Continued from Part 3….)
Yes, this week’s Don’s Weekly is slightly longer than usual - simply because there is a lot to let you know about, and to discuss. Thus, here the conclusive-, Part 4.
Equipment
South Korean arms sales rose from US$7 billion in 2021 to US$17 billion in 2022, and was at US$14 billion in 2023, ranging from fighters to ground vehicles and air defense systems to countries like Poland, Egypt, Australia and Malaysia. The UK is considering buying and producing the K9 self-propelled gun on its own, replacing the AS-90 that is scheduled to leave service at the end of the decade. The range of the K9 is 40 km with conventional shells. Poland’s Krab is based on a K9 chassis, an AS-90 turret and a Rheinmetall gun. Poland bought 152 K9’s and will receive them all by 2027…
Sometimes hills, trees and buildings will block radio signals and prevent an operator from flying a drone in certain locations. If you transmit the operator’s signals to a high flying drone and that high flying drone then broadcasts those signals down to the attacking FPV drones then the terrain is no longer a problem…
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1750821226233094480
This was announced back in September but they are just now releasing the video…
https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1745872771769340370
Greece receives F-35s. In turn, Ukraine receives air defense systems…
https://twitter.com/UKikaski/status/1751571842484019617
Artillery Production
Up to 70% of Ukraine’s casualties are a result of artillery fire. The percentage might be higher for Russia (though Ukrainian snipers, and operators of UAVs and anti-material rifles tend to disagree with such assessments).
At the height of its offensive, Ukraine was firing 7,000 rounds of artillery a day. If it fired that amount for an entire year it would consume 2.5 million rounds. Ukraine wanted to fire 10,000 rounds per day (a rate of 3.6 million rounds per year).
By this spring, the US is expected to be producing 57,000 shells per month, or 684,000 per year. By 2025 they plan to produce 1.2 million rounds a year. By the end of 2024, Germany will be producing 600,000 rounds a month. Nammo (Norway, Sweden, Finland) will produce 80,000 shells in 2025. France is producing 100,000 rounds a year with no announcements of increasing that rate (where, at the times of the Vattle of Verdun, back in 1916, this amount of shells would be good for a few days). All this, rounded up, comes to 2,000,000 rounds per year by 2025. That can sustain an expenditure rate of 5,500 rounds per day.
But: in 2025.
5,500 rounds a day would be adequate, but not optimal, for sustained defensive operations. Ukraine tried their best to conduct an offensive operation using 7,000 rounds a day when they preferred 10,000 rounds per day.
In a random video from seven months ago, you see very little Ukrainian artillery fire. But this is what 5,500 rounds a day looks like…
The NATO standard is to put multiple rounds on a target to completely destroy it. In the three vehicle column in the above example, there would be a six-gun battery firing in a linear pattern to cover the column, probably firing three salvos, or a total of 18 rounds. NATO practices Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) as a way to overwhelm a target in a very short time. The Swedish Archer artillery system was designed to conduct MRSI, too. This is what a single gun conducting MRSI looks like:
I’ve shown this before and I continue to bring it up to highlight how little ammo Ukraine has. The low rates of fire you see are not the NATO standard, they are a product of a diminished defense capacity, a ‘peace dividend’ since the fall of the Soviet Union.
For Ukraine to utilize the NATO standard of fire they might need 50,000 rounds a day, or 18 million rounds a year. But NATO can only sustain 5,000 rounds a day. By 2025. NATO can’t even sustain its own theoretical rate of fire in a prolonged war with a near-peer adversary. And still: two years into Putin’s all-out invasion, the Western law-makers and industry are still ‘not entirely sure’ should they or shouldn’t they, which is why production rates are increasing at an agonising pace…
South Korean law prevents it from sending equipment to war zones, so in 2023 they sent 330,000 shells to the US, who then sent 330,000 of its own shells to Ukraine. They supplied more shells (indirectly) to Ukraine than all of the European nations. This gambit can only be used until all the shells in US warehouses are South Korean, otherwise the law will have to be changed or South Korea will no longer be able to send shells - or: they will just ignore their own law. I could not find a rate of production for their shells but given its constant state of readiness for North Korean aggression and the rising sales of South Korean K9 155mm SPGs and other equipment, it is likely to be fairly high.
NATO is supposed to have standardized ammo and weapons for interoperability, but there are 14 different types of 155mm shells. A Dutch admiral says the cost of producing shells increased from 2,000 euros to 8,000 euros. An Estonian ministry defense official said it cost a ‘Western’ country $5-6,000 to make a shell. I’ve read US government documents in which it costs them only $800 per shell. Back in July, Bulgaria produced shells for $500 each, although that cost did not include packaging and shipping. Part of the cost is the price to build both the equipment and supply chains to increase production. Once the initial production costs are paid the price per shell should come down. Standardization would also lower costs.
Unless something changes, it will be very difficult for Ukraine to go on the offensive in 2025. 5,500 shells a day is not enough to conduct an attritional offensive operation. 10,000 shells a day might be. South Korea is one wild card in terms of its production capability and willingness to supply Ukraine, openly or otherwise.
Another unknown is if Ukraine will ever be able to conduct a large-scale coordinated offensive. It still requires a lot of ammunition, maybe a million rounds just for one sector in one month, but if a sector can be isolated and pulverized, and Ukraine can move through it, then they can achieve maneuver warfare, which consumes a LOT less ammo than attritional warfare. I haven’t seen any progress in Ukraine acquiring combined arms capabilities but a potential 2025 offensive is over a year away, and a lot can happen in a year.
During the spring and summer of 2022, Russia fired an unsustainable 20-60,000 rounds per day, burning through 10 million of its stockpile of 15 million shells in 2022. 20,000 rounds a day is an annual rate of 7.3 million shells. Russia has since reduced its rate of fire to 10,000 rounds per day.
In 2023, they produced and refurbished 3.5 million shells according to Estonia. The refurbished shells were already in the stockpile but needed to be repaired before they could be fired. Russia is firing at a rate of 3.6 million rounds a year and Estonia believes they will increase their output to 4.5 million rounds a year in 2024. At some point, there will be no more rounds to refurbish and that will lower the production rate.
In 2022, Russia received an unknown number of shells from Belarus, and there have been no reports of further shipments from Belarus. They also received one million shells from North Korea. These shells are of poor quality. Some are duds, some are responsible for blowing up a few gun barrels, but there are enough of them to still be quite effective at killing and wounding Ukrainians.
What is unknown is North Korea’s production rate, how many shells it has in its stockpile, and whether China will ever aid North Korea, who might pass that on to Russia. There has been one isolated report of China shipping gunpowder to Russia, a lot of banned electronics make their way from other countries through China to Russia, and China sells hobby-quality drones to both Russia and Ukraine. Other than that, there have been no reports of China directly aiding Russia with military equipment, nor have there been any reports of China using North Korea as a transshipment proxy.
It appears that Russia will be able to sustain firing 10,000 rounds a day and might be able to reach 12,000 rounds a day. Without any changes, it does not look like it could sustain anything higher.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/13/us/politics/russia-sanctions-missile-production.html
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/world/2024/01/501_364468.html
Some corrections and additional details on French shells production.
French Ministre des Armées Sebastien Lecornu recently gave an interview in which he talked about support for Ukraine and French "Economie de Guerre" aka a grandiloquant formulation to advertise the still anaemic french production.
https://www.leparisien.fr/international/sebastien-lecornu-il-faut-etre-endurant-dans-notre-soutien-militaire-a-lukraine-17-01-2024-CSY6LQXL2NCCXBKY7AMKKQTF7A.php
Lecornu said French production of 155 mm shells went from 1 000 per month to 2 000 per month for a grand total of ... 24 per year. Now the goal is to raise this production onward to reach ... 3 000 shells per months by 2024 end. I emphasize this is the goal by 2024 end. For most of the year, the production will be below 3k/month. Just like for most of 2023, the French production was below 2k/month and only reached this level by the end of the year.
Meaning French 2024 production will be *somewhere between 24 000 and 36 000 shells. And closer to the former than the latter.
Now there have been some confusion because earlier, the German MoD announced it had contracted a French company to produce 68 000 155mm shells for 278 million euros.
https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/ukraine-unterstuetzung-deutschland-beschafft-artilleriemunition-5717012
https://www.uawire.org/germany-to-provide-350-000-additional-155mm-artillery-shells-to-ukraine
The thing is, there is only one French company producing 155mm shells : Nexter. And as French Minister Lecornu said, it will produce less than 36 000 shells in 2024.
Now, the most attentive would have notice the German MoD does not specify when the 68k shells from "an unnamed French company" are supposed to be delivered to Ukraine. For all we know it could be in 2050.
An other explanation could be how our wonderful oligarchy operates. In France we used to talk about Nexter as an unified, French company. But technically, during the mid 2010s, Nexter became a joint-ventur with German company Krauss-Maffei Wegmann under the new name KNDS. And as KNDS website explains, KNDS do have shells productions capacities in Belgium and Italy. respectively trhough its subsidiaries Mecar (Belgium) and Simmel Difesa (Italy). On top of Nexter Munitions.
https://www.knds.fr/en/our-brand/mecar
It is most certains that Lecornu talked about Nexter Munitions alone since it is the only KNDS subsidiary responsible for ammunition production based in France. Maybe Germany contracted the other subsidiaries for the 68k shells. So technically it would have contracted an "unammed French company" but still deliver the shells relatively quickly. Unfortunately I have absolutely no clue on Belgian and Italian productions.
Last but not least, in that same interview, Lerconu boasted Nexter aims to produce 78 CAESAR howitzers in 2024. 6 of them bought by Ukraine. He called on "partners" to finance the rest jointly. Later, the French press announced France is to finance 12 of theses howitzers. Thus leaving 60 howitzers to be financed by *someone.
https://www.liberation.fr/international/europe/la-france-appelle-ses-allies-a-cofinancer-la-fourniture-de-78-canons-caesar-a-lukraine-20240118_LFFJZEGSSZFCPGZM5PU53PARWI/?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter&xtor=CS7-51-#Echobox=1705603622-1
So maybe, Germany will in fact subside all of KNDS shell production including Nexter Munitions' production which French authorities hyped as France noble and benevolent effort to support Ukraine. Given the level of cynicism in Paris theses days, it would not be surprising.
This is not a one off event. Often French authorities have advocated our partners ought to buy our wonderful equipment, so we make money and deliver them at a snail speed. Afaik, earlier during the war, French authorities contemplate to deliver our old Mirage and hopefully make some money out of it too. The Ukrainians said nope while they expected to receive F-16. Though it seems they may change their mind given Mykola Oleshchuk's recent words.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-mirage-aircraft-may-reinforce-ukrainian-air-force-commander-2024-01-14/
In fact, during the past year, French have gone absolutely crazy about defence contract. There is hardly a week that goes by without some politicians, "journalists", "experts" or businessmen rallying voraciously against "stupid Europeans buying Americans gears rather than French gears" and how it sabotages the "European Defence". Of course, "European Defence" ought to mean everybody buy overpriced French products which may be delivered sometimes. Hopefully before 2100.
For the record Nexter raised the price of the CAESAR by over 25% ... Side note but it is so typical of France and France economy evolution during the past decades. Voracious rentiers who never aim to sell more or better but merely raise prices on every occasion while producing as little as possible. It is literally destroying the country.
https://www.opex360.com/2023/01/27/artillerie-le-danemark-veut-remplacer-les-caesar-promis-a-lukraine-par-des-obusiers-israeliens-atmos/
Lecornu also said proudly it now takes only 15 months to produce a CAESAR. So even if the 78 canons are all financed, it is unlikely all will be delivered by 2024 end.
The article focuses on artillery shells and that is alright. What about artillery itself?
There are open source reports out there saying that Russia may run out of Soviet artillery stores through 2024 that it has been using to equip some of its troops. (Similarly to the more widely circulated analysis of leftover tanks.) It is also claimed that Russia has a much more limited ability to produce more artillery.
How do you evaluate these claims and their impact if true? Could Russia effectively start 'running out of artillery' while having, comparatively, enough shells? Will the impact, if any, be only visible by 2025; and will Russia have to start aggressively shopping for more to be able to sustain its operations?