Some RU POWs do not want to go back, but Ukrainians exchange them, because they want their POWs back. (Unless they decide to fight on UA side, e.g. in Russian Freedom Legion)
Thanks (to you both) for the update. You wrote: «Conclusion is obvious: if all of ‘the West’ is descending into idiocracy, why should Ukraine do any better?». We are not descending into…. We are there. We might move further down of course, but we are there. Has always been there.
You wrote: «As of 1 June, they’ve suffered 8,625 killed, 10,491 missing in action, and 7,846 deserted in this battle.» I am not disputing the numbers, but how is it possible to distinguish between these groups? Especially the «deserted group» and the «missing inaction? And what do the deserters do? Surrender, flee back into Russia or?
I know a litte ruzzian language as you do, translation is simple it means KIA/dead. Why? No need to pay death bonuses to families + space for corruption (money to brigade/platoon/... management for changing the status and unblocking payment to the family).
Yes there are deserters trying to hide somewhere and some of them surrended.
Regarding Pokrovsk.. with this development we can expect it to fall around Christmas. Everything else equal to today, which of course isn’t gonna happen. Still, I have earlier said that such a development would be the only way to really get a transformation of the Ukrainian army. I am afraid I must hold to that conclusion. Unfortunately for those fighting in Pokrovsk of course å. And with no guarantee that the transformation will take place.
All organizations do. We often do as people too. We know that training is good, but do we bother to take the effort? Speaking purely from personal experience I can say that our ability to ignore what is needed is big. Sometimes we need a rather strong warning. It would be better if we didn’t go there, but we often do. So, if Pokrovsk falls I think/hope it will be such an impact. I don’t guarantee it of course. I hope forlot of things in this war, often in vain.
What I understand is, where Rubicon goes, Russia is going to give the maximum priority and exert the most pressure. So, I would expect ZSU moving a fully manned brigade in front of them, if the front is to be stable.
It pains me to see ZSU refusing to adapt to battleground realities. And if Russia goes after a large round of mobilization as rumoured, Ukraine will have to mobilize everyone older than 18, if the state wants to survive.
Just curious, if these RU soldiers who killed their commander would be exchanged or not ...
One would guess they don’t want?
Some RU POWs do not want to go back, but Ukrainians exchange them, because they want their POWs back. (Unless they decide to fight on UA side, e.g. in Russian Freedom Legion)
Thanks (to you both) for the update. You wrote: «Conclusion is obvious: if all of ‘the West’ is descending into idiocracy, why should Ukraine do any better?». We are not descending into…. We are there. We might move further down of course, but we are there. Has always been there.
You wrote: «As of 1 June, they’ve suffered 8,625 killed, 10,491 missing in action, and 7,846 deserted in this battle.» I am not disputing the numbers, but how is it possible to distinguish between these groups? Especially the «deserted group» and the «missing inaction? And what do the deserters do? Surrender, flee back into Russia or?
I know a litte ruzzian language as you do, translation is simple it means KIA/dead. Why? No need to pay death bonuses to families + space for corruption (money to brigade/platoon/... management for changing the status and unblocking payment to the family).
Yes there are deserters trying to hide somewhere and some of them surrended.
Regarding Pokrovsk.. with this development we can expect it to fall around Christmas. Everything else equal to today, which of course isn’t gonna happen. Still, I have earlier said that such a development would be the only way to really get a transformation of the Ukrainian army. I am afraid I must hold to that conclusion. Unfortunately for those fighting in Pokrovsk of course å. And with no guarantee that the transformation will take place.
I would be surprised if it lasted that long.
Well, maybe I am too optimistic there. But the question for me now is how the Ukrainian Army will learn.
> how the Ukrainian Army will learn
- Why should it?
In general I would assume every organization needs to learn to improve. So also ZSU.
Yes, but many organizations oppose any change, improvement included.
All organizations do. We often do as people too. We know that training is good, but do we bother to take the effort? Speaking purely from personal experience I can say that our ability to ignore what is needed is big. Sometimes we need a rather strong warning. It would be better if we didn’t go there, but we often do. So, if Pokrovsk falls I think/hope it will be such an impact. I don’t guarantee it of course. I hope forlot of things in this war, often in vain.
What I understand is, where Rubicon goes, Russia is going to give the maximum priority and exert the most pressure. So, I would expect ZSU moving a fully manned brigade in front of them, if the front is to be stable.
It pains me to see ZSU refusing to adapt to battleground realities. And if Russia goes after a large round of mobilization as rumoured, Ukraine will have to mobilize everyone older than 18, if the state wants to survive.