Not that I've seen from that attack. There are Russian regions that have had blackouts unrelated to any Ukrainian attacks in July and August, and Moscow had rolling blackouts from January to March of this year, which suggests that they have trouble meeting demand when demand is high.
Ukraine just started with their attacks on Russia's power grid. I expect them to sustain the attacks at some rate and reduce Russia's production capacity over time.
As for Armenia, the ICC, and Putin - Armenia might be hoping that although Russia's past help with 'peacekeeping forces' didn't help much with Azerbaijan, that perhaps there might be assistance in the future.
With Israel backing Azerbaijan Armenia can't really afford to burn bridges.
Now in the unlikely event Netanyahu ever ended up in Armenia, they might well 'detain' him in the hope that the ICC does follow through on Khan's request for a warrant...
Based on past comments, I don't think Armenia is counting on Russian support, especially since Russian and Azerbaijani relations are a lot closer now. When Armenia and France starting forming security deals it angered Russia. There are, however, still Russian troops in Armenia.
The bulk of Armenia's military is still equipped with Soviet hardware so there is something of an incentive there to remain on some sort of 'good' terms. Although, whether Russia is even able to provide support for that hardware is moot at this point.
While Armenia has been looking to the West recently with France and even the US for support it will take time (that Armenia might not have with respect to Azerbaijan's future intentions).
I am not sure that that article's optimism about 'improving' relations with Turkey is justified either - 'Turkey and Azerbaijan - two countries one people' - might well be an overriding factor. Of course, that might slip a bit if Erdogan is serious with his comments on Israel and Gaza in light of Azerbaijan's close relationship with Israel.
And then there is also Iran in the mix as to how that impacts Russia's Azerbaijani rapprochement...
Armenia's Soviet hardware of tanks and artillery proved ineffective against Azerbaijan's drones. Azerbaijan used their oil and gas money to rebuild their army and are much stronger than Armenia now, a reversal of fortune from 30 years ago.
Azerbaijan talked about opening a corridor to Nakhichevan. Aremenia's best chance to prevent this isn't with their army, but with diplomatic support. Turkey, Russia and France are part of that equation but I don't know the specifics.
Of course Azerbaijan has a massive advantage with all their Israeli tech and the hardware their petro dollars bought them.
But Armenia still has to keep up what hardware they have. As we see in Ukraine even the 'outdated' Soviet era tanks and other hardware still has a place on the battlefield if supported (or in support of) newer technology.
To be frank, I don't see Turkey as a bulwark for Armenia in this case against their 'brothers' in Azerbaijan, although that might change depending on how strongly Azerbaijan holds to its ties with Israel and how badly Turkey's deteriorate. Having essentially 'ethnically cleansed' Nagorno.Karabakh with no repercussions I really doubt that Azerbaijan with hold off due to Armenia building stronger ties with Turkey or France/Europe.
Thanks for making your assessments available to us. I posted this question below yesterday. It got some interest but not really any decisive answers. I'd be grateful to have your response. Thanks.
'Winning' is guaranteeing a secure future for an independent, democratic Ukraine. The pro-Ukraine experts I've read (O'Brien, Hodges, etc.) still don't seem to offer us a clear theory for how Ukraine 'wins' by that criterion. Someone please help us figure out what we are shooting for.
As long as Putin's regime has men, machines, and money to continue aggression, it looks like he will continue it no matter what. Maybe he'll do brief pauses to regroup and attempt to divide Ukraine's allies.
I'm in favor of better armaments to Ukraine to help save lives of Ukraine's soldiers and civilians. But battlefield victories over Russia, in Ukraine or in Russia or anywhere else, seem like they won't end the war decisively for Ukraine. Putin can just keep it going. If Ukraine liberates Crimea, Gen Hodges says the war would be over, but Putin may not get Hodges' memo or agree to follow it. Even if Ukraine somehow pushed Russia back to the 1991 borders, Putin may not concede defeat.
It looks like the war could only end in a win for Ukraine when Russia has completely exhausted itself economically, militarily, and socially/ideologically. Then it either collapses or the risk of collapse will make it have to prioritize internal threats to survival over continued aggression. At least for a generation.
But Russia's exhaustion still seems years away. It literally means burning through all the old Soviet equipment, and burning through all the money they piled up over decades, and letting the hundreds of thousands of casualties finally undermine the Putin regime's legitimacy. That is an extremely long process. Also, I don't think the main powers in the West even want it: either for a false goal of 'stability' or out a flawed strategy to keep Russia as a major power to use as a counterweight to China.
Please could you give at least a rough view of a path ahead for how Ukraine 'wins'. I'd deeply appreciate. Thanks.
*******The war will end inside Russia through political change******* All efforts by Ukraine & those of its allies which are sincere, are to create circumstances in which regime/national survival is better served by Russia withdrawing from Ukraine than it staying. Those circumstances are forming but haven't fully formed. Further pressure is required it takes many forms. Military, socioeconomic, financial, and so on.
Thanks for engaging directly with the question. Few people have and I wish they would.
Unfortunately, this is basically Jake Sullivan's approach, and it isn't working. It should have already been clear after the battle of Kyiv to Russia's elite that the war wasn't winnable and regime/national survival for Russia was better served by ending it. There seems to be no mechanism in Russia to bring about the political change you are hoping for.
I think you are onto something, but not there yet..
The entire system has to implode from within for that to happen. It's not something gradual. When the dominos start to fall, the entire system will break in a few days.
That's what happened to the USSR, it's how it's worked historically.
Wars are always a contest of wills. A combatant loses a war only if they decide fighting isn't worth it anymore. Even if occupied, they could continue a guerrilla or terrorist conflict.
Ukraine said that their objective is to return to their 2014 borders. Given enough equipment and ammo, such as ten times the amount of artillery ammo they have now, that is an achievable goal. There are zero indications that they will receive such an increase in military aid, but if they manage to restore their original borders Ukraine will then continue to build a strong army and arms industry whether Russia concedes or not.
If Ukraine continues to receive the current levels of military and financial aid then Ukraine can continue to fight indefinitely at the cost of more manpower. It could multiply its military power by reforming its military to the standards of the 59th, 3rd, 92nd and other successful brigades, but there are no indications of that happening.
There's a wide level of possibilities in this likely scenario in which the war will drag on another couple years barring a significant change, such as the collapse of the Russian economy or the Ukrainian will to fight. Right now the Ukrainian will to fight looks a lot stronger than the long term prospects of the Russian economy, and Ukraine's escalating strategic bombing campaign is only going to increase the pressure on the Russian economy.
Thank you very much for engaging with my question. Other experts just ignore me because I am a nobody and it is getting frustrating. I think that it is important to explain the theory of victory as specifically as possible to the public in order to justify Ukraine aid, and to explain why the Biden-Scholz escalation management approach is wrong. Right now we all know the Biden-Scholz approach is a moral and humanitarian failure, but without a clear theory of victory as an alternative it is harder to win the debate against the Biden-Scholz approach on practical as opposed to moral grounds.
I'm not an expert on this so forgive me, but I disagree with your model that wars are contests of will. I say instead that wars are attempts to accomplish political goals through force. If one side can not accomplish its political goals, or if it becomes too weak so that it can not stop its opponent from accomplishing that opponent's political goal, then that side has lost. Continuation of bitter-enders through insurgency or terrorism doesn't change that loss as long as they can't overturn the big-picture political result. Take the US Civil War. Low level insurgency continued throughout the Reconstruction period. Terrorist violence (KKK. etc. continued into the 1960's) but the outcome of the war was final by the time of Lee's surrender because the South's political goal of an independent confederacy had been ended by force.
The political goal to me here is a secure, independent, democratic Ukraine, Whether or not it gets back to the 2024 borders. In fact the 2024 borders may be counterproductive to that goal because reincorporating the separatist regions may undermine possibilities for democracy and security of future Ukraine.
It seems that Putin's Russia will keep up his war to thwart a secure, independent, democratic Ukraine as long as he still has men and money to use and as long as he has strong enough political control within Russia to keep pushing the war effort. It looks like he will keep going until he has burned though all the Soviet stocks of weapons, all the money piled up over the decades, and his political power and control within Russia. It seems like it would take the collapse or near collapse of Russia's whole military, economic, and political system to finally end the war.
You seem to think that Russia's economic collapse may end the war. I think you're onto something there, but am not sure I can connect all the dots. Cant hey keep fighting regardless of how poor they get? But if economics is the answer, then we should go to the max with sanctions, etc. whereas equipping Ukraine for another offensive wouldn't align with that theory of victory, and long range strike isn't the answer either..
Sorry for such a long note. I'd be grateful for any responses. Thanks very much, John
As it turns out, what Ukraine wants to do is their choice, not ours.
You say you do not agree that wars are a battle of wills but wonder if Putin can keep fighting even if his military and economic power is greatly reduced. Of course he can. He just won't be as effective, but he can make that choice.
Sanctions are having an effect but in an interconnected world they are not as effective as a WW1 blockade. Secondary sanctions have been imposed on those that helped bypass the primary sanctions and that will help, but some materials will still get through. The objective of sanctions is to deny Russia material capability and that is the same objective as long range strikes. They have already removed some quantities of oil and munitions and are well worth the effort. Anything that reduces Russian capabilities is worth the effort.
I believe Putin's will won't change. So a contest of wills won't likely be won. But will no longer matters if Russia's capacity is weakened to the point that Putin's will to continue the war just can't be translated into impactful action.
So I think Ukraine and the West can only win by fully destroying Russia's capacity to use force (letting them bur through all their Soviet stocks, money, political cohesion), or selectively destroying certain key capacities. Every little bit helps, but a more targeted effort would be better and a better explanation of what capacities are being targeted and why and how that fits into a master plan would be very helpful and it would support the case that Ukraine's friends are making. Some fringe figures like Kamil Galeev think that the RUssian machine tools supply is the best target.
I tend to agree that Russia's economy may be the weakest leg of the stool and perhaps kicking that one out would lead to Russia's collapse. A full economic crisis might force Putin to focus on internal problems or simply no longer be able to pay for a million strong army in the field.
On the other hand, Ukraine could probably kill one million Russian infantry and still not get Russia to stop.
Thanks Don, interesting report, are the Ukrainian strikes on Russia's power plant etc hurting them or just being a nuisance and the drone missile how long before they have enough to make the Russians take notice if you can elaborate
The strikes on refineries seem to have had some effect - at least enough for Russia to classify its statistics for exports of oil products.
Power plants were not hit before, as far as I remember. Thus, that has no effect yet, and may be just a warning before the winter, when if a power plant is disabled for a couple of days, its city's centralized heating pipes may freeze through and crack, which is a real disaster - as all the post-Soviet cities are literally built over those pipes.
Oil depots also seem to be a new target - no data yet.
Industrial plants were hit from time to time, with no lasting effect reported in the news.
Russia already has issues in Moscow and other regions when demand for electricity is high, such as in the heat of summer or cold of winter. Cutting down on any power production will mean more rolling blackouts at lower levels of high demand (if that makes sense). Russia has 800 power plants and 35 nuclear reactors, so there are plenty of sources of power, but then everyone needs that power. Every little bit helps and puts more pressure on the economy and civilians.
>> Ihor Kolomoisky was a 2019 supporter of Zelensky and later became a supporter of Russian propaganda.
- I have not heard anything regarding his support of propaganda.
I second this, Kolomoisky is a known crook, but he didn't support ruzzian propaganda, it is a mistake.
Hi Don,
After the attacks on Russian power plants were there any reported blackouts?
Not that I've seen from that attack. There are Russian regions that have had blackouts unrelated to any Ukrainian attacks in July and August, and Moscow had rolling blackouts from January to March of this year, which suggests that they have trouble meeting demand when demand is high.
Ukraine just started with their attacks on Russia's power grid. I expect them to sustain the attacks at some rate and reduce Russia's production capacity over time.
Reportedly, there were power outages in two parts of the railways system around Moscow.
As for Armenia, the ICC, and Putin - Armenia might be hoping that although Russia's past help with 'peacekeeping forces' didn't help much with Azerbaijan, that perhaps there might be assistance in the future.
With Israel backing Azerbaijan Armenia can't really afford to burn bridges.
Now in the unlikely event Netanyahu ever ended up in Armenia, they might well 'detain' him in the hope that the ICC does follow through on Khan's request for a warrant...
Based on past comments, I don't think Armenia is counting on Russian support, especially since Russian and Azerbaijani relations are a lot closer now. When Armenia and France starting forming security deals it angered Russia. There are, however, still Russian troops in Armenia.
https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-russian-base-gyumri-alliance-weakening-geopolitical-storm/32874563.html
The bulk of Armenia's military is still equipped with Soviet hardware so there is something of an incentive there to remain on some sort of 'good' terms. Although, whether Russia is even able to provide support for that hardware is moot at this point.
While Armenia has been looking to the West recently with France and even the US for support it will take time (that Armenia might not have with respect to Azerbaijan's future intentions).
I am not sure that that article's optimism about 'improving' relations with Turkey is justified either - 'Turkey and Azerbaijan - two countries one people' - might well be an overriding factor. Of course, that might slip a bit if Erdogan is serious with his comments on Israel and Gaza in light of Azerbaijan's close relationship with Israel.
And then there is also Iran in the mix as to how that impacts Russia's Azerbaijani rapprochement...
Armenia's Soviet hardware of tanks and artillery proved ineffective against Azerbaijan's drones. Azerbaijan used their oil and gas money to rebuild their army and are much stronger than Armenia now, a reversal of fortune from 30 years ago.
Azerbaijan talked about opening a corridor to Nakhichevan. Aremenia's best chance to prevent this isn't with their army, but with diplomatic support. Turkey, Russia and France are part of that equation but I don't know the specifics.
Of course Azerbaijan has a massive advantage with all their Israeli tech and the hardware their petro dollars bought them.
But Armenia still has to keep up what hardware they have. As we see in Ukraine even the 'outdated' Soviet era tanks and other hardware still has a place on the battlefield if supported (or in support of) newer technology.
To be frank, I don't see Turkey as a bulwark for Armenia in this case against their 'brothers' in Azerbaijan, although that might change depending on how strongly Azerbaijan holds to its ties with Israel and how badly Turkey's deteriorate. Having essentially 'ethnically cleansed' Nagorno.Karabakh with no repercussions I really doubt that Azerbaijan with hold off due to Armenia building stronger ties with Turkey or France/Europe.
Perhaps Iran...
Hello Don,
Thanks for making your assessments available to us. I posted this question below yesterday. It got some interest but not really any decisive answers. I'd be grateful to have your response. Thanks.
'Winning' is guaranteeing a secure future for an independent, democratic Ukraine. The pro-Ukraine experts I've read (O'Brien, Hodges, etc.) still don't seem to offer us a clear theory for how Ukraine 'wins' by that criterion. Someone please help us figure out what we are shooting for.
As long as Putin's regime has men, machines, and money to continue aggression, it looks like he will continue it no matter what. Maybe he'll do brief pauses to regroup and attempt to divide Ukraine's allies.
I'm in favor of better armaments to Ukraine to help save lives of Ukraine's soldiers and civilians. But battlefield victories over Russia, in Ukraine or in Russia or anywhere else, seem like they won't end the war decisively for Ukraine. Putin can just keep it going. If Ukraine liberates Crimea, Gen Hodges says the war would be over, but Putin may not get Hodges' memo or agree to follow it. Even if Ukraine somehow pushed Russia back to the 1991 borders, Putin may not concede defeat.
It looks like the war could only end in a win for Ukraine when Russia has completely exhausted itself economically, militarily, and socially/ideologically. Then it either collapses or the risk of collapse will make it have to prioritize internal threats to survival over continued aggression. At least for a generation.
But Russia's exhaustion still seems years away. It literally means burning through all the old Soviet equipment, and burning through all the money they piled up over decades, and letting the hundreds of thousands of casualties finally undermine the Putin regime's legitimacy. That is an extremely long process. Also, I don't think the main powers in the West even want it: either for a false goal of 'stability' or out a flawed strategy to keep Russia as a major power to use as a counterweight to China.
Please could you give at least a rough view of a path ahead for how Ukraine 'wins'. I'd deeply appreciate. Thanks.
Best,
John
*******The war will end inside Russia through political change******* All efforts by Ukraine & those of its allies which are sincere, are to create circumstances in which regime/national survival is better served by Russia withdrawing from Ukraine than it staying. Those circumstances are forming but haven't fully formed. Further pressure is required it takes many forms. Military, socioeconomic, financial, and so on.
Thanks for engaging directly with the question. Few people have and I wish they would.
Unfortunately, this is basically Jake Sullivan's approach, and it isn't working. It should have already been clear after the battle of Kyiv to Russia's elite that the war wasn't winnable and regime/national survival for Russia was better served by ending it. There seems to be no mechanism in Russia to bring about the political change you are hoping for.
I think you are onto something, but not there yet..
The entire system has to implode from within for that to happen. It's not something gradual. When the dominos start to fall, the entire system will break in a few days.
That's what happened to the USSR, it's how it's worked historically.
Wars are always a contest of wills. A combatant loses a war only if they decide fighting isn't worth it anymore. Even if occupied, they could continue a guerrilla or terrorist conflict.
Ukraine said that their objective is to return to their 2014 borders. Given enough equipment and ammo, such as ten times the amount of artillery ammo they have now, that is an achievable goal. There are zero indications that they will receive such an increase in military aid, but if they manage to restore their original borders Ukraine will then continue to build a strong army and arms industry whether Russia concedes or not.
If Ukraine continues to receive the current levels of military and financial aid then Ukraine can continue to fight indefinitely at the cost of more manpower. It could multiply its military power by reforming its military to the standards of the 59th, 3rd, 92nd and other successful brigades, but there are no indications of that happening.
There's a wide level of possibilities in this likely scenario in which the war will drag on another couple years barring a significant change, such as the collapse of the Russian economy or the Ukrainian will to fight. Right now the Ukrainian will to fight looks a lot stronger than the long term prospects of the Russian economy, and Ukraine's escalating strategic bombing campaign is only going to increase the pressure on the Russian economy.
Hello Don,
Thank you very much for engaging with my question. Other experts just ignore me because I am a nobody and it is getting frustrating. I think that it is important to explain the theory of victory as specifically as possible to the public in order to justify Ukraine aid, and to explain why the Biden-Scholz escalation management approach is wrong. Right now we all know the Biden-Scholz approach is a moral and humanitarian failure, but without a clear theory of victory as an alternative it is harder to win the debate against the Biden-Scholz approach on practical as opposed to moral grounds.
I'm not an expert on this so forgive me, but I disagree with your model that wars are contests of will. I say instead that wars are attempts to accomplish political goals through force. If one side can not accomplish its political goals, or if it becomes too weak so that it can not stop its opponent from accomplishing that opponent's political goal, then that side has lost. Continuation of bitter-enders through insurgency or terrorism doesn't change that loss as long as they can't overturn the big-picture political result. Take the US Civil War. Low level insurgency continued throughout the Reconstruction period. Terrorist violence (KKK. etc. continued into the 1960's) but the outcome of the war was final by the time of Lee's surrender because the South's political goal of an independent confederacy had been ended by force.
The political goal to me here is a secure, independent, democratic Ukraine, Whether or not it gets back to the 2024 borders. In fact the 2024 borders may be counterproductive to that goal because reincorporating the separatist regions may undermine possibilities for democracy and security of future Ukraine.
It seems that Putin's Russia will keep up his war to thwart a secure, independent, democratic Ukraine as long as he still has men and money to use and as long as he has strong enough political control within Russia to keep pushing the war effort. It looks like he will keep going until he has burned though all the Soviet stocks of weapons, all the money piled up over the decades, and his political power and control within Russia. It seems like it would take the collapse or near collapse of Russia's whole military, economic, and political system to finally end the war.
You seem to think that Russia's economic collapse may end the war. I think you're onto something there, but am not sure I can connect all the dots. Cant hey keep fighting regardless of how poor they get? But if economics is the answer, then we should go to the max with sanctions, etc. whereas equipping Ukraine for another offensive wouldn't align with that theory of victory, and long range strike isn't the answer either..
Sorry for such a long note. I'd be grateful for any responses. Thanks very much, John
As it turns out, what Ukraine wants to do is their choice, not ours.
You say you do not agree that wars are a battle of wills but wonder if Putin can keep fighting even if his military and economic power is greatly reduced. Of course he can. He just won't be as effective, but he can make that choice.
Sanctions are having an effect but in an interconnected world they are not as effective as a WW1 blockade. Secondary sanctions have been imposed on those that helped bypass the primary sanctions and that will help, but some materials will still get through. The objective of sanctions is to deny Russia material capability and that is the same objective as long range strikes. They have already removed some quantities of oil and munitions and are well worth the effort. Anything that reduces Russian capabilities is worth the effort.
I believe Putin's will won't change. So a contest of wills won't likely be won. But will no longer matters if Russia's capacity is weakened to the point that Putin's will to continue the war just can't be translated into impactful action.
So I think Ukraine and the West can only win by fully destroying Russia's capacity to use force (letting them bur through all their Soviet stocks, money, political cohesion), or selectively destroying certain key capacities. Every little bit helps, but a more targeted effort would be better and a better explanation of what capacities are being targeted and why and how that fits into a master plan would be very helpful and it would support the case that Ukraine's friends are making. Some fringe figures like Kamil Galeev think that the RUssian machine tools supply is the best target.
I tend to agree that Russia's economy may be the weakest leg of the stool and perhaps kicking that one out would lead to Russia's collapse. A full economic crisis might force Putin to focus on internal problems or simply no longer be able to pay for a million strong army in the field.
On the other hand, Ukraine could probably kill one million Russian infantry and still not get Russia to stop.
Thanks again for any further insights...
Thanks Don, interesting report, are the Ukrainian strikes on Russia's power plant etc hurting them or just being a nuisance and the drone missile how long before they have enough to make the Russians take notice if you can elaborate
The strikes on refineries seem to have had some effect - at least enough for Russia to classify its statistics for exports of oil products.
Power plants were not hit before, as far as I remember. Thus, that has no effect yet, and may be just a warning before the winter, when if a power plant is disabled for a couple of days, its city's centralized heating pipes may freeze through and crack, which is a real disaster - as all the post-Soviet cities are literally built over those pipes.
Oil depots also seem to be a new target - no data yet.
Industrial plants were hit from time to time, with no lasting effect reported in the news.
Thanks for the reply Denys
Russia already has issues in Moscow and other regions when demand for electricity is high, such as in the heat of summer or cold of winter. Cutting down on any power production will mean more rolling blackouts at lower levels of high demand (if that makes sense). Russia has 800 power plants and 35 nuclear reactors, so there are plenty of sources of power, but then everyone needs that power. Every little bit helps and puts more pressure on the economy and civilians.
The story about Russian MPs reminded me of this one (Kafka would be proud)
https://arstechnica.com/culture/2024/08/trying-to-outrun-ukrainian-drones-kursk-traffic-cams-still-issue-speeding-tickets/
Yeah, that was amusing in its absurdity. Kafka, and see also Catch-22.
As you didn't mention the Proletarsk oil depot. Is that thing still burning or did it burn out as I don't think they extinguished the fire.
After 16 days, they put out the fire on September 2nd. Firefighters are still on site in case of flare ups.
Thanks