I’ve made a few accurate predictions about Ukraine’s war effort—calls that seemed unlikely at the time but have since been validated.
I warned that Ukraine would pursue a nuclear deterrent if left outside NATO. I said shotguns would become a frontline defense against drones. I predicted that the supposed $500 billion price tag for Ukraine’s reconstruction would balloon to well over $1 trillion. And I wasn’t surprised when Zelensky, once cautious, began calling out corruption in Washington directly (Ukraine isn’t more corrupt than the US, it’s differently corrupt.)
Here’s my next prediction:
Ukraine is already using—or will soon use—Signal-of-Opportunity Navigation (SoOPNav) to guide drones and long-range munitions deep into Russia, even in the most hostile electronic warfare environments.
NOTE: This was written back in March. Today we see Moscow’s communication systems being limited. Why? To deny Ukraine Signal of Opportunity Navigation.
What Is Signal-of-Opportunity Navigation?
SoOPNav relies on ambient signals in the electromagnetic spectrum—including but not limited to traditional radio frequencies—to estimate a platform’s position without GPS. These signals can come from:
● FM radio broadcasts
● Television towers
● Civilian cell networks
● Public infrastructure transmitters
● Industrial emitters
Rather than broadcasting or “talking,” these systems listen to signals that are already present—signals that can be mapped, modeled, and used to calculate location, heading, and speed.
Your smartphone does this constantly. Even when GPS is disabled, your device can still locate you with startling accuracy by measuring signal strength, timing, and signal identity from nearby Wi-Fi routers, Bluetooth devices, cell towers, and even magnetic anomalies.
This is not a primitive backup system. It is complex, persistent, and insidious—and it works. That same principle, scaled up and applied to drones and cruise missiles, is likely being used right now inside Russian airspace.
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Why Ukraine Needs This
Russia has constructed one of the most aggressive electronic warfare environments in the world. Near major cities, military bases, and strategic infrastructure, GPS signals are jammed, spoofed, or completely denied.
And yet Ukrainian drones continue to strike targets hundreds of kilometers inside Russian territory.
In some cases, they may be relying on inertial navigation, visual scene matching, or preloaded terrain maps. But the most adaptable—and scalable—solution is Signal-of-Opportunity Navigation.
Every FM tower in Belgorod. Every cell tower near an oil refinery in Tatarstan. Every civilian broadcast signal left untouched by Russian operators. These are not vulnerabilities in the traditional sense. They are fixed-position reference points, whether Moscow likes it or not.
SoOPNav doesn’t require decrypting the signal or accessing its content. It just needs the signal itself—its strength, timing, and frequency characteristics. Once cataloged, it becomes part of a drone’s mental map.
Why This Prediction Matters
SoOPNav is cheap, passive, and incredibly difficult to counter. You can jam GPS. You can spoof satellite links. But you cannot—short of turning off your entire country’s broadcast and communications infrastructure—easily erase your own electromagnetic footprint.
That footprint becomes a roadmap. A breadcrumb trail. A silent guide for munitions that fly low, fast, and unannounced.
Crucially, this would not be the only navigation method onboard. Ukraine’s most capable drones are likely using a layered suite of navigation systems. SoOPNav would work alongside GPS (when available), inertial navigation, barometric data, terrain contour matching, and AI-assisted visual recognition. No one method is perfect. But fused together, they create a resilient, adaptable system that survives in electronic warfare environments where a single mode would fail.
Ukraine won’t advertise that it’s using this. But if I’m right, we’ll see the effects in how often drones reach deep inside Russian territory—despite Russian attempts to blind them.
It’s not magic. It’s math.
Benjamin Cook continues to travel to, often lives in, and works in Ukraine, a connection spanning more than 14 years. He holds an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and has consulted with journalists on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and related topics. He is co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, working in southern Ukraine. You can find Mr. Cook between Odesa, Ukraine; Charleston, South Carolina; and Tucson, Arizona.
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Mr. Cook’s Substack:
I linked to this story on my DepletionCurve X account. Also created a graphic. If you'd ever like a cartoon for one of your stories let me know and I'll see what I can figure out. https://x.com/DepletionCurve/status/1920522203147252031
And broadcasting the Russians definitely won't switch of tomorrow