War Monitoring - for Beginners, Take II (Part 3)

Hello everybody!

Before I ‘return’ to my ‘usual updates’, here a third and final part of this feature, explaining certain details about ongoing Ukrainian operations on basis of few very specific examples.

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‘About a week ago’, videos began appearing shown Russian troops fleeing from their positions, a T-90Ms being damaged, and then destroyed (photo below). Then, few days later, another video surfaced, showing yet another T-90M being knocked out… With most of this being geo-located to ‘southern Klishchivka’, many people were quick into conclusion that this was all the work of the Ukrainian 3^rd Assault, or another of brigades advancing into this area from the north.

No doubt, there are ‘good reasons’ for certain conclusions. After all, the 3rd Assault Brigade is meanwhile famous in the social media: it’s a big unit (much bigger than generally known; indeed, much bigger than the designation ‘brigade’ might mean to anybody), and excellently led- and trained. Nowadays, the 3rd is including some of best ‘regular’ troops of the ZSU, ‘crack’ professionals, several of whom are equipped with ‘gopro’ cameras. It has a very effective PR-department, too: one that’s regularly releasing photos and videos of its actions. The combination of all these factors means this unit is operating like ‘well-oiled machinery’: commanders know what are they doing, they’re keeping their aims and planning within achievable limits; their troops are well-trained, they trust their superiors, follow their orders, they know what are they doing, and thus their operations can be used as ‘text-book examples’ for how to operate under the given circumstances. Unsurprisingly, every 2-3 days, we can follow the operations of the 3rd Assault in the Klishchivka area, ‘live’.

The essence of the 3rd’s tactics is a little bit harder to explain. Instead of maximalist ‘advance’, as I guess nearly everybody is expecting - i.e. instead of ‘conquering terrain’ - this brigade is ‘raiding’ and ‘mauling’ the Russians.

Means: it’s running near-constant, small-scale offensive infantry operations into the Russian positions; killing or capturing Russian troops; capturing their arms and ammunition; destroying their positions….and then withdraws to let the Russians replace their losses with yet more mobiks, before repeating the same procedure…. again…. and again…..and again… and again…. until the Russians give up and stop feeding troops into the area of the brigade’s interest.

As a consequence, its ‘advance’ is ‘extremely slow’. ‘But’: Russian losses are massive, while the 3rd is suffering next to none. This video is shown one of latest examples: 12 hours of raiding, 40 Russians killed, no own losses.

Make no mistakes: this is extremely hard to achieve. Not only every of involved commanders, but every of involved troops need to be fully focused on everything they sense for 12 hours, and every time do exactly the right thing.

….and the local Russian command (the 2-times-rolled-over 72nd Motor Rifle Brigade, meanwhile ‘re-filled’ by convicts of the Storm-Z), is finding no solution for this at all. Actually, it’s situation is hopeless to the degree where the VSRF ceased supporting it with artillery: it’s merely pumping yet more replacements into the line. Sure, these are replacing losses and appear to be ‘holding’ positions, but actually: Ukrainians then ‘drive in’, destroy them, and then withdraw…

On the contrary, relatively few have paid attention about videos like this one, released by the 28^th Mechanised Brigade. This is a unit staffed primarily by mobilised reservists, mostly poor people, including very few troops speaking English. It’s a unit that was battered by fighting in Kherson of September-October last year, and was slow to recover: it was ‘re-filled’ with ‘rather green’ recruits while its command staff was left with very little time to reorganise and re-train their troops. Arguably, like the 3rd Assault, so also the 28^th is not equipped with any kind of ‘flashy’ Western tanks or infantry fighting vehicles, but ‘still’ driving old T-72s and BMP-2s…And, hand on heart, the work of its PR-department cannot but be described as ‘miserable’. Bottom line: very few ‘war monitors’ are paying attention about this brigade - just like very few people are paying very little attention about the mass of other of Ukrainian units.

Now, in the light of what such ‘famous’ units like the 3^rd and 5^th Assault, 24^th Aidar Battalion, and the 210^th SF Battalion Berlingo were doing (and are still doing) to the Russians inside Klishchivka, just few kilometres further north, the ‘report’ by the 28^th – ‘renowned’ as deployed in the Kurdyumivka area - kind of ‘went down’. So, where’s the point?

Point is, that ‘sometimes the last week’, the 28^th first run a diversionary attack on the Russians in Kurdyumivka – to distract them from its actual target – and then crossed the Siversky Donets–Donbas Canal, securing most of two hedgerows running (approximately) in West-East direction, in direction of the hamlet known as Andriivka. The latter is unlikely to ring plenty of bells, but: the place is on the last tarmacked road into Klishchivka: the supply route for the VSRF fighting in that village.

Arguably, the assault of the 28^th was stopped by minefields and Russian artillery short of Andriivka, and the mass of war-mappers found all of this not worth their attention. Correspondingly, hardly any has ‘drawn a line’ indicating a Ukrainian bridgehead on the western side of the Canal north of that hamlet. Even less so would any of them come to the idea how deep is this bridgehead: ‘there are no videos from there’. As a result, most of maps are shown something like this:

This is simple to draw. Ukrainian-controlled territory to the left, blue for the ZSU frontline, red for the Russian side…

To a certain degree, that’s fine that way, no doubt about that: after all, we cannot - and should not - expect all the war-mappers to know precisely how and where is what unit deployed, and where are what kinds of its arms and positions. ‘Silence’ is important - if for no other reason then because much of the Russian battlefield intelligence gathering process is reliant on what’s reported in the social media.

However, one should not lose from the sight the fact that in reality there are no such ‘solid frontlines’. Especially none ‘stretching for miles’, all being nicely and tidily occuppied by the same number of troops all the time. Even less so are the frontlines in areas of active combat operations as ‘fix’ in time and place as indicated by maps published in the social media. In reality, neither side has ‘100% total control’: neither of its own frontlines, nor the area behind them. In reality, most of that ‘control’ is actually exercised along roads and ‘selected hedgerows’, and the situation is in the state of ‘constant flux’:

• regular Ukrainian troops are running their raids;

• regular Russian units are counterattacking;

• both sides are raiding the rear of the enemy frontline with their special forces (Spetsnaz);

• armoured vehicles are brought into a position, running fire-actions, then withdrawn;

• yet other armoured vehicles are deployed to support a raid or a counterattack, then withdrawn;

• Ukrainians are using some of their armoured vehicles to bring in supplies and evacuate casualties (especially M113s and old BMP-1s are used for ‘CASEVAC’);

• artillery is brought into position, running its own fire actions, destroying this or that position or the piece of heavy equipment….or being destroyed….

Positions are captured, abandoned or lost. By both sides. All the time. Thus, actually, the frontline is changing all the time, too.

So also in the case of this attack by the 28th Mech. Few hours after the brigade has reached its new positions west of Andriivka - indeed: while its troops were still busy ‘mopping up’ captured Russian positions - the VSRF counterattacked with almost everything it had on hand. This included elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade, supported by T-90s of the 80^th Tank Regiment. Yes, sure, these two units were re-built with mobiks, like so many other, but these are no BARS, and no overweight guys in their forties (or older), but younger, better trained, relatively good troops.

Nevertheless, their counterattacks were all repelled with a heavy loss. However, since the 28^th lacks money for UAVs, there you are: there are only two videos shown two losses of two Russian T-90s, plus that one shown ‘mech infantry attack into another hedgerow’ – and ‘nothing happened there’…

Which (and to digress a bit), I think was (and still is) ‘just as fine’ with Ukrainian command for this sector, because through this advance – no matter how ‘limited’ – the 28^th thus established itself in so-called ‘fire control’ of that road from Andriivka to Klishchivka. Means: whatever reinforcements and supplies the Russians want to bring from southern direction, is running through an area covered by heavy machine guns and mortars of this Ukrainian brigade. The Russian troops bunched together inside Klishchivka, are now sitting there in their trenches and basements of ruined homes, shelled, rocketed, and short on ammo, food, and even water – at temps above 35°C. And since the ZSU artillery in this area is superior of that of the VSRF, this also means that the Russian troops inside Klishchivka are also receiving relatively little artillery support: as soon as the VSRF brings another tank, or artillery piece into position, this is targeted by the ZSU… Obviously, Ukrainians are ‘not really eager’ to let anybody know about this fact: even less so the Russians.

….and, hand on heart: I do not consider it my business to let the Russians know…

Thus, the actual map of what was going on in this sector of the frontline for the last week should actually look something like this:

The 28th advanced along the two hedgerows in direction of Andriivka. Its success in that sector has ‘opened’ the flank for other ZSU units to run raids into the flank of Russian positions inside Klishchivka. In all cases, the Russians reacted with ‘counterattacks’: some launched immediately, others hours later; some aiming to stop Ukrainian advance/s, others aiming to push them back and recover lost positions, and yet others serving no other purpose but to ‘re-fill’ battered VSRF and VDV units.

As a result, there is actually no ‘firm frontline’ in several areas: some positions were taken, others lost, some were entirely destroyed (whether by artillery or by other means). There are ‘large gaps’ between units on both sides: some are known to the enemy, and promptly exploited for another raid or a counterattack….but, all too many not…

Point is: with few exceptions, there’s actually no ‘fix’, no permanent frontline. And units that were in one or another position at one point in time, are meanwhile at least 100, more often 1000-2000 metres away - if not (at least in the case of Ukrainians) rotated out, and given time to rest and recuperate.

I could now go on with drawing a similar map of - for example - the Robotyne or Staromaiorske area. Not only that I lack the time for that: I think it’s pointless because a) I’m not that good at drawing ‘clear, easy to understand’ maps,

b) because any such map would be far more complex than the two ‘simple’ ones above, and

c) even if I would do so, that map would be already obsolete, and thus misinforming, because the situation is meanwhile entirely different.

Sufficient to ‘explain’ few bits and pieces, just as examples. The ZSU run a series of raids into the ‘flank’ of the ‘main’ Russian position north of Robotyne, then exploited the opportunity to raid further south. Contrary to the Klishchivka area, the Robotyne area is heavily mined: while Ukrainians were busy widening their secure lines through the minefields north-east and east of Robotyne, and bringing in their heavy gear (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles etc.), the Russians counterattacked into their western flank, and - between others - captured one Bradley. Moreover, the Russians then launched an even stronger counterattack five kilometres further east (mind the concentration of Russian forces in the Verbove area, which I’ve mentioned about a week ago) - and did so over two of their own minefields. Reason: they attempted to collapse the entire Ukrainian advance north and east of Robotyne. To spoil all the results of six weeks of - often troublesome - Ukrainian advances.

Result? Related ‘photos and videos’ are then puzzling people: ‘what are the Russians doing there?’ and - because Ukrainians meanwhile not only stopped, but also pushed back that Russian counterattack - are resulting in yet more ‘wrong war maps’…

Bottom line: it’s easy - but wrong - to think about what’s currently going on in this war as about ‘trench warfare’. That’s a massive oversimplification, at least. Together with the terrain, any kind of fortifications and any other sorts of obstacles are ‘just the base of the battlefield’. What matters is the movement of troops and vehicles. And these are moved as the commanders find that necessary in the given moment of time, on basis of their situational awareness (or the lack of the same). Indeed, in this war it is rather so that units that are not moving for much too long, are certain to suffer heavy losses. Thus, almost all the units are moving every few hours, at least once a day.

Moreover, less than 5% of actual events is ever captured on photos or videos, and there are very few people who can seriously interpret them. Therfore, any insistence on ‘video or it didn’t happen’, and drawing conclusions just on such ‘evidence’ - is misleading, because the situation is constantly changing.

The only things sure are that wars are neither linear, nor static, and always a mess of constant terror and chaos.