Ukraine War, 9 August 2024

Hello everybody!

By now, it is becoming obvious that the Ukrainian ‘invasion of Russia’ (as the Russians are meanwhile calling it… Pudding is terming this a ‘terrorist operation’), is much more than ‘just another raid’. If for no other reason then because, contrary to the first two such raids, the ZSU is not withdrawing from the Russian territory.

However, it remains unclear what is the aim of this operation - what are the political- and military leadership in Kyiv trying to achieve by it - and: I think that’s good that way. The longer the public - and both Washington (which has meanwhile officially demanded an explanation from Kyiv) and Moscow - are kept in unclear, the better.

What is safe to conclude is that assessments like that this entire operation is about the capture of the metric- and pumping station at the joint of three gas pipelines in the Sudzha area (as made by the Washington Post and widely repeated in Russia) – is simply wrong. In Russia, this is explained with, ‘the USA named the Ukrainian target’. That’s also wrong. Fact is: such a station is not important for a blockade of any pipeline. About every 80-100km on any pipeline – in Ukraine, in Russia and everywhere else – there is another pumping station. Means, the Ukrainians could have interrupted the flow of gas on their own, well inside Ukraine and then without any kind of problems.

Far more important appears the Ukrainian seizure (confirmed by Russian sources) of a long stretch of the railway from Kursk to northern Kharkiv. This is the primary supply line for the VSRF’s concentration of forces in the latter. And this line is now cut off by the ZSU in the Sudzha area.

However, in turn, this is prompting some in the West into explaining this Ukrainian operation with ‘an attempt to drive into the back of the Russian group of forces in northern Kharkiv’. IMHO, that’s also fantasy, because that battlefield is about 100km south-east of the one in western Kharkiv. Too far away.

The third version is that the Ukrainians are trying to grab more Russian terrain as a bargain for some sort of negotiations to be held later this year, or that this operation is a diversion in preparation from some sort of Ukrainian counteroffensive in September this year. Sorry, ‘too little information to compute’: while I can confirm that Washington, Kyiv, and Moscow are ‘negotiating, sort of’, all the time (usually via Turkey) since February 2022, the talks in question are still in a state where I see no agreement at all. Moreover, I simply don’t know about any Ukrainian operations being prepared for September or any other points in time.

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AIR/MISSILE WAR

The ammunition depot of the Lipetsk AB was hit by Ukrainian UAVs. Reportedly: over 700 UMPK-kits (and an unknown number of FAB-250, FAB-500, and FAB-1500 bombs) were destroyed there.

The Russians claim to have hit the HQ of the ZSU’s Kharkiv Zone – positioned outside Malynivka, (south-east of Chuhuiv) – with two Iskander-Ms. According to them, they’ve killed four Ukrainian generals: Mihail Drapatiy (Deputy CoS and CO Kharkiv Zone), Andrey Hnativ, Aleksandar Pivnenko (CO National Guard), and Vladimir Horbatyuk (another Deputy CoS). Ukrainian contacts – including people usually taking reports from the same Russian sources seriously – are all calling this ‘fairy tales’, but I would say: it’s at least extremely likely the VSRF to have tried to hit such a target. That’s simply the way the VSRF is fighting. The question is only if the results of that strike were as claimed by the Russians – or not.

Regarding the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS): sure, the governor of the Sumy Oblast (in Ukraine) reported a total of 56 air strikes by UMPK glide bombs, yesterday. However, Sumy is in Ukraine. ZSU troops inside the Kursk Oblast reported no air strikes at all. Indeed, they say they haven’t seen a single aircraft or helicopter of the VKS the entire day, and not since the afternoon of 7 August.

Me thinks, the explanation is… ‘simple’: mind that UMPK glide-bombs can target only fix, non-mobile targets. They’re de-facto useless against mobile targets, and the ZSU seems to be moving very quickly. Unsurprisingly, the VKS can only strike roads and storage dumps in the rear of the Ukrainian offensive – or risk having yet more aircraft and/or helicopters shot down while trying to attack advancing ZSU units directly. Like they’ve tried on 6 and 7 August - and then suffered losses (reportedly: including two jets and at least two Ka-52s, plus one Mi-28). The Russians confirm the ZSU brought in (PSU’s) Buks and other air defence systems with them, and – so far – they were unable to find and destroy these.

In regards of UAVs, the Russians are complaining that the Ukrainian FPVs are roaming up to 25km deep behind their lines, while their own are all blocked by highly-effective Ukrainian electronic warfare.

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Kursk

I’ll remain focused on this sector today, because that’s where most of ‘news’ are coming from.

The Keystone Cops in Moscow continued reporting about the VSRF’s ‘Group Sever, together with FSB, continuing to destroy armed formations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Sudzhansky and Korenevsky districts of the Kursk Oblast’, and about ‘Su-34 multifunctional supersonic fighter-bombers of the VKS flying air strikes against military equipment’ and whatever. But: the ZSU reports not a single Russian air strike for something like the last 36 hours.

Indeed, even the few sober Russian contacts say: nope, there’s no defence line in this area, no mobile reserves ready to counterattack, very few armoured vehicles and heavy weapons, and – at least to them – it’s ‘obvious’ that the ZSU had excellent intelligence on the disposition of VSRF units: ‘combat-ready VSRF units are in Ocheretyne, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, Krasnohorivka, and Vovchansk’, one said. That said, photos of first Russian reinforcements – in form of T-72s and BMPs – streaming down the P200 highway from Kursk in direction of Skorodnoe have appeared, too (below is one):

The Russian PRBS-industrialists are meanwhile claiming the involvement of up to 15 Ukrainian brigades: according to them, not only the 22^nd and 61^st Mechanised, but also the 80^th and 82^nd Airborne, plus 5^th Assault, 150^th Mechanised, 151^st Mechanised, and the 24^th Airborne (just quoting Russian reports) are pushing into the Russian Federation. Furthermore, they’re reporting Kazacha Loknya, Boghanovka, Knyazhiy 1 and 2, and Martynovka as under Ukrainian control, and Ukrainians on approaches to Belitsa (all of these places are around Sudzha). In northern direction (i.e. from Sudzha towards Korenovo), they are reporting Anastasyevka, Novoivanovka and Snagost, Uspenivka and Gordeevka as under ZSU control. According to them, only the Ukrainian attack into Korenovo was ‘repelled’ and the town is ‘in the process of being mopped up’.  

Ukrainian troops in Ljubimovka

Ukrainian troops in Novoivanovka.

Yesterday afternoon, the Russians were reporting Ukrainians in Mala Lokna/Mala Loknya, Ivnitsa, Anastasievka, Boslshoe Soldatske, and then further north along the P200 highway: indeed, all the way to Shagarovo and Nizhnee Gridino, two villages approximately 19 kilometres short of the Kurchatov NPP. Apparently, it was somewhere in this area that a column of VSRF’s reinforcements was ambushed in Oktobarske.

Finally, they were reporting ‘fierce fighting south of Lgov’ – i.e. for Kromskie Byki… which is about 15km south of Lgov. In ‘grand total’, something along the following map:  

For their part, Ukrainian contacts are reporting the capture of

-          Complete 31^st Battalion, 102^nd Motor-Rifle Brigade VSRF

-          Complete 17^th Battalion, 488^th Motor-Rifle Regiment VSRF

-          Destruction of a third battalion (the one that attempted to counterattack at Zeleny Shlyakh, back on 6 August… sadly, can’t find that place on any maps), and

-          they stress that they have captured so many Russian troops, there are problems with sorting these out and marching them into captivity in Ukraine.

Moreover, they say they have captured ‘huge number of military vehicles’: so much so, some of involved ZSU units greatly gained in their mobility thanks to the use of captured vehicles.

***

Regarding different of your questions asked yesterday:

-          Russian reports about 6x Iskander strike on a ‘fortified Ukrainian UAV-factory in Brovary’: a hit on ‘factory in that area’, back during the night from 5 to 6 August,  was confirmed by unofficial contact. Got no further details.

-          How do I see the role of attack helicopters in the future? Me thinks, they were ‘rendered obsolete’ by the UAVs. At least the UAVs can do exactly the same, though in a fashion much safer for their operators, than that for attack helicopter crews. Attack helicopters might be retained for ‘intervention’ purposes: to be deployed in reaction to a sudden enemy advance in an area where there are not enough UAV-operators, ‘yet’. And of course, because the defence sector is going to try doing its utmost to keep them in production.

-          Regarding UAVs: sorry, don’t know enough about this topic to comment. We do have a new contributor for this blog, busying himself with such issues (too), and plan to start posting his findings in the coming days.