It hurts to write this but I fail to comprehend the Ukrainian grand strategy for this offensive. To what end do they launch small attacks here and there along the southern front, only to not double down on their successes like in Verbove? With Rasputiza starting in a few weeks, they'll be stuck with little to show but a few square kilometers and some dents in the Surovikin line. Absolutely true that the West didn't supply them with enough materiel, yet, I don't know to what end they fight the way they do now.
The purpose is very clear from the results Tom is describing - attrition. They're trying to grind down Russian war capability to next to nothing, to have it easier attacking and defending in the long term. Also it's not like it's for Ukrainians truly have a choice on the matter - the Russians are choosing to fight "no step back" style and expend soldiers and material in order to keep the territory.
It may be true that if their purpose was to entertain people watching the war they are doing a poor job. But their purpose is to win the long-term war, not the short-term battles. And no, the west isn't going to abandon them if they're not entertaining enough. I don't even understand how people who are not Putin can reconcile two so obviously conflicting ideas in their head - "The west thinks Russia is dangerous so the biggest military aliance that ever existed needs to tiptoe around them" and "The west thinks Russia is a weakling so if Ukraine can't beat them in time for supper that means they aren't doing a good job".
Since around 10 June, the point of this offensive is not 'liberate ground', but 'destroy VSRF' (and, meanwhile: 'destroy VDV', too).
Precisely that's also explained in this feature. I.e. this is the aim:
In the Robotyne area, four ZSU manoeuvre- and one artillery brigades took something like two months to destroy/render ineffective:
- 2 Russian reinforced motor-rifle divisions (19th and 42nd) ,
- 1 naval infantry brigade (810th)
- 1 artillery brigade (291st),
- 1 rocket artillery brigade (12th), and to maul
- 2 Spetsnaz brigades (22nd and 45th),
…i.e. an equivalent of three ‘full divisions, plus’.
....the aim is not 'liberate more villages/territory'.
This is so for reasons I'm explaining all the time since March-April last year: regardless the reason (Pudding's PRBS or whatever else), the victory in this war is going to be decided on the battlefield. And - also because NATO is far too dumb while run by opportunist and war profiteers but to understand this - there is only one way for Ukraine to win: destroy the VSRF (and VDV). Destroy it. Not damage it, not disable it, nothing else but destroy it. To the last, if necessary.
Right now, and unless Ukraine gets 1,000+ tanks, 1,000+ guns, plus necessary ammo, plus electronic warfare systems, plus necessary UAVs, plus necessary air defences - i.e. unless any of idiots in charge of NATO comes to his/her senses - there is only one way of effecting this result: attacking and killing dozens of thousands of Russians by (vastly superior) Ukrainian infantry, so to expose them to blows of available artillery, snipers, anti-material rifles, and UAVs (that's something like the 'charts' of most successful/effective Ukrainian weapons systems, right now).
That is a very good question that I have been asking myself for a while now. At what point does the West finally stop this madness of telling Ukrainians where they can shoot with their weapons. The same problem is with Taiwan, if the US continue with this utterly stupid policy of not attacking any territory of a nuclear power, then how exactly do they plan on defending Taiwan? China can literally fire missiles every month for years. They can destroy the entire high tech industry of Taiwan and make big business untenable. You cannot win such a war without attacking your enemy's territory.
There will be a coup or mutiny larger than the Prigozhin one once Ukraine recaptures all land lost after Feb 2022. If Putin survives that one he wont survive the the coup or mutiny that will result in Ukrainian military sieging Crimea. The internal turmoil wont leave the current regime intact at all. The prigozhin mutiny turned Putsch was caused in large part by the realization of the Wagner group that the war couldn't be won. So the upcoming ones will be much much larger. Can future Russian regimes resort to long range cruise missile/shahed strikes? Yes but by that time Ukraine will have gained parity at least in launching long range missiles.
1.) In the same way nobody expected Prigozhin to go against Putin and the MOD, there are other officers in the Russian military as well as high ranking Russian security operatives who are not happy about the war and how its being prosecuted(some may want to end it others may want to prosecute it differently). Putin cannot eliminate them all and some of them could be just as close as Prigozhin was or even closer!!! Those are the ones that are going to challenge Putin. You have to understand a lot of people in the Russian defence industry have been making a lot of money off govt contracts and other such corruption. The only thing for now stopping them from turning against Putin is the whole country is still holding out for a less embarrassing exit from the war i.e hopefully they can negotiate to keep what they've stolen. But once Ukraine recaptures so much of what Russia has stolen, there wont be any unifying message for the security services about the propsects of the war. The internal turmoil will be about who started the silly war or who fought it badly leading to the loss. And Putin cant survive either of those charges. If he states that he wasnt in support of the war he'll instigate a coup. If he blames his officer corps and intel services for a failed war, it will instigate a coup as well.
2.) " Putin has ensured that nobody competent has enough power to challenge him and anyone who might falls through the window...": This is very simplistic and 100% not true. Putin controls his security services through divide and rule for a reason(to stop them from uniting against him). But this builds different loyalty pyramids within especially in the officer corps which if left unchecked can turn into what happened for example with Prigozhin(outside the officer corps) and Surovikin. These things are not as simple as saying "Putin eliminated Prigozhin and some men" so problem solved. The security services and those that were making money off defence spending have their own selfish reasons for why they may want to end the war. The whole process of bringing Wagner into the control of the MOD was because the parastate force Putin helped fund to compete against the MOD, in his divide and rule antics backfired. The same methods he was using to keep the MOD in check backfired!! Without the divide and rule, the different organs or people he was playing against each other can unite. So its a zugzwang at this point. Its inevitable that as Ukraine progresses, the risk of a mutiny and putsch increases against Putin. The officer corps is just waiting for the crucial moment it(impossibility to win the war) becomes obvious to the public. Prigozhin jumped ship first and left very poignant messages about how the war couldnt be won and was started on lies.
3.)"and missile parity is irrelevant," I think you should argue against Gen. Zabrodsky and Zaluzhny who publicly said in a joint communication that its of utmost importance for Ukraine to develop long range missile capabilities for the long term of the war because(as you correctly stated earlier on) Russia will continue using long range missiles against Ukraine even after Ukraine wins the war. But with Ukraine now achieving this capability, Russia will be getting very nasty surprises in return as well. In essence a deterrence.
Is the attrition rate of a) personnel b) equipment, higher than the regenerating capabilities of the VSRF? Do you have any feeling for how fast they are attrited net wise?
IMHO, the attrition rate is 'simple' (and I think I've explained it some 5-6 times by now): the entire VSRF can press some 15,000-20,000 mobiks into service a month. Perhaps they've improved this towards some 25,000 by now.
That's about the maximum they can equip, organise and provide with at least a minimum of training. Per month.
Along Kyiv's reporting, the ZSU is (literally) shooting away at least some 15,000 per month. The figure for August might be even more than 20,000.
So, as long as the ZSU is - literally - shooting away more Russians than the VSRF (and VDV) can press into service, the Russians are losing.
That is precisely my question. Are they shooting away more than the VSRF can press into service? According to these numbers, the answer is either no or barely. The ZSU may have to find a way to increase the attrition or the VSRF will not collapse.
it is not just about number of soldiers, but VSRF is loosing last trained unit and replace them with mobik and also maybe more important is the question about equipment and munition.
The official numbers also seem to be very conservative in my opinion. Russian loses almost have to be higher than reported or there wouldn't have been such degradation as we see.
Russia is losing 60-75% of men they deploy per month for the war as injured or KIA. This isn't sustainable in any way and should answer your question. On top of that it comes along with slow but steady territorial gains by Ukraine(who still have the initiative) as well as improved weapons systems from the west. The writing is clear on the wall, the only thing missing is Western conviction to fully adapt their manufacturing to support a Ukrainian win.
Think you might find this useful. I tend to just listen to Perun just trust he's done his research better than I ever could when saying Russia's production is miles away from depletion but this is a more concrete estimate that sounds realistic:
Thanks for the link. Perun is great, highly informative. I am aware that Russia appears completely incapable of ramping up production, which is excellent. However, I don't know if this is enough for them to sustain their defensive posture or not. Certainly any strategic offensives are out of the question.
Well, based on the Forbes article it's clear that even in February they essnentially had:
1600 tank losses per year (translating to 150 per month which is probably less than reality)
250 fresh tanks production per year (which explains those T90s seen on the frontlines lately)
~600 refurbished from storage which are lower in quality
- potential faster refurbishment at the cost of even lower quality, which is likely to already be happening
- unknown number of potential T72 imports from North Korea to fill the gap, which coincidetally Putin is meeting in a few days
All of this isn't proving Russia will run out of tanks in a month or something, but it does confirm Perun's general sentiment - that their mid-to-long-term trend for quantity and quality is plunging into an abyss. And what's left out of these figures is the financial cost - they must be paying Iran, China and NK a fortune for all the stuff they're bying in order to delay the plunge. And even if they can maintain a defensive posture for a year more on these frontlines, the attrition will only get worse due to the quality degradation.
Thanks, this is great info. Especially in the South, the recent VSRF tank losses have been relatively low, while the artillery high. Also, for many months now, the VSRF seem to primarily use tanks as infantry support vehicles and indirect fire. Could it be the case that we should be looking at production of other types of equipment, rather than tanks? E.g. it may be more significant how many howitzer barrels they can produce.
The trajectory is clear and obvious. Before the war, Russia's economy was about the size of Italy's. Now, after the sanctions and with global trade cut dramatically, facing oil revenues that are about half of what they were, Russia is sliding into the abyss.
Another way to look at this is that the combined arms production of the US and most Western European countries cannot keep up with Ukraine's (more limited) artillery ammunition requirements -- how does anyone expect that Russia will do so?
The bottom line is that Russia is bleeding out. The only off-setting "strength" it has is the cultural belief that Russia is somehow invincible and that it wins wars by "out-suffering" the enemy. In this logic, the longer and deeper the suffering, the greater the ultimate victory will be for Russia. That this belief is based on flawed Stalinist propaganda about how Russia "won" the so-called "Great Patriotic War", apparently nearly all on its own if Russian media is to be believed, is immaterial -- the myth is real, at least to Russians.
Yeah I've found it quite funny how on one side Putin is bragging about their "fortitude" while on the other Russians seem obsessed with what kind of Cola they have in the stores.
But just to be clear, Russian GDP and economic position isn't THAT bad. Those Korean tanks will be paid by a slight decrease in living standards for ordinary Russians, as domestic production and imports are redirected from civilian to military goods. This is unpleasant but hardly a collapse. Russians still aren't going to like it.
Very true, there is no special fortitude. However, Russians are born slaves, they will do as their empire commands. As far as Russian GDP is concerned, it depends on what you mean by is or isn't bad :) the state and, more importantly, the trajectory of their economy is catastrophic but not in the sense that they will collapse any time soon. There is still a lot of private savings among their population that they can steal to sustain the war for longer. However, there will be nothing left after the war, back to the stone age, just with mandarin on every product.
Just before the invasion when American officials pointed out that the war with Ukraine can be hard Shoigu answered: "We are able to suffer a lot". But really does anybody believe in suffering of Shoigu personally or of his family?
Russia hopes that the West will not deliver enough munitions and equipment. So far that analysis has proven right. Further they probably hope that the West will not be united in its support, and not willing to stay the course. Probably they are hoping for Donald Trump as president again. Which means that If they hang in there til 2025 a solution might be found. So they are not hoping for production, but human stupidity to help them. Which is a much better hope.
Sarcastosaurus is back... with a vengeance. Many thanks Tom for the extended update; slowly, pieces start to engage and some kind of picture is showing.
It’s me, or the rant about Ukrainian offensive pace is decreasing? Some “journalists” are going into his senses, maybe (or they just take a blow in the head XD )
Rasputiza in Zaporizhzhia region comes in November only, while September is the dryest month of the year there and October is usually dry too. It's likely 7 to 8 weeks before the mud comes there.
I try to enable you to comprehend the situation and the strategy.
Current Ukrainian political goal is to kick the Russians out of their country. The US wants them not to lose and the Europeans are the Europeans - depending on how much this is a problem for you, you do something - otherwise not.
Hence, Ukrainians got equipped by their Western army delivery nations to run a counter offensive in a war of movement style like it is written in their doctrine. However, they delivered very few tanks, artillery systems and so forth, because the garages in Europe are empty and the US doesn't want to go to their tank graveyards and restore them like the Russians do. Furthermore they don't add any of the vital part to fight such a war - which is air superiority. That enabled the Germans, the Israelis and the US in Iraq to run theirs. Even the Soviets had those except during the Stalingrad encirclement, but there the opposing Romanian forces had no anti tank weapon to stop them.
Anyway, Ukrainians try and get stopped - why? Cause the way to stop a war of movement is to disable the movement. Soviets were very successfull during German operation citadel to do exactly that and destroy the most modern tank army at the time (yes, the infamous Tiger-II). Furthermore the West is great with announcing, but bad with delivery. So the Russians knew what was coming since September/October last year and started preparing. They may be highly corrupt, incompetent and with an outdated style of leadership, but they had enough mines from the Soviet Union and enough time to put those into the earth + the dragon teeth, digging tons of trenches, booby trap them and so forth.
As Ukrainian command is thankfully not that stupid, they figured out rather rapidly (even it was painfull to watch back then) that this will not work. So they ignored the Western advice of trying to drive around the minefields or cross them with mechanised mine clearing equipment. Why? Cause you should never fight a war according to the doctrine of the last war.
So, as a Ukrainian military strategist, you still have the political will of your population to kick the Russians out. Committing suicide by driving into these minefields is rather not an option even Western advisors and "neutral" observers are calling for that, as Ukraine needs a quick victory like in WWII. Do the logical thing and ask yourself: What did work in this war so far?
- light infantry attacks in small groups, because our soldiers are motivated, the enemy is not (especially in the beginning of the war)
- artillery fire to stop Russian tanks and infantry, counter battery fire to destroy enemy artillery (since the beginning of the war, the Ukrainians are very good at that (except when they pulled the artillery in to protect Severodonetsk))
- recon with small drones and also attack with small drones as those are cheap, available an effective
- take HIMARS and other long range weapons to put pressure on logistics
- push toward Russian logistic hubs (Isum) or routes (bridges over the Dnipro in Kherson) so that they have no choice except to retreaut
That is your strategy. Use the tools were you are superior to the enemy to achieve the last point in the list.
- Push at Robotyne/Verbove: That is the railway line to Tokmak or east of it this point where the four railway lines come together
- Push near Staromaiorske: There the railway line is the most north west of Volnovakha and you can hit them with artillery over the river
The Russian strategy on the other hand is to keep the Ukrainians in the minefields, cause you can't ignore a mine as it will otherwise cause casualties, as this is the most favourable option for them to have a fight. That's why you are waiting now for three month for the breakthrough, which everybody in the western media reported is going to happen tomorrow for three month now because they need you to keep watching an klicking.
However, the Russians may be all the not nice things as described above, but they are still there and they are now far more than last year on a much narrower front. That takes time to overcome.
Coming to an end. Even if Razputiza is coming and the Ukrainians didn’t push through – they at least have an army. Their advantage is still their motivated light infantry with drone + artillery support. So they can continue mauling the Russian forces and do the mechanised breakthrough when it freezes.
Most important for Ukrainians is, that they will save as many lives of their soldiers as possible, cause that is important in a country where the lives of the citizens matters. And sorry to say, but that goal is not on the agenda of either NATO, the western media or anybody else - except Ukraine.
Well its fairly obvious that they are trying to break through the defence line towards Tokmak, which is why the Russians are sending in more and more units. Resuming the attack on Novodonetske and Novomaiorske might be one of the only ways to redirect russ reinforcements away from the Tokmak axis.
It is depressing how difficult this war is proving though not surprising given Russian barbarism towards its own people and to Ukraine. It reminds me of the classic movie climax when the criminal is caught and then grabs and innocent person (usually some beautiful girl) and holds a gun to her head. "If I die, she dies! YAHAHA!!". Russia has no meaningful objective other than destruction. I hope Putin and all his supporters rot in hell.
Bridges from the Crimea to the mainland may be attacked by Storm Shadows. Do you know why we do not see any evidence of some Storm Shadows action in the last days?
I still do not understand why is everybody reporting 'no Storm Shadows'. OK, haven't checked 'really in-depth', the last week or so, but: AFAIK, Su-24s and Storm Shadows are in action, at least every 2-3 days.
I don’t think that bridges are a good target for this precious weapon. The Russian quickly build pontoon budges next to the damaged one and ZSU will need to keep them under constant fire to b effective, which wouldn’t have been a problem had they received thousands of them. Which again brings to the main problem - while Russia in engaged in total war of annihilation expanding arsenal prepared to fight the whole West (NATO+Sweden, Japan, etc), the aid Ukraine receives from the West is as if they fighting Saddam and his army, and even less.
But Russia cannot fight the whole West, Putin knows it and is not making any preparation to do it. VSFR has withdrawn many units from borders with NATO, from islands nears Japan. Russia is just preparing to fight with maximum 1% of NATO countries GDP - the help to Ukraine has not even reached that 1%! If all NATO countries would donate just 2% of their GDP, then AFU could fly F-35s today.
All what Putin counts for is our comfortableness - softness in hit eyes.
Yes, the thing that needs most urgently to be destroyed in this war is the complacency and indifference of us in the "west" - our governments, and we the people
I have checked the Russian sources and the last Storm Shadow strike reported by them is from 14th August. I the same situation is on Ukrainian side. Before, these strikes were actually heavily publicised by both sides, that´s why so many people are asking.
Of course this doesn´t mean these strikes do not happen, but for nearly a month, there is zero oficial or photographical evidence for it, which is worth of noting.
Sep 8, 2023·edited Sep 8, 2023Liked by Sarcastosaurus
The Russians say it was a HARM, not a Storm Shadow.
(Wich sounds a bit like a bullshit, because there was obviously a subsonic or transonic inbound - the passers-by hear it before the explosion - while HARM is a supersonic even on it's terminal phase. Actually IDK what it was, yet the official Ukrainian version of S-300/400 missile looks completely sound, with a clarification, that it wasn't actually an intentional terror strike, but just an infirmity of Russian GBAD, that tried again and again failed to shoot down a Ukrainian jet that made it's strike run near the town at the time. The missile, launched from the Belgorod area where S-300/400 divisions are deployed, just failed to find the jet, flew further, lost it's velocity and fell at the town.)
Impact sites look nearly identical (without very close investigation) for the majority of missiles with a fragmentational warhead. S-300/400 missiles have fragmentational warheads too.
I have seen a thumbnail for a YouTube video claiming that the Russians are planning a general mobilisation in September and might recruit 1,2 Million new troops. There is good reason to doubt it. So far Russia has rather given the impression that they'd prefer to freeze the conflict for the time being and rebuild their forces for another effort in a few years. But if they'd do a general mobilisation now, wouldn't that mean that the Ukraine effort to run down the Russian army was a wasted effort?
it is not only about soldier but also about equipment. Without heave guns they will be not able to fight effective. There will be less people to produce new weapons and their logistic will have problem to send them food not to speak about munition. We are not in ww2 time there you can attack just with small arms and to receive some success.
Tom has several comments that essentially Russia's capacity is around 20k per month - that is the rate of converting "on paper" mobilized in to actual mobics on the frontline. Russia's upcoming mobilization isn't about increasing this rate it's about maintaining it. They should be running out of "on paper" mobilized around that time, so they need to refresh the "stock". But whether it's 200k or 2m doesn't matter - it's like pre-paying a montly subscription for 20k troops per month.
The previous (autumn 2022) mobilization allowed them to get enough recruits to both fill the front lines with a mass of barely trained (a week or so) soldiers and provide 3 month of training for a half of the newly mobilized personnel while the other half was being killed.
I've also read that but I'm inclined to believe it was more complicated than that:
1) I doubt they had the logistics to move half of the mobilized (150k) in 1-2 weeks, training or not
2) I doubt they had enough trainers to train the other half (150k) in 3 months time
Thus I'm inclined to believe a more balanced version of this story - that in the first 1-2 months they rushed as many untrained troops as their logistics could handle, while in the meatime setting up training for the ~20k per month figure mentioned by Tom
I've been waiting for a while for the queue to finally "collapse" around Robotyne, but every time it seems like the time is right, they'll cram some units in again, but how long can this last? And if they don't, how far are Ukrainian forces capable of advancing? Apparently, progress in this direction is really paid in blood (where not).
So do you have any expectations in this direction? (I know! mainly, no expectations! because they are the closest shortcut to disappointment). But I'll just ask anyway - do you expect any major movement in this area anytime soon?
Damn, even with such heavy loses RF seem to be able to send even more reinforcements. There was information that RF is creating new divisions with 203 mm arthilery. Do you think that could fix their counter battery problem and turn the tables of the arthilery war ?
1). Are the Cubans being recruited by Russia making an appreciable battlefield difference? Given the medical training of Cuban medical professionals, I would assume that Russia is trying to recruit folk for battlefield medic deployment and not cannon fodder.
2). Given the percentage of people in the occupied oblasts that were supporting Russia in 2014, is there any indication as to whether the percentage of Russian supporters have changed since the invasion/counterattack? I'm just thinking that if Zelenskyy is able to repatriate all the oblasts/Crimea, that's great but if 80% of the people there are supporting Russia, is there any point to trying to retake those oblasts, I mean other than political statements to get support from other countries?
As a postscript, I think this may be a good opportunity for Finland to retake Karelia, but I also have opinions about Poland, Lithuania, and Kaliningrad...
There are many people who support Ukraine (otherwise what were all those torture chambers for?) on the occupied land. That somewhat differs for Crimea, however, 15% or so of its population are Tatars who are oppressed now (which is the reason for them to conduct guerilla operations there). Not to say of Jehovah Witnesses which are imprisoned in Russia.
Another point is Putin's dislike for the independent Ukraine, which was probably his main reason to invade it both in 2014 and in 2022. If his army is allowed to recover now, he will produce more artillery, MLRS, missiles and drones and will attack again in 5-7 years. Ukraine is not able to match the Russian military industry as its GDP is 10 or 15 times lower than that of Russia. Delaying the war now, when Ukraine is favored by the Russians' running headlong unprepared, is the surest recipe for a total defeat in the nearest future.
Yup, I considered what you were saying (e.g., Russia using the Donbas, etc. as a stepping off point for further incursions after replenishing weapons platforms and such). That said, I return to my original question which is how much will Zelenskyy have to commit in resources, troops, money, weapons, etc. in order to keep an insurgent force, with the obvious connivance of Papa Vladimir Vladimirich, in check? And is it worth it in terms of defending attacks from the north, northeast, and south?
I also realize that as Ukraine was able to resist the initial invasion and began to push back into the occupied oblasts, many (or at least some number) of these types of people have already fled to Mother Russia. So, maybe the insurgency wouldn't be as much of an issue as it was post-2014/pre-2022?
It just seems to me that a lot of resources will be required to address the constant threat of rebellion, resources that could be use to greater effect elsewhere on the battlefield.
1) Happened just after Kyiv removed Yanukovych who the Eastern Ukraine voted for. They were afraid of persecutions, probably listening to the same Russian propaganda ("Western Ukrainians are Nazi").
2) Was prepared and led by Girkin, a Russian FSB officer. Probably funded and supplied with weapons from Russia. That was possible because the border was weakly guarded, and the armed forces did not know which side to support, thus they did nothing.
3) Probably backed by the organized crime in those two regions (they say that Kharkiv criminals beat and sent away the propagandists, thus Kharkiv remained allied to Kyiv).
None of that points is valid now, and ordinary citizens:
a) Have seen to much war to want any more of that.
b) Many men were mobilized and did not return, to the extent that the local call their regions "Women People Republic". There is hardly anyone to rebel.
c) They have lived ruled by gangsters for 8 years, and now got Putin's dictatorship. The youth may want for more freedom, social lifts and the ability to travel abroad.
Thus I believe it will be enough to make sure the border with Russia is guarded. 80% of the population just live their lives. If the government is not extremely stupid (and Zelensky heavily relied on unifying people of Eastern and Western Ukraine in his electoral campaign, which brought him 70% of voices), it will not do anything to make those people very angry.
Crimea is another case, majority of population there are ethnic Russians. Making Russian and Tatar official regional languages is the way to go, IMO.
The trouble with Donbas is not about "stepping point", it is about the Russian morale and the legal status. If Russia is defeated, they will have to think twice before re-starting the war. If they win something, they will know that they are stronger, and will come back for the next bite. Exactly as it happened after they captured Crimea. And if Donbas is contested, they will always be able to claim more Ukrainian territory for their - as they have already written down to the Russian constitution that Kherson and Zaporizhzhia belong to Russia. The only way out now is for them to roll back the constitutional changes, but making so is a legal crime, namely "attack on integrity of Russian Federation". Thus, if there are contested lands, the war cannot stop.
Usually, cognitive dissonance is binary -- this and that, but both can't be true. Rarely, it is trinary -- this, that, or the other thing, but if any one of those things is true, then one or both of the other two cannot be true. However. Russia has broken new ground -- we're witnessing what may be the world's first example of four-way, quadruple cognitive dissonance -- a whole new level of insanity.
1. RUSSIA IS GREAT AND ALL-POWERFUL. The West must respect Russia as a great and powerful nation and must take measured steps or risk widening this war in ways that NATO cannot handle and does not wish to face at the hands of the Great Russian Army.
2. RUSSIA IS BEING BEATEN BACK BECAUSE IT IS FIGHTING NATO. The Russian army is having difficulty in Ukraine because they're actually fighting NATO in this war, not just Ukraine.
3. THE WEST IS LOSING PATIENCE WITH UKRAINE BECAUSE IT CANNOT DEFEAT RUSSIA ON ITS OWN. The West has lost faith in Ukraine and might cut off arms shipments -- why? Because Ukraine should be able to defeat the vastly weakened Russian army before tea time; because it cannot, this proves that Ukraine is weak, incompetent, and not deserving of Western support.
4. RUSSIA HAS YET TO COMMIT ITS FULL RESOURCES TO THIS WAR. Russia is holding back and has yet to use its best equipment and forces in this war -- a choice it makes for humanitarian reasons to avoid causing unnecessary Ukrainian civilian casualties.
Four-way cognitive dissonance! This is a historic breakthrough!!
Actually, this might be five-way -- Russian forces target Ukrainian civilians because the Ukrainians deserve it, they need to be beaten down and brought into line by the iron fist of Moscow....
Thanks for the update. One bit of info, I did not understand: you write the Ukrainian resistance caused trouble and as a result there are less checkpoints in occupied Ukraine. So checkpoints were attacked and blown away? That would then result in more freedom of movement for the resistance, resulting in more trouble for the k.cops right? So then I would expect the k.cops to react by creating more checkpoints, but they did not? Did they have no time/chance to do that yet? Or have they lost control of the inland? Or do I look at it wrongly?
If you have 18 small checkpoints getting regularly raided and troops killed , what do you do? You concentrate the troops on fewer but bigger checkpoints able to defend against such raids to minimize losses. Yes, this gives the resistance more freedom of movement, but the alternative would be still maintaining 18 checkpoints and regularly losing troops. I think you are looking a little bit wrong at it, by assuming that Russia can freely choose their options. Instead they are pressed by Ukrainian resistance into a poorer choice.
More checkpoint also means more forces, you can have 18 small with 10 people, together 180 which will be often attacked with huge loses or 3 with 30 , also 90 togehter which are more secure and you can send 90 soldier to front. Russia has not enough troops to have 18 with 30 or maybe also 18 with 10 because they need more soldiers on frontline.
Sep 8, 2023·edited Sep 8, 2023Liked by Sarcastosaurus
So, the offensive pessimists were right that this is a terminal battle of attrition, but they were wrong because the smaller country is winning. OK, in this one instance, with these respective combatants, I can almost credit it. When does the supply of "mobiks" from places like Dagestan run out and Putin has to go sending most of his pressgangs ever closer to the nerve centers of Moscow and Petersburg? It seems to me that's the only scenario in which Ukraine can destroy Russia's will to fight.
Based on Tom’s earlier analysis (a few days ago) the short answer would be no. But check out his postings this month and you will find his analysis on the effects of F16. (Not much, but a fighter jet is a fighter jet, Even 40 years old.)
I have seen his posts where he compare soviet era fighter jets with F-16 based on year of manufacturing. And i find it stupid, because those F-16 MLU Ukraine will get from Netherlands and Denmark were modernized in 2000s. They have modern radars and can use fire-and-forget AIM-120 missiles. Ukraine's main air-to-air missiles for Su-27 and Mig-29 is R-27 and it require target designation from the aircraft. The pilot must guide the missile all the way to the target and cannot immediately begin an evasive maneuver after launch. This makes him vulnerable and his work very dangerous, since russians have R-37 and R-77 missiles with an active homing head - fire-and-forget. That is the main advantage of 40 years old modernized F-16 under soviet era planes of the same age, which make the difference between them almost generational.
Tom was right that the most important thing Ukraine needs is artillery and AD though. The F16s will help as you've noted with more modern avionics, software and smarter longer range missiles. But core things like ground based artillery and ground based air defence, corrupt Western leaders have not yet provided in the needed quantities. These should be the focus until the demand is met. A single ATACMS missile can take out some nodes of an S-300/400 battery while an Su-24 or F16 is being armed to take out the AD site. Why have these been delayed? We have more ATACMS(publicly) Than Russia has medium to long range AD TELS and radars in Ukraine. So we need to send as much ground based artillery and AD systems and reorient our manufacturing to supply these demands then also look to provide F16s.
The thing is Su-35s and MiG-31 have modern AESA radars and active radar homing missiles, so "ceterus paribus", the F-16 MLU just exacerbates the stalemate with neither side gaining air superiority. F-16 MLU is not the big offset you'd get with say F-35 or F-22. (Gripen with Meteor would also outclass Su-35, not because it's stealth, but just because that system/combo is a more evolved 5th gen.)
"F-16 MLU just exacerbates the stalemate with neither side gaining air superiority." That's exactly what Ukraine need. We need to deprive the russians of their advantage in the air. And solve the problem of UMPC strykes. With Su-34, which are their carriers, the F-16 will definitely deal.
I dont know enough of the capabilities of the various planes to have a strong opinion. Ithink it is good that they are delivered, because a nyighter is better than no fighter. I also would prefer the Western countries to give more artillery, grenades etc. that is of course not mutually exclusive. Unfortunately it seems like everybody is looking for a gamechanger, a wunderwaffe, to beat Russia. That will not happen, but every bit help I suppose.
It hurts to write this but I fail to comprehend the Ukrainian grand strategy for this offensive. To what end do they launch small attacks here and there along the southern front, only to not double down on their successes like in Verbove? With Rasputiza starting in a few weeks, they'll be stuck with little to show but a few square kilometers and some dents in the Surovikin line. Absolutely true that the West didn't supply them with enough materiel, yet, I don't know to what end they fight the way they do now.
...they score and bleed Russians...they maintain constant media pressure necessary in the (continuous) campaign to obtain funds from NATO
The purpose is very clear from the results Tom is describing - attrition. They're trying to grind down Russian war capability to next to nothing, to have it easier attacking and defending in the long term. Also it's not like it's for Ukrainians truly have a choice on the matter - the Russians are choosing to fight "no step back" style and expend soldiers and material in order to keep the territory.
It may be true that if their purpose was to entertain people watching the war they are doing a poor job. But their purpose is to win the long-term war, not the short-term battles. And no, the west isn't going to abandon them if they're not entertaining enough. I don't even understand how people who are not Putin can reconcile two so obviously conflicting ideas in their head - "The west thinks Russia is dangerous so the biggest military aliance that ever existed needs to tiptoe around them" and "The west thinks Russia is a weakling so if Ukraine can't beat them in time for supper that means they aren't doing a good job".
Since around 10 June, the point of this offensive is not 'liberate ground', but 'destroy VSRF' (and, meanwhile: 'destroy VDV', too).
Precisely that's also explained in this feature. I.e. this is the aim:
In the Robotyne area, four ZSU manoeuvre- and one artillery brigades took something like two months to destroy/render ineffective:
- 2 Russian reinforced motor-rifle divisions (19th and 42nd) ,
- 1 naval infantry brigade (810th)
- 1 artillery brigade (291st),
- 1 rocket artillery brigade (12th), and to maul
- 2 Spetsnaz brigades (22nd and 45th),
…i.e. an equivalent of three ‘full divisions, plus’.
....the aim is not 'liberate more villages/territory'.
This is so for reasons I'm explaining all the time since March-April last year: regardless the reason (Pudding's PRBS or whatever else), the victory in this war is going to be decided on the battlefield. And - also because NATO is far too dumb while run by opportunist and war profiteers but to understand this - there is only one way for Ukraine to win: destroy the VSRF (and VDV). Destroy it. Not damage it, not disable it, nothing else but destroy it. To the last, if necessary.
Right now, and unless Ukraine gets 1,000+ tanks, 1,000+ guns, plus necessary ammo, plus electronic warfare systems, plus necessary UAVs, plus necessary air defences - i.e. unless any of idiots in charge of NATO comes to his/her senses - there is only one way of effecting this result: attacking and killing dozens of thousands of Russians by (vastly superior) Ukrainian infantry, so to expose them to blows of available artillery, snipers, anti-material rifles, and UAVs (that's something like the 'charts' of most successful/effective Ukrainian weapons systems, right now).
Ukrainian drones started to hit back, with Moscow in range. And he will have trouble selling the brave retreat to pre-2014 borders to Russians.
That is a very good question that I have been asking myself for a while now. At what point does the West finally stop this madness of telling Ukrainians where they can shoot with their weapons. The same problem is with Taiwan, if the US continue with this utterly stupid policy of not attacking any territory of a nuclear power, then how exactly do they plan on defending Taiwan? China can literally fire missiles every month for years. They can destroy the entire high tech industry of Taiwan and make big business untenable. You cannot win such a war without attacking your enemy's territory.
There will be a coup or mutiny larger than the Prigozhin one once Ukraine recaptures all land lost after Feb 2022. If Putin survives that one he wont survive the the coup or mutiny that will result in Ukrainian military sieging Crimea. The internal turmoil wont leave the current regime intact at all. The prigozhin mutiny turned Putsch was caused in large part by the realization of the Wagner group that the war couldn't be won. So the upcoming ones will be much much larger. Can future Russian regimes resort to long range cruise missile/shahed strikes? Yes but by that time Ukraine will have gained parity at least in launching long range missiles.
Prigozhin had a double. One of them should be alive now and may appear in the public soon.
1.) In the same way nobody expected Prigozhin to go against Putin and the MOD, there are other officers in the Russian military as well as high ranking Russian security operatives who are not happy about the war and how its being prosecuted(some may want to end it others may want to prosecute it differently). Putin cannot eliminate them all and some of them could be just as close as Prigozhin was or even closer!!! Those are the ones that are going to challenge Putin. You have to understand a lot of people in the Russian defence industry have been making a lot of money off govt contracts and other such corruption. The only thing for now stopping them from turning against Putin is the whole country is still holding out for a less embarrassing exit from the war i.e hopefully they can negotiate to keep what they've stolen. But once Ukraine recaptures so much of what Russia has stolen, there wont be any unifying message for the security services about the propsects of the war. The internal turmoil will be about who started the silly war or who fought it badly leading to the loss. And Putin cant survive either of those charges. If he states that he wasnt in support of the war he'll instigate a coup. If he blames his officer corps and intel services for a failed war, it will instigate a coup as well.
2.) " Putin has ensured that nobody competent has enough power to challenge him and anyone who might falls through the window...": This is very simplistic and 100% not true. Putin controls his security services through divide and rule for a reason(to stop them from uniting against him). But this builds different loyalty pyramids within especially in the officer corps which if left unchecked can turn into what happened for example with Prigozhin(outside the officer corps) and Surovikin. These things are not as simple as saying "Putin eliminated Prigozhin and some men" so problem solved. The security services and those that were making money off defence spending have their own selfish reasons for why they may want to end the war. The whole process of bringing Wagner into the control of the MOD was because the parastate force Putin helped fund to compete against the MOD, in his divide and rule antics backfired. The same methods he was using to keep the MOD in check backfired!! Without the divide and rule, the different organs or people he was playing against each other can unite. So its a zugzwang at this point. Its inevitable that as Ukraine progresses, the risk of a mutiny and putsch increases against Putin. The officer corps is just waiting for the crucial moment it(impossibility to win the war) becomes obvious to the public. Prigozhin jumped ship first and left very poignant messages about how the war couldnt be won and was started on lies.
3.)"and missile parity is irrelevant," I think you should argue against Gen. Zabrodsky and Zaluzhny who publicly said in a joint communication that its of utmost importance for Ukraine to develop long range missile capabilities for the long term of the war because(as you correctly stated earlier on) Russia will continue using long range missiles against Ukraine even after Ukraine wins the war. But with Ukraine now achieving this capability, Russia will be getting very nasty surprises in return as well. In essence a deterrence.
There may come black swans if the war lasts long enough
Is the attrition rate of a) personnel b) equipment, higher than the regenerating capabilities of the VSRF? Do you have any feeling for how fast they are attrited net wise?
IMHO, the attrition rate is 'simple' (and I think I've explained it some 5-6 times by now): the entire VSRF can press some 15,000-20,000 mobiks into service a month. Perhaps they've improved this towards some 25,000 by now.
That's about the maximum they can equip, organise and provide with at least a minimum of training. Per month.
Along Kyiv's reporting, the ZSU is (literally) shooting away at least some 15,000 per month. The figure for August might be even more than 20,000.
So, as long as the ZSU is - literally - shooting away more Russians than the VSRF (and VDV) can press into service, the Russians are losing.
That is precisely my question. Are they shooting away more than the VSRF can press into service? According to these numbers, the answer is either no or barely. The ZSU may have to find a way to increase the attrition or the VSRF will not collapse.
it is not just about number of soldiers, but VSRF is loosing last trained unit and replace them with mobik and also maybe more important is the question about equipment and munition.
The official numbers also seem to be very conservative in my opinion. Russian loses almost have to be higher than reported or there wouldn't have been such degradation as we see.
Russia is losing 60-75% of men they deploy per month for the war as injured or KIA. This isn't sustainable in any way and should answer your question. On top of that it comes along with slow but steady territorial gains by Ukraine(who still have the initiative) as well as improved weapons systems from the west. The writing is clear on the wall, the only thing missing is Western conviction to fully adapt their manufacturing to support a Ukrainian win.
Think you might find this useful. I tend to just listen to Perun just trust he's done his research better than I ever could when saying Russia's production is miles away from depletion but this is a more concrete estimate that sounds realistic:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/02/17/the-russian-army-could-run-out-of-tanks-in-a-few-years-what-happens-then/
Of course tanks are just one aspect of this, but other things like arty, planes, rockets, infantry equipment, ect. are unlikely to differ much.
Thanks for the link. Perun is great, highly informative. I am aware that Russia appears completely incapable of ramping up production, which is excellent. However, I don't know if this is enough for them to sustain their defensive posture or not. Certainly any strategic offensives are out of the question.
Well, based on the Forbes article it's clear that even in February they essnentially had:
1600 tank losses per year (translating to 150 per month which is probably less than reality)
250 fresh tanks production per year (which explains those T90s seen on the frontlines lately)
~600 refurbished from storage which are lower in quality
- potential faster refurbishment at the cost of even lower quality, which is likely to already be happening
- unknown number of potential T72 imports from North Korea to fill the gap, which coincidetally Putin is meeting in a few days
All of this isn't proving Russia will run out of tanks in a month or something, but it does confirm Perun's general sentiment - that their mid-to-long-term trend for quantity and quality is plunging into an abyss. And what's left out of these figures is the financial cost - they must be paying Iran, China and NK a fortune for all the stuff they're bying in order to delay the plunge. And even if they can maintain a defensive posture for a year more on these frontlines, the attrition will only get worse due to the quality degradation.
Thanks, this is great info. Especially in the South, the recent VSRF tank losses have been relatively low, while the artillery high. Also, for many months now, the VSRF seem to primarily use tanks as infantry support vehicles and indirect fire. Could it be the case that we should be looking at production of other types of equipment, rather than tanks? E.g. it may be more significant how many howitzer barrels they can produce.
The trajectory is clear and obvious. Before the war, Russia's economy was about the size of Italy's. Now, after the sanctions and with global trade cut dramatically, facing oil revenues that are about half of what they were, Russia is sliding into the abyss.
Another way to look at this is that the combined arms production of the US and most Western European countries cannot keep up with Ukraine's (more limited) artillery ammunition requirements -- how does anyone expect that Russia will do so?
The bottom line is that Russia is bleeding out. The only off-setting "strength" it has is the cultural belief that Russia is somehow invincible and that it wins wars by "out-suffering" the enemy. In this logic, the longer and deeper the suffering, the greater the ultimate victory will be for Russia. That this belief is based on flawed Stalinist propaganda about how Russia "won" the so-called "Great Patriotic War", apparently nearly all on its own if Russian media is to be believed, is immaterial -- the myth is real, at least to Russians.
Yeah I've found it quite funny how on one side Putin is bragging about their "fortitude" while on the other Russians seem obsessed with what kind of Cola they have in the stores.
But just to be clear, Russian GDP and economic position isn't THAT bad. Those Korean tanks will be paid by a slight decrease in living standards for ordinary Russians, as domestic production and imports are redirected from civilian to military goods. This is unpleasant but hardly a collapse. Russians still aren't going to like it.
Putler does not care a bit about Russian population.
Very true, there is no special fortitude. However, Russians are born slaves, they will do as their empire commands. As far as Russian GDP is concerned, it depends on what you mean by is or isn't bad :) the state and, more importantly, the trajectory of their economy is catastrophic but not in the sense that they will collapse any time soon. There is still a lot of private savings among their population that they can steal to sustain the war for longer. However, there will be nothing left after the war, back to the stone age, just with mandarin on every product.
Just before the invasion when American officials pointed out that the war with Ukraine can be hard Shoigu answered: "We are able to suffer a lot". But really does anybody believe in suffering of Shoigu personally or of his family?
Russia hopes that the West will not deliver enough munitions and equipment. So far that analysis has proven right. Further they probably hope that the West will not be united in its support, and not willing to stay the course. Probably they are hoping for Donald Trump as president again. Which means that If they hang in there til 2025 a solution might be found. So they are not hoping for production, but human stupidity to help them. Which is a much better hope.
Sarcastosaurus is back... with a vengeance. Many thanks Tom for the extended update; slowly, pieces start to engage and some kind of picture is showing.
It’s me, or the rant about Ukrainian offensive pace is decreasing? Some “journalists” are going into his senses, maybe (or they just take a blow in the head XD )
We’ll see what movements may start next week.
"With Rasputiza starting in a few weeks"
Rasputiza in Zaporizhzhia region comes in November only, while September is the dryest month of the year there and October is usually dry too. It's likely 7 to 8 weeks before the mud comes there.
barely enough time to reach Tokmak, I am afraid (and sea of Azov is probably unreachable already)
Tokmak may be bypassed on eastern side, and if the year is dry, there'll be no mud in autumn.
I try to enable you to comprehend the situation and the strategy.
Current Ukrainian political goal is to kick the Russians out of their country. The US wants them not to lose and the Europeans are the Europeans - depending on how much this is a problem for you, you do something - otherwise not.
Hence, Ukrainians got equipped by their Western army delivery nations to run a counter offensive in a war of movement style like it is written in their doctrine. However, they delivered very few tanks, artillery systems and so forth, because the garages in Europe are empty and the US doesn't want to go to their tank graveyards and restore them like the Russians do. Furthermore they don't add any of the vital part to fight such a war - which is air superiority. That enabled the Germans, the Israelis and the US in Iraq to run theirs. Even the Soviets had those except during the Stalingrad encirclement, but there the opposing Romanian forces had no anti tank weapon to stop them.
Anyway, Ukrainians try and get stopped - why? Cause the way to stop a war of movement is to disable the movement. Soviets were very successfull during German operation citadel to do exactly that and destroy the most modern tank army at the time (yes, the infamous Tiger-II). Furthermore the West is great with announcing, but bad with delivery. So the Russians knew what was coming since September/October last year and started preparing. They may be highly corrupt, incompetent and with an outdated style of leadership, but they had enough mines from the Soviet Union and enough time to put those into the earth + the dragon teeth, digging tons of trenches, booby trap them and so forth.
As Ukrainian command is thankfully not that stupid, they figured out rather rapidly (even it was painfull to watch back then) that this will not work. So they ignored the Western advice of trying to drive around the minefields or cross them with mechanised mine clearing equipment. Why? Cause you should never fight a war according to the doctrine of the last war.
So, as a Ukrainian military strategist, you still have the political will of your population to kick the Russians out. Committing suicide by driving into these minefields is rather not an option even Western advisors and "neutral" observers are calling for that, as Ukraine needs a quick victory like in WWII. Do the logical thing and ask yourself: What did work in this war so far?
- light infantry attacks in small groups, because our soldiers are motivated, the enemy is not (especially in the beginning of the war)
- artillery fire to stop Russian tanks and infantry, counter battery fire to destroy enemy artillery (since the beginning of the war, the Ukrainians are very good at that (except when they pulled the artillery in to protect Severodonetsk))
- recon with small drones and also attack with small drones as those are cheap, available an effective
- take HIMARS and other long range weapons to put pressure on logistics
- push toward Russian logistic hubs (Isum) or routes (bridges over the Dnipro in Kherson) so that they have no choice except to retreaut
That is your strategy. Use the tools were you are superior to the enemy to achieve the last point in the list.
- Push at Robotyne/Verbove: That is the railway line to Tokmak or east of it this point where the four railway lines come together
- Push near Staromaiorske: There the railway line is the most north west of Volnovakha and you can hit them with artillery over the river
(best visible to me on this map: https://liveuamap.com/)
The Russian strategy on the other hand is to keep the Ukrainians in the minefields, cause you can't ignore a mine as it will otherwise cause casualties, as this is the most favourable option for them to have a fight. That's why you are waiting now for three month for the breakthrough, which everybody in the western media reported is going to happen tomorrow for three month now because they need you to keep watching an klicking.
However, the Russians may be all the not nice things as described above, but they are still there and they are now far more than last year on a much narrower front. That takes time to overcome.
Coming to an end. Even if Razputiza is coming and the Ukrainians didn’t push through – they at least have an army. Their advantage is still their motivated light infantry with drone + artillery support. So they can continue mauling the Russian forces and do the mechanised breakthrough when it freezes.
Most important for Ukrainians is, that they will save as many lives of their soldiers as possible, cause that is important in a country where the lives of the citizens matters. And sorry to say, but that goal is not on the agenda of either NATO, the western media or anybody else - except Ukraine.
I hope that was of a little help.
Well its fairly obvious that they are trying to break through the defence line towards Tokmak, which is why the Russians are sending in more and more units. Resuming the attack on Novodonetske and Novomaiorske might be one of the only ways to redirect russ reinforcements away from the Tokmak axis.
It is depressing how difficult this war is proving though not surprising given Russian barbarism towards its own people and to Ukraine. It reminds me of the classic movie climax when the criminal is caught and then grabs and innocent person (usually some beautiful girl) and holds a gun to her head. "If I die, she dies! YAHAHA!!". Russia has no meaningful objective other than destruction. I hope Putin and all his supporters rot in hell.
Another anti-american bot.
Bridges from the Crimea to the mainland may be attacked by Storm Shadows. Do you know why we do not see any evidence of some Storm Shadows action in the last days?
I still do not understand why is everybody reporting 'no Storm Shadows'. OK, haven't checked 'really in-depth', the last week or so, but: AFAIK, Su-24s and Storm Shadows are in action, at least every 2-3 days.
Hope so. At least I have not read any spectacular news of Storm Shadows, like some bridges destroyed, etc.
AFAIK, they've targeted some other stuff instead.
I don’t think that bridges are a good target for this precious weapon. The Russian quickly build pontoon budges next to the damaged one and ZSU will need to keep them under constant fire to b effective, which wouldn’t have been a problem had they received thousands of them. Which again brings to the main problem - while Russia in engaged in total war of annihilation expanding arsenal prepared to fight the whole West (NATO+Sweden, Japan, etc), the aid Ukraine receives from the West is as if they fighting Saddam and his army, and even less.
I agree with the bridges part.
But Russia cannot fight the whole West, Putin knows it and is not making any preparation to do it. VSFR has withdrawn many units from borders with NATO, from islands nears Japan. Russia is just preparing to fight with maximum 1% of NATO countries GDP - the help to Ukraine has not even reached that 1%! If all NATO countries would donate just 2% of their GDP, then AFU could fly F-35s today.
All what Putin counts for is our comfortableness - softness in hit eyes.
Yes, the thing that needs most urgently to be destroyed in this war is the complacency and indifference of us in the "west" - our governments, and we the people
I have checked the Russian sources and the last Storm Shadow strike reported by them is from 14th August. I the same situation is on Ukrainian side. Before, these strikes were actually heavily publicised by both sides, that´s why so many people are asking.
Of course this doesn´t mean these strikes do not happen, but for nearly a month, there is zero oficial or photographical evidence for it, which is worth of noting.
they say a storm shadow hit that market in Konstantinivka
Not "they" but Russian propaganda exactly.
Röpcke and CIT?
I heard this yesterday from the "Good Russians".
The Russians say it was a HARM, not a Storm Shadow.
(Wich sounds a bit like a bullshit, because there was obviously a subsonic or transonic inbound - the passers-by hear it before the explosion - while HARM is a supersonic even on it's terminal phase. Actually IDK what it was, yet the official Ukrainian version of S-300/400 missile looks completely sound, with a clarification, that it wasn't actually an intentional terror strike, but just an infirmity of Russian GBAD, that tried again and again failed to shoot down a Ukrainian jet that made it's strike run near the town at the time. The missile, launched from the Belgorod area where S-300/400 divisions are deployed, just failed to find the jet, flew further, lost it's velocity and fell at the town.)
what about the pictures of the missile impact which look identical to that of a HARM?
Impact sites look nearly identical (without very close investigation) for the majority of missiles with a fragmentational warhead. S-300/400 missiles have fragmentational warheads too.
Good news :-)
ZSU didn’t enter Verbove. Outskirts yes. Center not yet.
There are videos showing them in the centre and the south, mate.
I didn’t see any video. But for sure it’s not real. Ready to bet that village is still under russians.
'There are none so blind as those who will not see. '
Delusion Class 101
You are right. The only difference between you and me: I work few km from V. You?;)
I am impressed that internet works so well from your bomb shelter :)
Getting to work daily must be difficult through the minefields and artillery shelling.
are u delusional? working next to V means this guy is a soldier.
Have you ever heard about Starlink?
Tom, can you say anything about the available Ukrainian reserves? Can Ukrainians support this level of pressure on russians for long time?
The Hill 166 never been captured. Yet.
I have seen a thumbnail for a YouTube video claiming that the Russians are planning a general mobilisation in September and might recruit 1,2 Million new troops. There is good reason to doubt it. So far Russia has rather given the impression that they'd prefer to freeze the conflict for the time being and rebuild their forces for another effort in a few years. But if they'd do a general mobilisation now, wouldn't that mean that the Ukraine effort to run down the Russian army was a wasted effort?
it is not only about soldier but also about equipment. Without heave guns they will be not able to fight effective. There will be less people to produce new weapons and their logistic will have problem to send them food not to speak about munition. We are not in ww2 time there you can attack just with small arms and to receive some success.
The numbers I saw was to mobilize 200 000 new conscripts.
Tom has several comments that essentially Russia's capacity is around 20k per month - that is the rate of converting "on paper" mobilized in to actual mobics on the frontline. Russia's upcoming mobilization isn't about increasing this rate it's about maintaining it. They should be running out of "on paper" mobilized around that time, so they need to refresh the "stock". But whether it's 200k or 2m doesn't matter - it's like pre-paying a montly subscription for 20k troops per month.
The previous (autumn 2022) mobilization allowed them to get enough recruits to both fill the front lines with a mass of barely trained (a week or so) soldiers and provide 3 month of training for a half of the newly mobilized personnel while the other half was being killed.
I've also read that but I'm inclined to believe it was more complicated than that:
1) I doubt they had the logistics to move half of the mobilized (150k) in 1-2 weeks, training or not
2) I doubt they had enough trainers to train the other half (150k) in 3 months time
Thus I'm inclined to believe a more balanced version of this story - that in the first 1-2 months they rushed as many untrained troops as their logistics could handle, while in the meatime setting up training for the ~20k per month figure mentioned by Tom
Thank you for the report.
I've been waiting for a while for the queue to finally "collapse" around Robotyne, but every time it seems like the time is right, they'll cram some units in again, but how long can this last? And if they don't, how far are Ukrainian forces capable of advancing? Apparently, progress in this direction is really paid in blood (where not).
So do you have any expectations in this direction? (I know! mainly, no expectations! because they are the closest shortcut to disappointment). But I'll just ask anyway - do you expect any major movement in this area anytime soon?
https://twitter.com/i/status/1699991198671270217
A new candidate for the turret tossing championship
Damn, even with such heavy loses RF seem to be able to send even more reinforcements. There was information that RF is creating new divisions with 203 mm arthilery. Do you think that could fix their counter battery problem and turn the tables of the arthilery war ?
I thought the 203 mm artillery is all 50 year old Soviet stuff that they do not make any more.
I could be wrong, I often am.
It was recovered from storage.
Hey Tom,
Two questions for you:
1). Are the Cubans being recruited by Russia making an appreciable battlefield difference? Given the medical training of Cuban medical professionals, I would assume that Russia is trying to recruit folk for battlefield medic deployment and not cannon fodder.
2). Given the percentage of people in the occupied oblasts that were supporting Russia in 2014, is there any indication as to whether the percentage of Russian supporters have changed since the invasion/counterattack? I'm just thinking that if Zelenskyy is able to repatriate all the oblasts/Crimea, that's great but if 80% of the people there are supporting Russia, is there any point to trying to retake those oblasts, I mean other than political statements to get support from other countries?
As a postscript, I think this may be a good opportunity for Finland to retake Karelia, but I also have opinions about Poland, Lithuania, and Kaliningrad...
There are many people who support Ukraine (otherwise what were all those torture chambers for?) on the occupied land. That somewhat differs for Crimea, however, 15% or so of its population are Tatars who are oppressed now (which is the reason for them to conduct guerilla operations there). Not to say of Jehovah Witnesses which are imprisoned in Russia.
Another point is Putin's dislike for the independent Ukraine, which was probably his main reason to invade it both in 2014 and in 2022. If his army is allowed to recover now, he will produce more artillery, MLRS, missiles and drones and will attack again in 5-7 years. Ukraine is not able to match the Russian military industry as its GDP is 10 or 15 times lower than that of Russia. Delaying the war now, when Ukraine is favored by the Russians' running headlong unprepared, is the surest recipe for a total defeat in the nearest future.
He does not really care about NATO. What did he do when Finland joined the alliance?
I don't think many Poles want to die in a foreign land. Whoever was eager to fight Russians joined the Ukrainian army.
Yup, I considered what you were saying (e.g., Russia using the Donbas, etc. as a stepping off point for further incursions after replenishing weapons platforms and such). That said, I return to my original question which is how much will Zelenskyy have to commit in resources, troops, money, weapons, etc. in order to keep an insurgent force, with the obvious connivance of Papa Vladimir Vladimirich, in check? And is it worth it in terms of defending attacks from the north, northeast, and south?
I also realize that as Ukraine was able to resist the initial invasion and began to push back into the occupied oblasts, many (or at least some number) of these types of people have already fled to Mother Russia. So, maybe the insurgency wouldn't be as much of an issue as it was post-2014/pre-2022?
It just seems to me that a lot of resources will be required to address the constant threat of rebellion, resources that could be use to greater effect elsewhere on the battlefield.
There are/were no insurgents. The 2014 rebellion:
1) Happened just after Kyiv removed Yanukovych who the Eastern Ukraine voted for. They were afraid of persecutions, probably listening to the same Russian propaganda ("Western Ukrainians are Nazi").
2) Was prepared and led by Girkin, a Russian FSB officer. Probably funded and supplied with weapons from Russia. That was possible because the border was weakly guarded, and the armed forces did not know which side to support, thus they did nothing.
3) Probably backed by the organized crime in those two regions (they say that Kharkiv criminals beat and sent away the propagandists, thus Kharkiv remained allied to Kyiv).
None of that points is valid now, and ordinary citizens:
a) Have seen to much war to want any more of that.
b) Many men were mobilized and did not return, to the extent that the local call their regions "Women People Republic". There is hardly anyone to rebel.
c) They have lived ruled by gangsters for 8 years, and now got Putin's dictatorship. The youth may want for more freedom, social lifts and the ability to travel abroad.
Thus I believe it will be enough to make sure the border with Russia is guarded. 80% of the population just live their lives. If the government is not extremely stupid (and Zelensky heavily relied on unifying people of Eastern and Western Ukraine in his electoral campaign, which brought him 70% of voices), it will not do anything to make those people very angry.
Crimea is another case, majority of population there are ethnic Russians. Making Russian and Tatar official regional languages is the way to go, IMO.
The trouble with Donbas is not about "stepping point", it is about the Russian morale and the legal status. If Russia is defeated, they will have to think twice before re-starting the war. If they win something, they will know that they are stronger, and will come back for the next bite. Exactly as it happened after they captured Crimea. And if Donbas is contested, they will always be able to claim more Ukrainian territory for their - as they have already written down to the Russian constitution that Kherson and Zaporizhzhia belong to Russia. The only way out now is for them to roll back the constitutional changes, but making so is a legal crime, namely "attack on integrity of Russian Federation". Thus, if there are contested lands, the war cannot stop.
@PeterL, excellent point.
Usually, cognitive dissonance is binary -- this and that, but both can't be true. Rarely, it is trinary -- this, that, or the other thing, but if any one of those things is true, then one or both of the other two cannot be true. However. Russia has broken new ground -- we're witnessing what may be the world's first example of four-way, quadruple cognitive dissonance -- a whole new level of insanity.
1. RUSSIA IS GREAT AND ALL-POWERFUL. The West must respect Russia as a great and powerful nation and must take measured steps or risk widening this war in ways that NATO cannot handle and does not wish to face at the hands of the Great Russian Army.
2. RUSSIA IS BEING BEATEN BACK BECAUSE IT IS FIGHTING NATO. The Russian army is having difficulty in Ukraine because they're actually fighting NATO in this war, not just Ukraine.
3. THE WEST IS LOSING PATIENCE WITH UKRAINE BECAUSE IT CANNOT DEFEAT RUSSIA ON ITS OWN. The West has lost faith in Ukraine and might cut off arms shipments -- why? Because Ukraine should be able to defeat the vastly weakened Russian army before tea time; because it cannot, this proves that Ukraine is weak, incompetent, and not deserving of Western support.
4. RUSSIA HAS YET TO COMMIT ITS FULL RESOURCES TO THIS WAR. Russia is holding back and has yet to use its best equipment and forces in this war -- a choice it makes for humanitarian reasons to avoid causing unnecessary Ukrainian civilian casualties.
Four-way cognitive dissonance! This is a historic breakthrough!!
Actually, this might be five-way -- Russian forces target Ukrainian civilians because the Ukrainians deserve it, they need to be beaten down and brought into line by the iron fist of Moscow....
Hi Tom,
Thanks for the update. One bit of info, I did not understand: you write the Ukrainian resistance caused trouble and as a result there are less checkpoints in occupied Ukraine. So checkpoints were attacked and blown away? That would then result in more freedom of movement for the resistance, resulting in more trouble for the k.cops right? So then I would expect the k.cops to react by creating more checkpoints, but they did not? Did they have no time/chance to do that yet? Or have they lost control of the inland? Or do I look at it wrongly?
Kind regards,
Wim
If you have 18 small checkpoints getting regularly raided and troops killed , what do you do? You concentrate the troops on fewer but bigger checkpoints able to defend against such raids to minimize losses. Yes, this gives the resistance more freedom of movement, but the alternative would be still maintaining 18 checkpoints and regularly losing troops. I think you are looking a little bit wrong at it, by assuming that Russia can freely choose their options. Instead they are pressed by Ukrainian resistance into a poorer choice.
More checkpoint also means more forces, you can have 18 small with 10 people, together 180 which will be often attacked with huge loses or 3 with 30 , also 90 togehter which are more secure and you can send 90 soldier to front. Russia has not enough troops to have 18 with 30 or maybe also 18 with 10 because they need more soldiers on frontline.
So, the offensive pessimists were right that this is a terminal battle of attrition, but they were wrong because the smaller country is winning. OK, in this one instance, with these respective combatants, I can almost credit it. When does the supply of "mobiks" from places like Dagestan run out and Putin has to go sending most of his pressgangs ever closer to the nerve centers of Moscow and Petersburg? It seems to me that's the only scenario in which Ukraine can destroy Russia's will to fight.
Don't you think F16s will change the situation with russian airstrikes by UMPK? And it's one of the main reasons Ukraine need them so much. 🤔
Based on Tom’s earlier analysis (a few days ago) the short answer would be no. But check out his postings this month and you will find his analysis on the effects of F16. (Not much, but a fighter jet is a fighter jet, Even 40 years old.)
I have seen his posts where he compare soviet era fighter jets with F-16 based on year of manufacturing. And i find it stupid, because those F-16 MLU Ukraine will get from Netherlands and Denmark were modernized in 2000s. They have modern radars and can use fire-and-forget AIM-120 missiles. Ukraine's main air-to-air missiles for Su-27 and Mig-29 is R-27 and it require target designation from the aircraft. The pilot must guide the missile all the way to the target and cannot immediately begin an evasive maneuver after launch. This makes him vulnerable and his work very dangerous, since russians have R-37 and R-77 missiles with an active homing head - fire-and-forget. That is the main advantage of 40 years old modernized F-16 under soviet era planes of the same age, which make the difference between them almost generational.
Tom was right that the most important thing Ukraine needs is artillery and AD though. The F16s will help as you've noted with more modern avionics, software and smarter longer range missiles. But core things like ground based artillery and ground based air defence, corrupt Western leaders have not yet provided in the needed quantities. These should be the focus until the demand is met. A single ATACMS missile can take out some nodes of an S-300/400 battery while an Su-24 or F16 is being armed to take out the AD site. Why have these been delayed? We have more ATACMS(publicly) Than Russia has medium to long range AD TELS and radars in Ukraine. So we need to send as much ground based artillery and AD systems and reorient our manufacturing to supply these demands then also look to provide F16s.
The thing is Su-35s and MiG-31 have modern AESA radars and active radar homing missiles, so "ceterus paribus", the F-16 MLU just exacerbates the stalemate with neither side gaining air superiority. F-16 MLU is not the big offset you'd get with say F-35 or F-22. (Gripen with Meteor would also outclass Su-35, not because it's stealth, but just because that system/combo is a more evolved 5th gen.)
"F-16 MLU just exacerbates the stalemate with neither side gaining air superiority." That's exactly what Ukraine need. We need to deprive the russians of their advantage in the air. And solve the problem of UMPC strykes. With Su-34, which are their carriers, the F-16 will definitely deal.
I dont know enough of the capabilities of the various planes to have a strong opinion. Ithink it is good that they are delivered, because a nyighter is better than no fighter. I also would prefer the Western countries to give more artillery, grenades etc. that is of course not mutually exclusive. Unfortunately it seems like everybody is looking for a gamechanger, a wunderwaffe, to beat Russia. That will not happen, but every bit help I suppose.