Ukraine War, 8 October 2023

Good evening everybody!

Thanks to attention of numerous self-declared ‘Israel-fans’ - who seem to be determined to maintain impression of themselves as the worst in blind racism, hatred, and all other sorts of dumbest extremism of our days - have been prevented from following developments in the war in Ukraine in my usual fashion. Certainly enough, Don’s Weekly is due soon, and it is going to provide the usual, comprehensive coverage. Thus, let me try to focus on few ‘neuralgic’ points of the frontline, this week.

AIR/MISSILE WARFARE

I’m delayed with the work on air warfare, so let me just mention the – me thinks – ‘biggest news’ of the week in this regards. Following the loss of two Su-35s (the Russians say: due to their own SAMs, but I have my doubts about that), the VKS re-deployed two squadrons from the 98^th Mixed Aviation Regiment from Monchegorsk to Balbek AB. Both are equipped with MiG-31BMs, which are now flying intensive combat air patrols over the occupied Crimea. Obviously, this is in reaction to continuous Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG strikes of the PSU: due to their higher operational altitude and higher maximums speed, MiG-31s are more likely to catch incoming Su-24s from longer ranges.

BATTLE OF DONBAS

Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremina… was relatively quiet - except for occasional blow-ups of Russian MBTs in the area between Svatove and Kremina (see the photo below, taken around 5 October).

That said, both sides brought in fresh units, especially the Russians, who now maintain a big artillery concentration behind this sector (some four artillery brigades, and two rocket artillery brigades).

The Russians seem to be back to the business of increasing their pressure along the Zherebets River, but I’m still receiving far too little info from that area but to be able to analyse in serious fashion. Except that there was a handsome video showing a spectacular blow-up of some T-90M - hit by an Ukrainian ATGM.

Bakhmut…. South… in the Klishchivka area, the Russians run a series of – reportedly: massive – counterattacks, early this week. All were repelled, and actually: Ukrainians managed to gain some ground. In the Andriivka area, Ukrainians also managed to continue their gradual advance (east of the railway berm).

Kurdyumivka…this was a week of fierce fighting, with Ukrainians refusing to get dragged into the fight for ruins of the village – even if the Russians are holding only its east. Instead, they’re flanking north of it – and, apparently, south of it, in the Ozarianivka area. That said, clearing the broken terrain north-east and east of Kurdyumivka and Zelenopilya….that’s likely to take some time, especially considering the Russians brought in the 51^st VDV Regiment to this sector.

UKRAINIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Generally… this was another week of heavy fighting in the triangle between Robotyne, Novoprokopivka, and Verbove, and I have a growing feeling that troops are getting seriously tired and are suffering ever additional shortages of equipment. The only thing really working ‘well’ there this and the last week was the ZSU artillery.

Thus, no surprise Ukrainians have lost some positions (quote: ‘two hedgerows’) north of Verbove, and didn’t manage any significant progress in Novoprokopivka or along the anti-tank ditches south-east of it. Just like some of ZSU troops, I remain fascinated by the Russians reserves: just when that damn Hill 166 was about to fall, this time they brought in the 387^th MRR to the battle. It was similar in the Kopani area, west of Robotyne: Ukrainians were in the process of gaining ground there, again, when the Russians returned the 810^th Naval Infantry ‘Brigade’ to the scene: sure, this is now actually little else but a battalion in terms of how few troops it still has, but the entire ‘game’ of finding and shooting them to pieces has to be started a new.  

A Leo 2 of the 47th Mech supporting troops in the Novoprokopivka area.

One thing I was asked about, several times this week – and I cannot explain, is the ZSU’s ‘unit politics’. ‘Old’, combat experienced brigades are fighting in the Bakhmut area for 5-6 months now, without being withdrawn for some rest and re-organisation. Even less so for re-equipment with Western equipment. All of this is going to ‘new’ units in the south – where the latest addition is the 14^th Chervona Kalyny Brigade (National Guard). There seems to be no intention to change this any time soon.

And amid all of that, different characters are spreading fake news about shortage of troops in the ZSU.

Now, no doubt: certain conclusions are based on heavy attrition of very specific units. Especially the number of wounded was large, this summer.

However - and actually - if the ZSU has ‘enough’ of anything, then of troops. It’s critically short on specific pieces of equipment (you know my usual list), ammo (mortar bombs), and night-vision equipment): but the ZSU being short on troops – that would be big news, alone because the force still has at least a dozen of brigades working up, or held in reserve.

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Thus, exactly what’s the reason for both such ‘personnel policy’ and unsubstantiated rumours…. sorry, no trace of clue.