Ukraine War, 6 June 2023
Hello everybody!
I guess, I’ve spent the last few days like many others: trying to figure out which way to look as first. And, there was a lot to see - even if there was relatively little making much sense to me. On the other hand, have had a few interesting chats with few, usually, very well-informed people.
Result? Well, here a ‘quick and dirty’ update with little analysis. This is to be followed by ‘much more’ in the coming days.
AIR/MISSILE WARFARE
On 1 June, around 02.45hrs local time, the Russians launched a total of (according to official Ukrainian sources), 7 Iskander-M and 3 Iskander-K ballistic/quasi-ballistic missiles from the Bryansk region, at Kyiv. Ukrainian air defences claimed all 10 as shot down, but, some of Ukrainians and of course all of the Russian social media eventually concluded: the Russians scored a ‘at least’ one hit on the building housing the headquarters of the GUR MO (Ukrainian military intelligence). Furthermore, at least three civilians were killed: reportedly, all by debris of downed Russian missiles – and then while trying to reach one of shelters… This is what happens when, tragically, missiles are as fast as Iskanders: not only that the situation with bomb shelters in Kyiv is already critical (because there are too few of these), but people simply cannot reach them on time.
The same evening, around 23.00hrs, the Russians attacked the Kyiv area with another stream of Shahed-131/136 LPGMs. This time, all came in from southern direction, along the Dnipro River. Ukrainians claimed 21 as shot down.
Around 03.00hrs on the morning of 2 June, these were followed by Kh-101s and Kh-555s released by Tu-95 bombers underway – as usually – over the Caspian Sea. This time, they entered the Ukrainian airspace from northern direction. Ukrainians claimed all 15 as shot down. Numerous persons were wounded by debris, several homes and cars damaged….
During the night from 3 to 4 June, the Russians released another stream of at least four Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles in direction of Odesa, and an unknown number of Shahed-131/136 from the direction of Bryansk. Air raid alerts were sounded in Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Cherkassy, and Khmelnytski. Ukrainians claimed all four cruise missiles and three of LPGMs for shot down, but two missiles are known to have hit (according to the Commander-in-Chief PSU) ‘an operational airfield outside Kropyvnytskyi’ (see: Kanatovo AB, few kilometres north-east of the town). Elsewhere, air raids were reported form the Poltava and Kyiv areas. That said, the heaviest hit was Dnipro – and especially Pidhorodne, one of its suburbs: this found itself on the receiving end of at least two ballistic missiles (reportedly: including one Iskander-K, and several S-300/S-400s): a 2-years-young-kid was killed and 22 people wounded…
Additionally, and as meanwhile usual, different places in Sumy and Kherson Oblasts have been exposed to repeated air- and artillery strikes over the last 4-5 days. Once again, too little is known about what exactly are the Russians targeting but to understand the purpose. Certain is only that a lots of places along the border between Russia and Ukraine, and behind the frontline inside Ukraine have been hit, the last few days. Between others, on 4 June, the Vovchansk area in Kharkiv Oblast was shelled, two civilians killed and three wounded (this was, probably, related to operations inside Russia, north of Vovchansk). On 5 June, the centre of Toretsk was hit by two MPK glided bombs (250kg): at least three were wounded. Further east, the Russians hit Balakleia – the fateful town known from the ZSU offensive of September the last year, and, supposedly, much beloved by the Russians – with a volley of BM-27 multiple rocket launchers. Killed at least one, and wounded nine other people… Late on 5 June, the Russians hit and damaged an ammonia pipeline in the Kupiansk district, depressurising it as result. Possible consequences are still under investigation.
Some analysis…
As nicely (and kindly) summarised in the article here, based on officially-released Ukrainian figures, during the month of May 2023, the Russians have unleashed more than 563 guided missiles and LPGMs on Ukraine, including:
- Kh-101/555 missiles: 114 (of which 106 were claimed as shot down)
- Kalibr missiles: 29 (of which 26 were claimed as shot down)
- Kinzhal missiles: 7 (of which all 7 were claimed as shot down)
- Iskander and S-400s: 16 (of which 16 were claimed as shot down)
- Kh-22: 5 (of which 5 were claimed as shot down)
- S-300s: 12 (of which 5 were claimed as shot down)
- Other/unidentified: 7 (of which 7 were claimed as shot down).
Because so many of US-citizens seem to be concerned about how are Ukrainian armed forces spending their taxpayer’s money, i.e. whether Ukrainians are ‘shooting with radar guided missiles at sparrows’ (i.e. wasting US-supplied SAMs on such targets like Shaheds): the answer is negative. Nope. Patriots are used for specific types of targets, foremost ballistic missiles. Also for reasons explained in my last report, there’s no sense in deploying them against ‘cheap’ stuff like Iranian-made ‘mopeds’ (i.e. Shaheds): these are countered by small-arms fire, machine guns, light flak, and MANPADs. Furthermore, from what I’ve got to hear from four different contacts meanwhile, modern-day MIM-104s are highly effective and even if the US doctrine still insists on firing two against every incoming missile, Ukrainians usually need just one to kill the target. Thus, nobody (in the West) needs to cry about the ‘cost’, nor try to argument about poor precision of Patriots using 30-years-old-sources of reference (those about the war for Kuwait, from 1991). Lots of water went down quite a few rivers ever since…
That said, the overall impression is unavoidable: since losing initiative on the ground, and getting nervous about the much-announced biiiiiiiiiiig Ukrainian counteroffensive, Russia is bombing Ukraine with all (conventional) means on hand. Despite significant success in defence, this isn’t good for the ZSU and the PSU. Not only that the Russians hit what looks like one major ammunition depot, and one major fuel depot, plus two different air bases, through the last week of May: but, they also hit dozens of – true or potential, that’s unclear – storage sites along the frontline. Foremost, through maintaining severe pressure upon the Ukrainian ‘rear’, the Russians are forcing the PSU to keep its air defences there – in the rear – instead where it matters to the Russians: along the frontline.
Here I cannot but repeat something I’ve explained repeatedly since late February last year: the VKS – the Russian Air-Space Force – is no ‘US Air Force East’. It is not fighting its own war, but its elements are subordinated to joint strategic commands, dominated by ground forces. As a result, the VSRF – and thus the VKS – is not overdependent on airborne radars, electronic warfare- and surveillance aircraft, or tanker aircraft – like Western-, and especially the US Air Force is. Putin and diverse of other Russian megalomaniacs might like PR-stunts like their Sukhoi Su-57 and Kinzhal and Iskander missiles and whatever else, but: when it comes to fighting a war, they do not need an air force with an ‘independent role’; they do not need equivalents to Boeing F-22s and Lockheed Martin F-35s; they do not even need more than 8-9 early warning radar aircraft.
They are using ‘other’ means to obtain sufficient situational awareness and combat results for what matters to Russia. Pay attention: for what matters to Russia. Not to Ukraine, and not to the West.
And what matters to Russia first and foremost is the situation on the frontline. Right now, this situation is ‘at least stabile’, definitely ‘under control’, if not ‘still slightly in the Russian favour’ (at least in some sectors) – and that regardless how nervous, even hysteric the Russian social media might be, and how boasting the Ukrainian and Western media is.
This is why the conclusion that the Russian missile strikes on Kyiv and other attacks on other parts of Ukraine well away from the frontline, have the principal aim of forcing the PSU to keep its ground-based air defences busy and concentrated ‘in the rear’, instead of being re-deployed ‘where they matter’: the frontline.
Of course, and additionally, in this fashion, the Russians are trying to pre-empt, delay, if not postpone the Ukrainian counteroffensive – foremost through strikes on different headquarters of the ZSU (which are never reported in Ukrainian media, and only sporadically in the Russian social media: here one example in form of a UMPK-strike on the HQ of one of battalions of the 92nd Mech, ZSU), on storage sties etc.
On the other hand… Ukrainians… actually, I’m (still) intending to get back to this topic to some more lenght. In this place, sufficient to say that through all of this time, the PSU and ZSU are trying to hit back upon Russia with all the means available. Foremost by Storm Shadows, but also HIMARS and MLRS, and then few other thingies. Just trying to track down all the reports about their missile and UAV-strikes inside Russia, or inside Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine the last 10-15 days… sorry, that’s near-hopeless. Thus, here just few examples. During the night from 3 to 4 June, several Ukrainian UAVs attacked the occupied Crimea: the Russians claimed five as shot down, and four others as brought down by electronic warfare systems.
Additionally, the PSU might have deployed some of its JDAMs to strike a selected building in (what was left of) Bakhmut (and that in cooperation with the 241st TD Brigade that, gauging by its actions in this area of the last 3-4 months, is causing the Russians far more problems than anybody would expect from ‘some Territorial Defence unit). Finally, the Russians reported the interception of a Tochka-U equipped with cluster warhead over the port of Bryansk.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Belgorod…
Yes, seems, I’ll have to maintain a ‘permanent rubric’ on this oblast in western Russia… To keep the long story short: things began heating up on 29 and 30 May, when Ukrainian artillery targeted several industrial objects, the main police station, and the main administrative building in Shebekino - a border town of about 40,000. All were set on fire, including the Monocrystal Factory (one of biggest factories of artificial sapphires in Russia; in turn, such sapphires are used in the electronic industry) – where the ZSU artillery torched a column of fuel bowsers of the VSRF. Immediately after, the GRU MO ‘unleashed its Russians’: the troops of the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) – reinforced by the ‘Polish Volunteer Corps’… Of course, official Moscow claimed all attacks were repelled by freshly deployed reinforcements, etc. Five days later, though, not only was most of the population of Shebekino evacuated, but also all of the population of this entire area (which, in turn, resulted in widespread looting - by the Russians): even the police all but disappeared from the streets.
Foremost, over the last two days fighting was reported all along a frontline of almost 250km, with the RDK, LSR and the Poles attacking, encircling, and sometimes already holding places like Mur, Nekhotivka, Zibrivka, Arkhangelsk, Nova Tavolzhanka, Shebekine, Rzhevka, Nezhgolsk and Voznesenivka, some of which are 10-15km deep inside Russia (‘just some 10,985km left…’). With other words, this is ‘slightly more than a raid’, and certainly including more than ‘two weak battalions of troops’, and its keeping the Russians on their toes…
Kupyansk-Svatove area…
Back on 29 May, the Russians – apparently in attempt to pre-empt an Ukrainian attack (perhaps this on the Shebekino area?) – attacked from the area north-east of Kupyansk and northwest of Svatove in direction of Kupyansk. Apparently, this operation lasted three days and did gain some ground north of Kupyansk, but elsewhere resulted in severe losses (especially Novoselivske was mentioned as ‘littered by Russian corpses’) and even the collapse of at least one of units staffed by convicts. Moreover, the 92nd Mech of the ZSU seems to have counterattacked and even gained some more ground than it held before this attack (at least the unit was openly praised in Ukrainian media).
Bakhmut…
Not sure even the ZSU is really ‘happy’ about the developments there. Essentially, and as well-known (and widely published), about two weeks ago, as the Wagner was in the process of securing the last corner of western Bakhmut, Ukrainians launched counterattacks north and south of the city. Sure, the assault of the 3rd Assautl Brigade almost caused a nervous breakdown to Prigozhin – because it mauled two companies of the Russian 72nd Motor Rifle, and then some. However, the II Battalion 56th Motor Brigade seems to have suffered significant losses (some 14-15 killed, up to 25 captured) while attacking north of the town. Moreover, the Russians then rushed so much artillery and reinforcements to the south, that even the 3rd Assault was eventually stopped before reaching Klishchivka (even if, apparently, recovering some of old positions ‘on that hill’ above the village)…..
Point is this: the VSRF has learned its lessons from the Ukrainian offensive in eastern Kharkiv of the last year, and nowadays is holding massive reinforcements well behind the frontline. Whenever there’s a crisis, selected units are alerted and rushed to counterattack. This is lessening the likelihood of just one battalion (or even less) of the ZSU punching through on a narrow sector and then collapsing an entire section of the frontline - like that happened in south-eastern Kharkiv, almost a year ago…
…which is bringing me to the final report of this update: the situation in southern Zaporizhzhya…
Since something like 36 hours, the Russians can’t stop reporting that the ZSU punched through their frontline and liberated Novodarivka and Nenudny. But, so they claim, they have then repelled this attack with heavy losses for Ukrainians. Moreover, the ZSU attack in the Velyka Novoselka should’ve been repelled in similar fashion. They’re ‘supporting’ such claims by pixelated videos supposedly shown about 10 different vehicles of the ZSU destroyed… (below some of resulting screen-grabs).
To the giant luck of Mother Russia, Moon and Mars - and all the Pudding-fans at home and abroad, of course - the Keystone Cops in Moscow (via the RIA.ru) claimed that nobody less than Saint Gerasimov was at the forward command post at the time of that attack and thus the situation was quickly stabilised: Ukrainians lost 100+ vehicles of different types, at least as many killed and whatever else. Because, you know, the Russians got so nervous about the Ukrainian counteroffensive, they’re holding their units on this sector of the frontline on permanent alert already since 30 May (at least): and because they expect Ukrainians to fail: they must fail….and what is better than to announce an enemy attack and then announce it for destroyed as soon as it began…
Now, at war, it’s almost like in lottery: ‘everything is possible’. Thus, it could be that something of this kind has happened.
It’s that itch in my small toe which is telling me it would be rather unreasonable for the ZSU to initiate its ‘biiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiig’ offensive by assaulting with such soft vehicles like MRAPs and M113s.
Why that, you ask? Well, that the latter are hopelessly obsolete nowadays, is no news. But, and foremost: MRAPs are no APCs. MRAP stands for ‘mine-resistant, ambush protected’ vehicle; not for ‘armoured personnel carrier’. That’s why MRAPs are MRAPs and no APCs…
….tragically, right now I’m not yet sure if Ukrainians have figured this out, on their own, and already long ago, or the US instructors for affairs of this kind have advised them correspondingly… or not. Like they did not in the case of lots of different other US allies around the world, the last 20 or so years….
With other wrds: we’ve got to be patient, wait and see…
any idea why belarusian volunteers are involved in raids in russia instead of belarus?
if it is no longer possible to store and accumulate, then they will use and apply - movement along the front has begun: everywhere, at the same time, everything cannot be bombed