Interesting developments. I hope the Ukrainians are able to cause serious losses in Robotyne. I get the impression from this information Russia may not have enough men and equipment to protect the rear areas after Ukraine breaks through past Novoprokopivka.
Troops: enough for another 2-3 weeks....which is why all Ukrainian strikes on the Russian supply-lines are so important: every dropped bridge, every disabled supply ship (including amphibious assault ships) is 'worth' at least one day less of fighting....
I posted this story a few days ago but the pictures are not convincing, needs a much closer view.
On the bridge topic there are photos circulating of octane95 price in Ukraine of over 60 roubles, it is claimed the average price in the last quarter was 52.
Watching the offensive going one step at a time I am only worried , that our (west) support might run out of ‘patience’, before Ukraine can reach their goals. Would you consider writing a piece on the ongoing weapons deliveries and the projection for the near future? Also - not having a good enough idea about Ukrainian losses fuels endless speculations how they are doing and whether they are running out of X (insert any relevant component or human resource).
Re. covering ongoing weapons deliveries: don't have enough info - and thus not enough understanding - for what's going on there. That said, the flow of heavy weapons seem to be 'down' to additional Bradleys and Leopard 1A5s, of which the latter are next to useless on the modern battlefield (at most, 'as useful as French AMX-10RCs quasi-tanks').
At least the flow of artillery ammo seems to be OK, even though because of emphasis on them, NATO forgot to continue sending mortar bombs, too...
Not yet, I'm afraid. The 58th CAA still has one fresh brigade (100th Reconnaissance), and the 5th CAA (right in the line from the 58th CAA), has the 58th CAA's 336th NIB as reserve.
Even if the 336th NIB was largely re-filled with sailors from warships, the 100th is quite a good outfit. And the Russians are working hard on sowing additional minefields along their 2nd Line of Defence.
I hope I'm wrong, but in my calculations, that's another 2-3 weeks of fighting.
In spite of everything I'd like to defend the impatient people (like myself). To my mind the impatience is not a token of ill will, but an expression of sincere concern.
Despite the adjusted and now pragmatic, intelligent, efficient and rather effective approach of the Ukrainian army, time remains a very crucial factor: If they can't get significant results before the time of the year will put a preliminary end to the offensive, all the achieved attritional effects will substantially fade, because the Russians will probably be capable of using the break to fix those shortcomings largely somehow.
But Ukrainians has no control over amount of weapons which was sent to them.
So you can re-phrase your sentence: "west sends amount of weapons (and timing) in a way that allows Ukrainians to advance with the speed which worries West of support".
I am a Westerner, so it's rather easy for me to talk this way from a certain distance. But I didn't want to sound arrogant or criticize the Ukrainian efforts, I simply want to understand what's going on and with such knowledge to be as positive and optimistic as Tom.
If the offensive is not mechanized, it can probably be also conducted through mud, especially as there are reports of undergrowth in the area (as the fields were not ploughed).
Thanks for the update. I had been waiting it, because I detected an increase in putinist BS in the media regarding the offensive (they call it “counteroffensive”) is stalled, and with great cost in ZSU casualties (personal and vehicles). The slow approach suits better to a (heavily) mined ground, IMHO.
Sadly, it's certain that ZSU units fighting in the Robotyne area are not as efficient as those fighting in the Bakhmut area. Thus, their losses are certainly 'unpleasant' - even if nowhere near being as heavy as those of the Russians south of them.
Is it too soon to compare current fighting in Zaporizhia with Kherson counteroffensive last year? It took some pretty heavy fighting from July until early October to "spend" most of Russian reserves. After that, their lines buckled and finally broke, and they had to retreat from the line of contact to their reserve positions, some 20-30 km back from initial frontline, and their full retreat was only a matter of time after that. Similar tempo would indicate culmination of Ukrainian offensive in about two months. Do Russian southern armies have the stamina to hold out until then?
Yup. With the note that 2 weeks into the ZSU offensive, it run out of artillery shells.... and that its commanders were far less experienced, and half the operation (the first half) was 'big chaos'.
Just a little nitpicking: "Zavitne and Bazhannya" are 2 words of the same name. "Zavetnoe Zhelanie" are the same 2 words in Russian. You can just call it Cherished Wish (that's what it means, and no, I've no idea who came up with an idea to call a village THAT). :)
Tom, Zavitne Bazhannya is the one village, not two.. and it is the same as Zavetnoe Zhelanie (name of in russian).. it is like Black forest and Schwarzwald..
Nope. Most of Separatist units were bleed to death already 5-6 months ago. They're still existent, but were declared a part of the VSRF and thus are re-filled with mobiks from Russia.
Thanks. Actually the articles is related to people in Donetsk and Luhansk but even then (and then more so if they do this in the other occupied territories) they are but monsters.
Ok, from this point of view you are completely right. I have hear story about getting out of enviroment of 3rd batallion and sublieutenant Zhelanov, which managed to save only 20 his men (he was commander of company). Putin awarded him with the order o the gold star
Sadly, the weather is not dry. It's hot and wet, i.e. humid. And unatended fields are growing thick weeds, which is making the de-mining yet more problematic....
Traditional warfare in this area included a tactical element of burning dry grass in July-August for multiple purposes: cut enemies supply lines, prevent movement, camo you own movements.
It was always a place of manuver warfare.
Not this year it seems, with a lot of rains. No dry grass ( or less then usual )
With Ukraine's latest hit on the Russian oil tanker Sig, they are trying to turn the Black Sea into a no-go area for Russian civilian ships.
I understand Russia's main grain exports are from the ports of Novorossiisk and Taman which are demonstrably in range of Ukraine's drones as are the occupied Ukraine ports.
There is also the fact that all ships have to pass through the Bosphorus which helps with targeting.
If Ukraine can bottle up Russian grain exports it might encourage Putin to rethink the grain deal.
Blocking Russian oil exports would also be useful, their Black sea ports are the Black Sea terminal of Sheskharis, near Novorossiisk, and around 150 Km away is Yuzhnaya Ozereevka.
This week, Michael Kofman has sounded pessimistic about the offensive on a podcast, arguing that UKR has made a strategic mistake in using experienced troops in Bakhmut for too long and is now stuck with western trained inexperienced brigades that can't break through RUS lines. On the other hand, Arty Green was more optimistic in an interview, saying UKR progess is not yet to be measured in km but in killed Russians, and by that measure UKR is very successful, and soon UKR could move to manoeuvre warfare. What are your thoughts on this?
Was it not the same guy pretending Ukrainians dont know nor could learn by themselves how to fight in complex "combined arms" operation and only Western training could teach it to selected Ukrainians brigades ?
Don't know if it's the same guy but, with regards to combined arms operations, after 1.5 years it is clear that whoever is doing the teaching and whoever is doing the learning, there is very little progress.
Or is so that people are putting all sort of phantasm on what "combined arms" means and forget to check the states of the different arms to begin with ?
I am sure the AFU operations would look differently if it had 600 Leopard 2, 250 5th gen fighter-jets and additional heavy artillery as well as a reliable supply of ammunitions. Ho and maybe 2 carriers with their planes so we could put the naval part into that "multi domain" combined arms nonsense.
Maybe the offensive would look differently if, god forbid, the AFU actually received effective mine-clearing systems in decent numbers.
But they dont. So the fight with the means they have. And it sure looks "combined" enough to me if you acknowledge the state of their inventory (and the absence of the highly expected Western lend-lease).
And yes, it is the same guy who claimed 2/3 weeks ago after a field trip that the AFU is going too slow because the AFU dont master "combined arms" operations. The same guy who claimed Russia would not invade in January 22, then Russia would win in 2/3 days, then Russia is not winning because it is not using its invincible BTG doctrine by the letter.
Michael Kofman is leaning towards giving as much ammo to Ukraine as possible and let them fight how they know, he is not a purist of combined arms or wishful believer in game changing wonder weapons, he’s always said that given time Russians adapt and learn from their bigger mistakes. He’s definitely conservative in his predictions and never underplays Russia, can talk openly about UA losses and failures but he is also no alarmist drama queen that overrates Russia, he is in general quite grounded and tries to only present facts and info that is available, instead of indulging in speculative gossip like many do.
His take on Bakhmut strategy is controversial and I don’t agree with it, but he is to me one of the most consistent Western analysts and commentators of this war, even if his methodology, background, and style are so different from Tom’s (and I sense Tom might not like him or his likes of), and sometimes their conclusions are opposite, I still consider them the 2 best sources and a good complement of point of views. There is also Perun YT channel, although he is more into summaries and background theory of grand topics than covering the latest tactical-level updates.
No, the point is the offensive wouldn't look any different if they had 600 leopard tanks and 250 fighter jets. Also, the VKS doesn't have 250 fighter jets available at any given time, at least not for striking operations.
Combined arms is not a complicated idea to understand. It is about coordinating different types of units and weapon systems all at the same time, at scale. This isn't a concept that a military person in antiquity wouldn't understand. The ZSU know very well what it is and are simply not capable of doing it. E.g they are incapable of coordinating artillery with a mechanised advance. Hence, they've been sequencing strikes, as Tom has reported multiple times. They are also incapable of coordinating more than a battalion or two at the same time. They fight with companies or even platoons. That's simply not how industrial warfare of developed countries has done it for at least 100 years, if you want to be generous.
Also, that shouldnt come as a surprise. You cannot do what you have not trained. The ZSU have not trained large scale, modern offensives. Pretending that the US, the UK or France wouldn't be able to pull it off is embarrassing. The ZSU is not a superior fighting force by top NATO standard. The ZSU are a mediocre 20th century army. No amount of equipment will magically change that, which does not mean that that equipment shouldn't be provided. All capabilities and ammo should be provided, en masse.
Mechanized advances are broken by mines and ATGM fired from hidden positions and helicopters. While the artillery does not have enough shells to destroy all the trees nearby. And the helicopters are out of range of air defense.
How does the NATO doctrine coordinate artillery with mechanized advance under such conditions?
If a few helis stop your entire heavy force advance it means your advance is at platoon or at most company level. Everything the ZSU does is slow. It takes hours before each phase begins. Even when they break the russian defence somewhere, they take so long to bring further units that the VSRF can just plug the gap. By the time the sappers demine a corridor and the mechanised units start moving, the place is remotely mined. Also, it is clear from the videos and reports that often the vulnerable demining equipment was sent completely unprotected. No smoke screens, no artillery cover. Nothing, just send the plows into a defended, dense minefield. The 47th is simply a bad brigade, badly led, badly trained. If 92nd or 93rd conducted the same operation, it would look differently. No clue if it would be successful but certainly fewer casualties and more russians killed.
Also, this constant talk of lack of shells is nonsensical. The ZSU had all the ammunition it wanted for the first 2 weeks of the offensive. Based on Tom's reports and Zelensky/Genstab statements, they planned a breakthrough operation to take a maximum of 2 weeks. They used the ammunition badly and changed their targetting tactics multiple times. If you change the way you conduct war over time, that is a sign of learning. If you change your tactics several times within a couple of weeks, then you dont know what you're doing.
Best NATO armies, that is the US, UK and France would perform much better with the same tools. Those professional armies are simply much better trained on every level, with possible exception of some small unit infantry tactics and drones. The efficiency of their logistics is incomparably better than anything the ZSU or VSRF can do. Compare operation serval with the kharkiv offensive, where the ZSU ran out of steam after just 100 km.
Interesting developments. I hope the Ukrainians are able to cause serious losses in Robotyne. I get the impression from this information Russia may not have enough men and equipment to protect the rear areas after Ukraine breaks through past Novoprokopivka.
Troops: enough for another 2-3 weeks....which is why all Ukrainian strikes on the Russian supply-lines are so important: every dropped bridge, every disabled supply ship (including amphibious assault ships) is 'worth' at least one day less of fighting....
Yup, the German Bundestag (Parliament) voted pro their delivery, this morning.
Re: bridge.
There's a Newsweek story based on an OSINT report that the Kerch rail bridge may have suffered damage in the second attack.
https://www.newsweek.com/satellite-photos-railway-damage-kerch-bridge-crimea-strike-attack-explosion-1817590
I posted this story a few days ago but the pictures are not convincing, needs a much closer view.
On the bridge topic there are photos circulating of octane95 price in Ukraine of over 60 roubles, it is claimed the average price in the last quarter was 52.
https://t.me/Crimeanwind/38687
Watching the offensive going one step at a time I am only worried , that our (west) support might run out of ‘patience’, before Ukraine can reach their goals. Would you consider writing a piece on the ongoing weapons deliveries and the projection for the near future? Also - not having a good enough idea about Ukrainian losses fuels endless speculations how they are doing and whether they are running out of X (insert any relevant component or human resource).
That's my principal worry, too.
Re. covering ongoing weapons deliveries: don't have enough info - and thus not enough understanding - for what's going on there. That said, the flow of heavy weapons seem to be 'down' to additional Bradleys and Leopard 1A5s, of which the latter are next to useless on the modern battlefield (at most, 'as useful as French AMX-10RCs quasi-tanks').
At least the flow of artillery ammo seems to be OK, even though because of emphasis on them, NATO forgot to continue sending mortar bombs, too...
Thank you. Let’s hope for some more abrupt changes, however unlikely these are.
Not yet, I'm afraid. The 58th CAA still has one fresh brigade (100th Reconnaissance), and the 5th CAA (right in the line from the 58th CAA), has the 58th CAA's 336th NIB as reserve.
Even if the 336th NIB was largely re-filled with sailors from warships, the 100th is quite a good outfit. And the Russians are working hard on sowing additional minefields along their 2nd Line of Defence.
I hope I'm wrong, but in my calculations, that's another 2-3 weeks of fighting.
Supplies. It's easier to keep them supplied there, than in southern Kherson and Zaporizhzhya.
In spite of everything I'd like to defend the impatient people (like myself). To my mind the impatience is not a token of ill will, but an expression of sincere concern.
Despite the adjusted and now pragmatic, intelligent, efficient and rather effective approach of the Ukrainian army, time remains a very crucial factor: If they can't get significant results before the time of the year will put a preliminary end to the offensive, all the achieved attritional effects will substantially fade, because the Russians will probably be capable of using the break to fix those shortcomings largely somehow.
But Ukrainians has no control over amount of weapons which was sent to them.
So you can re-phrase your sentence: "west sends amount of weapons (and timing) in a way that allows Ukrainians to advance with the speed which worries West of support".
I am a Westerner, so it's rather easy for me to talk this way from a certain distance. But I didn't want to sound arrogant or criticize the Ukrainian efforts, I simply want to understand what's going on and with such knowledge to be as positive and optimistic as Tom.
If the offensive is not mechanized, it can probably be also conducted through mud, especially as there are reports of undergrowth in the area (as the fields were not ploughed).
That's true, but after the desired break-through they need vehicles...
Nope.
The West supplied far too little for a 'faster' offensive. That's it. If they want the ZSU to advance faster, they must supply MUCH more.
Otherwise, they - or anybody else who thinks he/she can do it better - can always go there and demonstrate everybody how would they do it better.
Another good update. Thanks!
Thanks for the update. I had been waiting it, because I detected an increase in putinist BS in the media regarding the offensive (they call it “counteroffensive”) is stalled, and with great cost in ZSU casualties (personal and vehicles). The slow approach suits better to a (heavily) mined ground, IMHO.
Sadly, it's certain that ZSU units fighting in the Robotyne area are not as efficient as those fighting in the Bakhmut area. Thus, their losses are certainly 'unpleasant' - even if nowhere near being as heavy as those of the Russians south of them.
I’m thinking the same, but you know how PRBS farms work in RuZZia, and how the Putin-fanboys eat any piece of “cake” was served to them.
I'm preparing a 'discussion' of a comparable example from some 35 years ago....
Note: wait for the example in the foreseeable future. And many thanks for that!
Is it too soon to compare current fighting in Zaporizhia with Kherson counteroffensive last year? It took some pretty heavy fighting from July until early October to "spend" most of Russian reserves. After that, their lines buckled and finally broke, and they had to retreat from the line of contact to their reserve positions, some 20-30 km back from initial frontline, and their full retreat was only a matter of time after that. Similar tempo would indicate culmination of Ukrainian offensive in about two months. Do Russian southern armies have the stamina to hold out until then?
Yup. With the note that 2 weeks into the ZSU offensive, it run out of artillery shells.... and that its commanders were far less experienced, and half the operation (the first half) was 'big chaos'.
Artillery shells was not enough before offence 😉 and at the beginning
The terrain may be a factor of influence. It's said to be more open in the South.
Just a little nitpicking: "Zavitne and Bazhannya" are 2 words of the same name. "Zavetnoe Zhelanie" are the same 2 words in Russian. You can just call it Cherished Wish (that's what it means, and no, I've no idea who came up with an idea to call a village THAT). :)
Yup, in my usual rush, wasn't entirely sure about the name of the place, since info came from both sides....
That's yet another layer of sarcasm, to see the war destroying those villages with enthusiastic Soviet names.
Tom, Zavitne Bazhannya is the one village, not two.. and it is the same as Zavetnoe Zhelanie (name of in russian).. it is like Black forest and Schwarzwald..
What does this means -37th MRB (Urozhayne)
Guardian mekh ("cossak's") brigade from Kiakhta (Buryatia). 5th - is Buryat brigade as well, and it was best tank's unit in VSRF untill this winter
37th Motor Rifle Brigade.
The question is about the (Urozhayne) part. Are units getting filled by mobiks from Ukraine territories ?
Nope. Most of Separatist units were bleed to death already 5-6 months ago. They're still existent, but were declared a part of the VSRF and thus are re-filled with mobiks from Russia.
Is tere any idea if Ukrainians from occupied Zaporijya or Kherson are mobilized against the U. Army?
Some are. No idea how many, though.
There were reports that Russia mobilized 60 000 of Ukrainians from all over the occupied territories. https://kyivindependent.com/intelligence-russia-has-forcibly-mobilized-up-to-60-000-men-in-occupied-territories/
Thanks. Actually the articles is related to people in Donetsk and Luhansk but even then (and then more so if they do this in the other occupied territories) they are but monsters.
Urozhayne is a place where this unit is located/fighting.
Many thanks about your valuable information. Eager to know your opinion about the latest developments in maritime war.
"Fresh 37 mrb"?! This Buryat brigade is in position between Novodonetskoe and Urojainoe from early june, more them 2 months
I do not recall it suffering heavy losses (at least nothing comparable to 50-60% of units mentioned as 'battered/mauled').
Ok, from this point of view you are completely right. I have hear story about getting out of enviroment of 3rd batallion and sublieutenant Zhelanov, which managed to save only 20 his men (he was commander of company). Putin awarded him with the order o the gold star
Thank you, Tom. Slow and steady.
Let's hope dry weather would stay for longer...
Sadly, the weather is not dry. It's hot and wet, i.e. humid. And unatended fields are growing thick weeds, which is making the de-mining yet more problematic....
Traditional warfare in this area included a tactical element of burning dry grass in July-August for multiple purposes: cut enemies supply lines, prevent movement, camo you own movements.
It was always a place of manuver warfare.
Not this year it seems, with a lot of rains. No dry grass ( or less then usual )
There was the steppe, and now it's cut with treelines, that will stop fire.
Thank you.
Dear Tom, "Zavitne and Bazhannya" is actually one village, not two )
"Zavitne Bazhannya" translates to English as "Secret Wish".
In another paragraph you mentioned "Zavetnoe Zhelanie", which is the same village but no in Russian language (I guess you got it from Russian map).
....you're now the 4th or 5th to 'complain' about this so have reduced it to Zavitne.
Well, at least some prove that people are really reading what you are writing, Tom ;-)
Great Update! Short and directly the important notes!
With Ukraine's latest hit on the Russian oil tanker Sig, they are trying to turn the Black Sea into a no-go area for Russian civilian ships.
I understand Russia's main grain exports are from the ports of Novorossiisk and Taman which are demonstrably in range of Ukraine's drones as are the occupied Ukraine ports.
There is also the fact that all ships have to pass through the Bosphorus which helps with targeting.
If Ukraine can bottle up Russian grain exports it might encourage Putin to rethink the grain deal.
Blocking Russian oil exports would also be useful, their Black sea ports are the Black Sea terminal of Sheskharis, near Novorossiisk, and around 150 Km away is Yuzhnaya Ozereevka.
Hi Tom. Have you any information about Vasylivka, Luhove and other villages in this area?
A bit, yes. No time to pursue more info, though.
This week, Michael Kofman has sounded pessimistic about the offensive on a podcast, arguing that UKR has made a strategic mistake in using experienced troops in Bakhmut for too long and is now stuck with western trained inexperienced brigades that can't break through RUS lines. On the other hand, Arty Green was more optimistic in an interview, saying UKR progess is not yet to be measured in km but in killed Russians, and by that measure UKR is very successful, and soon UKR could move to manoeuvre warfare. What are your thoughts on this?
Was it not the same guy pretending Ukrainians dont know nor could learn by themselves how to fight in complex "combined arms" operation and only Western training could teach it to selected Ukrainians brigades ?
Don't know if it's the same guy but, with regards to combined arms operations, after 1.5 years it is clear that whoever is doing the teaching and whoever is doing the learning, there is very little progress.
Is it ?
Or is so that people are putting all sort of phantasm on what "combined arms" means and forget to check the states of the different arms to begin with ?
I am sure the AFU operations would look differently if it had 600 Leopard 2, 250 5th gen fighter-jets and additional heavy artillery as well as a reliable supply of ammunitions. Ho and maybe 2 carriers with their planes so we could put the naval part into that "multi domain" combined arms nonsense.
Maybe the offensive would look differently if, god forbid, the AFU actually received effective mine-clearing systems in decent numbers.
But they dont. So the fight with the means they have. And it sure looks "combined" enough to me if you acknowledge the state of their inventory (and the absence of the highly expected Western lend-lease).
And yes, it is the same guy who claimed 2/3 weeks ago after a field trip that the AFU is going too slow because the AFU dont master "combined arms" operations. The same guy who claimed Russia would not invade in January 22, then Russia would win in 2/3 days, then Russia is not winning because it is not using its invincible BTG doctrine by the letter.
Michael Kofman is leaning towards giving as much ammo to Ukraine as possible and let them fight how they know, he is not a purist of combined arms or wishful believer in game changing wonder weapons, he’s always said that given time Russians adapt and learn from their bigger mistakes. He’s definitely conservative in his predictions and never underplays Russia, can talk openly about UA losses and failures but he is also no alarmist drama queen that overrates Russia, he is in general quite grounded and tries to only present facts and info that is available, instead of indulging in speculative gossip like many do.
His take on Bakhmut strategy is controversial and I don’t agree with it, but he is to me one of the most consistent Western analysts and commentators of this war, even if his methodology, background, and style are so different from Tom’s (and I sense Tom might not like him or his likes of), and sometimes their conclusions are opposite, I still consider them the 2 best sources and a good complement of point of views. There is also Perun YT channel, although he is more into summaries and background theory of grand topics than covering the latest tactical-level updates.
Kofman did not in fact say any of that.
No, the point is the offensive wouldn't look any different if they had 600 leopard tanks and 250 fighter jets. Also, the VKS doesn't have 250 fighter jets available at any given time, at least not for striking operations.
Combined arms is not a complicated idea to understand. It is about coordinating different types of units and weapon systems all at the same time, at scale. This isn't a concept that a military person in antiquity wouldn't understand. The ZSU know very well what it is and are simply not capable of doing it. E.g they are incapable of coordinating artillery with a mechanised advance. Hence, they've been sequencing strikes, as Tom has reported multiple times. They are also incapable of coordinating more than a battalion or two at the same time. They fight with companies or even platoons. That's simply not how industrial warfare of developed countries has done it for at least 100 years, if you want to be generous.
Also, that shouldnt come as a surprise. You cannot do what you have not trained. The ZSU have not trained large scale, modern offensives. Pretending that the US, the UK or France wouldn't be able to pull it off is embarrassing. The ZSU is not a superior fighting force by top NATO standard. The ZSU are a mediocre 20th century army. No amount of equipment will magically change that, which does not mean that that equipment shouldn't be provided. All capabilities and ammo should be provided, en masse.
Mechanized advances are broken by mines and ATGM fired from hidden positions and helicopters. While the artillery does not have enough shells to destroy all the trees nearby. And the helicopters are out of range of air defense.
How does the NATO doctrine coordinate artillery with mechanized advance under such conditions?
If a few helis stop your entire heavy force advance it means your advance is at platoon or at most company level. Everything the ZSU does is slow. It takes hours before each phase begins. Even when they break the russian defence somewhere, they take so long to bring further units that the VSRF can just plug the gap. By the time the sappers demine a corridor and the mechanised units start moving, the place is remotely mined. Also, it is clear from the videos and reports that often the vulnerable demining equipment was sent completely unprotected. No smoke screens, no artillery cover. Nothing, just send the plows into a defended, dense minefield. The 47th is simply a bad brigade, badly led, badly trained. If 92nd or 93rd conducted the same operation, it would look differently. No clue if it would be successful but certainly fewer casualties and more russians killed.
Also, this constant talk of lack of shells is nonsensical. The ZSU had all the ammunition it wanted for the first 2 weeks of the offensive. Based on Tom's reports and Zelensky/Genstab statements, they planned a breakthrough operation to take a maximum of 2 weeks. They used the ammunition badly and changed their targetting tactics multiple times. If you change the way you conduct war over time, that is a sign of learning. If you change your tactics several times within a couple of weeks, then you dont know what you're doing.
Best NATO armies, that is the US, UK and France would perform much better with the same tools. Those professional armies are simply much better trained on every level, with possible exception of some small unit infantry tactics and drones. The efficiency of their logistics is incomparably better than anything the ZSU or VSRF can do. Compare operation serval with the kharkiv offensive, where the ZSU ran out of steam after just 100 km.