Ukraine War, 5 November 2023
A little bit telegraphic for this evening/morning, and focusing on an update on ground warfare of the last few days…
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremina… several Russian attacks were reported over the last few days, some of them quite large in size. None was seriously successful. Essentially, and as mentioned so often: the VSRF has lost its serious offensive capability. It still has got lots of troops and guns, though…
Robotine… few reports about renewed Ukrainian raids: lots of evidence for heavy Russian losses, but no indication of new advance. AFAIK, the terrain is muddy right now, so not much possible, actually.
Avdiivka….remains the Russian ‘Schwepunkt’: the last few days the VSRF run countless attacks, though without gaining any new ground. The ZSU did experience a few ‘crises’, but overcame all of them and pushed the Russians back to the eastern side of the railway berm north of the town. West of the town, all the Russian attacks on Tonenke and Severne were repelled, which is good news. A little bit more critical is the situation in northern Pervomaiskoe, but I think the ZSU will be able to solve that one. On 1 and 2 November, the ZSU run a local counterattack into the northern flank of the Russian offensive (approx. 3km north/north-west of Krasnohorivka), threatening to cut off the Russian supply lines – but: this didn’t change a lot in the overall situation. There are too many Russian troops around, and too little Ukrainian warheads and bullets for all of them.
Mariinka…like in the last autumn and winter, the Russians are back to attempting to ‘cut’ the corner in the frontlines in this part of Ukraine – and to drive the ZSU away from the crucial railway connection between Donetsk and Mariupol (this railway remains out of service, because it’s well within range of the ZSU artillery). As ‘successfully’ as the last autumn and winter…
Vuhledar…on 2 November, the Russians launched a major attack east of the town, but this was smashed by the 72nd Mech with heavy Russian loss (about 20 tanks and other armoured vehicles). Why this dissipation of (Russian) effort (away from Avdiivka to Mariinka and Vuhledar): no idea, but strategically, operationally, and tactically, this attack is not making any sense at all. To me, it would’ve made a lot more sense if the same VSRF units were deployed to bolster the effort in the Avdiivka area, regardless how pointless. Thus, I’m left without any other conclusion but: Pudding wants it, so be it…
Zaporizhzhya… there are days when I wouldn’t recommend certain ZSU officers to get anywhere near me. One such day was yesterday, when some…. idiot came to the idea to gather much of the 128th Mountain Assault in one spot, for the official celebration of the Day of Ukrainian Artillery, and distribution of decorations. Near Kmyshyvaha, within range of the Russian air-launched guided weapons…. Result: 22 killed, 53 wounded… 22 killed and 53 wounded…. I simply cannot believe this anymore: actually, nothing else but criminal stupidity. And belongs being punished correspondingly. To say I’m furious about this would be an understatement….and should I get to hear again that ‘this will be investigated after the war’….I better shut up now, or they’re going to ban me from this account too…
Dnipro…heavy fighting goes on as the ZSU is trying to connect the two bridgeheads (one in the Krynky area, and the other in the Pishchanivka-Poima area). RUMINT has it that Krynky is meanwhile completely free of the Russians, and that in the south Ukrainians have reached the crossing of E97 with T2206, but haven’t seen any evidence yet. he Russians are ‘a little bit in panic’, but still counterattacking, primarily from north-east. Notably: they seem to have ceased using tanks in this area: apparently suffered too many losses in October.
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Overall, having lost their offensive capability, the Russians are now – actually – down to holding what they can still hold. And since their armed forces are indoctrinated with ‘attack is the best defence’, they simply do not know anything better than to counterattack. No matter where, and no matter how much they lose. Even more so when commanded by Pudding.
If now the ZSU could get at least 90% of the stuff NATO promised to deliver ‘by this summer’…
Alas your report is in fact the only optimistic conclusion about the course of the war. Stupid political games in the USA and constant lamentation about dwarf operations in Israel leave little place for news from the battlefield in Ukraine. But nevertheless ZSU was able again to strike successfully the military plant in Kerch. Glory to ZSU!
Ukraine's Stratcom Center reported that the 128th Mtn Bde incident involved an Iskander; losing assembled infantry to LPGM is quite embarrassing. Mind you, this is pretty much what Russia was trying to accomplish in the Hroza missile attack, so blundering this way after that event is doubly embarrassing.
At some point we have to come to terms with the institutional weaknesses of the ZSU and the lack of training among the mass of soldiers. Ukraine received an absolutely adequate provision of ordnance to conduct ONE strategic offensive. The problem, as *so many* people have pointed out over and over, was that the level of quality and motivation among UFOR officers and troops is a little, but not substantially, better than the RuFOR average. And against a well-prepared and coordinated defense, one needs a lot more than a little.
2 months of training for conscripts (the reported average in the ZSU) is good enough for TDF militias a year ago, but it's not adequate for a shock corps. Several days of NATO "combined arms" training at the company or battalion level - what was actually provided to the "Western-equipped brigades" - was always going to be a joke on top of that. The Soviets knew plenty about combined arms. The Russians, for all their flaws, have been demonstrating better combined arms around Avdiivka than the Ukrainians almost ever have throughout the war. That Ukraine does not have the capacity to conduct proper wartime instruction to staff and enlisted in some form of iterated Soviet doctrine is exactly the glaring problem that NATO should have united in addressing 1.5 years ago. If one must invent some sort of dolchstosslegende, take it from that angle, not the myth that Ukraine was overall starved of equipment.
The proof is in the pudding. Throughout the war, the most rigorous casualty estimates keep putting the loss ratio in personnel between UFOR and RuFOR at around 1.5x in the former's favor, and perhaps the reverse when UFOR is attacking. But even before the summer campaign, we *knew*, could observe, that Russia and Ukraine typically converged on the same tactics and strategies - albeit Ukraine has much higher loss sensitivity and cautiousness. Similar militaries under similar constraints have achieved similar results, and we should fear that Ukraine will never succeed unless we identify what they truly need most. Getting that right matters for more than scoring points on the Internet.
Different results require a fundamental transformation of the responsible institutions. Not reinforcing past failure.